Re: [Fis] Is information physical? OR Does the information exist without the carrier?

[Bruno Marchal]

Hi Lou, Colleagues,


> On 25 Apr 2018, at 16:55, Louis H Kauffman  wrote:
> 
> Dear Krassimir and Mark,
> Let us not forget the intermediate question:
> How is information independent of the choice of carrier?
> This is the fruitful question in my opinion, and it avoids the problem of 
> assigning existence to that which is relational.
> 
> The same problem exists for numbers and other mathematical entities. Does the 
> number 2 exist without any couples?
> The mathematical answer is to construct a standard couple (e.g. { { }, {{}} } 
> in set theory or two marks || in formalism) and say that 
> a collection has cardinality two if it can be placed in 1-1 correspondence 
> with the standard couple. In this way of speaking we do not have to 
> assign an existence to two as a noun. The Russelian alternative  — to take 
> two to be the collection of all couples — is a fascinating intellectual move, 
> but
> I prefer to avoid it by not having to speak of the existence of two in such a 
> way. Two is a concept and it is outside of formal systems and outside of the 
> physical
> except in that we who have that concept are linked with formalism and linked 
> with the apparent physical.
> 
> And let us not forget the other question.
> What is "the physical”?
> What we take to be physical arises as a relation between our sensing (and 
> generalized sensing) and our ability to form concepts.
> To imagine that the “physical” exists independent of that relation is an 
> extra assumption that is not necessary for scientific work, however
> attractive or repelling it may seem.


Indeed, the existence of a physical ontology is an hypothesis in metaphysics, 
and not in physics. It was brought mainly by Aristotle and even more by its 
followers. 

What can be shown, is that if we assume Digital Mechanism in the cognitive 
science, then the physical cannot be ontological, and physics has to be reduced 
to the psychology, or better the theology of the digital machine. My 
contribution shows this testable, and the physical observations, up to now,  
favour the non existence of primary matter (as amazing and counter-intuive this 
could seem).

What many people seem to miss is that the notion of universal machine and the 
notion of computations (Turing, Post, Church, Kleene) are purely arithmetical 
notion. Anyone who is able to believe that (3^3) + (4^3) + (5^3) = (6^3) is 
necessarily either true or false even without verifying which it is, should be 
able to understand that all computations exists independently of the existence 
of anything physical, and then a reasoning can show that it is easier to 
explain the illusion of an otological matter to complex number relation, than 
to explain the numbers in term of complex relation between primary matter. In 
fact it is impossible, and the notion of primary matter adds unnecessary 
insuperable difficulties in the “mind-body” problem.

Now, Landauer, and others, have given some evidence that some notion of 
information is physical (like quantum information). That does not contradict 
the idea that information is not physical. The illusion of physical appearances 
is real, obeys laws, and physics is eventually reduced into an internal 
statistics on all computations in arithmetic, and that can explain some special 
form of physical information (and indeed the quantum one is already explained 
in some testable way).

The origin of information comes from the fact that aTuring machine cannot 
distinguish the physical reality from the arithmetical reality (which emulates 
all computations) except by observation. The machines are distributed in 
infinitely many exemplars in arithmetic, and that defines a sort of indexical 
differentiating consciousness flux, leading to (collective) sharable deep 
dreams which we call the physical.

Now, all this is long to explain, and I’m afraid this can look too much 
provocative, if I do not add the proofs and much more explanations. People can 
consult my papers, but needs to study a bit of mathematical logic.

Physicalism/materialism is a long lasting habit of thought, and, as I have 
experienced my whole life, some materialist defend the dogma with more 
integrism and violence than some (pseudo)-religious radicals in history. 

Once we assume mechanism, all we need to assume to get both mind and matter is 
*any* universal machine or machinery, and then the usual platonic 
epistemological definitions can be used (but they can also be motivated through 
some thought experience). 
For the universal machinery, I use (very) elementary arithmetic, because 
everyone is familiar with them, and can accept that “17 is prime” is true 
independently of them, which would not be the case with ((K K) K) = K in 
combinators theory (generally not known). But we can derive arithmetic, and the 
physical dreams from just very small theories, like

((K x) y) = x
(((S x) y) z) = ((x z) (y z))

(Axioms of the SK-combinators: that is Turing Universal!)

Or, very elemen

Re: [Fis] Is information physical? OR Does the information exist without the carrier?

[tozziarturo]

Dear Bruno, 
You claim: "all computations exists independently of the existence of anything 
physical".
I never heard, apart probably from Berkeley and Tegmark, a more untestable, 
metaphyisical, a-scientific, unquantifiable claim.  
Dear FISers, we NEED to deal with something testable and quantifiable, 
otherwise we are doing philosophy and logic, not science!  Even if information 
is (as many FISers suggest) at least in part not physical, we NEED to focus 
just on the testable part, i.e., the physical one.  And, even if physics does 
not exist, as Bruno states, at least it gives me something quantifiable and 
useful for my pragmatic purposes.
Even if information is something subjective in my mind (totally untestable, but 
very popular claim) who cares, by a scientific standpoint?
If I say that Julius Caesar was killed by an alien, the theory is fashinating, 
but useless, unless I provide proofs or testable clues.  
--
Inviato da Libero Mail per Android venerdì, 27 aprile 2018, 10:10AM +02:00 da 
Bruno Marchal  marc...@ulb.ac.be :

