Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based on the cateogry theory

[tozziarturo]

Dear Karl, 

your analysis about Wittgenstein does not take into account the second 
Wittgenstein, who repudiated his own idea from the Tractatus. 

I think, in touch with Carnap on other issues, that the use of the terms 
"symbol", "signal", "marker", "information" into scientific sentences does not 
mean anything. Such use gives rise to metaphysical (in its worst meaning) 
pseudosentences, because the propositions containing the terms "symbol", 
"signal", "marker", "information" can neither verified (in the Schlick sense), 
nor confirmed (in the Carnap sense), nor falsified (in the Popper sense), not 
statistically assessed (in the Reichenbach or Shannon sense). 

Therefore, I think, we are talking about pseudopropositions: there is not a way 
to empirically test the propositions containing the useless terms "symbol", 
"signal", "marker", "information".  Therefore, as always, and sorry to be 
boring and bothering, I suggest to fully REMOVE from the TRUE scientific 
adventures  the terms: "symbol", "signal", "marker", "information".   

I'm deeply horrified by such residuals of the ancient Hermes Trismegstus' 
hermetic conceptions in our current scientific vocabulary and practice.  We are 
not dwarves on the shoulders of giants, we are giants on the shoulders of 
dwarves.


> Il 10 febbraio 2018 alle 19.36 Karl Javorszky  ha 
> scritto:
> 
> Using the logical language to understand Nature
> 
>  
> 
> The discussion in this group refocuses on the meaning of the terms 
> “symbol”, “signal”, “marker” and so forth. This is a very welcome 
> development, because understanding the tools one uses is usually helpful when 
> creating great works.
> 
> There is sufficient professional literature on epistemology, logical 
> languages and the development of philosophy into specific sub-philosophies. 
> The following is just an unofficial opinion, maybe it helps.
> 
>  
> 
> Wittgenstein has created a separate branch within philosophy by 
> investigating the structure and the realm of true sentences. For this, he has 
> been mocked and ridiculed by his colleagues. Adorno, e.g. said that 
> Wittgenstein had misunderstood the job of a philosopher: to chisel away on 
> the border that separates that what can be explained and that what is opaque; 
> not to elaborate about how one can express truths that are anyway 
> self-evident and cannot be otherwise.
> 
> The Wittgenstein set of logical sentences are the rational explanation of 
> the world. That, which we can communicate about, we only can communicate 
> about, because both the words and what they mean are self-referencing. It is 
> true that nothing ever new, hair-raising or surprising can come out of a 
> logical discussion modi Wittgenstein, because every participant can only 
> point out truths that are factually true, and these have always been true. 
> There is no opportunity for discovery in rational thinking, only for an 
> unveiling of that what could have been previously known: like an 
> archaeologist can not be surprised about a finding, he can only be surprised 
> about himself, how he had been able to ignore the possibility of the finding 
> so long.
> 
> As the Wittgenstein collection uses only such concepts that are 
> well-defined, these concepts can be easily enumerated. In effect, his results 
> show, that if one uses well-formulated, clearly defined logical words, the 
> collection of all explanations is the solution of a combinatorial problem. 
> This is also the reason why he says that his philosophy is just a tool of 
> sharpening the brain, and contains nothing whatsoever noteworthy in a 
> semantic fashion.
> 
> One may summarise that the pariah state among philosophers that 
> Wittgenstein suffered on this his insight, is owed to the conclusion that 
> real philosophy has either nothing to do with the grammar of true logical 
> sentences or otherwise it is degenerating into a technique outside 
> philosophy, namely number theory. If every concept can be represented by a 
> number, and valid sentence are those for which the rules that govern numbers 
> are satisfied, then one can work with the numbers as such and figure out 
> later for what they stand.
> 
> This is the situation as per today. There is no change whatsoever. The 
> only noteworthy development is, that one can indeed teach new tricks to that 
> old dog, number theory. The sand that has to be swiped away is the covering 
> layer of attitudes that are too clever by half. By keeping the nose not too 
> high, one may look before one’s feet and reconsider simple operations that 
> one executes by routine.
> 
> We know how to sort and how to order, and we are intelligent and flexible 
> enough to change priorities if circumstances dictate such. We know how to 
> order and how to reorder. If we only had a brain like a computer, we could 
> memorise all the patterns that appear as we transform from priority 

