Re: [Fis] Fluc replies - more. Reply to Gordana

[Joseph Brenner]

FW: Fluc replies - moreDear Gordana and All,

Gordana's note is very useful, as I think it makes possible a further 
discussion of what is at the "heart" of information. The following, partially 
negative comments, should be seen only as an attempt to get closer to that 
heart.

1. Floridi indeed claims that reality is an informational structure, but if the 
reality of information - its structure and constitutive elements  - has not 
been defined, we are in full tautology. If there are really fluctuons "down 
there" (the theme of this discussion), this may have consequences for all of 
our theories, mine included.

2. This judgment is confirmed :-) by the citations: a) One can agree (I do) 
with Floridi's interpretation of reality as the totality of structures 
interacting with one another, but we still do not know what a structure is, 
ontologically, and there is a caesura with the implication for information; b) 
Referring to "physicists who say that reality is fundamentally informational" 
is begging the question at issue.

3. It is not quite accurate to say that Floridi's Levels of Organization (LoOs) 
give access to an "ontological side" that will enable us to see an 
informational reality for two reasons: a) we have not established that reality 
is primarily informational nor what this might mean (see above); b) LoOs, to 
quote Floridi do "support an ontological approach, according to which systems 
for analysis (my emphasis) are supposed to have a structure in themselves de 
re, which is allegedly captured and uncovered by its description. For example, 
levels of communication, of decision processing and of information flow can all 
be presented as specific instances that can be analyzed in terms of LoOs." 
However, I submit that we are still dealing, here, with epistemological 
constructions.

4. It is not necessarily true that an "ontological informational structures 
should be seen in conjunction (sic) with computational processes". Let us 
consider, quite seriously, that there is a /disjunction/ between ontological 
informational structures and computational processes.

5. On the question of "it 'or' bit", I suggest that bits are the simplest, most 
abstract elements of information, constitutive of its lowest semantic level. 
Its are something more, for example, as Kevin Kirby said, fluctuons can 
perfectly well be looked at as "its", given their apparent interactive 
characteristics. Understanding the relationship (one or more ?) between 
information and matter/energy may be easier if we consider that we might be 
talking about the same thing from two perspectives.

Cheers,

Joseph  
  - Original Message - 
  From: Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic 
  To: Kevin Kirby ; fis@listas.unizar.es 
  Sent: Wednesday, September 29, 2010 1:38 PM
  Subject: Re: [Fis] Fluc replies - more


  Dear Kevin, Dear all!

   

  What I was thinking about, referring to Floridi's Informational Structural 
Realism is his claim that reality is an informational structure

  "A preferable alternative is provided by an informational approach to 
structural realism, according to which knowledge of the world is knowledge of 
its structures. The most reasonable ontological commitment turns out to be in 
favour of an interpretation of reality as the totality of structures 
dynamically interacting with each other." Floridi [11] p. 151. 

  http://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/12/4/878/pdf

  I could have referred to physicists Zeilinger, Lloyd, or Vedral and number of 
other authors who would say that reality fundamentally is informational.

   

  Now, the question of objective vs. subjective levels (levels of organization 
vs. levels of abstraction). One may be interested in the first place in the 
epistemological aspect and then focus on what an agent can see from that 
informational reality. On the other hand one may put the focus on the 
ontological side and ask what informational reality an agent can see. Those two 
things are closely related. I agree with you that if we only focus on levels of 
abstraction we will miss something, as LOA only reflect epistemological side. 
Besides epistemology we need ontology, which is reflected in Levels of 
organization LOO. 

   

  What I find interesting is the interplay of epistemological and ontological 
informational structures. Those informational structures should be seen in 
conjunction with computational processes. All of that is also closely connected 
to the question of it or bit, or the relationships between information and 
matter/energy.

   

  Present FIS discussion shows that there is an interest and a lot of things to 
do in order to elucidate our current understanding of the relationship. 

