RE: Dual-Aspect Science
Scientists are part of the natural world, like elephants. Scientific
behaviour, like elephant behaviour, has invariants across the entire set of
scientific disciplines (humanity) as for elephanity(!) = elephants behaving
elephantly. Not many invariants, but a few. One of those is creativity, for
example. Not all are adopted well by all scientists. But there are
invariants to be found, even if they are not always adopted
Scientists are regularity in the natural world. There is absolutely no
reason why Scientific behaviour can't be expressed as a natural law like any
other law. Their behaviour is not that of a musician. Their behaviour is not
that of a tax accountant. Whatever their behaviour it is unique and can be
expressed as a basic minimal prescription, a statistic like and other
natural law.
I have constructed a prototype of what it may be like. The difference
between this law and all others is that it is implicit in scientists in that
unlike any other law of nature it has never been explicitly formulated, but
is passed on by mimicry. The complete set of all J+1 currently available
'laws of nature' (any paper in any scientific journal expressing empirical
results qualifies to go into this set) is:
T = {t0, t1 ..tN, .. tJ }
These are the laws of appearances, the T-aspect. The special law t0 is the
one for scientific behaviour. The status of these laws is as follows:
By acting 'as-if' t0 was literally driving the natural world you can predict
(statistically) the behaviour of a scientist.
By acting 'as-if' tx was literally driving the natural world you can predict
(statistically) the behaviour of those things that were used to formulate
tx. For example newton's 2nd law f = ma reformulated into the form of the
set T members would be one such law - this would enable a human to predict
the behaviour of mass m.
All the laws in the set T can be treated as beliefs necessary to drive
behaviour of a HUMAN in order that the natural world be predictable. They
say NOTHING about the actual underlying causal necessities of the natural
world. That claim cannot be made: there is no evidence. Novel Technology
proves the laws as predictive and therefore that the causal parent = the
human behaviour resulting from believing in the laws is adequate...remember
the laws are formulated with evidence of behaviour as presented by qualia
into the head of scientists. To the best of my ability the law t0 is as
follows:
==
tN =The natural world in < insert context> behaves as follows:
t0 =The natural world in behaves as follows: < to formulate statements of type tN,
each of which is a statementNote 1 of regularityNote 2 in a specific
contextNote 3 in the natural world arrived at through the process of
critical argumentNote 4 and that in principle can be refuted through the
process of experiencingNote 5 evidenceNote 6 of the regularity Note 7>.
I have embedded the notes down below. They don't matter much in what I am
trying to convey. Creativity is in them. Objectivity is in them.
Just like a thought about thinking is a member of the set of all possible
thoughts, the law t0 is a law of type tN about the formulation of laws of
type tN.
The set T does not have to be consistent. Different laws in set T can
contradict each other. That is they can be egregiously wrong outside their
context. The set T is growing exponentially day by day. Each member of set T
represents a net brain state (achieved during dynamic brain activity)
comprising the holding of a belief about the natural world by a scientist.
That is all that is claimed.
The property of the natural world that enables t0 is intrinsic (innate) to
brain material: the extraction of invariance from perceptual fields. The
accuracy of t0 is proven by observation of history in that it has been used
all along by scientists and can be seen to be in operation all along even
though any explicit t0 at any time could be very very wrong (it was never
written down until now)!
t0, as a 'law of science' is NOT 'scientific method'. Scientific method is
just detail inside the overall behaviour. This law t0 is novel. It is not in
science literature and it is not in philosophy literature and it is not in
anthropology literature.
Note that I have a second aspect T' ( a new set about underlying structure)
and the pair T and T' form the characterisation of science called dual
aspect. Set T and set T' are not claimed to 'be' the natural world, but
merely be 'about' it. Qualia as scientific evidence are evidence for both T
and T' equally. Natural laws in T' (future) will account for structures that
generate the qualia that are used to formulate the laws T. The system is
quite consistent and empirically backed throughout.
Cheers
Colin Hales
t0 Notes:
Please note that the detail included in these notes is not intended to be
complete or even appropriately configured. It is merely intended to be a
prototyp
RE: Dual-Aspect Science ooops
> I don't think there is a problem with science, but only with some
> scientist (and alas with those who are often more refer too in
> popularization).
>
> Actually I don't believe in any scientific field. I believe only in
> scientific attitude, which is almost just modesty, along with
> curiosity, and some amount of willingness to share.
>
> Science, defined as the fruit of that curious but modest attitude, can
> only go from doubt to more doubt. Despite a growing knowledge,
> ignorance grows quicker. This can be illustrated with the G and G*
> logic, but at this step, it would be useless technic. I will try to go
> back to the roadmap ...
>
Scientists are part of the natural world, like elephants. Scientific
behaviour, like elephant behaviour, has invariants across the entire set of
scientific disciplines (humanity) as for elephanity(!) = elephants behaving
elephantly. Not many invariants, but a few. One of those is creativity, of
which the aspects you speak are attributes and not all are adopted well by
all scientists, as you point out But there are invariants to be found,
even if they are not always adopted I have read piles of literature,
talked to many scientists. I sit in the midst of scientists every day all
day and see what they do. I swim in the literature.
Scientific behaviour can be expressed as a natural law like any other law. I
have constructed a prototype of what it may be like. The difference between
this law and all others is that it is implicit in scientists in that unlike
any other law of nature it has never been explicitly formulated, but is
passed on by mimicry. The complete set of all J+1 currently available 'laws
of nature' (any paper in any scientific journal expressing empirical results
qualifies to go into this set) is:
T = {t0, t1 ..tN, .. tJ } cut and paste error!
These are the laws of appearances, the T-aspect. The special law t0 is the
one for scientific behaviour. The status of these laws is as follows:
By acting 'as-if' t0 was literally driving the natural world you can predict
(statistically) the behaviour of a scientist.
By acting 'as-if' tx was literally driving the natural world you can predict
(statistically) the behaviour of those things that were used to formulate
tx. For example newton's 2nd law f = ma reformulated into the form of the
set T members would be one such law - this would enable a human to predict
the behaviour of mass m.
All the laws in the set T can be treated as beliefs necessary to drive
behaviour of a HUMAN in order that the natural world be predictable. They
say NOTHING about the actual underlying causal necessities of the natural
world. That claim cannot be made: there is no evidence. Novel Technology
proves the laws as predictive and therefore that the causal parent = the
human behaviour resulting from believing in the laws is adequate...remember
the laws are formulated with evidence of behaviour as presented by qualia
into the head of scientists. To the best of my ability the law t0 is as
follows:
tN =The natural world in < insert context> behaves as follows:
t0 =The natural world in behaves as follows: < to formulate statements of type tN,
each of which is a statementNote 1 of regularityNote 2 in a specific
contextNote 3 in the natural world arrived at through the process of
critical argumentNote 4 and that in principle can be refuted through the
process of experiencingNote 5 evidenceNote 6 of the regularity Note 7>.
Where I have embedded the notes down below. They don't matter much in what I
am trying to convey. Creativity is in them. Objectivity is in them.
Just like a thought about thinking is a member of the set of all possible
thoughts, the law t0 is a law of type tN about the formulation of laws of
type tN.
The set T does not have to be consistent. Different laws in set T can
contradict each other. That is they can be egregiously wrong outside their
context. The set T is growing exponentially day by day. Each member of set T
represents a net brain state (achieved during dynamic brain activity)
comprising the holding of a belief about the natural world by a scientist.
That is all that is claimed.
The property of the natural world that enables t0 is intrinsic (innate) to
brain material: the extraction of invariance from perceptual fields. The
accuracy of t0 is proven by observation of history in that it has been used
all along by scientists and can be seen to be in operation all along even
though any explicit t0 at any time could be very very wrong (it was never
written down until now)!
t0, as a 'law of science' is NOT 'scientific method'. Scientific method is
just detail inside the overall behaviour. This law t0 is novel. It is not in
science literature and it is not in philosophy literature and it is not in
anthropology literature.
Your characterisation of scientific behaviour is very romantic but it is not
scientific. It fails because it does not predict scientific behaviour in the
most basic wa
RE: Dual-Aspect Science
> I don't think there is a problem with science, but only with some
> scientist (and alas with those who are often more refer too in
> popularization).
>
> Actually I don't believe in any scientific field. I believe only in
> scientific attitude, which is almost just modesty, along with
> curiosity, and some amount of willingness to share.
>
> Science, defined as the fruit of that curious but modest attitude, can
> only go from doubt to more doubt. Despite a growing knowledge,
> ignorance grows quicker. This can be illustrated with the G and G*
> logic, but at this step, it would be useless technic. I will try to go
> back to the roadmap ...
>
Scientists are part of the natural world, like elephants. Scientific
behaviour, like elephant behaviour, has invariants across the entire set of
scientific disciplines (humanity) as for elephanity(!) = elephants behaving
elephantly. Not many invariants, but a few. One of those is creativity, of
which the aspects you speak are attributes and not all are adopted well by
all scientists, as you point out But there are invariants to be found,
even if they are not always adopted I have read piles of literature,
talked to many scientists. I sit in the midst of scientists every day all
day and see what they do. I swim in the literature.
