Re: Step 4? (Re: QUESTION 2 (Re: Holiday Exercise

[Bruno Marchal]

On 09 Aug 2016, at 19:32, John Clark wrote:

On Sun, Aug 7, 2016 at 10:40 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


​> ​a nine years old child get the point

​And I might get your point if I had the mentality of a nine year  
old child, or of something similar like an ancient Greek.



Feeling superior? That might be the root of your difficulties here.

Bruno





 John K Clark​



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Re: Step 4? (Re: QUESTION 2 (Re: Holiday Exercise

[John Clark]

On Sun, Aug 7, 2016 at 10:40 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

​> ​
> a nine years old child get the point


​And I might get your point if I had the mentality of a nine year old
child, or of something similar like an ancient Greek.

 John K Clark​

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Re: Step 4? (Re: QUESTION 2 (Re: Holiday Exercise

[Bruno Marchal]

On 06 Aug 2016, at 20:35, John Clark wrote:

On Sat, Aug 6, 2016 at 9:17 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


​> ​It was the question 2 which does not involve duplication.
Question 2:  if I am sure at time t that at time q, q > t, I will be  
uncertain of the outcome of some experience x, then I am uncertain  
about the outcome of that experience at time t.


​As I explained in my previous post that is not universally true,  
it depends on if you have forgotten something or not. ​When i was  
in the fourth grade I had to learn the state capitals and knew with  
certainty what the capital of Wyoming was, and I was not only  
certain I was undoubtedly correct too. Today I could look it up but  
right now, although much time has passed, I am uncertain what the  
capital of Wyoming is.


​> ​You have answered both questions positively in your posts of  
the 02 August and 03 August respectively.


​Yes that's true I did, and both questions involved either no  
duplication or identical environments after duplication so, as I  
also explained in my previous post, personal pronouns and the  
identity of the mysterious Mr. You is not important. And I might add  
if the environments are identical then although there are 2 brains  
there is only one individual because thinking is what brains do and  
the structure of the 2 brains are identical and the 2 environmental  
inputs to the 2 brains are identical so what the 2 brains are doing  
is also identical. ​



​> ​Then I have shown that the step 3 FPI is a direct consequence  
of answering "yes" to the questions 1 and 2.


​Not if YOU walk into a YOU duplicating machine and one YOU goes to  
Moscow and the other YOU goes to Washington! Then talking about THE  
FPI and the probabilities of what YOU will see after duplication is  
just ridiculous.




On the contrary. Once you have a bit of empathy with yourself you  
listen to whatever the copies can say, and a nine years old child get  
the point when doing that.


The rest is playing with words and ad hominem boring distractions.


Bruno







And don't start the bit about the duplicating machine being  
equivalent to one of Everett's branching worlds because it's not.  
With Everett the identity of the personal pronoun "YOU" is crystal  
clear and can always be uniquely and unambiguously defined:


YOU is the one and only chunk of matter in the observable universe  
that behaves in a Brunomarchalian way.


But if duplicating machines are around then "YOU" has no definition  
and talking about THE FPI as if there were only one is just silly.


​> ​do you see why it entails the FPI?

​What I don't see is how THE FPI can exist at all in a world with  
person duplicating machines because the "P" in FPI stands for  
"person" and the person has been duplicated, YOU have been  
duplicated, all of YOU has been duplicated. All. I think your  
confusion stems entirely from something you said a few posts ago,  
something you've used as a unnamed hidden axiom from day one at the  
very start of your "proof":


 "Nothing can duplicate a first person view from its first person  
point of view​"


If that's true then computationalism​ is false, but you can't use  
an assumption that ​computationalism​ is false to prove that  
computationalism​ is false.











 John K Clark


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Re: Step 4? (Re: QUESTION 2 (Re: Holiday Exercise

[John Clark]

On Sat, Aug 6, 2016 at 9:17 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

​> ​
> It was the question 2 which does not involve duplication.
> *Question 2*:  if I am sure at time t that at time q, q > t, I will be
> uncertain of the outcome of some experience x, then I am uncertain about
> the outcome of that experience at time t.
>

​As I explained in my previous post that is not universally true, it
depends on if you have forgotten something or not. ​When i was in the
fourth grade I had to learn the state capitals and knew with certainty what
the capital of Wyoming was, and I was not only certain I was undoubtedly
correct too. Today I could look it up but right now, although much time has
passed, I am uncertain what the capital of Wyoming is.

