Re: UDA last question (was UDA step 9 10).
Joel Dobrzelewski wrote: So the Universal Dovetailer simply enumerates all possible states for me. Yes. I prefer to say it generates all computations going through that states(°). Bennett has introduced a nice notion of depth from string, which is grosso modo the runtime to produce it. It is still possible (even probable) that me is deep and you are deep so that the occurence in UD* of you and me can be taken as evidence that we do share a long computation. (°) I see Hal Finney says the same thing. (Whatever me is, is unimportant). And somehow, these states are joined by their similarity to one another, which allows (virtual) motion from one state to the next. I think the relation of similarity, or proximity bears on the computations/histories/dreams. But you are correct. The only way to keep sharing the same deep computation, and thus sharing our domain of undeterminacy, is that the computation is linear in our common ignorance. This will multiply both of us, in some conservative way, and in extremely explosive way. I guess the first person *plural* has it origin in such self multiplication sharing. So, if I am currently sitting in the state of sitting at my desk, I have several realities branching off from this one where in the next moments I am rising from my chair, or still sitting at my desk, or petting a white rabbit. In case comp is true, I'm afraid necessarily so. Note that the existence of QM gives confirming evidence that there is some branching. And perhaps you can guess that comp predicts that any machine looking at her neighborood sufficiently closely, i.e. below her level of substitution will discover some observable weirdness and other continua of parallel computations ... Note that histories can be considered as fusing by difference amnesy. I really hope to succeed in rediscovering the quantum computer through machine's introspection. But I am left with one nagging question. I really hope so Joel. My strongest goal with UDA is to show that computationalism or mechanism does not solve *per se* the mind body problem. Quite the contrary. Before UDA you can believe there is only a consciousness problem, after UDA you got a body problem too. Understanding comp consists in understanding that matter/space /time is necessarily not obvious and must be recovered from the space of all computations as seen as some internal points of views. I told you that my UD or your MUCA or Schmidhuber's Great Programmer, ... are not the solution, there are only steps toward a mathematical *formulation* of the problem. Of course the formulation gives insight, (the reversal)... and that's nothing compare to the arithmetisation of that formulation, weird quantum logics, but that's technical ... (if you know modal logic search for LASE in the archive). 1) Where is Time? Time is *the* first person concept par excellence. It is linked with intuition, consciousness, but also construction, and truth. The arithmetical translation of UDA let me hope that time is captured by the modal logic known in the literature as S4Grz. 1a) What governs the trajectory of one's awareness through all his/her possible states? The geometry generated by the notion of proximity on the (maximal ?) consistent extensions (our alternative completed futures). Or if you prefer, what governs the possible trajectory of awaraness is Schroedinger Equation. Our problem: extract it from the geometry above. 1c) How do I get from one state to another? You 3-don't. You 1-do. This must be related to the geometry above. 1d) Isn't this awareness, and its motion path necessarily outside those states and the Universal Dovetailer? No. But perhaps you are close. A bizare thing is that if someone look at a portion of a representation of UD*, he can say there is, in some sense, no awareness possible in that portion. And this remains true for all finite portions of UD*. The meaning appears only when the whole UD* is considered. This is coherent with the fact that the neighborhood of first person state are defined on that limit. An image is that each instant, each observer moment perhaps, is defined by a trip from the base of the cone (UD*) to the (non existing) top, at infinite speed, just because we cannot be aware of the delays, nor of any initial represention. Since I am into cellular automata, I always assumed that time is implemented naturally... by the automaton... from one tick to the next - just like a movie. That's the integers sequence. No? Can we really assume UD* exists? Unless you are finitist you can realise that with comp you cannot escape its existence. You get UD* once you accept the existence of *all* natural numbers, and all their describable relations. But no problem without changing your mind. Abandoning comp by abandoning arithmetical platonisme is a way like another :-) Doesn't it take Time to execute UD? No. Only a concrete UD, concrete relatively to your most probable histories, will
Re: UDA last question (was UDA step 9 10).