Scientific behaviour can be expressed as a natural law like any other law. I
have constructed a prototype of what it may be like. The difference between
this law and all others is that it is implicit in scientists in that unlike
any other law of nature it has never been explicitly formulated, but is
passed on by mimicry. The complete set of all M+1 currently available 'laws
of nature' (any paper in any scientific journal expressing empirical results
qualifies to go into this set) is:
T = {t0, t1 ..tN, .. tJ, b1, b2, .bK ., bM }
These are the laws of appearances, the T-aspect. The special law t0 is the
one for scientific behaviour. The status of these laws is as follows:
By acting 'as-if' t0 was literally driving the natural world you can predict
(statistically) the behaviour of a scientist.
By acting 'as-if' tx was literally driving the natural world you can predict
(statistically) the behaviour of those things that were used to formulate
tx. For example newton's 2nd law f = ma reformulated into the form of the
set T members would be one such law - this would enable a human to predict
the behaviour of mass m.
All the laws in the set T can be treated as beliefs necessary to drive
behaviour of a HUMAN in order that the natural world be predictable. They
say NOTHING about the actual underlying causal necessities of the natural
world. That claim cannot be made: there is no evidence. Novel Technology
proves the laws as predictive and therefore that the causal parent = the
human behaviour resulting from believing in the laws is adequate...remember
the laws are formulated with evidence of behaviour as presented by qualia
into the head of scientists. To the best of my ability the law t0 is as
follows:
tN =The natural world in < insert context> behaves as follows:
t0 =The natural world in behaves as follows: < to formulate statements of type tN,
each of which is a statementNote 1 of regularityNote 2 in a specific
contextNote 3 in the natural world arrived at through the process of
critical argumentNote 4 and that in principle can be refuted through the
process of experiencingNote 5 evidenceNote 6 of the regularity Note 7>.
Where I have embedded the notes down below. They don't matter much in what I
am trying to convey. Creativity is in them. Objectivity is in them.
Just like a thought about thinking is a member of the set of all possible
thoughts, the law t0 is a law of type tN about the formulation of laws of
type tN.
The set T does not have to be consistent. Different laws in set T can
contradict each other. That is they can be egregiously wrong outside their
context. The set T is growing exponentially day by day. Each member of set T
represents a net brain state (achieved during dynamic brain activity)
comprising the holding of a belief about the natural world by a scientist.
That is all that is claimed.
The property of the natural world that enables t0 is intrinsic (innate) to
brain material: the extraction of invariance from perceptual fields. The
accuracy of t0 is proven by observation of history in that it has been used
all along by scientists and can be seen to be in operation all along even
though any explicit t0 at any time could be very very wrong (it was never
written down until now)!
t0, as a 'law of science' is NOT 'scientific method'. Scientific method is
just detail inside the overall behaviour. This law t0 is novel. It is not in
science literature and it is not in philosophy literature and it is not in
anthropology literature.
Your characterisation of scientific behaviour is very romantic but it is not
scientific. It fails because it does not predict scientific behaviour in the
most basic way:
RE: Dual-Aspect Science
>
> Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
> > Hi,
> > A lot of the dialog below is a mismatch of ideas which indicates that I
> > have underestimated the degree of difficulty to be expected in getting
> the
> If they are different substructures within a further (different)
> structure, they are also unified, in that sense and to that extent.
>
> The contentious claims here are:
> a) That being multiple instances of the same structure is the only
> way things can be "unified".
No there is only 1 structure. Within it are layers of members of different
classes of substructure. Space, Atoms. etc
>
> b) Things unified in that sense are devoid of any difference or
> separaration whatsoever.
They are 'difference' and 'separation' are not the same. The appearance of
separation is a physical claim. Imagine an ice-entity living in an ice-cube.
The rest of the ice cube looks like space. The ice entity can move around in
it freely. But they are made of the same (differently organised) stuff.
>
> > >> Absolutely everything is included in the
> > >> structure. No exceptions. Space, atoms, scientists, qualia. All
> > >> interactions at all 'scales' (scale itself) are all interactions
> between
> > >> different parts of the one structure. To interact at all is to
> interact
> > >> with another part of the structure.
> > >
> > > "another" in what sense ? You just said there is *no* concept
> > > of separation.
> >
> > eg. Matter passes through space. It is interacting with itself. Matter
> > 'looks' separate to space, but deep down its not. The appearance of
> > separateness is how it is presented to us.
>
> It is entirely possible that they are unified deep down and
> separate on the surface. Separation need not be dismissed
> as appearance.
Q. If you draw a surface boundary around a human what is inside it?
A. If 99,999,999,999,999,999,999 are space. We are the remaining 1 part.
We are all but not there.
There is a fundamental and intrinsically intimate connection between every
single little atomic nuance of us and space we inhabit. The atoms' mobility
within space is an act of cooperation between the atoms and the space they
inhabit through their joint 'parent' structure. There is no actual
separateness, only behavioural separateness.
>
> > >> The idea of there being anything else
> > >> ('not' the structure) is meaningless. If there is any 'thing' in the
> > >> structure then the balance of the structure expressed a perfect
> > >> un-thing.
> > >> There is nothing else. That is the coincept I am exploring.
> > >
> > > None of that has anything to do with your claim that there is
> > > a single *type* of structure, and that everything is composed of
> > > recursive combinations of its instances.
> > >
> > > It may be the case that everything is ultimately part of one
> strucutre,
> > > but
> > > that does not imply that everything within the Great Strucutre is
> > > self-similar.
> >
> > The structure is hierarchical layers of organisation only. Members of a
> > layer share morphological invariance to some characteristics of layer
> > layer. Properties are inherited by child layers from paretn layers. All
> > the layers are contained by each other.
>
> How very c++-ey.
>
> Do you have any evidence, or are you appelaing to the comfort
> zone of Sofware Engineers ?
I'm not appealing to any comfort zones. I'm trying to convey ideas in words
that people can follow and relate to. These concepts are well traveled and
explored and the principles can be easily applied to a 'theory of
everything'
>
>
> > >> Their presentation bestows intrinsic knowledge as a measurement to
> the
> > >> embedded structure member called the scientist. This is knowledge as
> > >> intrinsic intentionality.
> > >
> > > Are yu saying that qualia are marked by intentionality ?
> > > That would be novel.
> > >
> > > ",, qualia are intrinsic, consciously accessible, NON-INTENTIONAL
> > > features of sense-data and other non-physical phenomenal objects that
> > > are responsible for their phenomenal character."
> > >
> >
> > When we experience redness it is painted onto some'thing'.
>
> Not if it is adream or hallucination ,
This is simply internally generated qualia derived from memory rather than
sensory feed.
> or the result of pressing your eyeball.
This is a qualia generator mis-generating due to malfunctioning sensory
feed.
Neither of which actually change the argument at all. Machinery embeds
'aboutness', but it doesn't always have to be perfect or even right!
Mechanisms have normal and aberrant/pathological behaviour. Any cogent story
of qualia must account for both.
>
> You could just as well say the apparaent behaviour of the universe.
Yes. The universe literally can be the whole, single structure.
>
>
> > >> All of this is derived from a first person presentation of a
> > >> measurement.
> > >> Ergo science is entirely first operson based.
> > >
> > > The fact that science happens to be performed by persons
> > > doesn
Re: Dual-Aspect Science
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
> Hi,
> A lot of the dialog below is a mismatch of ideas which indicates that I
> have underestimated the degree of difficulty to be expected in getting the
> idea of hierarchical structures across. Nevetheless..
>
> >> I think you are assuming a separateness of structure that does not
> >> exist.
> >
> >
> > It obviously does exist , up to a point. I am separate form this
> > keyboard.
> > (and let's not confuse separateness and difference...)
>
> If space and matter (have a look at the cover of this weeks NewScientist)
> are different expressions of a single structure then you and space are
> unified.
If they are different substructures within a further (different)
struture,
they are also unified, in that sense and to that extent.
The contentious claims here are:
a) That being multiple instances of the same structure is the only
way things can be "unified".
b) Things unified in that sense are devoid of any difference or
separaration
whatsoever.
> It is that unification that is at the heart of qualia production,
> for qualia result as another feature of the underlying structure.
> >> There is one and one only structure.
> >
> > If you want ot look at it that way. But it is no
> > undifferentiated within itself.
>
> Looking at it like that is the only way that makes any sense.
So you say. You have not said anythign at all about what
makes the alternatives nonsensical.
> >> We are all part of it. There is no
> >> concept of 'separate' to be had.
> >
> > yes there is: spatial separation.
>
> See above.
Doesn't address the point.
> >> Absolutely everything is included in the
> >> structure. No exceptions. Space, atoms, scientists, qualia. All
> >> interactions at all 'scales' (scale itself) are all interactions between
> >> different parts of the one structure. To interact at all is to interact
> >> with another part of the structure.
> >
> > "another" in what sense ? You just said there is *no* concept
> > of separation.
>
> eg. Matter passes through space. It is interacting with itself. Matter
> 'looks' separate to space, but deep down its not. The appearance of
> separateness is how it is presented to us.
It is entirely possible that they are unified deep down and
separate on the surface. Separation need not be dismissed
as appearance.
> >> The idea of there being anything else
> >> ('not' the structure) is meaningless. If there is any 'thing' in the
> >> structure then the balance of the structure expressed a perfect
> >> un-thing.
> >> There is nothing else. That is the coincept I am exploring.
> >
> > None of that has anything to do with your claim that there is
> > a single *type* of structure, and that everything is composed of
> > recursive combinations of its instances.