[Fis] there is no need to number every word

[Krassimir Markov]

Dear Karl and FIS colleagues,
Yes, the Number Theory is very important basis!
But, I think, there is no need to number every word.
Because ... All words are already numbered  
We have published large monograph named
“Natural Language Addressing” 
where we outlined this idea and presented the mathematical model and computer 
implementation for very large volumes of data (BigData).
One can read it at http://foibg.com/ibs_isc/ibs-33/ibs-33.htm.
The idea is very simple – every letter has its own code and in the computer we 
enter not letters but their codes.
This way every word is a number in any positional numbering system.
It really works!!!
Friendly greetings
Krassimir







From: Karl Javorszky 
Sent: Saturday, February 10, 2018 8:36 PM
To: Stanley N Salthe 
Cc: fis 
Subject: Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based on the 
cateogry theory

Using the logical language to understand Nature



The discussion in this group refocuses on the meaning of the terms “symbol”, 
“signal”, “marker” and so forth. This is a very welcome development, because 
understanding the tools one uses is usually helpful when creating great works. 

There is sufficient professional literature on epistemology, logical languages 
and the development of philosophy into specific sub-philosophies. The following 
is just an unofficial opinion, maybe it helps. 



Wittgenstein has created a separate branch within philosophy by investigating 
the structure and the realm of true sentences. For this, he has been mocked and 
ridiculed by his colleagues. Adorno, e.g. said that Wittgenstein had 
misunderstood the job of a philosopher: to chisel away on the border that 
separates that what can be explained and that what is opaque; not to elaborate 
about how one can express truths that are anyway self-evident and cannot be 
otherwise. 

The Wittgenstein set of logical sentences are the rational explanation of the 
world. That, which we can communicate about, we only can communicate about, 
because both the words and what they mean are self-referencing. It is true that 
nothing ever new, hair-raising or surprising can come out of a logical 
discussion modi Wittgenstein, because every participant can only point out 
truths that are factually true, and these have always been true. There is no 
opportunity for discovery in rational thinking, only for an unveiling of that 
what could have been previously known: like an archaeologist can not be 
surprised about a finding, he can only be surprised about himself, how he had 
been able to ignore the possibility of the finding so long.

As the Wittgenstein collection uses only such concepts that are well-defined, 
these concepts can be easily enumerated. In effect, his results show, that if 
one uses well-formulated, clearly defined logical words, the collection of all 
explanations is the solution of a combinatorial problem. This is also the 
reason why he says that his philosophy is just a tool of sharpening the brain, 
and contains nothing whatsoever noteworthy in a semantic fashion.

One may summarise that the pariah state among philosophers that Wittgenstein 
suffered on this his insight, is owed to the conclusion that real philosophy 
has either nothing to do with the grammar of true logical sentences or 
otherwise it is degenerating into a technique outside philosophy, namely number 
theory. If every concept can be represented by a number, and valid sentence are 
those for which the rules that govern numbers are satisfied, then one can work 
with the numbers as such and figure out later for what they stand. 

This is the situation as per today. There is no change whatsoever. The only 
noteworthy development is, that one can indeed teach new tricks to that old 
dog, number theory. The sand that has to be swiped away is the covering layer 
of attitudes that are too clever by half. By keeping the nose not too high, one 
may look before one’s feet and reconsider simple operations that one executes 
by routine.

We know how to sort and how to order, and we are intelligent and flexible 
enough to change priorities if circumstances dictate such. We know how to order 
and how to reorder. If we only had a brain like a computer, we could memorise 
all the patterns that appear as we transform from priority readiness One into 
priority readiness Two. 

There are many opportunities for number theory to jump into action in the field 
of organising and reorganising. As one intensifies one’s hobby of reordering 
the contents of one’s office, one will now have arrived at the concept of 
sequenced groups of elements that change place together during a reorder. 
Cycles that constitute a reorder connect elements with each other. Learning is 
based on the concept of associations. Being an element in the corpus of a cycle 
may well be the formal explanation for a property of being associated with. 

Whether one calls the elements’ {position, amount, sequential place, relation 
to potential 

Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based on the cateogry theory

[Karl Javorszky]

Using the logical language to understand Nature



The discussion in this group refocuses on the meaning of the terms
“symbol”, “signal”, “marker” and so forth. This is a very welcome
development, because understanding the tools one uses is usually helpful
when creating great works.

