Roger,
Could you supply a link to where L said all that. Google is unable to
find any such place.
Richard
On Thu, Oct 11, 2012 at 9:37 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote:
Hi Craig Weinberg
L speaking here:
Every corporeal body without parts in the
universe is also a monad. Bodies of more than
one part have a monad for each part.
Every monad is alive to various degrees, hence
various forms of vitalism, and to various degrees
have intellect (intelligence), feeling (sensory stuff)
and body (a meaty or material part) so the entire universe
is alive in various degrees. Rocks only have body monads
and are considered to be somewhat as in a coma.
These objects in monad form are all nonlocal, since monads are outside
of spacetime, so they share intellects, feeling, and
bodily feelings to a limited extent, always distorted
and always limited in their field of view. They can also
see a little into the future, acccording to their capabilities.
While that may sound magical, the actual corporeal
bodies are your everyday corporeal bodies, show
no more signs of life than nature shows you.
No magic involved. Bounce a ball, eat a cake, etc.
Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
10/11/2012
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen
- Receiving the following content -
From: Craig Weinberg
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-10-10, 15:45:10
Subject: Re: Survey of Consciousness Models
On Wednesday, October 10, 2012 3:27:52 PM UTC-4, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 10.10.2012 17:16 Craig Weinberg said the following:
http://s33light.org/post/33296583824
Have a look. Objections? Suggestions?
I am not sure if vitalism is a model of consciousness.
Yeah, this is more of an informal consideration of the breakpoints between
awareness and matter. I bring in vitalism as a name for the breakpoint which
is assigned to biology as far as being the difference between what can evolve
awareness and what never can.
Eliminativism is not Epiphenomenalism. The small difference is that
epiphenomenalism assumes mental phenomena and eliminativism not.
I wasn't really talking about epiphenomenalism, I was saying that
eliminativism treats consciousness as an epiphenomenon. Or are you saying
that eliminativism eliminates even the concept of consciousness as an
experience - which yeah, maybe it does, even though it really doesn't even
make sense unless the inside of our brain looked like a Cartesian theater.
Epiphenomenalism acknowledge that mental phenomena do exist but they
just do not have causal power on human behavior.
Yeah, I see epiphenomenalism as a principle which could be attached to a lot
of the ones that I listed. You could have epiphenomenal idealism if you
believe that it is 'all God's Will', or whatever. It isn't really in the same
category as what I was after here in looking at where the breakpoints are.
Like substance dualism, it is just saying what consciousness is not but
offers no explanation about what it is.
Then there is Reductive Physicalisms: Mental states are identical to
physical states. It is not functionalism though, as everything goes
through physical states directly. The difference with eliminativism is
subtle.
Too subtle for me maybe. What does one say that the other doesn't?
There is Property Dualism and there is Externalism.
Externalism is a good one that I should add maybe. It still doesn't point to
who gets to be conscious and who doesn't though. Property dualism, like
Substance dualism seems like it could be attached to several of the others.
It doesn't really specify at what level the property of consciousness kicks
in.
You will find nice podcasts about it at
A Romp Through the Philosophy of Mind
http://podcasts.ox.ac.uk/series/romp-through-philosophy-mind
Thanks! Will check em out when I can!
Craig
Evgenii
--
http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2012/08/philosophy-of-mind.html
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