> >
> > It may be the case that everything is ultimately part of one strucutre,
> > but
> > that does not imply that everything within the Great Strucutre is
> > self-similar.
>
> The structure is hierarchical layers of organisation only. Members of a
> layer share morphological invariance to some characteristics of layer
> layer. Properties are inherited by child layers from paretn layers. All
> the layers are contained by each other.
How very c++-ey.
Do you have any evidence, or are you appelaing to the comfort
zone of Sofware Engineers ?
> >> Their presentation bestows intrinsic knowledge as a measurement to the
> >> embedded structure member called the scientist. This is knowledge as
> >> intrinsic intentionality.
> >
> > Are yu saying that qualia are marked by intentionality ?
> > That would be novel.
> >
> > ",, qualia are intrinsic, consciously accessible, NON-INTENTIONAL
> > features of sense-data and other non-physical phenomenal objects that
> > are responsible for their phenomenal character."
> >
>
> When we experience redness it is painted onto some'thing'.
Not if it is adream or hallucination ,
or the
result of pressing your eyeball.
> In _use_ it has
> intrinsic 'aboutness'.
Then that comes from the use, not the quale.
> In themselves they have none. At the instance of
> their creation they acquire intentionality _because_ they are meant for
> that very purpose - to inform 'aboutness'...That is the distinction I
> think useful.
> > S.E.P, my emphasis.
> >
> >> Within the experiences is regularity which can
> >> then be characterised as knowledge attributed to some identified
> >> behaviour
> >> in the structure. This attribution is only an attribution as to
> >> behaviour
> >> of the structure, not the structure. These attributions can be used by a
> >> another scientist in their 'first person' world.
> >
> > I still think "strcuture" is an unhappy term for soemthign which
> > cannot be reduced to abstract relations and behaviour.
>
> The structure can be abstracted and studied. But what you do is simulate
> it, not abstract it in the traditional sense, except to characterise the
> rules of the simulation and let them run. For example, one of the
> structural
Re: Dual-Aspect Science
Le 17-août-06, à 00:17, Colin Geoffrey Hales a écrit : > I'm after a real practical > outcome. A recognition that science is mis-structured and we have to > change. And sooner rather than later! > I don't think there is a problem with science, but only with some scientist (and alas with those who are often more refer too in popularization). Actually I don't believe in any scientific field. I believe only in scientific attitude, which is almost just modesty, along with curiosity, and some amount of willingness to share. Science, defined as the fruit of that curious but modest attitude, can only go from doubt to more doubt. Despite a growing knowledge, ignorance grows quicker. This can be illustrated with the G and G* logic, but at this step, it would be useless technic. I will try to go back to the roadmap ... Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Dual-Aspect Science
Hi,
A lot of the dialog below is a mismatch of ideas which indicates that I
have underestimated the degree of difficulty to be expected in getting the
idea of hierarchical structures across. Nevetheless..
>> I think you are assuming a separateness of structure that does not
>> exist.
>
>
> It obviously does exist , up to a point. I am separate form this
> keyboard.
> (and let's not confuse separateness and difference...)
If space and matter (have a look at the cover of this weeks NewScientist)
are different expressions of a single structure then you and space are
unified. It is that unification that is at the heart of qualia production,
for qualia result as another feature of the underlying structure.
>
>> There is one and one only structure.
>
> If you want ot look at it that way. But it is no
> undifferentiated within itself.
Looking at it like that is the only way that makes any sense.
>
>> We are all part of it. There is no
>> concept of 'separate' to be had.
>
> yes there is: spatial separation.
See above.
>
>> Absolutely everything is included in the
>> structure. No exceptions. Space, atoms, scientists, qualia. All
>> interactions at all 'scales' (scale itself) are all interactions between
>> different parts of the one structure. To interact at all is to interact
>> with another part of the structure.
>
> "another" in what sense ? You just said there is *no* concept
> of separation.
eg. Matter passes through space. It is interacting with itself. Matter
'looks' separate to space, but deep down its not. The appearance of
separateness is how it is presented to us.
>
>> The idea of there being anything else
>> ('not' the structure) is meaningless. If there is any 'thing' in the
>> structure then the balance of the structure expressed a perfect
>> un-thing.
>> There is nothing else. That is the coincept I am exploring.
>
> None of that has anything to do with your claim that there is
> a single *type* of structure, and that everything is composed of
> recursive combinations of its instances.
>
> It may be the case that everything is ultimately part of one strucutre,
> but
> that does not imply that everything within the Great Strucutre is
> self-similar.
The structure is hierarchical layers of organisation only. Members of a
layer share morphological invariance to some characteristics of layer
layer. Properties are inherited by child layers from paretn layers. All
the layers are contained by each other.
>
>> >
>> >> Note that we don't actually have to know what S(.) is to make a whole
>> pile
>> >> of observations of properties of organisations of it that apply
>> regardless
>> >> of the particular S(.). It may be we never actually get to sort out
>> the
>> specifics of S(.)! (I have an idea, but it doesn't matter from the
>> point
>> >> of
>> >> view of understanding qualia as another property of the structure
>> like
>> atoms).
>> >
>> >> In Bruno's terms the structure of S(.) is what he calls 'objective
>> reality'.
>> >> I would say that in science the first person view has primacy.
>> >
>> > Epistemic or Ontic ?
>>
>> These are just words invented by members of the structure.
>
> So is "structure".
>
> That wasn't a problem before, why should it be now.
>
>> But I'll try.
>> The structure delivers qualia in the first person. Those qualia are
>> quite
>> valid 'things' (virtual matter)..organisation/behaviour of structure.
>
> Qualia are not ust organisation and behaviour, or there
> would be no hard problem.
I think the confusion here is between oganisation and behaviour of the
_structure_ (one of which is qualia) on contrast with the
organisation/behaviour of the things presented to us _by_ qualia.
>
>> Their presentation bestows intrinsic knowledge as a measurement to the
>> embedded structure member called the scientist. This is knowledge as
>> intrinsic intentionality.
>
> Are yu saying that qualia are marked by intentionality ?
> That would be novel.
>
> ",, qualia are intrinsic, consciously accessible, NON-INTENTIONAL
> features of sense-data and other non-physical phenomenal objects that
> are responsible for their phenomenal character."
>
When we experience redness it is painted onto some'thing'. In _use_ it has
intrinsic 'aboutness'. In themselves they have none. At the instance of
their creation they acquire intentionality _because_ they are meant for
that very purpose - to inform 'aboutness'...That is the distinction I
think useful.
> S.E.P, my emphasis.
>
>> Within the experiences is regularity which can
>> then be characterised as knowledge attributed to some identified
>> behaviour
>> in the structure. This attribution is only an attribution as to
>> behaviour
>> of the structure, not the structure. These attributions can be used by a
>> another scientist in their 'first person' world.
>
> I still think "strcuture" is an unhappy term for soemthign which
> cannot be reduced to abstract relations and behaviour.
The structure can be abstracted and studied. But what you
Re: Dual-Aspect Science (a spawn of the roadmap)
Le 15-août-06, à 21:09, David Nyman a écrit : > > Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> 1), 2), 3), 4) are theorem in the comp theory. Note that the >> zero-person "point of view" will appear also to be unnameable. Names >> emerges through the third person pint of view. > > I'm beginning to see that, unnameability apart, it's the 'indexicality' > of the zero-person point of view that you are reluctant to concede. I > press you elsewhere on the 'reality' of the number realm. My essential > point is that I assert the necessary reality of 'indexical David', but > since I am a merely a 'lens' of the totality - the zero-person point of > view, the 'gestalt' - then my claim is subsumed in the logically prior > claim on indexical existence of that point of view - i.e. its necessary > reality. OK (as far as I understand you). > Hence in logic, if necessary reality is to be postulated as > deriving from something more 'fundamental', then this must a fortori > have a logically prior claim on such necessity. If we claim this > reality to be the number realm, are we not merely conceding it such > necessity through logical force majeure? This is unclear. i don't figure out what you are trying to say. You will have opportunity to explain this. No need to comment directly (but you can of course). > > Yours in ontic realism Really? :) Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Dual-Aspect Science
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
> LZ:
> >
> >
> > Colin Hales wrote:
> >
>
> >
> >>The underlying structure unifies the whole
> >> system. Of course you'll get some impact via the causality of the
> structurevia the deep structure right down into the very fabric of
> space.
> >> In a very real way the existence of 'mysterious observer dependence' is
> actually proof that the hierarchically organised S(.) structure idea
> must be
> >> somewhere near the answer.
> >
> > Not really. You can have a two-way causal interdependene between two
> systems without them both having th esame structure.
>
> I think you are assuming a separateness of structure that does not exist.
It obviously does exist , up to a point. I am separate form this
keyboard.
(and let's not confuse separateness and difference...)
> There is one and one only structure.
If you want ot look at it that way. But it is no
undifferentiated within itself.
> We are all part of it. There is no
> concept of 'separate' to be had.
yes there is: spatial separation.
> Absolutely everything is included in the
> structure. No exceptions. Space, atoms, scientists, qualia. All
> interactions at all 'scales' (scale itself) are all interactions between
> different parts of the one structure. To interact at all is to interact
> with another part of the structure.
"another" in what sense ? You just said there is *no* concept
of separation.
> The idea of there being anything else
> ('not' the structure) is meaningless. If there is any 'thing' in the
> structure then the balance of the structure expressed a perfect un-thing.