>Hi Lou, Colleagues,
>
>
>>On 25 Apr 2018, at 16:55, Louis H Kauffman < kauff...@uic.edu > wrote:
>>Dear Krassimir and Mark,
>>Let us not forget the intermediate question:
>>How is information independent of the choice of carrier?
>>This is the fruitful question in my opinion, and it avoids the problem of 
>>assigning existence to that which is relational.
>>
>>The same problem exists for numbers and other mathematical entities. Does the 
>>number 2 exist without any couples?
>>The mathematical answer is to construct a standard couple (e.g. { { }, {{}} } 
>>in set theory or two marks || in formalism) and say that 
>>a collection has cardinality two if it can be placed in 1-1 correspondence 
>>with the standard couple. In this way of speaking we do not have to 
>>assign an existence to two as a noun. The Russelian alternative  — to take 
>>two to be the collection of all couples — is a fascinating intellectual move, 
>>but
>>I prefer to avoid it by not having to speak of the existence of two in such a 
>>way. Two is a concept and it is outside of formal systems and outside of the 
>>physical
>>except in that we who have that concept are linked with formalism and linked 
>>with the apparent physical.
>>
>>And let us not forget the other question.
>>What is "the physical”?
>>What we take to be physical arises as a relation between our sensing (and 
>>generalized sensing) and our ability to form concepts.
>>To imagine that the “physical” exists independent of that relation is an 
>>extra assumption that is not necessary for scientific work, however
>>attractive or repelling it may seem.
>
>
>Indeed, the existence of a physical ontology is an hypothesis in metaphysics, 
>and not in physics. It was brought mainly by Aristotle and even more by its 
>followers. 
>
>What can be shown, is that if we assume Digital Mechanism in the cognitive 
>science, then the physical cannot be ontological, and physics has to be 
>reduced to the psychology, or better the theology of the digital machine. My 
>contribution shows this testable, and the physical observations, up to now,  
>favour the non existence of primary matter (as amazing and counter-intuive 
>this could seem).
>
>What many people seem to miss is that the notion of universal machine and the 
>notion of computations (Turing, Post, Church, Kleene) are purely arithmetical 
>notion. Anyone who is able to believe that (3^3) + (4^3) + (5^3) = (6^3) is 
>necessarily either true or false even without verifying which it is, should be 
>able to understand that all computations exists independently of the existence 
>of anything physical, and then a reasoning can show that it is easier to 
>explain the illusion of an otological matter to complex number relation, than 
>to explain the numbers in term of complex relation between primary matter. In 
>fact it is impossible, and the notion of primary matter adds unnecessary 
>insuperable difficulties in the “mind-body” problem.
>
>Now, Landauer, and others, have given some evidence that some notion of 
>information is physical (like quantum information). That does not contradict 
>the idea that information is not physical. The illusion of physical 
>appearances is real, obeys laws, and physics is eventually reduced into an 
>internal statistics on all computations in arithmetic, and that can explain 
>some special form of physical information (and indeed the quantum one is 
>already explained in some testable way).
>
>The origin of information comes from the fact that aTuring machine cannot 
>distinguish the physical reality from the arithmetical reality (which emulates 
>all computations) except by observation. The machines are distributed in 
>infinitely many exemplars in arithmetic, and that defines a sort of indexical 
>differentiating consciousness flux, leading to (collective) sharable deep 
>dreams which we call the physical.
>
>Now, all this is long to explain, and I’m afraid this can look to

Re: [Fis] The Concept of Two

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 25 Apr 2018, at 19:51, Alex Hankey  wrote:
> 
> Extract from Louis Kauffman: 
> 
> Two is a concept and it is outside of formal systems and outside of the 
> physical
> except in that we who have that concept are linked with formalism and linked 
> with the apparent physical 
> 
> WHAT SAY YOU BRUNO?

I am glad Lou says this. I totally agree (even without computationalism). 

2 exists independently of the physical, and indeed the physical illusion comes 
from 2 & Co. But our human bodies evolved from that physical, and so, we are 
discovering 2 through the physical and the formalism. But those are explained 
with 2 & Co at the fundamental level (necessarily so if we assume mechanism).

Best,

Bruno

PS last message of this week.

> 
> Alex 
> 
> 
> 
> -- 
> Alex Hankey M.A. (Cantab.) PhD (M.I.T.)
> Distinguished Professor of Yoga and Physical Science,
> SVYASA, Eknath Bhavan, 19 Gavipuram Circle
> Bangalore 560019, Karnataka, India  
> Mobile (Intn'l): +44 7710 534195 
> Mobile (India) +91 900 800 8789
> 
> 
> 2015 JPBMB Special Issue on Integral Biomathics: Life Sciences, Mathematics 
> and Phenomenological Philosophy 
> 
___
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Fis@listas.unizar.es
http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis

Re: [Fis] Is information physical? 'Signs rust.'

[Guy A Hoelzer]

Joseph,

Thank you for this concise statement.  It very closely matches my own 
perspective.  I would only add the notion that meaningfulness or 
meaninglessness is not an inherent property of information.  It is entirely 
contingent upon the affect, or the absence of affect, of encountered 
information on an agent.

Regards,

Guy



On Apr 26, 2018, at 7:31 AM, 
joe.bren...@bluewin.ch wrote:

Information refers to changes in patterns of energy flow, some slow (frozen), 
some fast, some quantitative and measurable, some qualitative and 
non-measurable, some meaningful and some meaningless, partly causally effective 
and partly inert, partly present and partly absent, all at the same time.

Best wishes,

Joseph

Message d'origine
De : u...@umces.edu
Date : 25/04/2018 - 08:14 (PDT)
À : mbur...@math.ucla.edu
Cc : fis@listas.unizar.es
Objet : Re: [Fis] Is information physical?

Dear Mark,

I share your inclination, albeit from a different perspective.

