Re: copy method important?
Le 24-juin-05, à 01:03, Brent Meeker a écrit : And then I recall I gave an exercise: show that with comp the no-cloning theorem can easily be justified a priori from comp. As I said this follows easily from the Universal dovetailer Argument. But the UDA and the comp-hypothesis are not the same thing. No but the UDA presuppose the comp hyp, and, unless I am wrong, the comp hyp entails the conclusion of the UDA. The argument shows that physical observable reality (relatively to what you decide to measure here and now) emerges as an average on all computations (generated by the UD) going through your actual state. Suppose now that you decide to observe yourself with at a finer and finer level of description. At some moment you will begin to observe yourself at a level below you substitution level (which I recall is the level where you survive through copy). How do you know you can observe that level? What would it mean not being able to observe that level? Mmh ... I can observe anything, I mean I can look at anything, I will "observe" the result of my experience, being perhaps fuzzy, indeterminate, multiple, etc. Below that level comp predict you will be confronted with the 1-comp indeterminacy, that is you will "see" the many computation/histories. If comp predicts that then it seems to involve a self-contradiction. It implies that there was no substitution level after all. But it does look like in QM, no? If we try to observe, very indirectly perhaps, some isolate piece of reality, doesn'it looking like observing the "parallel" realities. I think that is what David Deutsch has try to do by explaining that the Young two holes can be interpreted as a mean to accept the many worlds. Do you think the many worlds idea is contradictory? Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
RE: copy method important?
>-Original Message- >From: Bruno Marchal [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] >Sent: Monday, June 20, 2005 1:33 PM >To: Norman Samish >Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com >Subject: Re: copy method important? > > > >Le 18-juin-05, à 20:36, Norman Samish a écrit : > > >> I'm no physicist, but doesn't Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle forbid >> making exact quantum-level measurements, hence exact copies? If so, >> then >> all this talk of making exact copies is fantasy. > > >Many good answers has been given. And my comment will overlap some of >them. > >The most physicalist one is to referindeed to Tegmark's paper where he >justifies by Everett/decoherence that the evidence is that our brain, >when seen as an information handling computing machine, acts as a >classical machine. But comp makes physicalism wrong, and Tegmark's >answer cannot be "fundamentally" genuine. > > The importance of quantum decoherence in brain processes >M Tegmark 2000, quant-ph/9907009, Phys. Rev. E 61, 4194-4206 > 161 Why the brain is probably not a quantum computer >M Tegmark 2000, Information Sciences 128, 155-179 > > > >Then, concerning the comp 1-person indeterminacy, even if my >computational state is a quantum states, the Universal Dovetailer >Argument (UDA) is still going through. This is a consequence of the >fact that quantum computation does not violate Church's thesis. That >entails that you can simulate a quantum computer with a classical >computer. Sure, there is a relative exponential slow-down of the >computation, but this is not relevant because the universal dovetailer >is naturally slow down by its heavy dovetailing behavior, and then the >first person cannot be aware of that slow down. > >And then I recall I gave an exercise: show that with comp the >no-cloning theorem can easily be justified a priori from comp. As I >said this follows easily from the Universal dovetailer Argument. But the UDA and the comp-hypothesis are not the same thing. >The >argument shows that physical observable reality (relatively to what you >decide to measure here and now) emerges as an average on all >computations (generated by the UD) going through your actual state. >Suppose now that you decide to observe yourself with at a finer and >finer level of description. At some moment you will begin to observe >yourself at a level below you substitution level (which I recall is the >level where you survive through copy). How do you know you can observe that level? >Below that level comp predict >you will be confronted with the 1-comp indeterminacy, that is you will >"see" the many computation/histories. If comp predicts that then it seems to involve a self-contradiction. It implies that there was no substitution level after all. Brent Meeker
Re: copy method important?