​> ​
> You have answered both questions positively in your posts of the 02 August
> and 03 August respectively.
>

​Yes that's true I did, and both questions involved either no duplication
or identical environments after duplication so, as I also explained in my
previous post, personal pronouns and the identity of the mysterious Mr. You
is not important. And I might add if the environments are identical then
although there are 2 brains there is only one individual because thinking
is what brains do and the structure of the 2 brains are identical and the 2
environmental inputs to the 2 brains are identical so what the 2 brains are
doing is also identical. ​



​> ​
> Then I have shown that the step 3 FPI is a direct consequence of answering
> "yes" to the questions 1 and 2.
>

​Not if YOU walk into a YOU duplicating machine and one YOU goes to Moscow
and the other YOU goes to Washington! Then talking about *THE* FPI and the
probabilities of what YOU will see after duplication is just ridiculous.
And don't start the bit about the duplicating machine being equivalent to
one of Everett's branching worlds because it's not. With Everett the
identity of the personal pronoun "YOU" is crystal clear and can always
be uniquely and unambiguously defined:

YOU is the one and only chunk of matter in the observable universe that
behaves in a Brunomarchalian way.

But if duplicating machines are around then "YOU" has no definition and
talking about *THE *FPI as if there were only one is just silly.


> ​> ​
> do you see why it entails the FPI?
>

​What I don't see is how *THE* FPI can exist at all in a world with person
duplicating machines because the "P" in FPI stands for "person" and the
person has been duplicated, *YOU* have been duplicated, all of YOU has
been duplicated. All. I think your confusion stems entirely from something
you said a few posts ago, something you've used as a unnamed hidden axiom
from day one at the very start of your "proof":

 "
*Nothing can duplicate a first person view from its first person point of
view​"*

If that's true then computationalism
​ is false, but you can't use an assumption that ​
computationalism
​ is false to prove that
computationalism
​ is false.

 John K Clark

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Re: Step 4? (Re: QUESTION 2 (Re: Holiday Exercise

[Bruno Marchal]

On 06 Aug 2016, at 03:43, John Clark wrote:

On Fri, Aug 5, 2016 at 3:32 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:



​ ​>>>​>Assigning probabilities about what "YOU" will see next  
is not ambiguous as long as "YOU" duplicating machine are not around.


​>​>>​ ​So, you are OK that the guy in Helsinki write  
P("drinking coffee") = 1.


​​>> ​The guy in Helsinki​?​ NO!!! Bruno Marchal said   
"The question is not about duplication"


​> ​The question 2 was not about duplication,

​If duplication was not involved then why ​on god's green earth  
were you talking about the goddamn HELSINKI MAN?!



Do you read the posts?

Question 1: in the duplication protocol, if event X is presented to  
both copies (like getting coffee), P(X) = 1. You have agreed on this  
last week. I quote your post (of 02 augustus):


<<
​> ​both copies will have a cup of coffee after the  
reconstitution. Are you OK that P("experience of drinking coffee") =  
1?


​Yes, and in this case it doesn't matter if Bruno Marchal says P is  
the probability John Clark will drink the coffee or says P is the  
probability ​ ​"you" will drink the coffee, there is no ambiguity  
either way. However if the Moscow man got the coffee but the  
Washington man did not then there would be a 100% probability that  
John Clark will get the coffee and also a 100% probability that John  
Clark will not get the coffee, just as I would assign a 100%  
probability that tomorrow tomatoes will be red and I would also  
assign a 100% probability that tomorrow tomatoes will be​ green.


>>

It was the question 2 which does not involve duplication.

Question 2:  if I am sure at time t that at time q, q > t, I will be  
uncertain of the outcome of some experience x, then I am uncertain  
about the outcome of that experience at time t.