Consider the two statements:

1. Information is impossible without a physical carrier.

2. Information is impossible without the influence of that which does not exist.

There is significant truth in both statements.

I know that Claude Shannon is not a popular personality on FIS, but I
admire how he first approached the subject. He began by quantifying,
not information in the intuitive, positivist  sense, but rather the
*lack* of information, or "uncertainty", as he put it. Positivist
information thereby becomes a double negative -- any decrease in
uncertainty.

In short, the quantification of information begins by quantifying
something that does not exist, but nonetheless is related to that
which does. Terry calls this lack the "absential", I call it the
"apophatic" and it is a major player in living systems!

Karl Popper finished his last book with the exhortation that we need
to develop a "calculus of conditional probabilities". Well, that
effort was already underway in information theory. Using conditional
probabilities allows one to parse Shannon's formula for diversity into
two terms -- on being positivist information (average mutual
information) and the other apophasis (conditional entropy).


This duality in nature is evident but often unnoticed in the study of
networks. Most look at networks and immediately see the constraints
between nodes. And so it is. But there is also indeterminacy in almost
all real networks, and this often is disregarded. The proportions
between constraint and indeterminacy can readily be calculated.

What is important in living systems (and I usually think of the more
indeterminate ecosystems, rather than organisms [but the point applies
there as well]) is that some degree of conditional entropy is
absolutely necessary for systems sustainability, as it provides the
flexibility required to construct new responses to novel challenges.

While system constraint usually abets system performance, systems that
become too efficient do so by decreasing their (mutually exclusive)
flexibility and become progressively vulnerable to collapse.

The lesson for evolutionary theory is clear. Survival is not always a
min/max (fitt*est*) issue. It is about a balance between adaptation
and adaptability. Ecosystems do not attain maximum efficiency. To do
so would doom them.

 The balance also
puts the lie to a major maxim of economics, which is that nothing
should hinder the efficiency of the market. That's a recipe for "boom
and bust". 


Mark, I do disagree with your opinion that information cannot be
measured. The wider application of information theory extends beyond
communication and covers the information inherent in structure, or
what John Collier calls "enformation". Measurement is extremely
important there. Perhaps you are disquieted by the relative nature of
information measurements. Such relativity is inevitable. Information
can only be measured with respect to some (arbitrary) reference
distribution (which is also known in the wider realm of thermodynamics
as "the third law

Re: [Fis] Is information physical? 'Signs rust.'

[Karl Javorszky]

This is a literary level exposition of a view, of the category of
Confessiones. The confidence of a philosopher, like that of a poet, that
his words can be understood, even though they are of a subjective,
individual perspective, is well rewarded if indeed the worldview can be
understood.

Two aspects on which i'd like to comment :

1. If this general allmighty versatile ubiquitous something is such a
wonder thing - what distinguishes then this construct from concepts of
theology? Bruno has been advancing the idea that insofar the problems we
discuss here are of a deep nature, our forefathers will have discussed them
already, in their own respective generations, using the available concepts
of their respective times, and these were of theological lexica. Therefore,
so I understand Bruno to say, we shall not be alienated by the reappearance
of ideas theological. And here we experience a globality of potentials
ascribed to an idea, by the beutiful sonett above by Joseph, which does
come near to ancient beliefs. Welcome the approach, because we try to catch
a metamorphosing beast, which we call information.

2. No day shall pass without mentioning the cycles.  Could we interpret the
"patterns of energy flow" as some kinds of filaments, paths, levels,
densities, probabilities, predictabilities? If we un-anchor our concepts of
"how much determines where", then we have a continuous rearrangement, with
many patterns in it.

The numbers show an unequivocal, solid, rational support for what Joseph
described above as main characteristics of the idea of information.

Karl



joe.bren...@bluewin.ch  schrieb am Do., 26. Apr.
2018 16:33:

> Information refers to changes in patterns of energy flow, some slow
> (frozen), some fast, some quantitative and measurable, some qualitative and
> non-measurable, some meaningful and some meaningless, partly causally
> effective and partly inert, partly present and partly absent, all at the
> same time.
>
> Best wishes,
>
> Joseph
>
> >Message d'origine
> >De : u...@umces.edu
> >Date : 25/04/2018 - 08:14 (PDT)
> >À : mbur...@math.ucla.edu
> >Cc : fis@listas.unizar.es
> >Objet : Re: [Fis] Is information physical?
> >
> >Dear Mark,
> >
> >I share your inclination, albeit from a different perspective.
> >
> >Consider the two statements:
> >
> >1. Information is impossible without a physical carrier.
> >
> >2. Information is impossible without the influence of that which does not
> exist.
> >
> >There is significant truth in both statements.
> >
> >I know that Claude Shannon is not a popular personality on FIS, but I
> >admire how he first approached the subject. He began by quantifying,
> >not information in the intuitive, positivist  sense, but rather the
> >*lack* of information, or "uncertainty", as he put it. Positivist
> >information thereby becomes a double negative -- any decrease in
> >uncertainty.
> >
> >In short, the quantification of information begins by quantifying
> >something that does not exist, but nonetheless is related to that
> >which does. Terry calls this lack the "absential", I call it the
> >"apophatic" and it is a major player in living systems!
> >
> >Karl Popper finished his last book with the exhortation that we need
> >to develop a "calculus of conditional probabilities". Well, that
> >effort was already underway in information theory. Using conditional
> >probabilities allows one to parse Shannon's formula for diversity into
> >two terms -- on being positivist information (average mutual
> >information) and the other apophasis (conditional entropy).
> >
> >
> >This duality in nature is evident but often unnoticed in the study of
> >networks. Most look at networks and immediately see the constraints
> >between nodes. And so it is. But there is also indeterminacy in almost
> >all real networks, and this often is disregarded. The proportions
> >between constraint and indeterminacy can readily be calculated.
> >
> >What is important in living systems (and I usually think of the more
> >indeterminate ecosystems, rather than organisms [but the point applies
> >there as well]) is that some degree of conditional entropy is
> >absolutely necessary for systems sustainability, as it provides the
> >flexibility required to construct new responses to novel challenges.
> >
> >While system constraint usually abets system performance, systems that
> >become too efficient do so by decreasing their (mutually exclusive)
> >flexibility and become progressively vulnerable to collapse.
> >
> >The lesson for evolutionary theory is clear. Survival is not always a
> >min/max (fitt*est*) issue. It is about a balance between adaptation
> >and adaptability. Ecosystems do not attain maximum efficiency. To do
> >so would doom them.
> > The balance also
> >puts the lie to a major maxim of economics, which is that nothing
> >should hinder the efficiency of the market. That's a 

