[Fis] Fwd: Re: [FIS] Is information physical?

[tozziarturo]

Daer Bruno, 

first of all, sorry for the previous private communication, but for a mistake, 
I did not add the FIS list in the CC. 


Concerning your Faith, i.e., arithmetic, this appraoch... simply does not work 
for the description of physical and biological issues.  It is just in our mind. 
 See: 

http://vixra.org/abs/1804.0132


I'm not confusing digital physics with Mechanism, and I read, of course, the 
work of Everett (the original mathematical one), and it is exactly like 
Mechanism: an untestable, fashinating analogy.  He wants, without any 
possibility of proof, to extend the realm of quantum dynamics to the whole 
macroscopic world. 

When you state that:

> "the reality becomes the universal mind (the mind of the universal Turing 
> machine) and the physical is the border of the universal mind viewed from 
> inside that universal mind".
> 

you are saying something that, reductionistic or not (I do not understand your 
emphasis on this rather trascurable concepts of matter, reduction, and so on), 
needs to be clearly proofed, before becoming the gold standard. 

A suggestion: you cold try to correlate your "physical border of the Universal 
mind viewed from inside that universal mind" with the holographic principle and 
the cosmic horizon.  But in order to do that, you need a strong math, not to 
quote old philosophers that, for a simple matter of luck, were able to 
inconsciously predict some recent developments of the modern science.  I like 
logic, I love logic, I read logic, I study logic, I read a lot of the latin 
texts of the old philosophers that use it (in the Medioeval ones), but I have 
to confess that the scientific value of logic is close to zero.  Both of the 
ancient and of the "novel" logics.

Sorry again! 

  



 Messaggio originale --
Da: Bruno Marchal 
A: FIS Webinar 
Data: 14 maggio 2018 alle 11.48
Oggetto: Re: [Fis] [FIS] Is information physical?

Dear Arturo, Dear Colleagues, 



On 11 May 2018, at 18:36, tozziart...@libero.it mailto:tozziart...@libero.it 
wrote:

Dear Bruno, 
I'm sorry, but I cannot agree.



I take a disagreement as a courtesy to pursue a conversation, which would be 
boring without them.

But, what I say has been proved, peer reviewed by many, so it is perhaps more a 
matter of understanding than of agreeing.

Or you are just telling me that you disbelieve in Mechanism. I prefer to remain 
agnostic.

Mechanism is my working hypothesis. The idea is to take it seriously until we 
find a contradiction (internal or with the observation). It is a common by 
default type of hypothesis, held by many people, notably most materialist. But 
here I can prove that (even weak) materialism (the belief in ontological 
primary substances/matter) is inconsistent with (even weak) mechanism. See my 
papers for this, it is not entirely obvious. 





"eve­ntually I found a co­nceptually isomorphic explanation in ari­thmetic."  
Isomorphy is a dangerous claim: the underliying mechanisms in biology could be 
something other than isomorphism (i.e., an Ehresmann connection in a hyperbolic 
manifold, as it occurs in gauge theories).



Nothing in the observation point on either primary matter, nor on non 
mechanism. I am not sure why you think that Ehresmann connection or gauge 
theories are non mechanist. Actually Mechanism entails that the physical 
phenomenology cannot be mechanistic. You might confuse Mechanism in the 
cognitive science with digital physics. 

Digital physics (the idea that the physical reality is Turing emulable) does 
not make any sense. It entails mechanism, but mechanism entails the falsity of 
digital physics (see my paper or ask question: that is not obvious). So, with 
or without Mechanism, Digital Physics makes no sense.






Futhermore, you simply change the name of the primum movens, the first 
principium: instead of calling it physics, you call it arithmetic.  This is as 
fideistic as the Carnap's physicalist claims.  

?

Physics assumes Arithmetic.

Arithmetic do not assume physics.

I can follow you with the idea that arithmetic still ask for some faith, but 
the amount is less than assuming a primary physical reality.

Then, I have never heard about parents taking back their kids when they are 
taught elementary arithmetic.

Also, with mechanism, we need to assume only a Turing universal machinery. With 
less than that, we get no universal machinery at all. With one of them, we get 
all of them. I simply use arithmetic because everyone are familiar with it. The 
theology and physics of machine do not depend on the choice of the universal 
system assumed at the start. It is an important new invariant of physics. 
Indeed, it determines entirely physics (always assuming Mechanism (aka 
computationalism).






"If you think that a brain is not Turing emul­able, you might be the one to 
whom people can ask".  The burden of the final proof is yours, because your 
claim is stronger 

Re: [Fis] [FIS] Is information physical?