You have answered both questions positively in your posts of the 02  
August and 03 August respectively.


Then I have shown that the step 3 FPI is a direct consequence of  
answering "yes" to the questions 1 and 2.

But your reply to that was not referring to the question correctly.

So, do you still agree with yourself on those two questions, and if  
yes, do you see why it entails the FPI?


Bruno








​> ​but the question 1 was, and you said that P("drinking  
coffee") was equal to one.


​P can always be equal to 1, it depends on what P means, and if P  
has no meaning, if for example too many unspecified personal  
pronouns are used, then P has no value at all, not even zero. In the  
first case BOTH the Moscow man and the Washington man got the coffee  
so the identity of the mysterious Mr. You does not need to be  
specified and so P had both a meaning and a value.


​If one gets the coffee and ​one does not what is the probability  
(P) that "YOU" will get the coffee? Is it 1? No. Is it 1/2? No. Is  
it 0? No, P has no value at all because P is gibberish.


 John K Clark






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Re: Step 4? (Re: QUESTION 2 (Re: Holiday Exercise

[John Clark]

On Fri, Aug 5, 2016 at 3:32 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:


​
>>> ​>>>​>
>>> Assigning probabilities about what "YOU" will see next is not ambiguous
>>> as long as "YOU" duplicating machine are not around.
>>
>>
>> ​>
>>> ​>>​
>>> ​
>>> So, you are OK that the guy in Helsinki write P("drinking coffee") = 1.
>>>
>>
>> ​
>> ​>> ​
>> The
>>  guy in Helsinki
>> ​?​
>> NO!!! Bruno Marchal said  "The question is not about duplication"
>>
>
> ​> ​
> The question 2 was not about duplication,
>

​If duplication was not involved then why ​on god's green earth were you
talking about the goddamn* HELSINKI MAN*?!


> ​> ​
> but the question 1 was, and you said that P("drinking coffee") was equal
> to one.
>

​P can always be equal to 1, it depends on what P means, and if P has no
meaning, if for example too many unspecified personal pronouns are used,
then P has no value at all, not even zero. In the first case
BOTH the Moscow man and the Washington man got the coffee so the identity
of the mysterious Mr. You does not need to be specified and so P had both a
meaning and a value.

​If one gets the coffee and ​one does not what is the probability (P) that "
*YOU*" will get the coffee? Is it 1? No. Is it 1/2? No. Is it 0? No, P has
no value at all because P is gibberish.

 John K Clark


>

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Re: Step 4? (Re: QUESTION 2 (Re: Holiday Exercise

[Bruno Marchal]

On 04 Aug 2016, at 19:53, John Clark wrote:



On Thu, Aug 4, 2016 at 12:15 PM, Marchal  wrote:

​> ​The question is not about duplication.

​OK.​


​And that part is still OK. Assigning probabilities about what  
"YOU" will see next is not ambiguous as long as "YOU" duplicating  
machine are not around.


​> ​So, you are OK that the guy in Helsinki write P("drinking  
coffee") = 1.


​The guy in Helsinki​?​ NO!!! Bruno Marchal said  "The question  
is not about duplication" but the guy in Helsinki is just about to  
walk into a YOU ​duplicating machine​,​ so John Clark ​will  
not assign any probability of any sort​ about ​the​ one and  
only one thing ​that ​will happen to "​YOU​"​.​ ​It's  
just ​plain ​dumb.


Nope, question one was about duplication. Only question 2 was not. You  
ndid say that P("drinking coffee") = 1 for the helsinki guy.

Just to be sure, I quote your answer to question one:


On Tue, Aug 2, 2016 at 12:55 PM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


​> ​both copies will have a cup of coffee after the  
reconstitution. Are you OK that P("experience of drinking coffee") =  
1?


​Yes, and in this case it doesn't matter if Bruno Marchal says P is  
the probability John Clark will drink the coffee or says P is the  
probability ​ ​"you" will drink the coffee, there is no ambiguity  
either way. However if the Moscow man got the coffee but the  
Washington man did not then there would be a 100% probability that  
John Clark will get the coffee and also a 100% probability that John  
Clark will not get the coffee, just as I would assign a 100%  
probability that tomorrow tomatoes will be red and I would also  
assign a 100% probability that tomorrow tomatoes will be​ green.