Tom Caylor writes: [quoting Stathis Papaioannou] But I don't really understand your objection: are you disagreeing that your consciousness will continue as long as there is a successor OM somewhere, or are you disagreeing that there will be a successor OM somewhere if everything exists, or are you simply disagreeing that everything exists? < end quote I'm disagreeing that your consciousness will "continue" as long as there is a successor OM somewhere. You have to consider the possibility that the instances where there is a successor OM somewhere makes up a subset of measure zero of the set needed for continued consciousness, whatever that is. Of course this even assumes that our consciousness can even jump across whatever boundaries there may be there, e.g. between universes. And as I said before, I don't think that our identity is dependent on consciousness anyway, so I'm basically playing the devil's advocate in general when it comes to talking about the need and means of continued consciousness. I'm thinking on a future post having to do with this, and good experiences vs. bad experiences. I must have missed the post where you said our identity is not dependent on consciousness. How could this possibly be so? Are you suggesting that two people can be identical and yet have completely different minds, memories etc.? As for a successor OM having measure zero, why would this not be a problem if the successor OM occurs in the same physical brain? How could it possibly make any difference if it occurred a very long way away? If someone built an Apple Mac Powerbook exactly to factory specifications, but in a billion years time in the Andromeda Galaxy, wouldn't you expect it to work exactly the same as the ones currently built by Apple? How is it even theoretically possible that a copy of you exact in every detail could be distinguished from the original? --Stathis Papaioannou _ Have fun with your mobile! Ringtones, wallpapers, games and more. http://fun.mobiledownloads.com.au/191191/index.wl
Re: copy method important?
Tom wrote: quote: > I'm disagreeing that your consciousness will "continue" as long as there is a successor OM somewhere. You have to consider the possibility that the instances where there is a successor OM somewhere makes up a subset of measure zero of the set needed for continued consciousness, whatever that is. Of course this even assumes that our consciousness can even jump across whatever boundaries there may be there, e.g. between universes. And as I said before, I don't think that our identity is dependent on consciousness anyway, so I'm basically playing the devil's advocate in general when it comes to talking about the need and means of continued consciousness. I'm thinking on a future post having to do with this, and good experiences vs. bad experiences. < end quote Correction of a sort: You have to consider the possibility that the instances where there is a successor OM somewhere makes up a subset of measure zero of the set of successor events, whatever that is. Tom Caylor
Re: copy method important?
Stathis wrote: quote:> I don't think Hal Finney was agreeing with me, I think he was pointing out how absurd my position was to lead to this conclusion! But I don't really understand your objection: are you disagreeing that your consciousness will continue as long as there is a successor OM somewhere, or are you disagreeing that there will be a successor OM somewhere if everything exists, or are you simply disagreeing that everything exists? < end quote I'm disagreeing that your consciousness will "continue" as long as there is a successor OM somewhere. You have to consider the possibility that the instances where there is a successor OM somewhere makes up a subset of measure zero of the set needed for continued consciousness, whatever that is. Of course this even assumes that our consciousness can even jump across whatever boundaries there may be there, e.g. between universes. And as I said before, I don't think that our identity is dependent on consciousness anyway, so I'm basically playing the devil's advocate in general when it comes to talking about the need and means of continued consciousness. I'm thinking on a future post having to do with this, and good experiences vs. bad experiences. Tom Caylor
Re: copy method important?
Tom Caylor writes: Stathis wrote: > How is this basically different to surviving the next minute? You are *far* more likely to be dead almost everywhere in the universe than you are to be alive. The "common sense" answer to this would be that you survive the next minute due to the continuous existence of your physical body. But once you accept that this is not necessary for survival, because as we have discussed before your physical body completely changes over time, and because if something like teleportation were possible it would mean destroying your body in one place and rebuilding it in a different place, possibly also a different time, then I think the conclusion above is inevitable. The only way you could *not* be immortal is if there is no successor OM after your earthly demise, anywhere or ever. In fact, Stathis, you and Hal concluded that everyone is immortal (in the "death" thread). I take this to mean that every person that is associated with every OM is immortal, since every OM has a successor. This implies to me that we don't need to worry about copying, or which copying method is good for creating more successor OMs, since we are guaranteed to always have a successor OM. It sounds like this discussion probably would go into dividing in infinity of one cardinality by an infinity with another cardinality. This is very problematic to say the least, since you have to get the cardinalities of both infinities right. This leads me to believe that the chances of coming up with the right answer are almost like the chances of coming up with the right answer to a problem by dividing by zero. I don't think Hal Finney was agreeing with me, I think he was pointing out how absurd my position was to lead to this conclusion! But I don't really understand your objection: are you disagreeing that your consciousness will continue as long as there is a successor OM somewhere, or are you disagreeing that there will be a successor OM somewhere if everything exists, or are you simply disagreeing that everything exists? I should add that immortality by this mechanism (or probably any other) will not necessarily involve frolicking in paradise for eternity. It may involve extreme unpleasantness, or you may progressively become more and more demented until your consciousness sort of fizzles out, for example. That is why it is important to do all the normal things people do to make life better for themselves and their descendants. What you want to do is increase the relative measure of good experiences and/or decrease the relative measure of bad experiences. --Stathis Papaioannou _ SEEK: Over 80,000 jobs across all industries at Australia's #1 job site. http://ninemsn.seek.com.au?hotmail
Re: copy method important?