  I would like to kindly invite you to contribute to the following special 
issue of the journal Information:

  . http://www.mdpi.com/journal/information/special_issues/matter/

   

  With best regards,

  Gordana

   

   

  From: fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es [mailto:fis-boun...@list

Re: [Fis] Fluc replies - more. Reply to Gordana

[Rafael Capurro]

 dear Joseph

I very much agree with your views and criticisms of Floridi's 
tautologies. One main problem I have with Floridi is that he does not 
distinguish between ontology and metaphysics (in the Heideggerian sense 
of these terms). This leads to the question of trying to identify the 
nature of "it" which is, I guess, another term for what metaphysics 
called "beings" (or "das Seiende" im German, i.e. everything that is). 
Metaphysics is the project of trying to fix the nature of beings in 
their being (or "on he on" as Aristotle said). But this is exactly the 
problem, that in every intent to fix this "is" (or "it") there is always 
an AS. In other words, we have no possibility of taking a metahistorical 
and meta-physical (our of the world in which we are involved as 
being-in-the-world) position and overview forms AS being only this and 
not that. Neither through "levels of abstraction" (LoA) which is the 
classic method of metaphysics since Plato, nor through "levels of 
communication" nor... On the other hand, what we say when we say that 
"it" is AS this and this (including the digital perspective when we say 
that "it" AS "bit") is one possible perspective. The fluctuation of AS 
co-rresponds to the fluctuation of "its". To say that "reality" is 
"fundamentally" this or that is to repeat the ambitions of metaphysics.


best regards

Rafael



Dear Gordana and All,
Gordana's note is very useful, as I think it makes possible a further 
discussion of what is at the "heart" of information. The following, 
partially negative comments, should be seen only as an attempt to get 
closer to that heart.
1. Floridi indeed claims that reality is an informational structure, 
but if the reality of information - its structure and constitutive 
elements  - has not been defined, we are in full tautology. If there 
are really fluctuons "down there" (the theme of this discussion), this 
may have consequences for all of our theories, mine included.
2. This judgment is confirmed :-) by the citations: a) One can agree 
(I do) with Floridi's interpretation of reality as the totality of 
structures interacting with one another, but we still do not know what 
a structure is, ontologically, and there is a /caesura /with the 
implication for information; b) Referring to "physicists who say that 
reality is fundamentally informational" is begging the question at issue.
3. It is not quite accurate to say that Floridi's Levels of 
Organization (LoOs) give access to an "ontological side" that will 
enable us to see an informational reality for two reasons: a) we have 
not established that reality is primarily informational nor what this 
might mean (see above); b) LoOs, to quote Floridi do "support an 
ontological approach, according to which systems /for analysis /(my 
emphasis) are supposed to have a structure in themselves /de re/, 
which is allegedly captured and uncovered by its description. For 
example, levels of communication, of decision processing and of 
information flow can all be presented as specific instances that can 
be analyzed in terms of LoOs." However, I submit that we are still 
dealing, here, with epistemological constructions.
4. It is not necessarily true that an "ontological informational 
structures should be seen in conjunction (sic) with computational 
processes". Let us consider, quite seriously, that there is a 
//disjunction// between ontological informational structures and 
computational processes.
5. On the question of "it 'or' bit", I suggest that bits are the 
simplest, most abstract elements of information, constitutive of its 
lowest semantic level. Its are something more, for example, as Kevin 
Kirby said, fluctuons can perfectly well be looked at as "its", given 
their apparent interactive characteristics. Understanding the 
relationship (one or more ?) between information and matter/energy may 
be easier if we consider that we might be talking about the same thing 
from two perspectives.

Cheers,
Joseph

- Original Message -
*From:* Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic 
*To:* Kevin Kirby  ; fis@listas.unizar.es

*Sent:* Wednesday, September 29, 2010 1:38 PM
*Subject:* Re: [Fis] Fluc replies - more

Dear Kevin, Dear all!

What I was thinking about, referring to Floridi's Informational
Structural Realism is his claim that reality is an informational
structure

/"A preferable alternative is provided by an informational
approach to structural realism, according to which knowledge of
the world is knowledge of its structures. The most reasonable
ontological commitment turns out to be in favour of an
interpretation of reality as the totality of structures
dynamically interacting with each other." /Floridi [11] p. 151.

http://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/12/4/878/pdf

I could have referred to physicists Zeilinger, Lloyd, or Vedral
and numb

Re: [Fis] Fluc replies - more. Reply to Gordana

[karl javorszky]

Dear FIS,

the discussion here is excitingly interesting from the standpoint of formal
logic. The points that one may comment on regard:
 tautology
 structure
 totality of structures interacting with one another
 epistemological constructions
 relationship between matter/energy
 perspectives of descriptions
 philosophic relativity
to name but a few.

Formal logic addresses all these points and introduces a neutral web of
well-defined concepts, the relations of which allow quite exact definitions
of the above terms.

