Re: The Good, the Bad and the weirdly computable
Hi Roger, On 01 Oct 2012, at 19:28, Roger Clough wrote: BRUNO: OK. But the ability to selct does not require intelligence, just interaction and some memory. $$ ROGER: No, that's where you keep missing the absolutely critical issue of self. Choice is exclusive to the autonomous self, and is absolutely necessary. Self selects A or B or whatever entirely on its own.. That's what intelligence is. INTELLIGENCE = AUTONOMOUS CHOOSER + CHOICES When you type a response, YOU choose which letter to type, etc. That's an intelligent action. I agree with you on choice. I use the term self-determination in my defense of free will. When I was talking about consciousness selection, it has nothing to do with choice. It was what happen, in the comp theory, when you duplicate yourself in two different place, like Washington and Moscow. After that duplication, when you look at you neighborhood, there is a consciousness or first person selection: you feel to be in W, or you feel to be in M. You have no choice in that matter. Choice is something else entirely, and play no role in the origin and shape of the physical laws, but consciousness selection (which is a form of Turing-tropism (generalization of anthropism)). Selection of a quantum path (collapse or reduction of the jungle of brain wave paths) produces consciousness, according to Penrose et al. They call it orchestrated reduction. . BRUNO: Penrose is hardly convincing on this. Its basic argument based on G del is invalid, and its theory is quite speculative, like the wave collapse, which has never make any sense to me. ROGER: All physical theories (not mathematical theories) are speculative until validated by data. No. All theories are speculative. Period. But when I said quite speculative, I meant no evidence at all, and contradictory with all current evidences. Yes. Atoms are no atoms (in greek t??? means not divisible). $$ROGER: The greeks had no means to split the atom, they hadn't even seen one. The greeks knew that atoms are not divisible, by definition. They didn't knew that atoms exists, nor do we. I use atom in the philosophical sense. The current physical atoms where believed to be such philo atoms, until the discovery of the electron and nucleus. The new physical philosophical atoms are the elementary particles, but they are no more philosophical atoms in string theory. $$$ROGER: The monads are just points but not physical objects. Overlaying them, all of L's reality is just a dimensionless dot. Like the UD. It is a function from nothing to nothing, and as such 0- dimensional. But i don't really believe the geometrical image is useful. With comp it is better to put geometry in the epistemology of numbers, like analysis, infinities, and physics. Keeping the ontology minimal assures that we will not risk reifying unnecessary materials. I'm still trying to figure out how numbers and ideas fit into Leibniz's metaphysics. Little is written about this issue, so I have to rely on what Leibniz says otherwise about monads. BRUNO: OK. I will interpret your monad by intensional number. ROGER: Numbers do not associate to corporeal bodies, so that won't work. What do you mean by corporeal bodies? With comp + the usual Occam razor, corporeal bodies belongs to the mind of numbers (+ infinities of numbers relation). Those less dominant monads are eaten or taken over by the stronger ones. It's a Darwinian jungle down here. Crap happens. BRUNO: Crap happens also in arithmetic when viewed from inside. Contingency is given by selection on the many computational consistent continuation. There are different form of contingencies in arithmetic: one for each modal box having an arithmetical interpretations. In modal logic you can read []p by p is necessary, or true in all (accessible) worlds p by p is possible or true in one (accessible) world ~[]p or ~p by p is contingent (not necessary) What will change from one modal logic to another is the accessibility or the neighborhood relations on the (abstract) worlds. $ ROGER: That's correct, I was incorrectly limiting numbers to necessary logic. OK. Nice. comp reduces the ontology to arithmetic, but it is not a reductionism at all, it is the discovery that arithmetic has an unboundable complexity, full of life, crap, and surprises, and super- exponentially so when seen from inside, where qualitative features appears, as the numbers/machine already witness in their self- referential discourses. Another argument against numbers being monads is that all monads must be attached to corporeal bodies. Ah? ROGER: By atttached I mean associated with. The association is permanent. Each monad is an individiaul with individual identity given by the corporeal body it is associated with. Its soul. All corporeal bodies are different
Re: The Good, the Bad and the weirdly computable
On 02 Oct 2012, at 07:14, William R. Buckley wrote: $$$ 1) Well it's an indeterminantcy, but which path is chosen is done by the geometry of the location or test probe, not the same I would think as logical choice (?) So I would say no. ... Note that intelligence requires the ability to select. BRUNO: OK. But the ability to selct does not require intelligence, just interaction and some memory. I can make a selection without the use of memory. We call such choices by the term arbitrary William, please look at my answer to Roger. Consciousness selection is a posteriori, and happens in self-duplication (in the comp theory), or in superposition (in the Everett theory). It has nothing to do with choice, which is self-determination. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: The Good, the Bad and the weirdly computable