Quentin wrote: > Hi,> Le Lundi 20 Juin 2005 18:21, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :>> What feature of the universe(s) causes you to be able to say that the dead>> OM continues to be conscious rather than continues to be dead? >> An OM (Observer Moment) by definition must contains a conscious observer... If > it's not the case... I don't understand the concept at all.>>Quentin Thanks, Quentin. I should rephrase my question to Stathis: What feature of the universe(s) causes you [or anyone] to be able to say that the dead [person] continues to be conscious rather than continues to be dead? Aren't there just as many universes (or more?) or future moments in this universe, where there is no conscious [person with that identity]? It seems like it's a wash (unknown) when it comes to being able to claim the existence of immortality or not, based on that type of argument. Staphis wrote:> How is this basically different to surviving the next minute? You are *far* more likely to be dead almost everywhere in the universe than you are to be alive. The "common sense" answer to this would be that you survive the next mimute due to the continuous existence of your physical body. But once you accept that this is not necessary for survival, because as we have discussed before your physical body completely changes over time, and because if something like teleportation were possible it would mean destroying your body in one place and rebuilding it in a different place, possibly also a different time, then I think the conclusion above is inevitable. The only way you could *not* be immortal is if there is no successor OM after your earthly demise, anywhere or ever. In fact, Staphis, you and Hal concluded that everyone is immortal (in the "death" thread). I take this to mean that every person that is associated with every OM is immortal, since every OM has a successor. This implies to me that we don't need to worry about copying, or which copying method is good for creating more successor OMs, since we are guaranteed to always have a successor OM. It sounds like this discussion probably would go into dividing in infinity of one cardinality by an infinity with another cardinality. This is very problematic to say the least, since you have to get the cardinalities of both infinities right. This leads me to believe that the chances of coming up with the right answer are almost like the chances of coming up with the right answer to a problem by dividing by zero. Tom Caylor
Re: copy method important?
Tom Caylor wrote: Stathis wrote: >Scouring the universe to find an exact copy of RM's favourite marble may seem a very inefficient method of duplication, but when it comes to conscious observers in search of a successor OM, the obvious but nonetheless amazing fact is that nobody needs to search or somehow bring the the observer and the OM together: if the successor OM exists anywhere in the plenitude, then the mere fact of its existence means that the observer's consciousness will continue. What feature of the universe(s) causes you to be able to say that the dead OM continues to be conscious rather than continues to be dead? Aren't there just as many universes (or more?) or future moments in this universe, where there is no conscious OM? It seems like it's a wash (unknown) when it comes to being able to claim the existence of immortality or not, based on that type of argument. How is this basically different to surviving the next minute? You are *far* more likely to be dead almost everywhere in the universe than you are to be alive. The "common sense" answer to this would be that you survive the next mimute due to the continuous existence of your physical body. But once you accept that this is not necessary for survival, because as we have discussed before your physical body completely changes over time, and because if something like teleportation were possible it would mean destroying your body in one place and rebuilding it in a different place, possibly also a different time, then I think the conclusion above is inevitable. The only way you could *not* be immortal is if there is no successor OM after your earthly demise, anywhere or ever. --Stathis Papaioannou _ Have fun with your mobile! Ringtones, wallpapers, games and more. http://fun.mobiledownloads.com.au/191191/index.wl
Re: copy method important?
Hi, Le Lundi 20 Juin 2005 18:21, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : > What feature of the universe(s) causes you to be able to say that the dead > OM continues to be conscious rather than continues to be dead? An OM (Observer Moment) by definition must contains a conscious observer... If it's not the case... I don't understand the concept at all. Quentin
Re: copy method important?
Stathis wrote: >Scouring the universe to find an exact copy of RM's favourite marble may seem a very inefficient method of duplication, but when it comes to conscious observers in search of a successor OM, the obvious but nonetheless amazing fact is that nobody needs to search or somehow bring the the observer and the OM together: if the successor OM exists anywhere in the plenitude, then the mere fact of its existence means that the observer's consciousness will continue. What feature of the universe(s) causes you to be able to say that the dead OM continues to be conscious rather than continues to be dead? Aren't there just as many universes (or more?) or future moments in this universe, where there is no conscious OM? It seems like it's a wash (unknown) when it comes to being able to claim the existence of immortality or not, based on that type of argument. Tom Caylor
Re: copy method important?