> There is nothing else. That is the coincept I am exploring.
None of that has anything to do with your claim that there is
a single *type* of structure, and that everything is composed of
recursive combinations of its instances.
It may be the case that everything is ultimately part of one strucutre,
but
that does not imply that everything within the Great Strucutre is
self-similar.
> >
> >> Note that we don't actually have to know what S(.) is to make a whole pile
> >> of observations of properties of organisations of it that apply regardless
> >> of the particular S(.). It may be we never actually get to sort out the
> specifics of S(.)! (I have an idea, but it doesn't matter from the
> point
> >> of
> >> view of understanding qualia as another property of the structure like
> atoms).
> >
> >> In Bruno's terms the structure of S(.) is what he calls 'objective
> reality'.
> >> I would say that in science the first person view has primacy.
> >
> > Epistemic or Ontic ?
>
> These are just words invented by members of the structure.
So is "structure".
That wasn't a problem before, why should it be now.
> But I'll try.
> The structure delivers qualia in the first person. Those qualia are quite
> valid 'things' (virtual matter)..organisation/behaviour of structure.
Qualia are not ust organisation and behaviour, or there
would be no hard problem.
> Their presentation bestows intrinsic knowledge as a measurement to the
> embedded structure member called the scientist. This is knowledge as
> intrinsic intentionality.
Are yu saying that qualia are marked by intentionality ?
That would be novel.
",, qualia are intrinsic, consciously accessible, NON-INTENTIONAL
features of sense-data and other non-physical phenomenal objects that
are responsible for their phenomenal character."
S.E.P, my emphasis.
> Within the experiences is regularity which can
> then be characterised as knowledge attributed to some identified behaviour
> in the structure. This attribution is only an attribution as to behaviour
> of the structure, not the structure. These attributions can be used by a
> another scientist in their 'first person' world.
I still think "strcuture" is an unhappy term for soemthign which
cannot be reduced to abstract relations and behaviour.
> All of this is derived from a first person presentation of a measurement.
> Ergo science is entirely first operson based.
The fact that science happens to be performed by persons
doesn't make it irreducibly first-personal. That would
depend on whether persons can remove themselves from
scientific descriptions. As it happens they can. That
is still true with much-misunderstood issue of
quantum "observer" involvement, since
that is really apparatus-involvement. No observer
ever influenced an experiment without changing the settings of some
apparatus.
> Epistemic and Ontic
> characters are smatter throughout this description. I could label them all
> but you already know and the process adds nothing to the message or to
> sorting out how it all works.
> >> I'd say that
> >> we formulate abstractions that correlate with agreed appearances within
> the
> >> first person view. However, the correspo0ndence between the underlying
> structure and the formulate abstractions is only that - a correlation.
> Our
> >> models are not the structure.
> >
> > *Could* they be the structure ? if it necessaril
RE: Dual-Aspect Science
LZ:
>
>
> Colin Hales wrote:
>
>
>>The underlying structure unifies the
whole system. Of course you'll
>>get some impact via the causality of the
structurevia the deep structure right down into
the very fabric of space.
>> In a very real way the existence of
'mysterious observer dependence'
>> is
actually proof that the hierarchically organised S(.)
structure idea must be
>> somewhere near the answer.
>
> Not really. You can have a two-way causal
interdependene between two
systems without them both having th esame structure.
I think you are assuming a separateness of structure
that does not exist.
There is one and one only structure. We are all part
of it. There is no concept of 'separate' to be had. Absolutely everything is
included in the structure. No exceptions. Space, atoms, scientists, qualia. All
interactions at all 'scales' (scale itself) are all interactions between
different parts of the one structure. To interact at all is to interact with
another part of the structure. The idea of there being anything else ('not' the
structure) is meaningless. If there is any 'thing' in the structure then the
balance of the structure expressed a perfect un-thing.
There is nothing else. That is the coincept I am
exploring.
>
>> Note that we don't actually have to know what
S(.) is to make a whole
>> pile of observations of properties of
organisations of it that apply
>> regardless of the particular S(.). It may be
we never actually get to
>> sort out the
specifics of S(.)! (I have an idea, but it doesn't
matter from the point
>> of
>> view of understanding qualia as another
property of the structure
>> like
atoms).
>
>> In Bruno's terms the structure of S(.) is
what he calls 'objective
reality'.
>> I would say that in science the first person
view has primacy.
>
> Epistemic or Ontic ?
These are just words invented by members of the
structure. But I'll try.
The structure delivers qualia in the first person.
Those qualia are quite valid 'things' (virtual matter)..organisation/behaviour
of structure.
Their presentation bestows intrinsic knowledge as a
measurement to the embedded structure member called the scientist. This is
knowledge as intrinsic intentionality. Within the experiences is regularity
which can then be characterised as knowledge attributed to some identified
behaviour in the structure. This attribution is only an attribution as to
behaviour of the structure, not the structure. These attributions can be used
by a another scientist in their 'first person' world.
All of this is derived from a first person
presentation of a measurement.
Ergo science is entirely first operson based.
Epistemic and Ontic characters are smatter throughout this description. I could
label them all but you already know and the process adds nothing to the message
or to sorting out how it all works.
>
>> I'd say that
>> we formulate abstractions that correlate with
agreed appearances
>> within
the
>> first person view. However, the
correspo0ndence between the
>> underlying
structure and the formulate abstractions is only that
- a correlation.
Our
>> models are not the structure.
>
> *Could* they be the structure ? if it necessarily
the case that the
> "structure" cannot be modelled, then it
is perhaps no strcuture at
> all.
>
Which is the simpler and more reasonable basis upon
which to explore the
universe:
1) The universe is literally constructed by some sort
of 'empirical_law_in_ a_certain_context embodiment machine' by means unknown
that has appearances (qualia as 1st person perception) that cannot
be predicted by empirical laws driving the machine, yet are clearly implemented
by the machine. (logically equivalent to "the laws of nature are invoked
by the purple balloon people of the horsehead nebula").
or
2) The universe is a structure of which we are a part
and which also has the property of delivering appearances of itself to us
within which is regularity that can be captured mathematically as empirical
laws. By considering universes of structure capable of delivering appearances
we can then insist that the structures appearances thus delivered shall also deliver
appearances that would lead us to formulate regularity as empirical laws when
made of it... this 2-sided equation with qualia the linking/unifying/central/prime
feature is dual aspect science.
Parsimony is in 2), not 1).
>
>> Yesall these things rely on perceptual
mechanisms which will
never...repeat...never...be found in quantum
mechanicsnor any other depiction of appearances.
>
> Why not ?
Continuing right along: sorry
QM is an appearance. Trying to explain appearance with
appearance is like trying to telephone somebody a telephone (or maybe fax a
real fax machine down the line). It doesn’t make sense. If you want to
figure out how the phone works then you have to start thinking about the things
that com
Re: Dual-Aspect Science
LZ:
>
>
> Colin Hales wrote:
>
>
>>The underlying structure unifies the whole
>> system. Of course you'll get some impact via the causality of the
structurevia the deep structure right down into the very fabric of
space.
>> In a very real way the existence of 'mysterious observer dependence' is
actually proof that the hierarchically organised S(.) structure idea
must be
>> somewhere near the answer.
>
> Not really. You can have a two-way causal interdependene between two
systems without them both having th esame structure.
I think you are assuming a separateness of structure that does not exist.
There is one and one only structure. We are all part of it. There is no
concept of 'separate' to be had. Absolutely everything is included in the
structure. No exceptions. Space, atoms, scientists, qualia. All
interactions at all 'scales' (scale itself) are all interactions between
different parts of the one structure. To interact at all is to interact
with another part of the structure. The idea of there being anything else
('not' the structure) is meaningless. If there is any 'thing' in the
structure then the balance of the structure expressed a perfect un-thing.
There is nothing else. That is the coincept I am exploring.
>
>> Note that we don't actually have to know what S(.) is to make a whole pile
>> of observations of properties of organisations of it that apply regardless
>> of the particular S(.). It may be we never actually get to sort out the
specifics of S(.)! (I have an idea, but it doesn't matter from the
point
>> of
>> view of understanding qualia as another property of the structure like
atoms).
>
>> In Bruno's terms the structure of S(.) is what he calls 'objective
reality'.
>> I would say that in science the first person view has primacy.
>
> Epistemic or Ontic ?
These are just words invented by members of the structure. But I'll try.
The structure delivers qualia in the first person. Those qualia are quite
valid 'things' (virtual matter)..organisation/behaviour of structure.
Their presentation bestows intrinsic knowledge as a measurement to the
embedded structure member called the scientist. This is knowledge as
intrinsic intentionality. Within the experiences is regularity which can
then be characterised as knowledge attributed to some identified behaviour
in the structure. This attribution is only an attribution as to behaviour
of the structure, not the structure. These attributions can be used by a
another scientist in their 'first person' world.
All of this is derived from a first person presentation of a measurement.
Ergo science is entirely first operson based. Epistemic and Ontic
characters are smatter throughout this description. I could label them all
but you already know and the process adds nothing to the message or to
sorting out how it all works.
>
>> I'd say that
>> we formulate abstractions that correlate with agreed appearances within
the
>> first person view. However, the correspo0ndence between the underlying
structure and the formulate abstractions is only that - a correlation.
Our
>> models are not the structure.