Re: [Fis] Is information physical? OR Does the information exist without the carrier?

[Louis H Kauffman]

Dear Folks,
I suspect I am past quota for the week. Apologies for that.
1. Work in logic and mathematics is scientific even if mathematicians and 
logicians sometimes deny being scientists.
2. Exact work is logical work coupled with precise and repeatable methods of 
measurement.
3. The point about mathematics and logic is that it is independent of the 
substrate on which it is apparently performed. 
This is what I mean by statements such as “all computations exist independently 
of the existence of anything physical”.
You may say, yes, but computations or reasonings cannot occur without some 
substrate!
I almost agree, but point out to you that since you use reasoning, concept and 
observation to conjecture and verify the properties of substrates 
(physical or even conceptual) there is a circularity here.
4. We come to know substrates such as physicality through reason and 
measurement.
We come to know reason and measurement through the support of our physical and 
biological substrates.
We come to investigate both reason and physicality through each other and our 
ability to sense and feel.
Sensing and feeling and measurement are our terms for those places where 
concept and the physical arise together in our perception.
5. Beyond those places where significant related pairs of opposites that cannot 
be separated (complementarities) occur there is our (in at least my tradition)
personal reality of unity — whereof nothing can be said. 
6. We cannot sever philosophy and logic and reason from science, AND for 
science we must open to the largest possible access to precision and 
understanding.
Best,
Lou

> On Apr 27, 2018, at 4:38 AM, tozziart...@libero.it wrote:
> 
> Dear Bruno, 
> You claim: "all computations exists independently of the existence of 
> anything physical".
> I never heard, apart probably from Berkeley and Tegmark, a more untestable, 
> metaphyisical, a-scientific, unquantifiable claim.  
> 
> Dear FISers, we NEED to deal with something testable and quantifiable, 
> otherwise we are doing philosophy and logic, not science!  Even if 
> information is (as many FISers suggest) at least in part not physical, we 
> NEED to focus just on the testable part, i.e., the physical one.  And, even 
> if physics does not exist, as Bruno states, at least it gives me something 
> quantifiable and useful for my pragmatic purposes.
> Even if information is something subjective in my mind (totally untestable, 
> but very popular claim) who cares, by a scientific standpoint?
> If I say that Julius Caesar was killed by an alien, the theory is 
> fashinating, but useless, unless I provide proofs or testable clues.  
> 
> --
> Inviato da Libero Mail per Android
> 
> venerdì, 27 aprile 2018, 10:10AM +02:00 da Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be 
> :
> 
> Hi Lou, Colleagues,
> 
> 
>> On 25 Apr 2018, at 16:55, Louis H Kauffman > > wrote:
>> 
>> Dear Krassimir and Mark,
>> Let us not forget the intermediate question:
>> How is information independent of the choice of carrier?
>> This is the fruitful question in my opinion, and it avoids the problem of 
>> assigning existence to that which is relational.
>> 
>> The same problem exists for numbers and other mathematical entities. Does 
>> the number 2 exist without any couples?
>> The mathematical answer is to construct a standard couple (e.g. { { }, {{}} 
>> } in set theory or two marks || in formalism) and say that 
>> a collection has cardinality two if it can be placed in 1-1 correspondence 
>> with the standard couple. In this way of speaking we do not have to 
>> assign an existence to two as a noun. The Russelian alternative  — to take 
>> two to be the collection of all couples — is a fascinating intellectual 
>> move, but
>> I prefer to avoid it by not having to speak of the existence of two in such 
>> a way. Two is a concept and it is outside of formal systems and outside of 
>> the physical
>> except in that we who have that concept are linked with formalism and linked 
>> with the apparent physical.
>> 
>> And let us not forget the other question.
>> What is "the physical”?
>> What we take to be physical arises as a relation between our sensing (and 
>> generalized sensing) and our ability to form concepts.
>> To imagine that the “physical” exists independent of that relation is an 
>> extra assumption that is not necessary for scientific work, however
>> attractive or repelling it may seem.
> 
> 
> Indeed, the existence of a physical ontology is an hypothesis in metaphysics, 
> and not in physics. It was brought mainly by Aristotle and even more by its 
> followers. 
> 
> What can be shown, is that if we assume Digital Mechanism in the cognitive 
> science, then the physical cannot be ontological, and physics has to be 
> reduced to the psychology, or better the theology of the digital machine. My 
> contribution shows this testable, and the physical observations, up to now,  
> favour the non existence of pr

[Fis] Just a few words about substrate

[Jose Javier Blanco Rivero]

Dear fellows,

Let us not forget that the talk about substrate can be misleading if it is
not taken into account that communication itself produces a "double bind"
(Bateson  and Watzlawick)or "double closure " (von Foerster), that is, for
every statement made it allows a set of suppositions to lay underneath, and
for every current statement a set of possible further statements. As a
consequence, care should be taken that the substrate we are talking about
is not an outcome of the communication process.
If scientific communication would orientate itself by means of the concept
of medium, this shall makes us aware of the conditions of possibility
allowed to enter and play a role within the states of affairs to be dealt
with.