Like I just said: QED, unless you explicitly change your mind on  
question 1. But then say it, and we come back to question 1.


Bruno








​> ​Now, the guy in Helsinki is told that we have put a painting  
by Van Gogh in one of the reconstitution box, and a painting by  
Monet in the other reconstitution box.​ ​


​Let's see if John Clark can guess what's coming. After "YOU" have  
been duplicated by a YOU duplicating machine what is the probability  
that "YOU" will blah blah blah. What on earth made Bruno Marchal  
think that substituting a painting for a cup of coffee would make  
things less ambiguous?


​> ​The key point here, is that we don't tell you which  
reconstitution box contains which painting. ​[...]


​Why is that the key point? Suppose we​ ​change the experiment  
and this time before the experiment we tell "YOU" which box contains  
which painting, we tell "YOU" that the red box on the left contains  
the Van Gogh​ ​and the blue box on the right contains the Monet ,  
and we tell "YOU" that after "YOU" are duplicated by the YOU  
duplicating machine "YOU" will be in both boxes. Does that  
information help in the slightest way in determining what one and  
only one painting "YOU" will see after "YOU" ​are​  
duplicated? ​ ​It's just plain​ ​dumb.


​>​ P("being uncertain about which city is behind the door")

​P is equal to who's uncertainty? After the experiment is​ ​ 
over how do we determine what the true value of P turned out to be?  
To find out that value we need to ask "YOU" what "YOU" saw after  
"YOU" walked into the YOU duplicating machine and opened one and  
only one door. But who exactly do we ask? We can't ask the Helsinki  
man as he's no longer around, oh I know, we ask "YOU".


​> ​OK?

​No it's not OK, it's about as far from OK as things get.​

​> ​Can we move to step 4?

​Just as soon as Bruno Marchal explains what one and only one thing  
"YOU" refers to in a world with "YOU" duplicating machines.


John K Clark ​





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Re: Step 4? (Re: QUESTION 2 (Re: Holiday Exercise

[Bruno Marchal]

On 04 Aug 2016, at 19:53, John Clark wrote:



On Thu, Aug 4, 2016 at 12:15 PM, Marchal  wrote:

​> ​The question is not about duplication.

​OK.​


​And that part is still OK. Assigning probabilities about what  
"YOU" will see next is not ambiguous as long as "YOU" duplicating  
machine are not around.


​> ​So, you are OK that the guy in Helsinki write P("drinking  
coffee") = 1.


​The guy in Helsinki​?​ NO!!! Bruno Marchal said  "The question  
is not about duplication"



The question 2 was not about duplication, but the question 1 was, and  
you said that P("drinking coffee") was equal to one.


You already contradict your recent post where you said that question  
1, which was clearly about duplication, admit a positive answer.


QED.

Bruno







but the guy in Helsinki is just about to walk into a YOU ​ 
duplicating machine​,​ so John Clark ​will not assign any  
probability of any sort​ about ​the​ one and only one thing ​ 
that ​will happen to "​YOU​"​.​ ​It's just ​plain ​ 
dumb.



​> ​Now, the guy in Helsinki is told that we have put a painting  
by Van Gogh in one of the reconstitution box, and a painting by  
Monet in the other reconstitution box.​ ​


​Let's see if John Clark can guess what's coming. After "YOU" have  
been duplicated by a YOU duplicating machine what is the probability  
that "YOU" will blah blah blah. What on earth made Bruno Marchal  
think that substituting a painting for a cup of coffee would make  
things less ambiguous?


​> ​The key point here, is that we don't tell you which  
reconstitution box contains which painting. ​[...]


​Why is that the key point? Suppose we​ ​change the experiment  
and this time before the experiment we tell "YOU" which box contains  
which painting, we tell "YOU" that the red box on the left contains  
the Van Gogh​ ​and the blue box on the right contains the Monet ,  
and we tell "YOU" that after "YOU" are duplicated by the YOU  
duplicating machine "YOU" will be in both boxes. Does that  
information help in the slightest way in determining what one and  
only one painting "YOU" will see after "YOU" ​are​  
duplicated? ​ ​It's just plain​ ​dumb.


