Re: FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-01:59.rmuser

2001-09-05 Thread Chojin

When I apply the patch :
[ /usr/src/usr.sbin/adduser]$patch -p  /home/chojin/patch/rmuser.patch
Hmm...  Looks like a unified diff to me...
The text leading up to this was:
--
|Index: rmuser.perl
|===
|RCS file: /usr2/ncvs/src/usr.sbin/adduser/rmuser.perl,v
|retrieving revision 1.8.2.4
|retrieving revision 1.8.2.5
|diff -u -r1.8.2.4 -r1.8.2.5
|--- rmuser.perl2001/05/25 15:05:00 1.8.2.4
|+++ rmuser.perl2001/07/28 12:10:15 1.8.2.5
--
Patching file rmuser.perl using Plan A...
Hunk #1 failed at 42.
Hunk #2 failed at 311.
Hunk #3 failed at 340.
Hunk #4 failed at 350.
4 out of 4 hunks failed--saving rejects to rmuser.perl.rej
done


- Original Message -
From: FreeBSD Security Advisories [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: FreeBSD Security Advisories [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Tuesday, September 04, 2001 9:49 PM
Subject: FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-01:59.rmuser


 -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-



=
 FreeBSD-SA-01:59   Security
Advisory
 FreeBSD,
Inc.

 Topic:  rmuser contains a race condition exposing
/etc/master.passwd

 Category:   core
 Module: rmuser
 Announced:  2001-09-04
 Credits: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 Affects:FreeBSD 4.2-RELEASE, 4.3-RELEASE
 FreeBSD 4.3-STABLE prior to the correction date.
 Corrected:  2001-07-28 12:10:15 UTC (4.3-STABLE)
 2001-09-04 07:46:57 UTC (RELENG_4_3)
 FreeBSD only:   Yes

 I.   Background

 rmuser is a perl script used to completely remove users from a system.

 II.  Problem Description

 When removing a user from the system with the rmuser utility, the
 /etc/master.passwd file and it's corresponding database /etc/spwd.db
 must be updated.  The rmuser script was incorrectly doing this by
 creating a new master.passwd file with an unsafe umask and then using
 chmod to set its permissions to 0600.  Between the time that the file
 was created and the time that its permissions were changed the file is
 world-readable.

 This is only a minor security vulnerability since the rmuser command
 is only used infrequently on most systems, and the attack is highly
 timing-dependent.

 All versions of FreeBSD prior to the correction date including FreeBSD
 4.3 contain this problem.  The base system that will ship with FreeBSD
 4.4 does not contain this problem since it was corrected prior to the
 release.

 III. Impact

 For a brief amount of time while running rmuser, a world-readable copy
 of /etc/master.passwd is available.  A local attacker who reads this
 file can extract password hashes from the copy of /etc/master.passwd.
 This information could be used by attackers to escalate their
 privileges, possibly yielding root privileges on the local system, by
 mounting an offline dictionary attack in order to guess the plaintext
 passwords of the accounts on the local system.

 IV. Workaround

 Use the pw(8) utility to remove users instead of rmuser.

 - pw userdel username will only remove the user from
   /etc/passwd, /etc/master.passwd and /etc/group
 - pw -r userdel username will also remove the user's home
   dirrectory

 V. Solution

 1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to 4.3-STABLE or the RELENG_4_3
 security branch, dated after the respective correction dates.

 2) To patch your present system: download the relevant patch from the
 below location, and execute the following commands as root:

 # fetch
ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/patches/SA-01:59/rmuser.patch
 # fetch
ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/patches/SA-01:59/rmuser.patch.asc

 Verify the detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.

 This patch has been verified to apply to FreeBSD 4.2-RELEASE and
 4.3-RELEASE.  It may or may not apply to older, unsupported releases
 of FreeBSD.

 # cd /usr/src/usr.sbin/adduser
 # patch -p  /path/to/patch
 # make depend  make all install

 3) FreeBSD 4.3-RELEASE systems:

 An experimental upgrade package is available for users who wish to
 provide testing and feedback on the binary upgrade process.  This
 package may be installed on FreeBSD 4.3-RELEASE systems only, and is
 intended for use on systems for which source patching is not practical
 or convenient.

 If you use the upgrade package, feedback (positive or negative) to
 [EMAIL PROTECTED] is requested so we can improve the
 process for future advisories.

 During the installation procedure, backup copies are made of the files
 which are replaced by the package.  These backup copies will be
 reinstalled if the package is removed, reverting the system to a
 pre-patched state.

 # fetch
ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/packages/SA-01:59/security-patch-rmus
er-01.59.tgz
 # fetch
ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT

Re: FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-01:59.rmuser

2001-09-05 Thread Kris Kennaway

On Wed, Sep 05, 2001 at 10:23:57AM +0200, Chojin wrote:
 When I apply the patch :
 [ /usr/src/usr.sbin/adduser]$patch -p  /home/chojin/patch/rmuser.patch
 Hmm...  Looks like a unified diff to me...
 The text leading up to this was:
 --
 |Index: rmuser.perl
 |===
 |RCS file: /usr2/ncvs/src/usr.sbin/adduser/rmuser.perl,v
 |retrieving revision 1.8.2.4
 |retrieving revision 1.8.2.5
 |diff -u -r1.8.2.4 -r1.8.2.5
 |--- rmuser.perl2001/05/25 15:05:00 1.8.2.4
 |+++ rmuser.perl2001/07/28 12:10:15 1.8.2.5
 --
 Patching file rmuser.perl using Plan A...
 Hunk #1 failed at 42.
 Hunk #2 failed at 311.
 Hunk #3 failed at 340.
 Hunk #4 failed at 350.
 4 out of 4 hunks failed--saving rejects to rmuser.perl.rej
 done

I don't think this is the fault of the patch.

Kris

 PGP signature