Le 18-juin-05, à 20:36, Norman Samish a écrit : I'm no physicist, but doesn't Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle forbid making exact quantum-level measurements, hence exact copies? If so, then all this talk of making exact copies is fantasy. Many good answers has been given. And my comment will overlap some of them. The most physicalist one is to referindeed to Tegmark's paper where he justifies by Everett/decoherence that the evidence is that our brain, when seen as an information handling computing machine, acts as a classical machine. But comp makes physicalism wrong, and Tegmark's answer cannot be "fundamentally" genuine. The importance of quantum decoherence in brain processes M Tegmark 2000, quant-ph/9907009, Phys. Rev. E 61, 4194-4206 161 Why the brain is probably not a quantum computer M Tegmark 2000, Information Sciences 128, 155-179 Then, concerning the comp 1-person indeterminacy, even if my computational state is a quantum states, the Universal Dovetailer Argument (UDA) is still going through. This is a consequence of the fact that quantum computation does not violate Church's thesis. That entails that you can simulate a quantum computer with a classical computer. Sure, there is a relative exponential slow-down of the computation, but this is not relevant because the universal dovetailer is naturally slow down by its heavy dovetailing behavior, and then the first person cannot be aware of that slow down. And then I recall I gave an exercise: show that with comp the no-cloning theorem can easily be justified a priori from comp. As I said this follows easily from the Universal dovetailer Argument. The argument shows that physical observable reality (relatively to what you decide to measure here and now) emerges as an average on all computations (generated by the UD) going through your actual state. Suppose now that you decide to observe yourself with at a finer and finer level of description. At some moment you will begin to observe yourself at a level below you substitution level (which I recall is the level where you survive through copy). Below that level comp predict you will be confronted with the 1-comp indeterminacy, that is you will "see" the many computation/histories. Now that is strictly speaking an infinite set , and there is no reason at all, a priori, that this set is a computational object, so there is no reason at all you could duplicate exactly. Here you can appreciate the difference between Schmidhuber's comp and "my" comp. In Schmidhuber's comp the "physical" universe is a computational object and there is no 1-indeterminacy, and non-cloning is rather mysterious. "My" comp is the more humble bet that "I" am a computational object. With "my" comp, I (first person) bet on the existence of a level of substitution for some 3 description of my body (that is a first person says "yes" to its doctor when the doctor proposes a substitution of his body by *some* digital machine). Then, what the UDA shows is that the universe, whatever it is, cannot be a computational object, and no piece of "real (observable)" matter can be cloned, a priori. Logically, it is still logically possible that the theoretical computer science constraints makes this reasoning invalid, but this would be a consequence of a sort of an arithmetical conspiracy. (Given that the logic of observable proposition *is* already proved to be highly NOT boolean and even quantum-like, but ok here I am in the arithmetical translation of the UDA: note that I am introducing the combinators to just been able to interview the Lobian machine on the non-cloning question, and also on the complete reversibility of the laws of physics). The easy (not quite rigorous) proof of the non-cloning theorem from comp shows that the QM non cloning can be seen (retrospectively, sure) as a confirmation of comp. Here is another exercise (a little bit less easy): show that the fact we can test experimentally and share with each other such non-cloning behavior would confirm, not only comp, but would vindicate the differentiation between the 1-person point of view, and the 1-person plural point of view (I just mention it in my post to Jonathan): for a computationalist the observability of non cloning is an evidence against solipsism! (well the observability of QM indeterminacy also, and is perhaps more easy to use). It is also an evidence that we share the level of substitution. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: copy method important?
George Levy writes: Psychological copying is much less stringent than Physical copying. It requires that the person being copied feels the same as the original, "a la Turing test." This introduce the intriguing possibility of psychological indeterminacy which allows me to regard myself as the same person this evening as I was this morning, even though I am actually physically strictly different. Psychological indeterminacy support COMP and the associated experiments between Brussels, Washington and Moscow and is not restricted by the Quantum Non-Cloning Theorem. Psychological indeterminacy also raises the question of how different should I be until I become someone else. How big am "I"? Yes, and the answer to the question "how different should I be until I become someone else" is ultimately arbitrary. One neo-Lockean theory in the philosophy of personal identity (I forget which philosopher this is due to, perhaps someone could enlighten me) goes like this: there are three individuals A, B, C at three sequential times t1, t2, t3 respectively. C has no recollection of ever being A or anything about A's experiences; however, B recalls something about being A, and C recalls something about being B. Therefore, with this partial transfer of memories, we can say that A and C were actually the same person. This allows us to maintain that a person with failing memory remains the same person. However, it also allows us to say that any arbitrary person X at time t1 was identical with any other arbitrary and apparently unrelated person Y at a later time t2, provided that suitable intermediates could be found between t1 and t2. --Stathis Papaioannou _ Sell your car for $9 on carpoint.com.au http://www.carpoint.com.au/sellyourcar
Re: copy method important?