Questions 1) and 1a) have been answered in this article: http://xxx.lanl.gov/abs/math-ph/0008018 Saibal Joel wrote: Bruno and fellow Everythingers... Sorry I've been disconnected for a while. I think Bruno's last message has really helped me to understand the Universal Dovetailer. Some of those computations will generate the 3-states corresponding to my preparing coffe 1-state. Because we accept comp. Now if I prepare a cup of coffee, my brain will go through a sequence of states (third person describable computational state, at the right level of description of myself). and I have pick one of those state---like in a duplication experiment). So the UD generates that state eventually (by going through a computation which emulates my doing or dreaming of doing that cup of coffe). So the Universal Dovetailer simply enumerates all possible states for me. (Whatever me is, is unimportant). And somehow, these states are joined by their similarity to one another, which allows (virtual) motion from one state to the next. So, if I am currently sitting in the state of sitting at my desk, I have several realities branching off from this one where in the next moments I am rising from my chair, or still sitting at my desk, or petting a white rabbit. But I am left with one nagging question: 1) Where is Time? 1a) What governs the trajectory of one's awareness through all his/her possible states? 1b) What defines the current state? 1c) How do I get from one state to another? 1d) Isn't this awareness, and its motion path necessarily outside those states and the Universal Dovetailer? Since I am into cellular automata, I always assumed that time is implemented naturally... by the automaton... from one tick to the next - just like a movie. Can we really assume UD* exists? Doesn't it take Time to execute UD? Joel
Re: UDA last question (was UDA step 9 10).
Levy wrote: Marchal wrote: It is better to read (change in capital): This is of course still countable when you look at the domain from a third person point of view. But, as you aknowledge in question 7, the delays does not count for the first person, so the domain of 1-indeterminacy, which BEARS ON first persons EXPERIENCE is, thanks of that delays elimination, given by the union (which is just the set theoretical interpretation of the or) of all portion of UD* (the execution of the UD, an infinite three dimensional cone in case the UD is implemented in a two dimensional cellular automaton) in which my preparing coffee state appear. (Reread that sentence slowly, I have written it slowly, and without doubts it's too long). So it is a third person measure on first person experiences. iigghhh!! I read the sentence many times and it still does not make sense to me. Should I read it again? Read it three times at breakfast, and one time in the evening jumping the parenthesis. Ok, ok. My diagnostic is that either you have forget the question 7 or 8, (see below) or you are forgetting what the UD does. What is: the union of all portion of UD* in which my preparing coffee state appear. Suppose that the UD is written in Fortran. I guess you know what the trace of a program is. UD* is the infinite trace of the UD. It is describe by the sequence of its subsequent states (as a program fortran). It is an infinite tree describing all possible computations in fortran. (which includes fortran simulation of all program in Lisp, all Fortran simulation of the COBOL version 5.3 emulation of all linear transformations, all the unitary transformations, etc. Some of those computations will generate the 3-states corresponding to my preparing coffe 1-state. Because we accept comp. Now if I prepare a cup of coffee, my brain will go through a sequence of states (third person describable computational state, at the right level of description of myself). and I have pick one of those state---like in a duplication experiment). So the UD generates that state eventually (by going through a computation which emulates my doing or dreaming of doing that cup of coffe). The UD will generates that state eventually. Let us say in 10^googol years (or steps). Our poor universe has disappeared, but we don't care because the UD run in Plato Heaven, or if you prefer, the whole UD* (the trace of the UD) lies staticaly but completely in Plato heaven). UD* is the block mindscape (mindscape borrowed to Rudy Rucker's Infinity and the Mind.). And we don't care of the number of steps and of the time that UD would have take to get that states because, as first person we cannot be aware of those delays. Ok? Please reread ten billions times, after lunch, the question 7 and 8. Especially 8. (copy and past from http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m2992.html below) Note in passing that a copy and paste is a duplication without annhilation of the original. The apparition in UD* of that third person description of the precise state where is my cup now? (occuring when I am preparing my cup of coffee (existing by comp)) is provided by the fact that the UD generates all computations. Saying yes to 7 and 8, makes that event, executed by the UD equivalent with a delayed reconstitution without demolition of the original. So with comp you *must* bet that at each instant you are copy and paste somewhere in your domain of indeterminacy. But, after a much longer time (much longer that 10^googol (the DU *dovetails*, so that it has a lot of work while generating and executing the other programs) it generates a new reconstitution of that states, so he builds little by little your entire domain of 1-indeterminacy. The fact that the DU builds the reconstitutions so slowly does not change the first person experience because of the non awareness of the delay. So when I am preparing my coffee cup, if I want to predict my next possible instant, I must have a measure on the set of computational histories generated by the DU going through the state corresponding to my particular preparing my coffee cup state. Or a measure on all the reconsitution in UD*. We just cannot care that some of those reconstitution appears at step n1, some other at step n2, other at step n3, The domain of reconstitution will be the union of all the portion (subset or substring or subspace, or whatever depending on the choice of representation) ... portion containing the virtual (or arithmetical) reconstitution. Find a LISP interpreteur, run the UD at http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m2793.html If you don't like LISP, write yourself a UD in COBOL (why not) Run it. Stop it after two days. You have a portion of UD*. Stop it after three days, you get a bigger portion of UD*. By comp there is a day it will generate (and reconstitute de facto) my coffee-state of mind (the 3-comp state corresponding for that state which
Re: UDA last question (was UDA step 9 10).