​>​ P("being uncertain about which city is behind the door")

​P is equal to who's uncertainty? After the experiment is​ ​ 
over how do we determine what the true value of P turned out to be?  
To find out that value we need to ask "YOU" what "YOU" saw after  
"YOU" walked into the YOU duplicating machine and opened one and  
only one door. But who exactly do we ask? We can't ask the Helsinki  
man as he's no longer around, oh I know, we ask "YOU".


​> ​OK?

​No it's not OK, it's about as far from OK as things get.​

​> ​Can we move to step 4?

​Just as soon as Bruno Marchal explains what one and only one thing  
"YOU" refers to in a world with "YOU" duplicating machines.


John K Clark ​





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Re: Step 4? (Re: QUESTION 2 (Re: Holiday Exercise

[John Clark]

On Thu, Aug 4, 2016 at 12:15 PM, Marchal  wrote:
>
> ​> ​
>> The question is not about duplication.
>
>
> ​OK.​
>
>
> ​And that part is still OK. Assigning probabilities about what "YOU" will
see next is not ambiguous as long as "YOU" duplicating machine are not
around.

​> ​
> So, you are OK that the guy in Helsinki write P("drinking coffee") = 1.
>

​The
 guy in Helsinki
​?​
NO!!! Bruno Marchal said  "The question is not about duplication" but the
guy in Helsinki is just about to walk into a *YOU*
 ​
duplicating machine
​,​
so John Clark
​will not
 assign any probability of any sort​ about
​the​
 one and only one thing
​that ​
will happen to "
​*YOU​*
"
​.​

​
It's just
​plain ​
dumb.


​> ​
> Now, the guy in Helsinki is told that we have put a painting by Van Gogh
> in one of the reconstitution box, and a painting by Monet in the other
> reconstitution box.
> ​ ​
>
>

​Let's see if John Clark can guess what's coming. After "*YOU*" have been
duplicated by a *YOU* duplicating machine what is the probability that "
*YOU*" will blah blah blah. What on earth made Bruno Marchal think that
substituting a painting for a cup of coffee would make things less
ambiguous?

​> ​
> The key point here, is that we don't tell you which reconstitution box
> contains which painting.
> ​[...]
>

​
Why is that the key point? Suppose we
​ ​
change the experiment and this time before the experiment we tell "Y*OU*"
which box contains which painting, we tell "*YOU*" that the red box on the
left contains the Van Gogh
​ ​
and the blue box on the right contains the Monet , and we tell "*YOU*" that
after "*YOU*" are duplicated by the *YOU* duplicating machine "*YOU*" will
be in both boxes. Does that information help in the slightest way in
determining what one and only one painting "*YOU*" will see after "*YOU*"
​are​
 duplicated?
​ ​
It's just plain
​ ​
dumb.

​>​
>  P("being uncertain about which city is behind the door")


​P is equal to who's uncertainty? After the experiment is​

​over how do we determine what the true value of P turned out to be? To
find out that value we need to ask "*YOU*" what "*YOU*" saw after "*YOU*"
walked into the *YOU *duplicating machine and opened one and only one door.
But who exactly do we ask? We can't ask the Helsinki man as he's no longer
around, oh I know, we ask "*YOU*".


​> ​
> OK?
>

​No it's not OK, it's about as far from OK as things get.​


​> ​
> Can we move to step 4?
>

​Just as soon as Bruno Marchal explains what one and only one thing "*YOU*"
refers to in a world with "*YOU*" duplicating machines.

John K Clark ​

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Step 4? (Re: QUESTION 2 (Re: Holiday Exercise

[Bruno Marchal]

On 03 Aug 2016, at 19:20, John Clark wrote:

On Tue, Aug 2, 2016 at 2:56 PM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


​> ​The question is not about duplication.