In the thought experiments I have recently proposed, I should have specified *functionally* exact copies. Millions of neurons die in a normal adult brain every day, and generally this loss isn't even noticed, so the sort of detail which would make the uncertainty principle a significant consideration would be *way* below the acceptable noise level. However, as Brent Meeker recently pointed out, even disregarding quantum effects, classical chaos would cause two initially identical brains to diverge greatly within a very short time period. It therefore looks like the only practical way to have two or more minds running perfectly synchronised with each other would be to run them in parallel as AI's in a virtual environment. Although setting out to make a perfect copy of a human brain may prove impossible, RM's post raises the interesting question of whether it could just happen naturally. Many years ago, before I had heard of the Everett MWI, it occurred to me that if time and/or space were infinite and non-repeating, then it was certain that somewhere in the universe there would arise a copy or analogue of my brain at the moment of my earthly demise (that is, a successor observer moment), thus ensuring that my consciousness would continue. It might take zillions of years, but when you're dead you can afford to wait. The existence of a multiverse (or larger mathematical structures which contain it) can only add weight to this idea, although it might be subject to the same criticisms attracted by the QTI. Scouring the universe to find an exact copy of RM's favourite marble may seem a very inefficient method of duplication, but when it comes to conscious observers in search of a successor OM, the obvious but nonetheless amazing fact is that nobody needs to search or somehow bring the the observer and the OM together: if the successor OM exists anywhere in the plenitude, then the mere fact of its existence means that the observer's consciousness will continue. --Stathis Papaioannou Norman Samish writes: I'm no physicist, but doesn't Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle forbid making exact quantum-level measurements, hence exact copies? If so, then all this talk of making exact copies is fantasy. Norman Samish ~ - Original Message - From: "rmiller" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; Sent: Saturday, June 18, 2005 10:05 AM Subject: copy method important? All, Though we're not discussing entanglement per se, some of these examples surely meet the criteria. So, my thought question for the day: is the method of copying important? Example #1: we start with a single marble, A. Then, we magically create a copy, marble B--perfectly like marble B in every way. . .that is, the atoms are configured similarly, the interaction environment is the same--and they are indistinguishable from one another. Example #2: we start with a single marble A. Then, instead of magically creating a copy, we search the universe, Tegmarkian-style, and locate a second marble, B that is perfectly equivalent to our original marble A. All tests both magically avoid QM decoherence problems and show that our newfound marble is, in fact, indistinguishable in every way from our original. Here's the question: Are the properties of the *relationship* between Marbles A and B in Example #1 perfectly equivalent to those in Example #2? If the criteria involves simply analysis of configurations at a precise point in time, it would seem the answer must be "yes." On the other hand, if the method by which the marbles were created is crucial to the present configuration, then the answer would be "no." R. Miller -- No virus found in this incoming message. Checked by AVG Anti-Virus. Version: 7.0.323 / Virus Database: 267.7.8/22 - Release Date: 6/17/2005 _ Single? Start dating at Lavalife. Try our 7 day FREE trial! http://lavalife9.ninemsn.com.au/clickthru/clickthru.act?context=an99&locale=en_AU&a=19179
Re: copy method important?
On Sat, Jun 18, 2005 at 02:02:01PM -0700, "Hal Finney" wrote: > In practice most people believe that consciousness does not depend > critically on quantum states, so making a copy of a person's mind would > not be affected by these considerations. It is interesting that there is still no publicly avialable FAQ on the nature of identity, given how often exactly the same issues come up, over the years. -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE signature.asc Description: Digital signature
Re: copy method important?