We find empistemologically clear and well-defined explanations for these
terms by taking recourse to the words of a formal language (in the sense of
Wittgenstein), namely to the natural numbers. We may be in the situation of
those of our forefathers who have felt that there is a comprehensive
explanation to spatial arrangements they observed but lacked the exact
understanding of the words "height", "distance", "angle" and so forth. I
don't know who proposed using simple calculations regarding the sides of
triangles to arrive at trigonometry, but the principles that can be read off
the tables of trigonometry demonstrate that numbers do have a use outside of
mathematics, too.

The concepts of "sinus" and "cosinus" and "tangent" etc. could be understood
after one has seen how these concepts are generated by simple numeric
procedures.

Please allow me to propose for general usage some tables based on natural
numbers. The concepts can prove to be well usable and versatile, after one
has seen how the concepts are generated.

The Table to be introduced into this discussion is quite simple, in fact not
more complicated (from the level of its intellectual principles) as dividing
the lengths of sides of triangles. It uses following novelties in the
dealings with natural numbers:

1) we discuss the instances of a+b=c for values of a,b 1..16;
1.1. This yields 136 cases of additions, from 1+1=2 to 16+16=32
1.1.1 we alsways assume a<=b
2) we concentrate on the "symmetry" of a and b, that is on u=b-a;
2.1 u can be in the range of 0 to 15
3) we generate measures for the relation of u to a and b
3.1. we build k=u-a
3.2. we build k+u=t
3.2.1 we make an addition ((b-a)-a)+(b-a)=2b-3a
3.3. we build -u=a-b
3.3.1 we do this for reasons of commutativity
3.4.  we build q=-u-b
3.5.  we build w=q+(-u)
3.5.1. we make an addition ((-u-b)+(-u))=((a-b-b)+(a-b))=2a-3b
3.6. we thus have 4 additions:
3.6.1. a+b=c
3.6.2. k+u=t  =((b-a)-a)+(b-a)=2b-3a
3.6.3. q+(-u)=w  =((-u-b)+(-u))=((a-b-b)+(a-b))=2a-3b
3.6.4. reading column 3 down we see c+t=-w=(a+b)+(2b-3a)= -
(2a+3b)=3b-2a
3.7. we propose to investigate, which of the 4 additions is generally
relevant in each case of a,b
3.8. we call the terms a,b,c,k,u,t,q,w, and and measure s=17-{a+b|c}
"aspects" of a+b=c
4. we introduce the conept of "order"
4.1. we order the set of 136 additions by sorting them
4.1.1. we use the procedure "sort()" from excel or any other software to do
so
4.2. we sort the collection on two of the aspects
4.2.1. we have then 72 sorting orders, 9 aspects once as 1st, 8 aspects once
as 2nd sorting key
4.3. each case of a+b has then a specific sequential place in the sequence
1..136
5. we re-sort from sorting order alpha,beta into sorting order gamma.delta
5.0.1. alpha,beta,gamma,delta are any of the 9 aspects
5.0.2. alpha#beta, gamma#delta
5.1. we investigate the place changes of the individual cases of a+b
5.2. those cases that move together we call a "thread"
5.2.1. the term "thread" may possibly be the concept behind the word
"string" used in Physics
5.3. some resorts yield no changes, some do
5.3.1. those resorts that yield no changes we call the "structure"
5.4. there are resorts that offer themselves as unit resorts
6. The unit resorts allow constructing two Euclid spaces
6.1. the two Euclid spaces differ slightly
6.2. the two Euclid spaces can be merged into one Euclid space
6.2.1. in this merged space one loses either the position's exactitude or
the extent's exactitude
6.2.2. the differences of the two Eulid spaces may well be the concept
behind the word "information"
7. there are several - but by no means an infinite number of - realities of
orders' consequences
7.1. the terms "relevance" and "importance" of ordering concepts can easily
be defined.
8. The term "logical archetype" is defined by those standard rearrangements
that are geometrically representable in an Euclid space
8.1. the term "logical archetype" may well be the concept behind the words
"chemical element".

This is of course only a very cursory introduction. The idea is new but it
seems to be quite useful to contribute to a discussion within FIS. The usage
of this kind of approach to words is, that one may well point out: "this is
what I mean as I say 'structure' or 'information' or 'ordering principle'".

Exact science has to be rooted in solid logic, where the words one uses do
have a clear and unmistakable def