There is sufficient professional literature on epistemology, logical
languages and the development of philosophy into specific sub-philosophies.
The following is just an unofficial opinion, maybe it helps.



Wittgenstein has created a separate branch within philosophy by
investigating the structure and the realm of true sentences. For this, he
has been mocked and ridiculed by his colleagues. Adorno, e.g. said that
Wittgenstein had misunderstood the job of a philosopher: to chisel away on
the border that separates that what can be explained and that what is
opaque; not to elaborate about how one can express truths that are anyway
self-evident and cannot be otherwise.

The Wittgenstein set of logical sentences are the rational explanation of
the world. That, which we can communicate about, we only can communicate
about, because both the words and what they mean are self-referencing. It
is true that nothing ever new, hair-raising or surprising can come out of a
logical discussion modi Wittgenstein, because every participant can only
point out truths that are factually true, and these have always been true.
There is no opportunity for discovery in rational thinking, only for an
unveiling of that what could have been previously known: like an
archaeologist can not be surprised about a finding, he can only be
surprised about himself, how he had been able to ignore the possibility of
the finding so long.

As the Wittgenstein collection uses only such concepts that are
well-defined, these concepts can be easily enumerated. In effect, his
results show, that if one uses well-formulated, clearly defined logical
words, the collection of all explanations is the solution of a
combinatorial problem. This is also the reason why he says that his
philosophy is just a tool of sharpening the brain, and contains nothing
whatsoever noteworthy in a semantic fashion.

One may summarise that the pariah state among philosophers that
Wittgenstein suffered on this his insight, is owed to the conclusion that
real philosophy has either nothing to do with the grammar of true logical
sentences or otherwise it is degenerating into a technique outside
philosophy, namely number theory. If every concept can be represented by a
number, and valid sentence are those for which the rules that govern
numbers are satisfied, then one can work with the numbers as such and
figure out later for what they stand.

This is the situation as per today. There is no change whatsoever. The only
noteworthy development is, that one can indeed teach new tricks to that old
dog, number theory. The sand that has to be swiped away is the covering
layer of attitudes that are too clever by half. By keeping the nose not too
high, one may look before one’s feet and reconsider simple operations that
one executes by routine.

We know how to sort and how to order, and we are intelligent and flexible
enough to change priorities if circumstances dictate such. We know how to
order and how to reorder. If we only had a brain like a computer, we could
memorise all the patterns that appear as we transform from priority
readiness One into priority readiness Two.

There are many opportunities for number theory to jump into action in the
field of organising and reorganising. As one intensifies one’s hobby of
reordering the contents of one’s office, one will now have arrived at the
concept of sequenced groups of elements that change place together during a
reorder. Cycles that constitute a reorder connect elements with each other.
Learning is based on the concept of associations. Being an element in the
corpus of a cycle may well be the formal explanation for a property of
being associated with.

Whether one calls the elements’ {position, amount, sequential place,
relation to potential successors, …} {symbol, signal, mass, impact,
chemical valence, predictability, energy level, information content,…} is
of secondary importance. As we look into a kaleidoscope, the first step is
to make sure *that* we all look at a kaleidoscope, and preferably the same
one. The next task is to make sure that we all perceive the *same picture*.
As the kaleidoscope produces natural numbers, this should be a challenge
that one can be expected to match. Only after it has been agreed that we
all observe the same patterns is it reasonable to start discussing how to
name the facts of perception.

The present problem is not with the inability of the logical language to
process that what we wish to discuss.  The present task is to realise that
one needs a clear idea before one enters the struggle to express it
clearly. The unveiling has been done. Now the interested public is invited
to look at the picture.

Once one has answered 

Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based on the cateogry theory

[Stanley N Salthe]

Xueshan -- I think one can condense some of your insights hierarchically,
as:

In a system having language, information seemingly may be obtained in other
ways as well. It would be a conceptually broader category. Thus (using the
compositional hierarchy):

[information [language [signal]]]

Meaning that, when a system has language, all information will be
understood or construed by way of linguistic constructs.