At 11:23 PM 6/18/2005, George Levy wrote: rmiller wrote: my thought question for the day: is the method of copying important? Example #1: we start with a single marble, A. Then, we magically create a copy, marble B--perfectly like marble B in every way. . .that is, the atoms are configured similarly, the interaction environment is the same--and they are indistinguishable from one another. Example #2: we start with a single marble A. Then, instead of magically creating a copy, we search the universe, Tegmarkian-style, and locate a second marble, B that is perfectly equivalent to our original marble A. I distinguish between two kinds of copying: physical copying and psychological copying. (snip) Psychological indeterminacy support COMP and the associated experiments between Brussels, Washington and Moscow and is not restricted by the Quantum Non-Cloning Theorem. Psychological indeterminacy also raises the question of how different should I be until I become someone else. How big am "I"? George Levy RMiller: While my copy thought problem of mine was a lame attempt to drag Bohm into the picture (hidden variables revealed as specific histories) , George raises an interesting point re psychological copying. The behavioral construct obviously changes with time, yet has a relatively static core--that is, we tend to return to old habits and ways of doing things. Given the dynamic nature of the system itself, based as it is upon electrons traveling through neurons and across synapses--changing through time, why should patterns persist at all? In other words, why shouldn't we be reconstituted as someone completely different on a minute-by-minute basis? What is the basis for the set of recurrent patterns that seem to define the behavioral "set" over great periods of time? Obviously some of it is defined by the way the circuitry is hard-wired, but even so, some areas are occasionally "diked off" (to use a coding phrase) for years at a time---only to recur later. Approaching it from a slightly different angle, some pretty clever experiments have shown that our behavior system is modular, or as Robert Ornstein (Roots of Consciousness) suggested, we're composed of sub-personalities that "wheel" around to the foreground as conditions permit. It's why we can listen to a radio *and* think about a film we saw a few weeks ago *as* we drive through heavy traffic on the way to work. Hilgard suggested that the sub-personalities are corralled by the "hidden observer" which takes on the "executive function" of deciding who takes over and when---based, again, on conditions. My question has always been--how much does the hidden observer actually "know" about the environment(s) prior to making the decisions? Additionally, I would imagine Stathis has quite a bit to say about this, and of course, I'd appreciate his comments as well. R. Miller
Re: copy method important?
rmiller wrote: my thought question for the day: is the method of copying important? Example #1: we start with a single marble, A. Then, we magically create a copy, marble B--perfectly like marble B in every way. . .that is, the atoms are configured similarly, the interaction environment is the same--and they are indistinguishable from one another. Example #2: we start with a single marble A. Then, instead of magically creating a copy, we search the universe, Tegmarkian-style, and locate a second marble, B that is perfectly equivalent to our original marble A. I distinguish between two kinds of copying: physical copying and psychological copying. Physical copying requires that all consistent histories be maintained. These histories form a causal (light) cone leading to the object. Clearly it is impossible to replicate the same causal cone within our visible universe since the use of a copy machine would by definition, introduce a different causal cone. A perfect copy may still be possible beyond the visible universe since an identical causal cone could exist there without interfeing with the causal cone here. In addition, Quantum Theory has a non-cloning theorem that prevents the exact copying of the same quantum states. These arguments shoot down the COMP experiments that Bruno was proposing, such as being dematerialized in Brussels and copied in Washington or Moscow. Essentially he would have to change his experiment to such that you are dematerialized in Brussels in this visible universe and are rematerialized in a different Brussels beyond our visible universe where you already exist by the way, so actually no transfer of energy or information is required. All is required is the transfer of the attention of the observer from one place to another but identical place. So the transfer appears from an observer's point of view to be no transfer at all. You may want to relax the requirement of an identical causal cone as long as the result is an identical object. But then you must define the object's boundaries and abandon the strict and small scale precision of Quantum Mechanics. This leads us to Psychological copying. Psychological copying is much less stringent than Physical copying. It requires that the person being copied feels the same as the original, "a la Turing test." This introduce the intriguing possibility of psychological indeterminacy which allows me to regard myself as the same person this evening as I was this morning, even though I am actually physically strictly different. Psychological indeterminacy support COMP and the associated experiments between Brussels, Washington and Moscow and is not restricted by the Quantum Non-Cloning Theorem. Psychological indeterminacy also raises the question of how different should I be until I become someone else. How big am "I"? George Levy
RE: copy method important?
>-Original Message- >From: Norman Samish [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] >Sent: Saturday, June 18, 2005 11:20 PM >To: everything-list@eskimo.com >Subject: Re: copy method important? > > >Hal, >Isn't it possible that decision processes of the brain, hence >consciousness, DOES depend critically on quantum states? >My understanding of the workings of the brain is that my action, whether >thought or deed, is determined by whether or not certain neurons fire. This >depends on many other neurons. So the brain can be in a state of delicate >balance, where it could be impossible to predict whether or not the neuron >fires. >We all have to make decisions where the pluses apparently equal the >minuses. It would take very little to tip the balance one way or the other. >Perhaps, at the deepest level, the route we take depends on whether an >electron has left or right polarization, or some other quantum property - >which we agree can't be measured. >If this is true, then perhaps Free Will (or at least behavior that is, >in principle, unpredictable) does exist. >Norman Certainly the processes of the brain might be influenced this way or that by random events; but as Tegmark showed the randomness from the environment (i.e. thermal random motion) is orders of magnitude higher than the intrinsic quantum randomness. So you don't need to posit quantum randomness to avoid the predicament of Buridan's ass. Brent Meeker
Re: copy method important?