>
> *Could* they be the structure ? if it necessarily
> the case that the "structure" cannot be modelled, then
> it is perhaps no strcuture at all.
>
Which is the simpler and more reasonable basis upon which to explore the
universe:
1) The universe is literally constructed by some sort of
'empirical_law_in_ a_certain_context embodiment machine' by means unknown
that has appearances that cannot be predicted by empirical laws.
(logically equivalent to "the laws of nature are invoked by the purple
baloon people of the horsehead nebula")
or
2) The universe is a structure of which we are a part and which also has
the property of delivering appearances of itself to us within which is
regularity that can be captured mathematically.
>
>> Yesall these things rely on perceptual mechanisms which will
never...repeat...never...be found in quantum mechanicsnor any other
depiction of appearances.
>
> Why not ?
out of time!!!
colin
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Re: Dual-Aspect Science
David Nyman: > > Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: > >> Perspectival Ubiquity >> From the perspective of any one instance of S(.) within the structure, no >> matter how huge and complex it is, there is a 'perspective' view of any other point in the structure. That 'view' is the view that is 'as-if' you >> walked all the way down to the bottom of the hierarchy to a common ancestor (parent) S(.) element and then walked all the way up the structure to the S(.) that you are viewing from wherever you were. This is >> a direct causal chain. Connected/organised S(.) literally are >> causality/causal chains. >> This property is inherent or intrinsic or innate to any structure of S(.), >> regardless of the details of S(.). I posit that this 'visibility', or at >> least the potential for it, is fundamental to the generation of qualia. > > Yes, good language. 'This visibility, or at least the potential for it', is the heart of my intuitions about the primacy of the 1st-person - i.e. 'I' am an indexical lens on a manifestly/ ubiqitously/ > unmediatedly/ relflexively/ revealingly behaving 1st-person gestalt (badly needs abbreviating, but all the adverbs are required). > OK. Let's go with this explanation for the 'potential' for a view as instrinsic to the structure. Remember: in this model of reality one organisation of S(.) is space, another and atom, another a scientist inclusive of yet another called qualia. All the same. >> If one S(.) has some sort of proto-experience, then cohorts of S(.) acting >> coherently will combine their proto-experiences in the manner of the collective behaviour of the cohort. >> Having arrived at this point we have said nothing about the nature of "what it is like" i.e. that the visibility thus conferred has any particular quality to it..light, sound, taste and so on. You can imagine >> this is being cohorts of S(.) behaving in different ways for different subjective qualities. > > Yes, this is in essence what I've been trying to express in my dialogue with Peter, where I've used 'structure' as the static equivalent of 'behaviour'. He doesn't believe that qualia have this aspect of > structure or behaviour, and I'm not sure how debatable this is > indexically, but IMO it's strongly suggested by experiential > correlation with physical processes. I think Peter's blockage may be the usual...difficulty imagining how space and matter can be differently organised collections of the same primitive. When any 'matter' behaves at the top of the hierarchy it drages the entire hierarchy with it. At some deep layer space and the matter become an expression of a common parent. Imagine making a universe out of lots of identical elastic bands. You'd have to make structure for a) space and then structures called b) matter that can move around in it. The only way you could do this is by inventing some sort of common parent structure that enables a) to move around inside b) naturally. What would elastic band qualia look like? Imagine how you would contrive an elastic band qualia in an elastic band scientist. > The fundamental > 'what-it's-likeness' of cohorts (or modalities) of qualia is > incommunicable, though not incommensurable, because they are the instantiation of information, not information itself, which is > abstracted from their structural/ behavioural relations. This primary representation appears analogically (i.e. what it's *like*) with digital-ness a second-order derivation (using analogic qualia as bits). My simplified language for this would be that qualia are simply a measurement spoken into your head by the structure. All qualia are 'about' the rest of the structure. The measurement does not have to be accurate. It merely has to be repeatable. Lets say we see an omnidirectional field of redness when in the presence of an elephant. This is our perception of elephantness. Have we correctly depicted an elephant in any way? Nope. It's 100% innacurate in that regard. Are we able to know conclusively we are in the presence of an elephant? Absolutely. What is important is that in the above weird universe of perception we would not call the experience redness. We'd call it 'elephantness'. This experience is our entire and only reality. The production of 'elephantness' qualia is the only reality owned by the perceiver. The issue of the intrinsic privacy of that measurement is irrelevant to this. The issue of intentionality - the 'aboutness' of the experience - as to whether it applies to 'self' or 'not-self', is merely one of organisation. I could look at my hand and get a 'redness' field. It's up to me to somehow discriminate my hand from an elephant. More/different qualia are needed...and so on. > >> B) The structure expresses a quale. The structure behaves quale-ly. From >> the perspective of being the structure that does this behaviour quale-ness >> is experienced. In the direction of the quale is perceived a >> 'perspective >> view' of character 'qualeness'. (tough language, this!) This
Re: Dual-Aspect Science
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: > Perspectival Ubiquity > From the perspective of any one instance of S(.) within the structure, no > matter how huge and complex it is, there is a 'perspective' view of any > other point in the structure. That 'view' is the view that is 'as-if' you > walked all the way down to the bottom of the hierarchy to a common > ancestor (parent) S(.) element and then walked all the way up the > structure to the S(.) that you are viewing from wherever you were. This is > a direct causal chain. Connected/organised S(.) literally are > causality/causal chains. > > This property is inherent or intrinsic or innate to any structure of S(.), > regardless of the details of S(.). I posit that this 'visibility', or at > least the potential for it, is fundamental to the generation of qualia. Yes, good language. 'This visibility, or at least the potential for it', is the heart of my intuitions about the primacy of the 1st-person - i.e. 'I' am an indexical lens on a manifestly/ ubiqitously/ unmediatedly/ relflexively/ revealingly behaving 1st-person gestalt (badly needs abbreviating, but all the adverbs are required). > If one S(.) has some sort of proto-experience, then cohorts of S(.) acting > coherently will combine their proto-experiences in the manner of the > collective behaviour of the cohort. > > Having arrived at this point we have said nothing about the nature of > "what it is like" i.e. that the visibility thus conferred has any > particular quality to it..light, sound, taste and so on. You can imagine > this is being cohorts of S(.) behaving in different ways for different > subjective qualities. Yes, this is in essence what I've been trying to express in my dialogue with Peter, where I've used 'structure' as the static equivalent of 'behaviour'. He doesn't believe that qualia have this aspect of structure or behaviour, and I'm not sure how debatable this is indexically, but IMO it's strongly suggested by experiential correlation with physical processes. The fundamental 'what-it's-likeness' of cohorts (or modalities) of qualia is incommunicable, though not incommensurable, because they are the instantiation of information, not information itself, which is abstracted from their structural/ behavioural relations. This primary representation appears analogically (i.e. what it's *like*) with digital-ness a second-order derivation (using analogic qualia as bits). > B) The structure expresses a quale. The structure behaves quale-ly. From > the perspective of being the structure that does this behaviour quale-ness > is experienced. In the direction of the quale is perceived a 'perspective > view' of character 'qualeness'. (tough language, this!) This is 'matter' > but has intentionality. It is intrinsically 'about' something elsewhere. Yes, this reiterates the point about analogy or metaphor. Language is rooted in metaphor, and the 'what-is-it-like?' regression has to originate somewhere. This point of origin is the 'like this!' character of 'qualeness'. David > David Nyman: > > > > Colin Hales wrote: > > > >> There is no dualism here. The simplest solution is a monism of a > posited > >> structural primitive, say, S(.). The universe is a structure of > organised > >> S(.). One type and one type only. The structure itself is simply and > necessarily a hierarchically organised massive collection of S(.). In this > >> hierarchy the behaviour that generates appearances and that which does > not > >> are indistinguishable. The whole question changes to one of visibility. > > > > Absolutely. > > > >> Make sense? I'll keep saying this until it sinks in. Somebody other > than > >> me > >> has to see this! > > > > Yes, it makes a lot of sense, and reminds me of long hours over the > decades struggling to visualise how various 'observer perspectives' would > map in detail to my 1st-person experience (a career in software > engineering also presents many opportunities for meditative waiting!) > 'Saving the appearances' was my point of departure, because it seemed to > be mostly ignored in standard theoretical treatments, apparently in > pursuit of some mirage of methodological 'rigour' - myopia, it seemed to > me. Also, all those 'quantum collapse' notions involving 'the observer' > seemed to be blind to the fact that this seemingly > > influential chap was simply a non-isolatable element of the network of > interacting information under 'observation'. > > > > My question about observing from the perspective of the 'gestalt' (maybe > this isn't the best word) was posed in this spirit. That is, each one of > my list of 'observables' makes sense to me from this perspective, but not > from that of a classical 'nameable' 1st person. QM/MW is just one way to > conceptualise the structural/ behavioural aspects of this, but my starting > point is: given these experiences, 'from what experiential perspective > would the situation look, feel, sound, taste, smell, like this?' And the > answer always seems
Re: Dual-Aspect Science (a spawn of the roadmap)