Best,

J.J.
El abr 27, 2018 4:36 PM, "Louis H Kauffman"  escribió:

Dear Folks,
I suspect I am past quota for the week. Apologies for that.
1. Work in logic and mathematics is scientific even if mathematicians and
logicians sometimes deny being scientists.
2. Exact work is logical work coupled with precise and repeatable methods
of measurement.
3. The point about mathematics and logic is that it is independent of the
substrate on which it is apparently performed.
This is what I mean by statements such as “all computations exist
independently of the existence of anything physical”.
You may say, yes, but computations or reasonings cannot occur without some
substrate!
I almost agree, but point out to you that since you use reasoning, concept
and observation to conjecture and verify the properties of substrates
(physical or even conceptual) there is a circularity here.
4. We come to know substrates such as physicality through reason and
measurement.
We come to know reason and measurement through the support of our physical
and biological substrates.
We come to investigate both reason and physicality through each other and
our ability to sense and feel.
Sensing and feeling and measurement are our terms for those places where
concept and the physical arise together in our perception.
5. Beyond those places where significant related pairs of opposites that
cannot be separated (complementarities) occur there is our (in at least my
tradition)
personal reality of unity — whereof nothing can be said.
6. We cannot sever philosophy and logic and reason from science, AND for
science we must open to the largest possible access to precision and
understanding.
Best,
Lou

On Apr 27, 2018, at 4:38 AM, tozziart...@libero.it wrote:

Dear Bruno,
You claim: "all computations exists independently of the existence of
anything physical".
I never heard, apart probably from Berkeley and Tegmark, a more untestable,
metaphyisical, a-scientific, unquantifiable claim.

Dear FISers, we NEED to deal with something testable and quantifiable,
otherwise we are doing philosophy and logic, not science!  Even if
information is (as many FISers suggest) at least in part not physical, we
NEED to focus just on the testable part, i.e., the physical one.  And, even
if physics does not exist, as Bruno states, at least it gives me something
quantifiable and useful for my pragmatic purposes.
Even if information is something subjective in my mind (totally untestable,
but very popular claim) who cares, by a scientific standpoint?
If I say that Julius Caesar was killed by an alien, the theory is
fashinating, but useless, unless I provide proofs or testable clues.

--
Inviato da Libero Mail per Android
venerdì, 27 aprile 2018, 10:10AM +02:00 da Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:

Hi Lou, Colleagues,


On 25 Apr 2018, at 16:55, Louis H Kauffman  wrote:

Dear Krassimir and Mark,
Let us not forget the intermediate question:
How is information independent of the choice of carrier?
This is the fruitful question in my opinion, and it avoids the problem of
assigning existence to that which is relational.

The same problem exists for numbers and other mathematical entities. Does
the number 2 exist without any couples?
The mathematical answer is to construct a standard couple (e.g. { { }, {{}}
} in set theory or two marks || in formalism) and say that
a collection has cardinality two if it can be placed in 1-1 correspondence
with the standard couple. In this way of speaking we do not have to
assign an existence to two as a noun. The Russelian alternative  — to take
two to be the collection of all couples — is a fascinating intellectual
move, but
I prefer to avoid it by not having to speak of the existence of two in such
a way. Two is a concept and it is outside of formal systems and outside of
the physical
except in that we who have that concept are linked with formalism and
linked with the apparent physical.

And let us not forget the other question.
What is "the physical”?
What we take to be physical arises as a relation between our sensing (and
generalized sensing) and our ability to form concepts.
To imagine that the “physical” exists independent of that relation is an
extra assumption that is not necessary for scientific work, however
attractiv

Re: [Fis] Is information physical?

[joe.bren...@bluewin.ch]