Norman Samish writes: > Isn't it possible that decision processes of the brain, hence > consciousness, DOES depend critically on quantum states? Yes, it's possible. There is a school of thought which advances this position. Penrose, Hamerhoff are a couple of the names, off the top of my head. There is an extensive literature on the subject to which you could find some entries via Google. I just did so and found archives of a mailing list called QUANTUM-MIND which is all about this subject. Nevertheless I think it is safe to say that the opposite opinion is more widespread, that the mind does not depend critically on any quantum property. One of the main reasons is that quantum coherence is very difficult to maintain outside of carefully prepared laboratory conditions. Another point is that our models of neurons do not require quantum behavior, yet computer simulations suggest that they can learn patterns and respond in meaningful ways similar to actual neural tissue. Of course we are far from being able to simulate anything at the level of consciousness, but so far there is nothing observable about neural behavior that suggests nonclassical effects. > My understanding of the workings of the brain is that my action, whether > thought or deed, is determined by whether or not certain neurons fire. This > depends on many other neurons. So the brain can be in a state of delicate > balance, where it could be impossible to predict whether or not the neuron > fires. > We all have to make decisions where the pluses apparently equal the > minuses. It would take very little to tip the balance one way or the other. > Perhaps, at the deepest level, the route we take depends on whether an > electron has left or right polarization, or some other quantum property - > which we agree can't be measured. I think it is doubtful that neurons often get into a condition where they are so delicately balanced that a single electron could make a difference. There are a lot of electrons in a neuron! But even if it did happen, it wouldn't mean that the neuron *depends* on this effect. A simulation of a brain that was non-quantum might not behave 100% the same as the real brain being modelled, but it would probably work ok. By their nature, brains need to be robust and immune to disturbances. Neurons are constantly dying, their internals assaulted by changes in blood chemistry, but the brain keeps chugging away. It's not exactly a delicate flower. Again, this is exactly the opposite of the quantum behavior we observe in the lab, which is extremely sensitive and gets messed up if you look at it funny. > If this is true, then perhaps Free Will (or at least behavior that is, > in principle, unpredictable) does exist. Right, well, for many people, being at the mercy of unpredictable and uncontrollable randomness may be free but it's hardly willful. Hal Finney
Re: copy method important?
Hal, Isn't it possible that decision processes of the brain, hence consciousness, DOES depend critically on quantum states? My understanding of the workings of the brain is that my action, whether thought or deed, is determined by whether or not certain neurons fire. This depends on many other neurons. So the brain can be in a state of delicate balance, where it could be impossible to predict whether or not the neuron fires. We all have to make decisions where the pluses apparently equal the minuses. It would take very little to tip the balance one way or the other. Perhaps, at the deepest level, the route we take depends on whether an electron has left or right polarization, or some other quantum property - which we agree can't be measured. If this is true, then perhaps Free Will (or at least behavior that is, in principle, unpredictable) does exist. Norman - Original Message - From: ""Hal Finney"" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Saturday, June 18, 2005 2:02 PM Subject: Re: copy method important? > I'm no physicist, but doesn't Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle forbid > making exact quantum-level measurements, hence exact copies? If so, then > all this talk of making exact copies is fantasy. > Norman Samish You can't *specifically* copy a quantum state, but you can create systems in *every possible* quantum state (of a finite size), hence you can make an ensemble which contains a copy of a given quantum system. You can't say which specific item in the ensemble is the copy, but you can make a copy. That may or may not be sufficient for a particular thought experiment to go forward. In practice most people believe that consciousness does not depend critically on quantum states, so making a copy of a person's mind would not be affected by these considerations. Hal Finney
Re: copy method important?
> I'm no physicist, but doesn't Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle forbid > making exact quantum-level measurements, hence exact copies? If so, then > all this talk of making exact copies is fantasy. > Norman Samish You can't *specifically* copy a quantum state, but you can create systems in *every possible* quantum state (of a finite size), hence you can make an ensemble which contains a copy of a given quantum system. You can't say which specific item in the ensemble is the copy, but you can make a copy. That may or may not be sufficient for a particular thought experiment to go forward. In practice most people believe that consciousness does not depend critically on quantum states, so making a copy of a person's mind would not be affected by these considerations. Hal Finney
Re: copy method important?