Hi Bruno Marchal My understanding of personal or subjective or 1p filtering has little to do with where the person is (Washington or Moscow). it has to do (if I might say it this way) with where the person has been. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/2/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-02, 05:34:11 Subject: Re: The Good, the Bad and the weirdly computable Hi Roger, On 01 Oct 2012, at 19:28, Roger Clough wrote: BRUNO: OK. But the ability to selct does not require intelligence, just interaction and some memory. $$ ROGER: No, that's where you keep missing the absolutely critical issue of self. Choice is exclusive to the autonomous self, and is absolutely necessary. Self selects A or B or whatever entirely on its own.. That's what intelligence is. INTELLIGENCE = AUTONOMOUS CHOOSER + CHOICES When you type a response, YOU choose which letter to type, etc. That's an intelligent action. I agree with you on choice. I use the term self-determination in my defense of free will. When I was talking about consciousness selection, it has nothing to do with choice. It was what happen, in the comp theory, when you duplicate yourself in two different place, like Washington and Moscow. After that duplication, when you look at you neighborhood, there is a consciousness or first person selection: you feel to be in W, or you feel to be in M. You have no choice in that matter. Choice is something else entirely, and play no role in the origin and shape of the physical laws, but consciousness selection (which is a form of Turing-tropism (generalization of anthropism)). Selection of a quantum path (collapse or reduction of the jungle of brain wave paths) produces consciousness, according to Penrose et al. They call it orchestrated reduction. . BRUNO: Penrose is hardly convincing on this. Its basic argument based on G del is invalid, and its theory is quite speculative, like the wave collapse, which has never make any sense to me. ROGER: All physical theories (not mathematical theories) are speculative until validated by data. No. All theories are speculative. Period. But when I said quite speculative, I meant no evidence at all, and contradictory with all current evidences. Yes. Atoms are no atoms (in greek t??? means not divisible). $$ROGER: The greeks had no means to split the atom, they hadn't even seen one. The greeks knew that atoms are not divisible, by definition. They didn't knew that atoms exists, nor do we. I use atom in the philosophical sense. The current physical atoms where believed to be such philo atoms, until the discovery of the electron and nucleus. The new physical philosophical atoms are the elementary particles, but they are no more philosophical atoms in string theory. $$$ROGER: The monads are just points but not physical objects. Overlaying them, all of L's reality is just a dimensionless dot. Like the UD. It is a function from nothing to nothing, and as such 0-dimensional. But i don't really believe the geometrical image is useful. With comp it is better to put geometry in the epistemology of numbers, like analysis, infinities, and physics. Keeping the ontology minimal assures that we will not risk reifying unnecessary materials. I'm still trying to figure out how numbers and ideas fit into Leibniz's metaphysics. Little is written about this issue, so I have to rely on what Leibniz says otherwise about monads. BRUNO: OK. I will interpret your monad by intensional number. ROGER: Numbers do not associate to corporeal bodies, so that won't work. What do you mean by corporeal bodies? With comp + the usual Occam razor, corporeal bodies belongs to the mind of numbers (+ infinities of numbers relation). Those less dominant monads are eaten or taken over by the stronger ones. It's a Darwinian jungle down here. Crap happens. BRUNO: Crap happens also in arithmetic when viewed from inside. Contingency is given by selection on the many computational consistent continuation. There are different form of contingencies in arithmetic: one for each modal box having an arithmetical interpretations. In modal logic you can read []p by p is necessary, or true in all (accessible) worlds p by p is possible or true in one (accessible) world ~[]p or ~p by p is contingent (not necessary) What will change from one modal logic to another is the accessibility or the neighborhood relations on the (abstract) worlds. $ ROGER: That's correct, I was incorrectly limiting numbers to necessary logic. OK. Nice. comp reduces the ontology to arithmetic
Re: Re: The Good, the Bad and the weirdly computable
Hi Stephen P. King I appreciate criticisms of Leibniz. Not sure what computational complexity or universality means although I suppose that it has something to do with the whole is greater than its parts. That being so, if we take the parts to be monads, each part knows everything (all of the other monads) in the universe, in which there are an infinite number of monads. So the whole (the monad of monads, the All) in Leibniz is infinitely greater than the parts (its monads and their infinite contents of all the other monads. And that's just the beginning, for Leibniz says that world consists of monads within monads within monads within. Would that overcome your objection ? Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/2/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-02, 00:16:31 Subject: Re: The Good, the Bad and the weirdly computable On 10/1/2012 1:28 PM, Roger Clough wrote: ROGER: Objects can be physical and also infinitely divisible, but L considered this infinite divisibility to disqualify an object to be real because there's no end to the process, one wouldn't end up with something to refer to. Hi Roger, This is part of the thoughts that Leibniz was wrong about since he did not know of computational complexity or universality. His explanations assumed only ideas from the material world. He was an unparalleled genius, there is no doubt of that, but he was far ahead of his time. We can now correct these errors and use the monadology as a mereological model of entities. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