Dear Lou and All,
Mark Burgin deserves credit for having started a discussion in which 
contrasting points of view are clearly delineated, and where some new 
convergences can appear. Karl critiques my views as philosophy, but says that 
numbers support them. Arturo critiques Bruno's view of numbers, and I critique, 
in the same spirit, Arturo's unqualified reliance on the physical. "Otherwise 
we are doing philosophy and logic, not science".
But Lou says, "we must not sever philosophy and logic from science", where 
logic is independent of substrate.
I propose inverting this statement: "science must not be severed from 
philosophy and logic", but the logic cannot be what is usually understood by 
that term. The logic must NOT be topic-neutral and does not have to be 
dependent on precise and repeatable methods of measurement. In order to serve 
science, however, any such logic must be grounded in the underlying physical 
structure of the universe, about which we know much more today thanks to 
science. 
So Lou, pace Ludwig, with a logic of real process systems, one can say 
something more about significantly, that is for me dynamically, related pairs 
of opposites, namely, about the patterns of evolution or change.
The energetic and non-energetic aspects of information constitute such a pair 
of significantly related opposites.
Best regards,
Joseph
Message d'origine
De : kauff...@uic.edu
Date : 27/04/2018 - 12:35 (PDT)
À : tozziart...@libero.it
Cc : fis@listas.unizar.es
Objet : Re: [Fis] Is information physical? OR Does the information exist
without the carrier?
Dear Folks,
I suspect I am past quota for the week. Apologies for that.
1. Work in logic and mathematics is scientific even if mathematicians and 
logicians sometimes deny being scientists.
2. Exact work is logical work coupled with precise and repeatable methods of 
measurement.
3. The point about mathematics and logic is that it is independent of the 
substrate on which it is apparently performed. 
This is what I mean by statements such as “all computations exist independently 
of the existence of anything physical”.
You may say, yes, but computations or reasonings cannot occur without some 
substrate!
I almost agree, but point out to you that since you use reasoning, concept and 
observation to conjecture and verify the properties of substrates 
(physical or even conceptual) there is a circularity here.
4. We come to know substrates such as physicality through reason and 
measurement.
We come to know reason and measurement through the support of our physical and 
biological substrates.
We come to investigate both reason and physicality through each other and our 
ability to sense and feel.
Sensing and feeling and measurement are our terms for those places where 
concept and the physical arise together in our perception.
5. Beyond those places where significant related pairs of opposites that cannot 
be separated (complementarities) occur there is our (in at least my tradition)
personal reality of unity — whereof nothing can be said. 
6. We cannot sever philosophy and logic and reason from science, AND for 
science we must open to the largest possible access to precision and 
understanding.
Best,
Lou
On Apr 27, 2018, at 4:38 AM, tozziart...@libero.it wrote:
Dear Bruno, 
You claim: "all computations exists independently of the existence of anything 
physical".
I never heard, apart probably from Berkeley and Tegmark, a more untestable, 
metaphyisical, a-scientific, unquantifiable claim.  
Dear FISers, we NEED to deal with c!  Even if information is (as many FISers 
suggest) at least in part not physical, we NEED to focus just on the testable 
part, i.e., the physical one.  And, even if physics does not exist, as Bruno 
states, at least it gives me something quantifiable and useful for my pragmatic 
purposes.
Even if information is something subjective in my mind (totally untestable, but 
very popular claim) who cares, by a scientific standpoint?
If I say that Julius Caesar was killed by an alien, the theory is fashinating, 
but useless, unless I provide proofs or testable clues.  
--
Inviato da Libero Mail per Androidvenerdì, 27 aprile 2018, 10:10AM +02:00 da 
Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:
Hi Lou, Colleagues,
On 25 Apr 2018, at 16:55, Louis H Kauffman  wrote:
Dear Krassimir and Mark,
Let us not forget the intermediate question:
How is information independent of the choice of carrier?
This is the fruitful question in my opinion, and it avoids the problem of 
assigning existence to that which is relational.
The same problem exists for numbers and other mathematical entities. Does the 
number 2 exist without any couples?
The mathematical answer is to construct a standard couple (e.g. { { }, {{}} } 
in set theory or two marks || in formalism) and say that 
a collection has cardinality two if it can be placed in 1-1 correspondence with 
the standard couple. In this way of speaking we do not have to 
assign an existence to two as a no

Re: [Fis] Fw: The 'Shirasawa phenomenon' or the 'Shirasawa effect"

[Arthur Wist]

Hi,

Just a short note to first of all say thank you, I've find this very
helpful to know albeit I can't point to a direct application. Secondly
however, I do wonder: Why & how come you neglected to - in either an
inclusionary or exclusionary manner - address any potential epigenetic
mechanisms?