Bruno Marchal wrote: > 1), 2), 3), 4) are theorem in the comp theory. Note that the > zero-person "point of view" will appear also to be unnameable. Names > emerges through the third person pint of view. I'm beginning to see that, unnameability apart, it's the 'indexicality' of the zero-person point of view that you are reluctant to concede. I press you elsewhere on the 'reality' of the number realm. My essential point is that I assert the necessary reality of 'indexical David', but since I am a merely a 'lens' of the totality - the zero-person point of view, the 'gestalt' - then my claim is subsumed in the logically prior claim on indexical existence of that point of view - i.e. its necessary reality. Hence in logic, if necessary reality is to be postulated as deriving from something more 'fundamental', then this must a fortori have a logically prior claim on such necessity. If we claim this reality to be the number realm, are we not merely conceding it such necessity through logical force majeure? Yours in ontic realism David > Le 14-août-06, à 01:04, David Nyman a écrit : > > > There is another aspect, which I've been musing about again since my > > most recent exchanges with Peter. This is that if one is to take > > seriously (and I do) 'structural' or 'block' views such as MWI, it > > seems to me that whatever is behaving 'perceivingly', '1st-personally', > > or 'subjectly' (gawd!) is the gestalt, not any particular abstraction > > therefrom. It seems to me that this is necessary to yield: > > > > 1) The unnameability of the 1st-person (i.e. 'this observer situation') > > 2) The consequential validity (?) of any probability calculus of > > observer situations > > 3) The dynamic quality of time as experienced (i.e. contrast between > > 'figure' and 'ground') > > 4) Meta-experiential layering - e.g. 'coherent histories' of observer > > situations > > > > Any views on this? > > 1), 2), 3), 4) are theorem in the comp theory. Note that the > zero-person "point of view" will appear also to be unnameable. Names > emerges through the third person pint of view. > > Bruno > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Dual-Aspect Science
Colin Hales wrote: > Think about it...When you put the scientist back inside the picture, the > measurement process (qualia) that literally are qualia is directly causally > linked to the appearance you get! The scientist has never been separate in that sense. The question is *how* qualia are causally produced, or rather, how they can emerge from structure. >The underlying structure unifies the whole > system. Of course you'll get some impact via the causality of the > structurevia the deep structure right down into the very fabric of > space. > > In a very real way the existence of 'mysterious observer dependence' is > actually proof that the hierarchically organised S(.) structure idea must be > somewhere near the answer. Not really. You can have a two-way causal interdependene between two systems without them both having th esame structure. > Note that we don't actually have to know what S(.) is to make a whole pile > of observations of properties of organisations of it that apply regardless > of the particular S(.). It may be we never actually get to sort out the > specifics of S(.)! (I have an idea, but it doesn't matter from the point of > view of understanding qualia as another property of the structure like > atoms). > In Bruno's terms the structure of S(.) is what he calls 'objective reality'. > I would say that in science the first person view has primacy. Epistemic or Ontic ? > I'd say that > we formulate abstractions that correlate with agreed appearances within the > first person view. However, the correspo0ndence between the underlying > structure and the formulate abstractions is only that - a correlation. Our > models are not the structure. *Could* they be the structure ? if it necessarily the case that the "structure" cannot be modelled, then it is perhaps no strcuture at all. > Yesall these things rely on perceptual mechanisms which will > never...repeat...never...be found in quantum mechanicsnor any other > depiction of appearances. Why not ? --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Dual-Aspect Science (a spawn of the roadmap)
Le 14-août-06, à 01:04, David Nyman a écrit : > There is another aspect, which I've been musing about again since my > most recent exchanges with Peter. This is that if one is to take > seriously (and I do) 'structural' or 'block' views such as MWI, it > seems to me that whatever is behaving 'perceivingly', '1st-personally', > or 'subjectly' (gawd!) is the gestalt, not any particular abstraction > therefrom. It seems to me that this is necessary to yield: > > 1) The unnameability of the 1st-person (i.e. 'this observer situation') > 2) The consequential validity (?) of any probability calculus of > observer situations > 3) The dynamic quality of time as experienced (i.e. contrast between > 'figure' and 'ground') > 4) Meta-experiential layering - e.g. 'coherent histories' of observer > situations > > Any views on this? 1), 2), 3), 4) are theorem in the comp theory. Note that the zero-person "point of view" will appear also to be unnameable. Names emerges through the third person pint of view. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Dual-Aspect Science
David Nyman: > > Colin Hales wrote: > >> There is no dualism here. The simplest solution is a monism of a posited >> structural primitive, say, S(.). The universe is a structure of organised >> S(.). One type and one type only. The structure itself is simply and necessarily a hierarchically organised massive collection of S(.). In this >> hierarchy the behaviour that generates appearances and that which does not >> are indistinguishable. The whole question changes to one of visibility. > > Absolutely. > >> Make sense? I'll keep saying this until it sinks in. Somebody other than >> me >> has to see this! > > Yes, it makes a lot of sense, and reminds me of long hours over the decades struggling to visualise how various 'observer perspectives' would map in detail to my 1st-person experience (a career in software engineering also presents many opportunities for meditative waiting!) 'Saving the appearances' was my point of departure, because it seemed to be mostly ignored in standard theoretical treatments, apparently in pursuit of some mirage of methodological 'rigour' - myopia, it seemed to me. Also, all those 'quantum collapse' notions involving 'the observer' seemed to be blind to the fact that this seemingly > influential chap was simply a non-isolatable element of the network of interacting information under 'observation'. > > My question about observing from the perspective of the 'gestalt' (maybe this isn't the best word) was posed in this spirit. That is, each one of my list of 'observables' makes sense to me from this perspective, but not from that of a classical 'nameable' 1st person. QM/MW is just one way to conceptualise the structural/ behavioural aspects of this, but my starting point is: given these experiences, 'from what experiential perspective would the situation look, feel, sound, taste, smell, like this?' And the answer always seems to be 'from the point of view of the universe, delimited by these information horizons.' This for me is the fundamental 1st-person perspective. > > David > How about this: When you have a hierarchical structure of a single posited primitive there is a fundamental property that is inherent in the structure as a whole. This is as follows: Perspectival Ubiquity >From the perspective of any one instance of S(.) within the structure, no matter how huge and complex it is, there is a 'perspective' view of any other point in the structure. That 'view' is the view that is 'as-if' you walked all the way down to the bottom of the hierarchy to a common ancestor (parent) S(.) element and then walked all the way up the structure to the S(.) that you are viewing from wherever you were. This is a direct causal chain. Connected/organised S(.) literally are causality/causal chains. This property is inherent or intrinsic or innate to any structure of S(.), regardless of the details of S(.). I posit that this 'visibility', or at least the potential for it, is fundamental to the generation of qualia. === Additivity If one S(.) has some sort of proto-experience, then cohorts of S(.) acting coherently will combine their proto-experiences in the manner of the collective behaviour of the cohort. Having arrived at this point we have said nothing about the nature of "what it is like" i.e. that the visibility thus conferred has any particular quality to it..light, sound, taste and so on. You can imagine this is being cohorts of S(.) behaving in different ways for different subjective qualities. = Here we have at least the basics of the production of a quale. There are a raft of other issues before you can locate these things in brain material. But at least the hierarchical structures have these innate possibilities. = Now consider this: A) The structure expresses an atom (a subset of collaborating S(.) behaves atom-ly). The structure is not 'about' an atom. It 'is' an atom. Contrast this with: B) The structure expresses a quale. The structure behaves quale-ly. From the perspective of being the structure that does this behaviour quale-ness is experienced. In the direction of the quale is perceived a 'perspective view' of character 'qualeness'. (tough language, this!) This is 'matter' but has intentionality. It is intrinsically 'about' something elsewhere. = We easily recognise A as being matter. Q1. What would we recognise as B? A1. It is not matter in the sense we know it. I'd call it 'virtual matter'. From the point of view of being the structure behaving quale-ly, it is acting 'as-if' some other part of the structure interacted with it. More than that the interaction is transient. The structure has to repeatedly behave as if interacting with the selected other part of the structure. This suggests repetitious behaviour of matter will be associated with the arrival of virtual matter. == So you can see that with simple about the nature of hierarchical structure
Re: Dual-Aspect Science
Colin Hales wrote: > There is no dualism here. The simplest solution is a monism of a posited > structural primitive, say, S(.). The universe is a structure of organised > S(.). One type and one type only. The structure itself is simply and > necessarily a hierarchically organised massive collection of S(.). In this > hierarchy the behaviour that generates appearances and that which does not > are indistinguishable. The whole question changes to one of visibility. Absolutely. > Make sense? I'll keep saying this until it sinks in. Somebody other than me > has to see this! Yes, it makes a lot of sense, and reminds me of long hours over the decades struggling to visualise how various 'observer perspectives' would map in detail to my 1st-person experience (a career in software engineering also presents many opportunities for meditative waiting!) 