Jacques Mallah wrote: It should be apparent to all that an objective measure is needed on observer-moments. I agree. (if you agree there is a non trivial conditionalisation, entailing a non trivial geometry on the space of observer-moment). I do not call this a 3rd person measure because that would falsely imply the existance of some other type of measure to be a logical possibility. I apologise for having written in my last post to joel: This is of course still countable when you look at the domain from a third person point of view. But, as you aknowledge in question 7, the delays does not count for the first person, so the domain of 1-indeterminacy, which is of course a first person notion, is, thanks of that delays elimination, given by the union (which is just the set theoretical interpretation of the or) of all portion of UD* (the execution of the UD, an infinite three dimensional cone in case the UD is implemented in a two dimensional cellular automaton) in which my preparing coffee state appear. (Reread that sentence slowly, I have written it slowly, and without doubts it's too long). It is better to read (change in capital): This is of course still countable when you look at the domain from a third person point of view. But, as you aknowledge in question 7, the delays does not count for the first person, so the domain of 1-indeterminacy, which BEARS ON first persons EXPERIENCE is, thanks of that delays elimination, given by the union (which is just the set theoretical interpretation of the or) of all portion of UD* (the execution of the UD, an infinite three dimensional cone in case the UD is implemented in a two dimensional cellular automaton) in which my preparing coffee state appear. (Reread that sentence slowly, I have written it slowly, and without doubts it's too long). So it is a third person measure on first person experiences. This is not so important because the modal arithmetical translation i Propose is done at a more abstract level. But ok, I was phrasing things a little to quickly. Bruno
Re: UDA last question (was UDA step 9 10).
Marchal wrote: It is better to read (change in capital): This is of course still countable when you look at the domain from a third person point of view. But, as you aknowledge in question 7, the delays does not count for the first person, so the domain of 1-indeterminacy, which BEARS ON first persons EXPERIENCE is, thanks of that delays elimination, given by the union (which is just the set theoretical interpretation of the or) of all portion of UD* (the execution of the UD, an infinite three dimensional cone in case the UD is implemented in a two dimensional cellular automaton) in which my preparing coffee state appear. (Reread that sentence slowly, I have written it slowly, and without doubts it's too long). So it is a third person measure on first person experiences. iigghhh!! I read the sentence many times and it still does not make sense to me. Should I read it again? What is: the union of all portion of UD* in which my preparing coffee state appear. You define UD* as the the execution of the UD, an infinite three dimensional cone in case the UD is implemented in a two dimensional cellular automaton). Is the cone in space, time, or what? Why three dimensions? Why not four or five? Where are these dimensions coming from? The sentence is not too long... it's just that it assumes too much background. Is it the union of UD* or the union of the outputs of UD*? Is UD* a cellular automaton or is it a set of all cellular automatons with particular properties? How does UD* relate to UD? Is it the complement, the conjugate, the inverse, or what? In any case, the whole issue of restricting an implementation to a particular cellular automaton in any dimensional configuration is abhorrent to me. If finite inputs are considered any automaton can be replaced with a huge look up table. And as any electrical engineer knows, any automaton, Turing machine or computer can be implemented by circuits consisting solely of NAND gates (with additional initialization levels of 0 and 1.) That's it. Just NAND gates. Pure logic. No three dimensional cones or any other kinds of cones. I apologize for having written in my last post to Jacques Mallah, which BEARS ON first persons EXPERIENCE read which BEARS ON first person EXPERIENCES (The s was not exactly at the right place !) Yeah, I sympathize, English sometimes puts s in the singular and no s in the plural! Very confusing. I have the same problems sometime. :-) George
Re: UDA last question (was UDA step 9 10)
