Re: [Freeswitch-users] MPL and licensing

2009-06-20 Thread David Sugar
There are no legal uncertainties with respect to patents in GPL v3.  You
cannot assert them in code you license under it.  There was ambiguities
in GPL v2 in this respect which some companies liked.  I prefer to deal
with honest companies rather than those that are anti-social or might
choose legal ambush later, so any that feel they cannot accept the
greater legal certainty of GPL v3 in this respect are probably companies
that I would not choose to have any kind of relationship with anyway ;).

I recall there were other technical reasons why some have preferred the
MPL, especially over the language of the Lesser GNU General Public
License prior to v3.  I remember having a lovely discussion about this
with Craig Southern a few years back who conceeded that if the language
(of the older LGPL) had been corrected for C++ use cases and object
oriented practices (inlines, templates, derived classes, etc, all were
problems...), he would likely have used it at the time instead of the
MPL for OpenH323.

Steve Underwood wrote:
 paul.degt wrote:
 Yes, that's one of the reasons. Another point is that GPL v.3 is defined 
 more clearly from legal perspective, at least from our legal adviser 
 point of view.
   
 While the legal status of MPL is widely considered to be vague, is GPL 3 
 any better? GPL 2 is pretty sound, and has stood the test of time. 
 However a number of large companies have banned their employees from 
 working on anything involving GPL 3 code, because of legal 
 uncertainties, especially with regard to patents.
 
 Steve
 
 
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Re: [Freeswitch-users] FS + encryption

2009-05-07 Thread David Sugar
SIP TLS will protect the SIP session information with static keys via a
certificate, assuming of course the call is direct between two peers.
It will do nothing for the actual voice channel.

There is SRTP, which can be used to create a cryptographic context over
RTP.  However, the key question is how to exchange the keys.  If they
are exchanged in the SIP session, even TLS SIP, then there are
certificates around, and it is possible to acquire a past rtp session
that has been intercepted.

ZRTP offers a solution for setting up SRTP cryptographic contexts using
distributed and self generated keys (much like gnupg or ssh) that are
exchanged between the peers over RTP itself, and validated through a
fingerprint hash at both ends.  It is of course essential to initially
validate the keys in a secure network first, but once that is done, a
man-in-the-middle in the key exchange process will then stick out like a
sore thumb.  Furthermore, since each call uses different per-session
generated keys, there is no forward knowledge; breaking one call does
not allow one to also decrypt all past calls.

Paul wrote:
 Yes, I've seen this http://wiki.freeswitch.org/wiki/SIP_TLS.
 I was just curious if the only way to have true end to end secure 
 communications with FS would have to be a SIP trunk from one FS system to 
 another encrypted SIP system on the other with no POTS/PRI/BRI circuits used 
 in transit. I'm assuming if there's any POTS/BRI/PRI/DSS circuits used in 
 transit, anyone with a lineman's handset could still eavesdrop on any 
 conversations. Is this not the case?
 
 Paul
 
 
 
   
 
 
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Re: [Freeswitch-users] FS + encryption

2009-05-07 Thread David Sugar
If I can find funding for travel presently I would.

Anthony Minessale wrote:
 Hey David!
 
 You should come by to this year's ClueCon!
 We still have some speaking slots left.
 
 
 On Thu, May 7, 2009 at 11:08 AM, David Sugar dy...@gnutelephony.org
 mailto:dy...@gnutelephony.org wrote:
 
 SIP TLS will protect the SIP session information with static keys via a
 certificate, assuming of course the call is direct between two peers.
 It will do nothing for the actual voice channel.
 
 There is SRTP, which can be used to create a cryptographic context over
 RTP.  However, the key question is how to exchange the keys.  If they
 are exchanged in the SIP session, even TLS SIP, then there are
 certificates around, and it is possible to acquire a past rtp session
 that has been intercepted.
 
 ZRTP offers a solution for setting up SRTP cryptographic contexts using
 distributed and self generated keys (much like gnupg or ssh) that are
 exchanged between the peers over RTP itself, and validated through a
 fingerprint hash at both ends.  It is of course essential to initially
 validate the keys in a secure network first, but once that is done, a
 man-in-the-middle in the key exchange process will then stick out like a
 sore thumb.  Furthermore, since each call uses different per-session
 generated keys, there is no forward knowledge; breaking one call does
 not allow one to also decrypt all past calls.
 