You ca still create two identical systems starting from another system. E.g. in stimulated emission two photons are created in the same state. Another example is a Bose Einstein condensate, in which all the atoms are in the same state. Note that you can still teleport an unknown quantum state despite Heisenberg's uncertainty principle (you do this without measuring the state). It can be shown that you can't copy an unknown quantum state, because that would violate the Schrodinger equation. Saibal - Defeat Spammers by launching DDoS attacks on Spam-Websites: http://www.hillscapital.com/antispam/ - Original Message - From: "Norman Samish" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Saturday, June 18, 2005 08:36 PM Subject: Re: copy method important? > I'm no physicist, but doesn't Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle forbid > making exact quantum-level measurements, hence exact copies? If so, then > all this talk of making exact copies is fantasy. > Norman Samish > ~ > - Original Message - > From: "rmiller" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > To: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; > <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; > Sent: Saturday, June 18, 2005 10:05 AM > Subject: copy method important? > > > All, > Though we're not discussing entanglement per se, some of these examples > surely meet the criteria. So, my thought question for the day: is the > method of copying important? > Example #1: we start with a single marble, A. Then, we magically > create a copy, marble B--perfectly like marble B in every way. . .that is, > the atoms are configured similarly, the interaction environment is the > same--and they are indistinguishable from one another. > Example #2: we start with a single marble A. Then, instead of > magically creating a copy, we search the universe, Tegmarkian-style, and > locate a second marble, B that is perfectly equivalent to our original > marble A. All tests both magically avoid QM decoherence problems and show > that our newfound marble is, in fact, indistinguishable in every way from > our original. > Here's the question: Are the properties of the *relationship* > between Marbles A and B in Example #1 perfectly equivalent to those in > Example #2? > If the criteria involves simply analysis of configurations at a > precise point in time, it would seem the answer must be "yes." On the > other hand, if the method by which the marbles were created is crucial to > the present configuration, then the answer would be "no." > > R. Miller > > > > > > > > > -- > No virus found in this incoming message. > Checked by AVG Anti-Virus. > Version: 7.0.323 / Virus Database: 267.7.8/22 - Release Date: 6/17/2005 > >
Re: copy method important?
I'm no physicist, but doesn't Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle forbid making exact quantum-level measurements, hence exact copies? If so, then all this talk of making exact copies is fantasy. Norman Samish ~ - Original Message - From: "rmiller" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; Sent: Saturday, June 18, 2005 10:05 AM Subject: copy method important? All, Though we're not discussing entanglement per se, some of these examples surely meet the criteria. So, my thought question for the day: is the method of copying important? Example #1: we start with a single marble, A. Then, we magically create a copy, marble B--perfectly like marble B in every way. . .that is, the atoms are configured similarly, the interaction environment is the same--and they are indistinguishable from one another. Example #2: we start with a single marble A. Then, instead of magically creating a copy, we search the universe, Tegmarkian-style, and locate a second marble, B that is perfectly equivalent to our original marble A. All tests both magically avoid QM decoherence problems and show that our newfound marble is, in fact, indistinguishable in every way from our original. Here's the question: Are the properties of the *relationship* between Marbles A and B in Example #1 perfectly equivalent to those in Example #2? If the criteria involves simply analysis of configurations at a precise point in time, it would seem the answer must be "yes." On the other hand, if the method by which the marbles were created is crucial to the present configuration, then the answer would be "no." R. Miller -- No virus found in this incoming message. Checked by AVG Anti-Virus. Version: 7.0.323 / Virus Database: 267.7.8/22 - Release Date: 6/17/2005
copy method important?
All, Though we're not discussing entanglement per se, some of these examples surely meet the criteria. So, my thought question for the day: is the method of copying important? Example #1: we start with a single marble, A. Then, we magically create a copy, marble B--perfectly like marble B in every way. . .that is, the atoms are configured similarly, the interaction environment is the same--and they are indistinguishable from one another. Example #2: we start with a single marble A. Then, instead of magically creating a copy, we search the universe, Tegmarkian-style, and locate a second marble, B that is perfectly equivalent to our original marble A. All tests both magically avoid QM decoherence problems and show that our newfound marble is, in fact, indistinguishable in every way from our original. Here's the question: Are the properties of the *relationship* between Marbles A and B in Example #1 perfectly equivalent to those in Example #2? If the criteria involves simply analysis of configurations at a precise point in time, it would seem the answer must be "yes." On the other hand, if the method by which the marbles were created is crucial to the present configuration, then the answer would be "no." R. Miller