Joel: Bruno: But don't we have a contradiction, or something like an empirical contradiction here. I can certainly hope for certain futures, and honestly I think (at least from past experience) that some are more probable than others. For exemple I am now preparing some coffee. I would have the feeling of lying to myself if I was telling you that I do not believe drinking coffee is probable. So something is probable. So, if we maintain comp, we must explain why, after I have done coffee, drinking coffee got an higher degree of probability. We must aknowledge that physicalist do have an explanation here. There is coffee, there is a material machine preparing it, etc. Hmm... I think I see the problem now. But I don't understand your proposed solution. I am glad you begin to see the problem. I have not proposed a solution (yet), I have only try to give an accurate description of the problem. Later I will point onto some strategy to search the solution, which, btw, cannot be proposed. The solution exists or does not exists. If the solution does not exists (provably), then comp is false (refuted). Do you want to 1) make predictions about the future based on past observations, or 2) make predictions about the future based on all possible histories, or 3) something else entirely. Nicely formulated question: it is neither 1), neither 2), neither 3) ! What I want to do ... Well, no: what I'm *obliged* to do (keeping comp) is to explain why 1) seems to work giving that comp force me to accept 2). We must justified something like 2) = 1). Perhaps more precisely: why a third person 2) implies a first person 1). Perhaps that will be clearer below where I will attempt to conclude the UDA less rapidly. In the first case (1), I think I can see how this might be possible. For example, if every 9 out of 10 times you drink the coffee after making it, then you should be able to reasonably conclude that the next time you make coffee, you will most likely drink it. I agree, except that this is what we need to explain. This seems to work in our current simulation because for the most part, our world appears to be mostly predictable. But it will start to fail in worlds where there is little regularity. (e.g. making coffee and drinking coffee almost never happen) So we must explain why, summing on all computational stories, we stabilise on predictable stories. Note also that an expression like our world is unavoidably ambiguous, and strictly speaking cannot be used with comp (through the UDA). But in the second case (2) I can't see how we can make any meaningful predictions since the number of all possible histories is infinite. Yes, even uncountable. But that is not a problem. Measure theory, including Lebesgue integration theory has been invented for dealing with probability on uncountable domains. This is used in elementary (non relativistic) quantum mechanics too. The problem is not even to find an ad hoc measure which makes the white rabbit stories negligeable, but to show that the unique measure forced by UDA (or arithmetical translation of UDA) is such that rabbit stories are (relatively) negligeable in it. In case it is not, comp is refuted. Put in another way, we must derive the laws of physics from computer science. And, through the role of the notion of 1-pov, we must derive physical belief from coherent discourse by machines, or more simply derive physics from (machine) psychology. Do you agree? I'm not sure. I'm still unclear about what you are proposing. I am not proposing anything. I'm just showing that if we are machine then next instants are defined by a (relative) measure put on the set of consistent reconstitutions *as seen by themselves* (the 1-person psychology) generated by the UD. How can we derive physics from psychology? Interesting question. Note that the UDA just show that: if we are machine then we *must* derive physics from psychology (itself, by comp, embedded in number (meta) theory. Mmh... UDA shows more. It shows that your next instant is determined by all computational histories (generated bu the UD) going through your 3-state. Can you give some simple example, like the coffee experiment? Excellent idea! I will make myself a cup of coffee. If you follow me perhaps you can understand why, in case your MUCA is *the* bottom, then we should not postulate that!!! We should prove it, for exemple by showing that the measure behave well only thanks to the infinite MUCAs' work generated in arithmetics (or by any DUs, or in Numberland, as I like to say. No - sorry. I don't understand that either. I think you've lost me. If you really take the comp 1-indeterminisme seriously, perhaps you can guess also why our very finiteness makes us confronting some continuum, and some random oracle, ... Infinite possibilities? I don't know. Remember that you have answered yes to the ten first question. Let us run the UD again, and let us
Re: UDA last question (was UDA step 9 10).