The Good, the Bad and the weirdly computable
Hi Bruno Marchal Responses indicated by $$s Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/1/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-01, 11:26:24 Subject: Re: Numbers vs monads Hi Roger Clough, ### ROGER: Quanta are different from particles. They don't move from A to B along particular paths through space (or even through space), they move through all possible mathematical paths - which is to say that they are everywhere at once- until one particular path is selected by a measurement (or selected by passing through slits). Do you agree with Everett that all path exists, and that the selection might equivalent with a first person indeterminacy? $$$ 1) Well it's an indeterminantcy, but which path is chosen is done by the geometry of the location or test probe, not the same I would think as logical choice (?) So I would say no. ... Note that intelligence requires the ability to select. BRUNO: OK. But the ability to selct does not require intelligence, just interaction and some memory. $$ ROGER: No, that's where you keep missing the absolutely critical issue of self. Choice is exclusive to the autonomous self, and is absolutely necessary. Self selects A or B or whatever entirely on its own.. That's what intelligence is. INTELLIGENCE = AUTONOMOUS CHOOSER + CHOICES When you type a response, YOU choose which letter to type, etc. That's an intelligent action. Selection of a quantum path (collapse or reduction of the jungle of brain wave paths) produces consciousness, according to Penrose et al. They call it orchestrated reduction. . BRUNO: Penrose is hardly convincing on this. Its basic argument based on G del is invalid, and its theory is quite speculative, like the wave collapse, which has never make any sense to me. ROGER: All physical theories (not mathematical theories) are speculative until validated by data. Why would the physical not be infinitely divisible and extensible, especially if not real? ROGER: Objects can be physical and also infinitely divisible, but L considered this infinite divisibility to disqualify an object to be real because there's no end to the process, one wouldn't end up with something to refer to. BRUNO: In comp we end up with what is similar above the substitution level. What we call macro, but which is really only what we can isolate. The picture is of course quite counter-intuitive. Personally. I substitute Heisenberg's uncertainty principle as the basis for this view because the fundamental particles are supposedly divisible. By definition an atom is not divisible, and the atoms today are the elementary particles. Not sure you can divide an electron or a Higgs boson. With comp particles might get the sme explanation as the physicist, as fixed points for some transformation in a universal group or universal symmetrical system. The simple groups, the exceptional groups, the Monster group can play some role there (I speculate). ROGER: You can split an atom because it has parts, reactors do that all of the time. of this particular point, Electrons and other fundamental particles do not have parts. You lost me with the rest of this comment, but that's OK. Yes. Atoms are no atoms (in greek t??? means not divisible). $$ROGER: The greeks had no means to split the atom, they hadn't even seen one. BRUNO: But if string theory is correct even electron are still divisible (conceptually). I still don't know with comp. Normally some observable have a real continuum spectrum. Physical reality cannot be entirely discrete. $$$ROGER: The monads are just points but not physical objects. Overlaying them, all of L's reality is just a dimensionless dot. I'm still trying to figure out how numbers and ideas fit into Leibniz's metaphysics. Little is written about this issue, so I have to rely on what Leibniz says otherwise about monads. BRUNO: OK. I will interpret your monad by intensional number. ROGER: Numbers do not associate to corporeal bodies, so that won't work. BRUNO: let me be explicit on this. I fixe once and for all a universal system: I chose the programming language LISP. Actually, a subset of it: the programs LISP computing only (partial) functions from N to N, with some list representation of the numbers like (0), (S 0), (S S 0), ... I enumerate in lexicographic way all the programs LISP. P_1, P_2, P_3, ... The ith partial computable functions phi_i is the one computed by P_i. I can place on N a new operation, written #, with a # b = phi_a(b), that is the result of the application of
Re: The Good, the Bad and the weirdly computable
On 10/1/2012 1:28 PM, Roger Clough wrote: ROGER: Objects can be physical and also infinitely divisible, but L considered this infinite divisibility to disqualify an object to be real because there's no end to the process, one wouldn't end up with something to refer to. Hi Roger, This is part of the thoughts that Leibniz was wrong about since he did not know of computational complexity or universality. His explanations assumed only ideas from the material world. He was an unparalleled genius, there is no doubt of that, but he was far ahead of his time. We can now correct these errors and use the monadology as a mereological model of entities. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
RE: The Good, the Bad and the weirdly computable
$$$ 1) Well it's an indeterminantcy, but which path is chosen is done by the geometry of the location or test probe, not the same I would think as logical choice (?) So I would say no. ... Note that intelligence requires the ability to select. BRUNO: OK. But the ability to selct does not require intelligence, just interaction and some memory. I can make a selection without the use of memory. We call such choices by the term arbitrary wrb -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