Kind regards,


Arthur

On 20 April 2018 at 19:32, Sungchul Ji  wrote:
> Hi,
>
>
> I am forwarding a slightly modified version of my previous post with the
> same title which was rejected by the FIS list due to the heavy attachments.
> The most significant addition is written in green.  The removed attachments
> are now replaced by their web addresses from which they can be downloaded
> free of charge.
>
>
> Best.
>
>
> Sung
>
> 
> From: Sungchul Ji
> Sent: Thursday, April 19, 2018 11:02 AM
> To: FIS FIS
> Cc: Sergey Petoukhov; dani...@shirasawa-acl.net; John Stuart Reid; sayer ji;
> sji.confor...@gmail.com; x...@chemistry.harvard.edu;
> sbur...@proteomics.rutgers.edu; n...@princeton.edu
> Subject: The 'Shirasawa phenomenon' or the 'Shirasawa effect"
>
>
> Hi FISers,
>
>
> In 2003, Takuji Shirasawa and his coworkers [1] found that mutating certain
> amino acids in the hemoglobin molecule (Hb) in mice produced the following
> effects:
>
> (1) increase O_2 consumption and CO_2 production,
>
> (2) the conversion of the muscle histology from a fast glycolytic to a fast
> oxidative type,
>
> (3) a mild anemia, and
>
> (4) faster running speed.
>
>
> In other words, Shirasawa et al provided a concrete example of molecular
> changes (e.g., amino acid mutations in Hb)  leading to (or associated with)
> macroscopic physiological changes in whole animals (e.g., anemia,  running
> behavior, etc.).  For the convenience of discussions, I am taking the
> liberty of referring to this finding as the "Shirasawa et al.
> phenomenon/effect" or, more briefly, the "Shirasawa phenomenon/effect" which
> may be viewed as the macroscopic version of the Bohr effect [2].
>
>
> The 'Shirasawa phenomenon/effect' is not limited to hemoglobin.  There are
> now many similar phenomena found in the fields of voltage-gated ion
> channels, i.e., molecular changes in the amino acid sequences of ion channel
> proteins leading to (or associated with) macroscopic effects on the human
> body called diseases [3].
>
>
> Although the current tendency among practicing molecular biologists and
> biophysicists would be to explain away what is here called the Shirasawa
> phenomenon in terms of the microscopic changes "causing" the macroscopic
> phenomenon in a 1:1 basis, another possibility is that the microscopic
> changes "cause" a set of other microscopic changes at the DNA molecular
> level which in turn cause a set of macroscopic changes", in a many-to-many
> fashion.
>
>
> Current trend:  Microscopic change (Hb mutation) ->  Macroscopic
> change 1 (Oxygen affinity change of blood) -> Macroscopic change 2
> (O_2 metabolism, anemia, running behavior)
>
>
>
> Althernative mechanism:  Microscopic change 1 (Hb mutation) --->
> Microscopic change 2 (Changes in the standing waves in DNA) --->
> Multiple macroscopic changes (O_2 metabolism, anemia, muscle cell
> histological changes).
>
>
> The alternative mechanism proposed here seems to me to be more consistent
> with the newly emerging models of molecular genetics [4] and single-molecule
> enzymology [5, 6].
>
>
>
> Since the 'Shirasawa phenomenon/effect' evidently implicates information
> transfer from the microscale to the macroscale, it may be of interest to
> many information theoreticians in this group.   If you have any questions,
> comments, or suggestions, please let me know.
>
>
> All the best.
>
>
> Sung
>
>
>
> References:
>
>[1] Shirasawa, T., et al. (2003).  Oxygen Affinity of Hemoglboin
> Regulaters O_2 Comsumtion, Metabolism, and Physical Activity.  J. Biol.
> Chem. 278(7): 5035-5043.  PDF at
> http://www.jbc.org/content/278/7/5035.full.pdf
>
>[2] The Bohr effect.  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bohr_effect
>[3] Huang W, Liu M, S Yan F, Yan N. (2017).  Structure-based assessment
> of disease-related mutations in human voltage-gated sodium channels. Protein
> Cell. 8(6):401-438. PDF at https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/28150151
>
>[4] Petoukhov, S. V. (2016).  The system-resonance approach in modeling
> genetic structures. BioSystems 139: 1–11. PDF at
> https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0303264715001732
>
>[5] Lu, H. P., Xun, L. and Xie, X. S. (1998) Single-Molecule Enzymatic
> Dynamics. Science 282:1877-1882.  PDF at
> http://www.jbc.org/content/274/23/15967.short
>[6] Ji, S. (2017). RASER Model of Single-Molecule Enzyme Catalysis and
> Its Application to the Ribosome Structure and Function. Arch Mol. Med & Gen
> 1:104. PDF at http://hendun.org/journals/AMMG/PDF/AMMG-18-1-104.pdf
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> ___
> Fis mailing list
> Fis@listas.unizar.es
> http://list

Re: [Fis] Is information physical? OR Does the information exist without the carrier?

[Loet Leydesdorff]

Dear colleagues,

Not only logic, but also language is not directly and one-to-one coupled 
to physics. The hidden positivism of claiming priority for physics by 
some of us, is at odds with the linguistic turn in the philosophy of 
science. Furthermore, the issue is not directly related to the 
definition of information as probablistic entropy or otherwise.


I agree with most of what Lou Kauffman said, but:

We come to investigate both reason and physicality through each other 
and our ability to sense and feel.
Sensing and feeling and measurement are our terms for those places 
where concept and the physical arise together in our perception.
The emphasis in the above remains on the individual sensing and feeling, 
mediated by measurement. However, scientific observation is not such 
immediate feeling, but careful and discursively constructed 
articulations of expectations which are tested against observations. The 
cocon of language (a la Maturana) is opened at specific places which are 
carefully reasoned. The feelings do enter only after having been 
articulated into observational reports. The latter contain knowledge 
claims which are validated discursively. No escape! The observations 
enable us to improve the codification in the specialist language 
(jargon).


Physics is part of this edifice of science. It has no privileged access 
to reality, but constructs its own reality. Nobody senses the particles 
at CERN. The observational reports are readings from an instrument which 
have to be discussed before one can interpret.


If any science can claim priority, it is communication studies. The 
specialist languages are shaped in processes of communication. How does 
this work? Can it be improved?


Best,
Loet




5. Beyond those places where significant related pairs of opposites 
that cannot be separated (complementarities) occur there is our (in at 
least my tradition)

personal reality of unity — whereof nothing can be said.
6. We cannot sever philosophy and logic and reason from science, AND 
for science we must open to the largest possible access to precision 
and understanding.

Best,
Lou


On Apr 27, 2018, at 4:38 AM, tozziart...@libero.it wrote:

Dear Bruno,
You claim: "all computations exists independently of the existence of 
anything physical".
I never heard, apart probably from Berkeley and Tegmark, a more 
untestable, metaphyisical, a-scientific, unquantifiable claim.


Dear FISers, we NEED to deal with something testable and quantifiable, 
otherwise we are doing philosophy and logic, not science!  Even if 
information is (as many FISers suggest) at least in part not physical, 
we NEED to focus just on the testable part, i.e., the physical one.  
And, even if physics does not exist, as Bruno states, at least it 
gives me something quantifiable and useful for my pragmatic purposes.
Even if information is something subjective in my mind (totally 
untestable, but very popular claim) who cares, by a scientific 
standpoint?
If I say that Julius Caesar was killed by an alien, the theory is 
fashinating, but useless, unless I provide proofs or testable clues.


--
Inviato da Libero Mail per Android

venerdì, 27 aprile 2018, 10:10AM +02:00 da Bruno Marchal 
marc...@ulb.ac.be:



Hi Lou, Colleagues,



On 25 Apr 2018, at 16:55, Louis H Kauffman  wrote:

Dear Krassimir and Mark,
Let us not forget the intermediate question:
How is information independent of the choice of carrier?
This is the fruitful question in my opinion, and it avoids the 
problem of assigning existence to that which is relational.