'Saving the appearances' was my point of departure, because it seemed to be mostly ignored in standard theoretical treatments, apparently in pursuit of some mirage of methodological 'rigour' - myopia, it seemed to me. Also, all those 'quantum collapse' notions involving 'the observer' seemed to be blind to the fact that this seemingly influential chap was simply a non-isolatable element of the network of interacting information under 'observation'. My question about observing from the perspective of the 'gestalt' (maybe this isn't the best word) was posed in this spirit. That is, each one of my list of 'observables' makes sense to me from this perspective, but not from that of a classical 'nameable' 1st person. QM/MW is just one way to conceptualise the structural/ behavioural aspects of this, but my starting point is: given these experiences, 'from what experiential perspective would the situation look, feel, sound, taste, smell, like this?' And the answer always seems to be 'from the point of view of the universe, delimited by these information horizons.' This for me is the fundamental 1st-person perspective. David > David Nyman: > > Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: > > > > > ASIDE, for the record, dual aspect science (from the previous post). I) > > > APPEARANCE ASPECT. Depictions (statistics) of regularity (correlations > > of > > > agreed 'objects' within) in appearances > > > II) STRUCTURE ASPECT. Depictions (Statistics) of structure of an > > > underlying natural world based on organisations of one or more posited > > > structural primitives. > > > > > > Both have equal access to qualia as evidence. Qualia are evidence for > > > both. Whatever the structure is, scientists are made of it and it must > > > simultaneously a) deliver qualia and all the rest of the structure in > > the > > > universe(II) and b) deliver the contents of qualia (appearances) that > > > result in our correlations of appearances that we think of as empirical > > > laws(I). This is a complete consistent set of natural laws, none of > > which > > > literally 'are' the universe but are merely 'about' it. > > > > For the record, how (if at all) does this differ from Chalmers' > > property dualism and his programme for 'psycho-physical laws'? And is > > his 'conceivability' of structure (ll) without appearance (l) relevant > > in your approach? This is where I part company from him. My > > conceivability apparatus just can't come up with this. For me a > > situation that doesn't know itself needs a mediator (little observer) > > to do the knowing, and we know where that leads... > > > > No homunculus. I'm not sure of chalmers' 'conceivability'. It's a while > since I read him. But I think it might be relevant. The key to it is when > you realise that the structure (II) actually delivers the appearance (I) of > the rest of the structure. That is actually a defining criteria limiting > possibilities for the possible structures and any structural primitive used > in same. > > There is no dualism here. The simplest solution is a monism of a posited > structural primitive, say, S(.). The universe is a structure of organised > S(.). One type and one type only. The structure itself is simply and > necessarily a hierarchically organised massive collection of S(.). In this > hierarchy the behaviour that generates appearances and that which does not > are indistinguishable. The whole question changes to one of visibility. > > As to physho-physical laws in consideration of hierarchical > organisations of a structural primitive one or more fundamental principles > are (will be) proven to be true _because_ qualia exist. Only when we let > ourselves look at such monisms will we be able to see what the parameters of > such fundamental laws might be. Then we may be able to devise tests that > take the structure to novel behavioural places...and the usual experimental > regime ... and science marches onthe sorts of experimental regimes I am > thinking of are the AI and 'asking it' (in a hardware sense) "what it is > like"unlike with biology we can merge their brains and get them to see > what e
RE: Dual-Aspect Science
David Nyman: > Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: > > > ASIDE, for the record, dual aspect science (from the previous post). I) > > APPEARANCE ASPECT. Depictions (statistics) of regularity (correlations > of > > agreed 'objects' within) in appearances > > II) STRUCTURE ASPECT. Depictions (Statistics) of structure of an > > underlying natural world based on organisations of one or more posited > > structural primitives. > > > > Both have equal access to qualia as evidence. Qualia are evidence for > > both. Whatever the structure is, scientists are made of it and it must > > simultaneously a) deliver qualia and all the rest of the structure in > the > > universe(II) and b) deliver the contents of qualia (appearances) that > > result in our correlations of appearances that we think of as empirical > > laws(I). This is a complete consistent set of natural laws, none of > which > > literally 'are' the universe but are merely 'about' it. > > For the record, how (if at all) does this differ from Chalmers' > property dualism and his programme for 'psycho-physical laws'? And is > his 'conceivability' of structure (ll) without appearance (l) relevant > in your approach? This is where I part company from him. My > conceivability apparatus just can't come up with this. For me a > situation that doesn't know itself needs a mediator (little observer) > to do the knowing, and we know where that leads... > No homunculus. I'm not sure of chalmers' 'conceivability'. It's a while since I read him. But I think it might be relevant. The key to it is when you realise that the structure (II) actually delivers the appearance (I) of the rest of the structure. That is actually a defining criteria limiting possibilities for the possible structures and any structural primitive used in same. There is no dualism here. The simplest solution is a monism of a posited structural primitive, say, S(.). The universe is a structure of organised S(.). One type and one type only. The structure itself is simply and necessarily a hierarchically organised massive collection of S(.). In this hierarchy the behaviour that generates appearances and that which does not are indistinguishable. The whole question changes to one of visibility. As to physho-physical laws in consideration of hierarchical organisations of a structural primitive one or more fundamental principles are (will be) proven to be true _because_ qualia exist. Only when we let ourselves look at such monisms will we be able to see what the parameters of such fundamental laws might be. Then we may be able to devise tests that take the structure to novel behavioural places...and the usual experimental regime ... and science marches onthe sorts of experimental regimes I am thinking of are the AI and 'asking it' (in a hardware sense) "what it is like"unlike with biology we can merge their brains and get them to see what each other sees. The whole evidence problem goes away. > > Qualia(appearances) are only intractible because we keep insisting on & > > trying to use qualia (appearances, our scientific evidence) to explain > > them! Is it only me that sees that when the scientific evidence system > > (qualia) is applied to collect evidence in favour of a "science of > > qualia", a science of _our evidence system_!!, that the evidence system > > breaks down? > > Can you say more about how a structure (ll) science approaches this? A structure that, from any point of view can, in principle supply a perspective view of any other part of the structure is such a thing. Cellular automata are one such structure (not a computer program, but reality as a massively parallel cellular automata of S(.) ) > > > FYI > > ['unsituated' means that the scientist is, despite the observer > dependence > > characterised by quantum mechanics, surgically excised from the universe > > by the demand for an objective view that does not exist. 'Situated' > > science puts the scientist back inside the universe with the studied > > items. Note that science only needs OBJECTIVITY (a behaviour) not a real > > 'objective view' to construct correlations of type I (above). Dual > aspect > > science disposes of the cultish need for a delusion of a 3rd person view > ] > > Yes, this is broadly what I was aiming at with '1st-person primacy', > using words like 'embedded', 'present', etc. - but 'situated' is good, > I'll adopt it. 'SITUATEDNESS' is a very good standard term to use. There are mountains of books on SITUATED AGENCY. It's quite well traveled, especially in computer science, but also in biology (try and understand an elephant outside its habitat!). What has not been done is to treat that biology called "the scientist" as a situated agent inside its own habitat: the universe. "Mysterious observer dependence" in QM is not so mysterious when you actually put the scientist inside the picture. Why not put the scientist back inside the universe instead of objectively declaring something 'mysterious'! If
Re: Dual-Aspect Science (a spawn of the roadmap)
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: > ASIDE, for the record, dual aspect science (from the previous post). I) > APPEARANCE ASPECT. Depictions (statistics) of regularity (correlations of > agreed 'objects' within) in appearances > II) STRUCTURE ASPECT. Depictions (Statistics) of structure of an > underlying natural world based on organisations of one or more posited > structural primitives. > Both have equal access to qualia as evidence. Qualia are evidence for > both. Whatever the structure is, scientists are made of it and it must > simultaneously a) deliver qualia and all the rest of the structure in the > universe(II) and b) deliver the contents of qualia (appearances) that > result in our correlations of appearances that we think of as empirical > laws(I). This is a complete consistent set of natural laws, none of which > literally 'are' the universe but are merely 'about' it. For the record, how would you contrast this with Chalmers' property dualism and his programme for 'psycho-physical laws'? Presumably his 'conceivability' of structure (ll) without appearance (l) is sheer '3rd-person cultism' from your perspective. This is where I part company from him. My conceivability apparatus just can't come up with this. For me a situation that isn't self-revealing needs a mediator (little observer) to do the revealing for it, and we know where that leads... > Qualia(appearances) are only intractible because we keep insisting on & > trying to use qualia (appearances, our scientific evidence) to explain > them! Is it only me that sees that when the scientific evidence system > (qualia) is applied to collect evidence in favour of a "science of > qualia", a science of _our evidence system_!!, that the evidence system > breaks down? Can you say more about how a structure (ll) science approaches this? > FYI > ['unsituated' means that the scientist is, despite the observer dependence > characterised by quantum mechanics, surgically excised from the universe > by the demand for an objective view that does not exist. 'Situated' > science puts the scientist back inside the universe with the studied > items. Note that science only needs OBJECTIVITY (a behaviour) not a real > 'objective view' to construct correlations of type I (above). Dual aspect > science disposes of the cultish need for a delusion of a 3rd person view ] Yes, this is broadly what I was aiming at with '1st-person primacy', using words like 'embedded', 'present', etc. - but 'situated' is good, I'll adopt it. There's another aspect, which I've been musing about again since my most recent exchanges with Peter. This is that if one takes seriously (and I do) 'structural' or 'block' views such as MWI, then it seems to me that whatever is behaving 'perceivingly', 1st-personally', or 'subjectly' (gawd!) is the gestalt, not any particular abstraction therefrom. It seems to me that this is necessary to yield from an infinity of recursively nested structure: 1) The unnameability of the 1st-person (i.e. 'this observer situation') 2) The consequential validity (?) of any probability calculus of observer situations 3) 'Time' as the tension of structure and gestalt - i.e. sensing situations dynamically 4) 'Coherent observer histories' - i.e. sensing 'meta-situationally' (is this an adverb?) Any thoughts on this? David > David Nyman" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > > > > Yes, and I despair (almost) of remedying this, even if I knew how. My > own attempts at linguistic 'clarity' seemed destined only to muddy the > waters further, especially as I'm really trying to translate from > personal modes that are often more visual/ kinaesthetic than verbal, > gestalt than analytic. > > I have these very same difficulties and I try my very hardest to use the > minimal number of most-accessible words in their popular mode. Not always > successfully...but you have to start somewhere. My origins are as an > engineer immersed in the natural (electrical) world. Thousands of hours of > waiting during commissioning, thinking for a couple of decades to > surface and try to describe what you have seen after this...is a > challenge. > > > > > That said, I rather like your 'adverbial' mode, which I think has also > cropped up in other contexts (didn't Whitehead attempt something of the > sort with his process view?) Nominalisation/ reification creates > conceptual confusions, embedded assumptions spawn others, as in all > language to do with time, which is already loaded with the assumption of > experiential dynamism, and hence can do nothing to help explain it. > > > > ASIDE, for the record, dual aspect science (from the previous post). I) > APPEARANCE ASPECT. Depictions (statistics) of regularity (correlations of > agreed 'objects' within) in appearances > II) STRUCTURE ASPECT. Depictions (Statistics) of structure of an > underlying natural world based on organisations of one or more posited > structural primitives. > > Both have equal