​OK.​

​> ​Do you agree that if today, someone is "sure" that tomorrow  
(or any precise time later) he will be uncertain of an outcome of a  
certain experience, then he can say, today, that he is uncertain  
about that future outcome.


​Sure, he can say whatever he wants because being sure ​and being  
correct are two entirely different things.


​> ​For example, if I promise myself to buy a lottery ticket next  
week. I am pretty sure now that next week I will​ ​be unsure  
winning something


​I've been known to break promises to myself before. If I didn't  
buy the ticket I'd absolutely certain I won't win the lottery next  
week, if I do buy the ticket I'd be almost certain I won't win next  
week. I'll have to wait till next week to find out if in addition to  
being certain I was also correct. And because you said right at the  
start that people duplicating machines ​are not involved this time  
personal pronouns can be used without ​ambiguity. ​


​> ​or not with that ticket, so I consider myself to be uncertain  
right now about winning or not the lottery next week.​ ​So I  
repeat, the principle questioned here says that if at t_0​ ​P("I  
will be uncertain of the outcome of some experience at t_1") =  
1​ ​then​ ​The outcome of the experience at t_1 is uncertain  
at t_0.


​You can be certain and wrong, and uncertain and correct. I will  
say that if I don't know fact X tomorow but I do know fact X now  
then sometime between today and tomorrow part of my memory must have  
been be erased. It's called "forgetting". But I haven't forgotten  
you said " The question is not about duplication" and that means "I"  
duplicating Machines are not involved, and that is the only reason  
it wasn't gibberish when you said "I will be uncertain of the...".



OK.

So, you are OK that the guy in Helsinki write P("drinking coffee") =  
1. (Question 1).


I notice also that you did not mention that the coffee should taste  
exactly the same, and I could have just propose a hot drink, we would  
still have P("drinking hot drink") = 1. All right?


And you agree (question 2) that if am pretty sure that tomorrow I will  
make an experience with a random/uncertain result (lottery, quantum  
lottery, whatever), I can say that I am already uncertain today about  
the result of that experience, assuming I keep my promise to myself to  
do the experience of course (buying the lottery ticket, measuring that  
spin, etc.).


Good!

Now, I will prove, assuming computationalism (alias digital mechanist  
hypothesis in cognitive science), that there is a first person  
indeterminacy in some still modified step 3 protocol. Then I will  
explain that the modification does not change the uncertainty, and  
thus proved step 3.



Now, the guy in Helsinki is told that we have put a painting by Van  
Gogh in one of the reconstitution box, and a painting by Monet in the  
other reconstitution box. The key point here, is that we don't tell  
you which reconstitution box contains which painting. After the  
reconstitutions, the doors will remain close for some short time,  
which I call delta-t_1, so that t_0 is when the guy is in Helsinki,  
and delta-t_2 is the interval of time when the reconstitutions are  
done, simultaneously (say) in Washington and in Moscow.


The guy in Helsinki reasons like this: by the question 1 principle,  
P("seeing a painting") = 1, given that there will be a painting in  
both reconstitution boxes. Now, by Digital Mechanism, both copies will  
see different paintings, given that they have been reconstituted in  
different boxes containing different paintings. But the difference  
between the paintings differentiates the first persn experience of  
each copies, and they know that. Both will see a specific painting,  
like a Monet, or a Van Gogh, and both will conclude that by seiing the  
painting, they have already differentiate, so that the city behind the  
door is already determined. But as we have not told the guy in  
Helsinki where the paintings have been placed, the differentiation is  
not enough for them to deduce with certainty what city is behind the  
door. The guy in Helsinki I just prove that P("being uncertain about  
which city is behind the door") = 1, in the same sense of the question  
one principle (if X occurs at both places then P(X) = 1).


The guy in Helsinki expect (with P=1, modulo assumption and default  
hyp) to get a cup of coffee, to see a painting, and to live an  
interval of time where he will be aware that the differentiation has  
occurred, despite not knowing which city is behind the doors. By the  
principle of the question 2, he is already uncertain about the outcome  
of the opening of the door tomorrow. The delta-t_2 interval of  
uncertainty is lifted to the day before.


Now, obviously,