[Bruno Marchal]

Dear Arturo, Dear Colleagues, 


> On 11 May 2018, at 18:36, tozziart...@libero.it wrote:
> 
> Dear Bruno, 
> I'm sorry, but I cannot agree.
> 
> 

I take a disagreement as a courtesy to pursue a conversation, which would be 
boring without them.

But, what I say has been proved, peer reviewed by many, so it is perhaps more a 
matter of understanding than of agreeing.

Or you are just telling me that you disbelieve in Mechanism. I prefer to remain 
agnostic.

Mechanism is my working hypothesis. The idea is to take it seriously until we 
find a contradiction (internal or with the observation). It is a common by 
default type of hypothesis, held by many people, notably most materialist. But 
here I can prove that (even weak) materialism (the belief in ontological 
primary substances/matter) is inconsistent with (even weak) mechanism. See my 
papers for this, it is not entirely obvious. 



> "eve­ntually I found a co­nceptually isomorphic explanation in ari­thmetic."  
> Isomorphy is a dangerous claim: the underliying mechanisms in biology could 
> be something other than isomorphism (i.e., an Ehresmann connection in a 
> hyperbolic manifold, as it occurs in gauge theories).
> 
> 

Nothing in the observation point on either primary matter, nor on non 
mechanism. I am not sure why you think that Ehresmann connection or gauge 
theories are non mechanist. Actually Mechanism entails that the physical 
phenomenology cannot be mechanistic. You might confuse Mechanism in the 
cognitive science with digital physics. 

Digital physics (the idea that the physical reality is Turing emulable) does 
not make any sense. It entails mechanism, but mechanism entails the falsity of 
digital physics (see my paper or ask question: that is not obvious). So, with 
or without Mechanism, Digital Physics makes no sense.




> Futhermore, you simply change the name of the primum movens, the first 
> principium: instead of calling it physics, you call it arithmetic.  This is 
> as fideistic as the Carnap's physicalist claims.  
> 
?

Physics assumes Arithmetic.

Arithmetic do not assume physics.

I can follow you with the idea that arithmetic still ask for some faith, but 
the amount is less than assuming a primary physical reality.

Then, I have never heard about parents taking back their kids when they are 
taught elementary arithmetic.

Also, with mechanism, we need to assume only a Turing universal machinery. With 
less than that, we get no universal machinery at all. With one of them, we get 
all of them. I simply use arithmetic because everyone are familiar with it. The 
theology and physics of machine do not depend on the choice of the universal 
system assumed at the start. It is an important new invariant of physics. 
Indeed, it determines entirely physics (always assuming Mechanism (aka 
computationalism).




> "If you think that a brain is not Turing emul­able, you might be the one to 
> whom people can ask".  The burden of the final proof is yours, because your 
> claim is stronger and less conventional than mine.
> 

Mechanism is a common, implicit or explicit, hypothesis among philosophers and 
scientists. It is a very old theory, already in “the question of Milinda” (a 
buddhist old text), and of course Descartes. Diderot identified it with 
rationalism. That makes sense, because to assume its negation consists in 
adding something for which we do not have any evidence (until now).

Maybe you confuse computable (like automata) and semi-computable (like Turing 
machine). It is the existence of universal machine which is responsible for the 
incompleteness of theories, because there is no complete theory possible for 
anything enough rich to prove the existence of universal machine, like, 
amazingly enough, already very elementary arithmetic.



>   If you say that angels do exist, you have to provide the proof, it's not me 
> that have to provide the proofs that they do not exist.  
> 
> 

But you are the one saying that “angels” exist, with “angels” pointing on 
something not “computable nor semi-computable” in nature or the mind …

Mechanism is just the conjunction of the Church-Turing thesis (CT) + “yes 
doctor” (YD, the idea that we can survive with a brain digital prosthesis). A 
version of Mechanism is that there is no magic at play in our body.

Then it seems that you claim a form of weak materialism, but there too, you are 
the one reifying the notion of primary-matter. That is a strong axiom in 
metaphysics, and there are no evidences for it. It is a natural extrapolation 
from the mundane experience, and we can understand why evolution has select 
such a belief, as we need to take the existence of prey and predator seriously. 
But this, as the Indian and Greeks understood a long time ago, does not provide 
any evidence of primary matter (a notion absent of any book in physics).


> "I will ask your evidence for the wave collapse." This is indeed a strange 
> claim.  There are tons of published papers that