From: Jesse Mazer [EMAIL PROTECTED] Personally, I've never been able to understand the attitude of the anti-measurists--how can anything make sense without one? What possible reason would I have to believe that the future will resemble the past in any way whatsoever? After all, there are an infinite number of possible universes that resemble the one I've experienced up to the present moment, and then suddenly transform into a swarm of white rabbits--should I be bracing myself for such a possibility at every moment? Without some kind of measure on the Plenitude we cannot even talk about the probability that the laws of physics will continue to operate normally a minute from now...you can't really talk about anything but the present moment, in fact. You're right, almost. But what _about_ the present? Without an _objective_ measure on possible experiences, there would be no reason for even the present moment to be as wabbit-free as it is! (e.g. The present moment suggests evolution, etc.) And you can never see the future (maybe you _will_, depending on the definition of you, but you never have yet!), so clearly it is only the present that supplies the info you have to make such Bayesian deductions. In fact it's simpler to define you as just existing now. (Which is not to say your utility function shouldn't care about future guys.) It should be apparent to all that an objective measure is needed on observer-moments. I do not call this a 3rd person measure because that would falsely imply the existance of some other type of measure to be a logical possibility. - - - - - - - Jacques Mallah ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) Physicist / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate I know what no one else knows - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum My URL: http://hammer.prohosting.com/~mathmind/ _ Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com
Re: UDA last question (was UDA step 9 10)
From: Joel Dobrzelewski Hmm... I think I see the problem now. But I don't understand your proposed solution. Do you want to 1) make predictions about the future based on past observations, or 2) make predictions about the future based on all possible histories, or 3) something else entirely. In the first case (1), I think I can see how this might be possible. For example, if every 9 out of 10 times you drink the coffee after making it, then you should be able to reasonably conclude that the next time you make coffee, you will most likely drink it. Similarly, if 99 out of 100 times an electron is deflected away from the nucleus of an atom, then we can be reasonably sure that the next time we fire one into the nucleus, it will be deflected. This seems to work in our current simulation because for the most part, our world appears to be mostly predictable. But it will start to fail in worlds where there is little regularity. (e.g. making coffee and drinking coffee almost never happen) But in the second case (2) I can't see how we can make any meaningful predictions since the number of all possible histories is infinite. That's part of the problem. What do you mean by *our* current simulation? Within the Plenitude there are an infinite number of simulations that resemble this one up to some moment and then suddenly change the laws in crazy ways...if you agreed with the earlier thought-experiment about duplication, in which there's some chance your next moment will be that of any number of different duplicates, then how can you be sure your own next moment will be one in a physics-conserving simulation? All those other simulated Joels living in simulations that are regular up to a given moment but then suddenly transform into whiterabbitland thought the same thing. What basis do you have for thinking you're not one of them? Without some kind of objective measure on the set of all possibilities (or at least all possible 'next moments') we have no sound basis for predicting anything at all. Don't drink that coffee--it might have suddenly turned into hydrochloric acid! Or maybe you'll suddenly find the taste of coffee absolutely revolting, or maybe drinking the coffee will cause you to transform into a stegosaurus...anything's possible, really. Check out this thread I started on the measure problem a while ago, which got some interesting responses: http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/index.html?by=OneThreadt=Global%20measure%20and%20%22one%20structure%2C%20one%20vote%22 _ Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com
Re: UDA last question (was UDA step 9 10)
For the computationalist that simple explanation is not available. For an explanation that preparing coffee augment the degree of plausibility (probability, credibility) of the experience of drinking coffee, the only way is to isolate, from pure arithmetics, a measure on the consistent computational extensions of my preparing coffee-state-history and to show that in most of them (in a sense which need to be define also purely arithmeticaly) I will be drinking coffee. Slurp. (I'm definitely drinking coffee now!). Put in another way, we must derive the laws of physics from computer science. And, through the role of the notion of 1-pov, we must derive physical belief from coherent discourse by machines, or more simply derive physics from (machine) psychology. Do you agree? From some of Joel's other comments I get the feeling that he's one of those who doesn't believe in putting a measure on the set of all possible events, whether it's a universal measure (the absolute probability that one set of events will be experienced vs. some other) or an observer-relative measure (the first-person probability that *I* will experience some future state, given my current state). Is this correct, Joel? Personally, I've never been able to understand the attitude of the anti-measurists--how can anything make sense without one? What possible reason would I have to believe that the future will resemble the past in any way whatsoever? After all, there are an infinite number of possible universes that resemble the one I've experienced up to the present moment, and then suddenly transform into a swarm of white rabbits--should I be bracing myself for such a possibility at every moment? Without some kind of measure on the Plenitude we cannot even talk about the probability that the laws of physics will continue to operate normally a minute from now...you can't really talk about anything but the present moment, in fact. _ Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com