The same problem exists for numbers and other mathematical entities. 
Does the number 2 exist without any couples?
The mathematical answer is to construct a standard couple (e.g. { { 
}, {{}} } in set theory or two marks || in formalism) and say that
a collection has cardinality two if it can be placed in 1-1 
correspondence with the standard couple. In this way of speaking we 
do not have to
assign an existence to two as a noun. The Russelian alternative  — 
to take two to be the collection of all couples — is a fascinating 
intellectual move, but
I prefer to avoid it by not having to speak of the existence of two 
in such a way. Two is a concept and it is outside of formal systems 
and outside of the physical
except in that we who have that concept are linked with formalism 
and linked with the apparent physical.


And let us not forget the other question.
What is "the physical”?
What we take to be physical arises as a relation between our sensing 
(and generalized sensing) and our ability to form concepts.
To imagine that the “physical” exists independent of that relation 
is an extra assumption that is not necessary for scientific work, 
however

attractive or repelling it may seem.



Indeed, the existence of a physical ontology is an hypothesis in 
metaphysics, and not in physics. It was brought mainly by Aristotle 
and even more by its followers.


What can be shown, is that if we assume Dig

Re: [Fis] Is information physical? OR Does the information exist without the carrier?

[Alex Hankey]

Dear Arturo,

Bruno is a metamathematician - as far as I can tell.
He regards everything as mathematics - an extension of arithmetic - which I
would contest.

In his 'Reality' we are all mathematics, not physics, not physical science.
So he seems not to require Popper or testing.

Bruno?

Alex

On 27 April 2018 at 15:08,  wrote:

> Dear Bruno,
> You claim: "all computations exists independently of the existence of
> anything physical".
> I never heard, apart probably from Berkeley and Tegmark, a more
> untestable, metaphyisical, a-scientific, unquantifiable claim.
>
> Dear FISers, we NEED to deal with something testable and quantifiable,
> otherwise we are doing philosophy and logic, not science!  Even if
> information is (as many FISers suggest) at least in part not physical, we
> NEED to focus just on the testable part, i.e., the physical one.  And, even
> if physics does not exist, as Bruno states, at least it gives me something
> quantifiable and useful for my pragmatic purposes.
> Even if information is something subjective in my mind (totally
> untestable, but very popular claim) who cares, by a scientific standpoint?
> If I say that Julius Caesar was killed by an alien, the theory is
> fashinating, but useless, unless I provide proofs or testable clues.
>
> --
> Inviato da Libero Mail per Android
> venerdì, 27 aprile 2018, 10:10AM +02:00 da Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
> :
>
>
> Hi Lou, Colleagues,
>
>
> On 25 Apr 2018, at 16:55, Louis H Kauffman  wrote:
>
> Dear Krassimir and Mark,
> Let us not forget the intermediate question:
> How is information independent of the choice of carrier?
> This is the fruitful question in my opinion, and it avoids the problem of
> assigning existence to that which is relational.
>
> The same problem exists for numbers and other mathematical entities. Does
> the number 2 exist without any couples?
> The mathematical answer is to construct a standard couple (e.g. { { },
> {{}} } in set theory or two marks || in formalism) and say that
> a collection has cardinality two if it can be placed in 1-1 correspondence
> with the standard couple. In this way of speaking we do not have to
> assign an existence to two as a noun. The Russelian alternative  — to take
> two to be the collection of all couples — is a fascinating intellectual
> move, but
> I prefer to avoid it by not having to speak of the existence of two in
> such a way. Two is a concept and it is outside of formal systems and
> outside of the physical
> except in that we who have that concept are linked with formalism and
> linked with the apparent physical.
>
> And let us not forget the other question.
> What is "the physical”?
> What we take to be physical arises as a relation between our sensing (and
> generalized sensing) and our ability to form concepts.
> To imagine that the “physical” exists independent of that relation is an
> extra assumption that is not necessary for scientific work, however
> attractive or repelling it may seem.
>
>
>
> Indeed, the existence of a physical ontology is an hypothesis in
> metaphysics, and not in physics. It was brought mainly by Aristotle and
> even more by its followers.
>
> What can be shown, is that if we assume Digital Mechanism in the cognitive
> science, then the physical cannot be ontological, and physics has to be
> reduced to the psychology, or better the theology of the digital machine.
> My contribution shows this testable, and the physical observations, up to
> now,  favour the non existence of primary matter (as amazing and
> counter-intuive this could seem).
>
> What many people seem to miss is that the notion of universal machine and
> the notion of computations (Turing, Post, Church, Kleene) are purely
> arithmetical notion. Anyone who is able to believe that (3^3) + (4^3) +
> (5^3) = (6^3) is necessarily either true or false even without verifying
> which it is, should be able to understand that all computations exists
> independently of the existence of anything physical, and then a reasoning
> can show that it is easier to explain the illusion of an otological matter
> to complex number relation, than to explain the numbers in term of complex
> relation between primary matter. In fact it is impossible, and the notion
> of primary matter adds unnecessary insuperable difficulties in the
> “mind-body” problem.
>
> Now, Landauer, and others, have given some evidence that some notion of
> information is physical (like quantum information). That does not
> contradict the idea that information is not physical. The illusion of
> physical appearances is real, obeys laws, and physics is eventually reduced
> into an internal statistics on all computations in arithmetic, and that can
> explain some special form of physical information (and indeed the quantum
> one is already explained in some testable way).
>
> The origin of information comes from the fact that aTuring machine cannot
> distinguish the physical reality from the arithmetical reality (which
> emulate