(Here I am using ‘signal’ as being more specific than Peirce’s ‘sign’,
where:

[sign [information [...]]] )

Then, more dynamically (using the subsumptive hierarchy):

{language {signal {information}}}

Information in a languaged system is derived by way linguistic formations,
so that, even though it is an extremely broad category, information
(informing) only emerges by way of linguistically informed transformations.

STAN

On Sat, Feb 10, 2018 at 3:21 AM, Xueshan Yan  wrote:

> Dear Colleagues,
>
> I have read the article "The languages of bacteria" which Gordana
> recommended, and has gained a lot of inspiration from it. In combination
> with Sung's comparative linguistics exploration on cell language and human
> language, I have the following learning feelings to share with everyone:
>
> In this article, the author recognized that bacteria have evolved multiple
> languages for communicating within and between species. Intra- and
> interspecies cell-cell communication allows bacteria to coordinate various
> biological activities in order to behave like multicellular organisms. Such
> as AI-2, it is a general language that bacteria use for intergenera
> signaling.
>
> I found an interesting phenomenon in this paper: the author use the
> concept *information* 3 times but the concept *signal* (signal or
> signaling) 55 times, so we have to review the history and application of
> “information” and “signal” in biology and biochemistry, it is helpful for
> us to understand the relationship between language, signal, and information.
>
> The origin of the concept of signal (main the signal transduction) can be
> traced back to the end of the 1970s. But until 1980, biochemist and
> endocrinologist Martin Rodbell published an article titled: “The Role of
> Hormone Receptors and GTP-Regulatory Proteins in Membrane Transduction" in 
> *Nature,
> *in this paper he used the "signal transduction" first time. Since then,
> the research on signal transduction is popular in biology and biochemistry.
>
> As for any information transmission system, if we pay more attention to
> its transmission carrier instead of its transmission content, we are used
> to employing "signal transmission" instead of "signal transduction". From
> the tradition of the early use of information concept, the signal
> transduction study of cells is only equivalent to the level of
> telecommunications before 1948. Outwardly, before the advent of Shannon's
> information theory, the central issue of telecommunications is "signal"
> rather than "information". After that, the central issue of
> telecommunications is "information" rather than "signal".
>
> According to the application history of information concept, nearly all
> the essential problems behind the concepts of communication, messenger,
> signal and so on may be information problems. Just as the language problem
> what we are discussing here, our ultimate goal is to analyze the
> information.
>
>
>
> For the same reason, I recommend another two papers:
>
> 1. Do Plants Think?  (June 5, 2012, *Scientific American*)
>
> (http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/do-plants-think-
> daniel-chamovitz/#rd?sukey=fc78a68049a14bb24ce82efd8ef931
> e64057ce6142b1f2f7b919612d2b3f42c07f559f5be33be0881613ccfbf5b43c4b）
>
> 2. Plants Can Think, Feel and Learn  (December 3, 2014, *New Scientist*)
>
> (http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg22429980-400-root-
> intelligence-plants-can-think-feel-and-learn)
>
> From which we can judge whether or not a plants informatics can exists.
>
>
>
> Best wishes,
>
> Xueshan
>
>
>
> *From:* fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es]
> *On Behalf Of *Sungchul Ji
> *Sent:* Thursday, February 8, 2018 9:10 PM
> *To:* Francesco Rizzo <13francesco.ri...@gmail.com>; Terrence W. DEACON <
> dea...@berkeley.edu>
> *Cc:* Fis, 
> *Subject:* Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based
> on the cateogry theory
>
>
>
> Hi Terry,  and FISers,
>
>
>
> Can it be that "language metaphor" is akin to a (theoretical) knife that,
> in the hands of a surgeon, can save lives but, in a wrong hand, can kill?
>
>
>
> All the best.
>
>
>
> Sung
> --
>
> *From:* Francesco Rizzo <13francesco.ri...@gmail.com>
> *Sent:* Thursday, February 8, 2018 2:56:11 AM
> *To:* Terrence W. DEACON
> *Cc:* Fis,; Sungchul Ji
> *Subject:* Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based
> on the cateogry theory
>
>
>
> Caro Terry estensibile a tutti,
>
> è sempre un 

[Fis] Fwd: Re: The unification of the theories of information based on the cateogry theory

[Jose Javier Blanco Rivero]

-- Mensaje reenviado --
De: "Jose Javier Blanco Rivero" 
Fecha: feb 10, 2018 9:35 AM
Asunto: Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based on
the cateogry theory
Para: 
Cc:

Dear Xueshan,

Thanks for sharing your interesting remarks and references. I think no one
really wants to deny the crucial role the language metaphor has played in
the thinking of communication and information models. But I believe the
crucial point is to distinguish between language and communication.
Language is for us humans the main communication medium, though not the
only one. We tend to describe other communication media in society and
nature by mapping the language-like characteristics they have. This has
been useful and sucessful so far. But pushing the language metaphor too far
is showing its analytical limits. I think we need to think of a
transdisciplinary theory of communication media.
On the other hand, I agree with you that we need to check the uses of the
concepts of signal and information. I think that only signals can be
transmitted, not information. Information can only be gained by an observer
(a self-referential system) that draws a distinction.

Best,

Javier
El feb 10, 2018 5:23 AM, "Xueshan Yan"  escribió:

> Dear Colleagues,
>
> I have read the article "The languages of bacteria" which Gordana
> recommended, and has gained a lot of inspiration from it. In combination
> with Sung's comparative linguistics exploration on cell language and human
> language, I have the following learning feelings to share with everyone:
>
> In this article, the author recognized that bacteria have evolved multiple
> languages for communicating within and between species. Intra- and
> interspecies cell-cell communication allows bacteria to coordinate various
> biological activities in order to behave like multicellular organisms. Such
> as AI-2, it is a general language that bacteria use for intergenera
> signaling.
>
> I found an interesting phenomenon in this paper: the author use the
> concept *information* 3 times but the concept *signal* (signal or
> signaling) 55 times, so we have to review the history and application of
> “information” and “signal” in biology and biochemistry, it is helpful for
> us to understand the relationship between language, signal, and information.
>
> The origin of the concept of signal (main the signal transduction) can be
> traced back to the end of the 1970s. But until 1980, biochemist and
> endocrinologist Martin Rodbell published an article titled: “The Role of
> Hormone Receptors and GTP-Regulatory Proteins in Membrane Transduction" in 
> *Nature,
> *in this paper he used the "signal transduction" first time. Since then,
> the research on signal transduction is popular in biology and biochemistry.
>
> As for any information transmission system, if we pay more attention to
> its transmission carrier instead of its transmission content, we are used
> to employing "signal transmission" instead of "signal transduction". From
> the tradition of the early use of information concept, the signal
> transduction study of cells is only equivalent to the level of
> telecommunications before 1948. Outwardly, before the advent of Shannon's
> information theory, the central issue of telecommunications is "signal"
> rather than "information". After that, the central issue of
> telecommunications is "information" rather than "signal".
>
> According to the application history of information concept, nearly all
> the essential problems behind the concepts of communication, messenger,
> signal and so on may be information problems. Just as the language problem
> what we are discussing here, our ultimate goal is to analyze the
> information.
>
>
>
> For the same reason, I recommend another two papers:
>
> 1. Do Plants Think?  (June 5, 2012, *Scientific American*)
>
> (http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/do-plants-think-d
> aniel-chamovitz/#rd?sukey=fc78a68049a14bb24ce82efd8ef931e640
> 57ce6142b1f2f7b919612d2b3f42c07f559f5be33be0881613ccfbf5b43c4b）
>
> 2. Plants Can Think, Feel and Learn  (December 3, 2014, *New Scientist*)
>
> (http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg22429980-400-root-int
> elligence-plants-can-think-feel-and-learn)
>
> From which we can judge whether or not a plants informatics can exists.
>
>
>
> Best wishes,
>
> Xueshan
>
>
>
> *From:* fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es]
> *On Behalf Of *Sungchul Ji
> *Sent:* Thursday, February 8, 2018 9:10 PM
> *To:* Francesco Rizzo <13francesco.ri...@gmail.com>; Terrence W. DEACON <
> dea...@berkeley.edu>
> *Cc:* Fis, 
> *Subject:* Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based
> on the cateogry theory
>
>
>
> Hi Terry,  and FISers,
>
>
>
> Can it be that "language metaphor" is akin to a (theoretical) knife that,
> in the hands of a surgeon, can save lives but, in a wrong hand, can kill?
>
>
>
> All 

Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based on the cateogry theory

[Xueshan Yan]

Dear Colleagues,

I have read the article "The languages of bacteria" which Gordana
recommended, and has gained a lot of inspiration from it. In combination
with Sung's comparative linguistics exploration on cell language and human
language, I have the following learning feelings to share with everyone:

In this article, the author recognized that bacteria have evolved multiple
languages for communicating within and between species. Intra- and
interspecies cell-cell communication allows bacteria to coordinate various
biological activities in order to behave like multicellular organisms. Such
as AI-2, it is a general language that bacteria use for intergenera
signaling.