Re: Dual-Aspect Science (a spawn of the roadmap)
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: > ASIDE, for the record, dual aspect science (from the previous post). I) > APPEARANCE ASPECT. Depictions (statistics) of regularity (correlations of > agreed 'objects' within) in appearances > II) STRUCTURE ASPECT. Depictions (Statistics) of structure of an > underlying natural world based on organisations of one or more posited > structural primitives. > > Both have equal access to qualia as evidence. Qualia are evidence for > both. Whatever the structure is, scientists are made of it and it must > simultaneously a) deliver qualia and all the rest of the structure in the > universe(II) and b) deliver the contents of qualia (appearances) that > result in our correlations of appearances that we think of as empirical > laws(I). This is a complete consistent set of natural laws, none of which > literally 'are' the universe but are merely 'about' it. For the record, how (if at all) does this differ from Chalmers' property dualism and his programme for 'psycho-physical laws'? And is his 'conceivability' of structure (ll) without appearance (l) relevant in your approach? This is where I part company from him. My conceivability apparatus just can't come up with this. For me a situation that doesn't know itself needs a mediator (little observer) to do the knowing, and we know where that leads... > Qualia(appearances) are only intractible because we keep insisting on & > trying to use qualia (appearances, our scientific evidence) to explain > them! Is it only me that sees that when the scientific evidence system > (qualia) is applied to collect evidence in favour of a "science of > qualia", a science of _our evidence system_!!, that the evidence system > breaks down? Can you say more about how a structure (ll) science approaches this? > FYI > ['unsituated' means that the scientist is, despite the observer dependence > characterised by quantum mechanics, surgically excised from the universe > by the demand for an objective view that does not exist. 'Situated' > science puts the scientist back inside the universe with the studied > items. Note that science only needs OBJECTIVITY (a behaviour) not a real > 'objective view' to construct correlations of type I (above). Dual aspect > science disposes of the cultish need for a delusion of a 3rd person view ] Yes, this is broadly what I was aiming at with '1st-person primacy', using words like 'embedded', 'present', etc. - but 'situated' is good, I'll adopt it. There is another aspect, which I've been musing about again since my most recent exchanges with Peter. This is that if one is to take seriously (and I do) 'structural' or 'block' views such as MWI, it seems to me that whatever is behaving 'perceivingly', '1st-personally', or 'subjectly' (gawd!) is the gestalt, not any particular abstraction therefrom. It seems to me that this is necessary to yield: 1) The unnameability of the 1st-person (i.e. 'this observer situation') 2) The consequential validity (?) of any probability calculus of observer situations 3) The dynamic quality of time as experienced (i.e. contrast between 'figure' and 'ground') 4) Meta-experiential layering - e.g. 'coherent histories' of observer situations Any views on this? David > > David Nyman" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > > > > Yes, and I despair (almost) of remedying this, even if I knew how. My > own attempts at linguistic 'clarity' seemed destined only to muddy the > waters further, especially as I'm really trying to translate from > personal modes that are often more visual/ kinaesthetic than verbal, > gestalt than analytic. > > I have these very same difficulties and I try my very hardest to use the > minimal number of most-accessible words in their popular mode. Not always > successfully...but you have to start somewhere. My origins are as an > engineer immersed in the natural (electrical) world. Thousands of hours of > waiting during commissioning, thinking for a couple of decades to > surface and try to describe what you have seen after this...is a > challenge. > > > > > That said, I rather like your 'adverbial' mode, which I think has also > cropped up in other contexts (didn't Whitehead attempt something of the > sort with his process view?) Nominalisation/ reification creates > conceptual confusions, embedded assumptions spawn others, as in all > language to do with time, which is already loaded with the assumption of > experiential dynamism, and hence can do nothing to help explain it. > > > > ASIDE, for the record, dual aspect science (from the previous post). I) > APPEARANCE ASPECT. Depictions (statistics) of regularity (correlations of > agreed 'objects' within) in appearances > II) STRUCTURE ASPECT. Depictions (Statistics) of structure of an > underlying natural world based on organisations of one or more posited > structural primitives. > > Both have equal access to qualia as evidence. Qualia are evidence for > both. Whatever the structure i
Re: Dual-Aspect Science (a spawn of the roadmap)
David Nyman" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > > Yes, and I despair (almost) of remedying this, even if I knew how. My own attempts at linguistic 'clarity' seemed destined only to muddy the waters further, especially as I'm really trying to translate from personal modes that are often more visual/ kinaesthetic than verbal, gestalt than analytic. I have these very same difficulties and I try my very hardest to use the minimal number of most-accessible words in their popular mode. Not always successfully...but you have to start somewhere. My origins are as an engineer immersed in the natural (electrical) world. Thousands of hours of waiting during commissioning, thinking for a couple of decades to surface and try to describe what you have seen after this...is a challenge. > > That said, I rather like your 'adverbial' mode, which I think has also cropped up in other contexts (didn't Whitehead attempt something of the sort with his process view?) Nominalisation/ reification creates conceptual confusions, embedded assumptions spawn others, as in all language to do with time, which is already loaded with the assumption of experiential dynamism, and hence can do nothing to help explain it. > ASIDE, for the record, dual aspect science (from the previous post). I) APPEARANCE ASPECT. Depictions (statistics) of regularity (correlations of agreed 'objects' within) in appearances II) STRUCTURE ASPECT. Depictions (Statistics) of structure of an underlying natural world based on organisations of one or more posited structural primitives. Both have equal access to qualia as evidence. Qualia are evidence for both. Whatever the structure is, scientists are made of it and it must simultaneously a) deliver qualia and all the rest of the structure in the universe(II) and b) deliver the contents of qualia (appearances) that result in our correlations of appearances that we think of as empirical laws(I). This is a complete consistent set of natural laws, none of which literally 'are' the universe but are merely 'about' it. back to David's words re language...'adverbial' descriptions: Nicholas Rescher has wrested process thought from the Whitehead sequestration of it. Rescher uses the adverbial mode quite convincingly in his latest works. Thank goodness...far too much religious/cultish detritus smattered throughout the Whitehead camp. They have no right to 'own' the process view. I hope those days are over now. The adverbial depiction is very apt as it stops us being deluded into the assumption of 'nouns' and 'things'. In day to day life nouns and things are very very useful, but the assumption that just because our language has them and we have agreed to their presence in the universe's appearance...does not mean that the language tokens are actually instantiated! Adverbial descriptions are far more general in that they easily unify all natural world behaviour as a single process that can deal with 'verby things' like rainstorms, that are inherently processual and apparent lumpy things (like lions) that behave 'nounly'. Qualia naturally fit into this idea. There is no thing 'red' in your head. The universe is behaving red-ly in your head. NOTE: An ideal object 'red' may be said to exist in 'platonia'. But so what! This is about _our_ universe, not some abstraction. > My own hastily contrived usages were an attempt to expose the implicit (and hence generally conceptually invisible) holding of the world 'at arm's length' by the objectifying effect of 3rd person language, which simultaneusly relegates 1st-person to a subsidiary role, to the extent that some even feel impelled to deny its existence, or resort to bizarre ontolgies in an attempt to 'reintroduce' it. Where McGinn and Chomsky hold that it is the analytic/ synthetic modes of language that puts 1st person beyond our ability to conceptualise, I feel that the unacknowledged consensual projection of an 'objective model' as > 'reality' has more to do with it. > > My belief has been that restoring 1st person to some sort of centrality would be part of the antidote, and I haven't yet (quite) lost hope on this score. I look forward to the fruits of your own efforts in this regard. > > David Your plea has not gone unheard. V.S. Ramachandran said "...the need to reconcile the first and third person accounts of the universe...is the single most important problem in science." (Phantoms in the Brain .229) and there's McGinn in 'the mysterious flame' where he makes a convincing case for us having a profoundly inadequate view of matter. I agree! I'd say there isn't any such 'thing'! :-) Note Ramachandran is not saying 'physics' or 'neuroscience' or 'consciousness studies' is affected but SCIENCE, all of it. He is absolutely right. Qualia are our entire source of scientific evidence. We have nothing else. They are an appearance (as a measurement supplied to us inside our heads by the a