I found an interesting phenomenon in this paper: the author use the concept
information 3 times but the concept signal (signal or signaling) 55 times,
so we have to review the history and application of “information” and
“signal” in biology and biochemistry, it is helpful for us to understand
the relationship between language, signal, and information.

The origin of the concept of signal (main the signal transduction) can be
traced back to the end of the 1970s. But until 1980, biochemist and
endocrinologist Martin Rodbell published an article titled: “The Role of
Hormone Receptors and GTP-Regulatory Proteins in Membrane Transduction" in
Nature, in this paper he used the "signal transduction" first time. Since
then, the research on signal transduction is popular in biology and
biochemistry.

As for any information transmission system, if we pay more attention to its
transmission carrier instead of its transmission content, we are used to
employing "signal transmission" instead of "signal transduction". From the
tradition of the early use of information concept, the signal transduction
study of cells is only equivalent to the level of telecommunications before
1948. Outwardly, before the advent of Shannon's information theory, the
central issue of telecommunications is "signal" rather than "information".
After that, the central issue of telecommunications is "information" rather
than "signal".

According to the application history of information concept, nearly all the
essential problems behind the concepts of communication, messenger, signal
and so on may be information problems. Just as the language problem what we
are discussing here, our ultimate goal is to analyze the information.

 

For the same reason, I recommend another two papers:

1. Do Plants Think?  (June 5, 2012, Scientific American)

(http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/do-plants-think-daniel-chamovitz/
#rd?sukey=fc78a68049a14bb24ce82efd8ef931e64057ce6142b1f2f7b919612d2b3f42c07f
559f5be33be0881613ccfbf5b43c4b）

2. Plants Can Think, Feel and Learn  (December 3, 2014, New Scientist)

(http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg22429980-400-root-intelligence-plants
-can-think-feel-and-learn)

>From which we can judge whether or not a plants informatics can exists.

 

Best wishes,

Xueshan

 

From: fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On
Behalf Of Sungchul Ji
Sent: Thursday, February 8, 2018 9:10 PM
To: Francesco Rizzo <13francesco.ri...@gmail.com>; Terrence W. DEACON

Cc: Fis, 
Subject: Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based on
the cateogry theory

 

Hi Terry,  and FISers,

 

Can it be that "language metaphor" is akin to a (theoretical) knife that, in
the hands of a surgeon, can save lives but, in a wrong hand, can kill?

 

All the best.

 

Sung

  _  

From: Francesco Rizzo < 
13francesco.ri...@gmail.com>
Sent: Thursday, February 8, 2018 2:56:11 AM
To: Terrence W. DEACON
Cc: Fis,; Sungchul Ji
Subject: Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based on
the cateogry theory 

 

Caro Terry estensibile a tutti, 

è sempre un piacere leggerTi e capirTi. La  general theory of information
è preceduta da un sistema (o semiotica) di significazione e seguita da un
sistema (o semiotica ) di comunicazione. Tranne che quando si ha un processo
comunicativo come il passaggio di un Segnale (che non significa
necessariamente 'un segno') da una Fonte, attraverso un  Trasmettitore,
lungo un Canale, a un Destinatario. In un processo tra macchina e macchina
il segnale non ha alcun potere 'significante'. In tal caso non si ha
significazione anche se si può dire che si ha passaggio di informazione.
Quando il destinatario è un essere umano (e non è necessario che la fonte
sia anch'essa un essere umano) si è in presenza di un processo di
significazione. Un sistema di significazione è una costruzione semiotica
autonoma, indipendente da ogni possibile atto di comunicazione che
l'attualizzi. Invece ogni processo di comunicazione tra esseri umani -- o
tra ogni tipo di apparato o struttura 'intelligente, sia meccanico che
biologico, -- presuppone un sistema di significazione come propria o
specifica condizione. In conclusione, è possibile avere una