 Paul wrote:
  Yes, I've seen this http://wiki.freeswitch.org/wiki/SIP_TLS.
  I was just curious if the only way to have true end to end secure
 communications with FS would have to be a SIP trunk from one FS
 system to another encrypted SIP system on the other with no
 POTS/PRI/BRI circuits used in transit. I'm assuming if there's any
 POTS/BRI/PRI/DSS circuits used in transit, anyone with a lineman's
 handset could still eavesdrop on any conversations. Is this not the
 case?
 
  Paul
 
 
 
 
 
 
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 -- 
 Anthony Minessale II
 
 FreeSWITCH http://www.freeswitch.org/
 ClueCon http://www.cluecon.com/
 
 AIM: anthm
 MSN:anthony_miness...@hotmail.com
 mailto:msn%3aanthony_miness...@hotmail.com
 GTALK/JABBER/PAYPAL:anthony.miness...@gmail.com
 mailto:paypal%3aanthony.miness...@gmail.com
 IRC: irc.freenode.net http://irc.freenode.net #freeswitch
 
 FreeSWITCH Developer Conference
 sip:8...@conference.freeswitch.org
 mailto:sip%3a...@conference.freeswitch.org
 iax:gu...@conference.freeswitch.org/888
 http://iax:gu...@conference.freeswitch.org/888
 googletalk:conf+...@conference.freeswitch.org
 mailto:googletalk%3aconf%2b...@conference.freeswitch.org
 pstn:213-799-1400
 
 
 
 
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Re: [Freeswitch-users] Sip for Skype - g.729 requirement

2009-03-24 Thread David Sugar
They require one use g.729, which is patent encumbered as well as rather
computationally intensive.

Dan wrote:
 You probably already saw this but
 
 http://www.skypeforsip.com/
 
 Skype is supporting sip for business users.
 
 
 
 
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Re: [Freeswitch-users] SIP server? PBX vs. softswitch?

2009-02-28 Thread David Sugar
Where this is distinguished, it is not directly at the level that user's
experience the end result.

In the case of what is called a softswitch, one answer is found in
organizations like the ISC (International Softswitch Consortium) and
vendors who built products around their architecture recommendations.
These systems tend to be very complex and componetized, where basic
functionality operates in self-contained components that then interact
with the whole through defined open standards and network protocols,
such as SIP.

The primary reason for ISC-style architectures is a result of
proprietary development, where code and internal operations cannot be
shared or modified.  Hence, by breaking up functionality into
subcomponents, it is possible to replace a component subsystem as a
whole while retaining the interfaces.  A perfect example is call
forwarding.  In a traditional proprietary (ISC-model) softswitch, call
forwarding would be an entirely separate self-contained proprietary
feature server interacting over SIP.  If someone wants to create a
different call forwarding behavior, one slips in an alternate server.

By contrast, it is far easier in an open source/free software PBX to
simply modify the feature code that implements call forwarding directly
to create new and specialized versions of that feature.  Hence, you do
not find or have need for micro-services for tiny features in pbx
software that originated as open source and free software or that did
not follow the path of proprietary architectures, such as Bayonne,
Asterisk, or FreeSwitch.  A perfect example of a traditional
softswitch architecture is SipX, which originated as a proprietary
VoIP pbx codebase.

However, even at this point, such distinctions I think are still
somewhat artificial, as Brian suggests.  What does distinguish
architectures that may be relevant to end users is whether a IP-PBX
solution operates as a B2BUA (back-to-back user agent) or not.  A pure
B2BUA solution is one where all media as well as signalling goes
directly through the central PBX switch.  A perfect example of this is
how Asterisk traditionally works.  This makes it very easy to adapt and
connect multi-protocol endpoints, to convert media formats for endpoints
who do not have common codecs, etc, since all media endpoints talk to
the switch rather than each other.  However, since all media goes
through a central point, the scalability of such systems can often
become compute-bound, and extra latency is induced.

A pure network solution by contrast has all media connect directly
peer to peer by the user agent endpoints, and the pbx really only
handles and coordinate independently operating endpoints through
signalling.  This often requires separate servers for gateways to the
PSTN or other protocols.  But it does offer better latency and
scalability, and the ability to provide end-to-end media security, such
as when using ZRTP.

This difference, between B2BUA and non-B2BUA, is I think far more
relevant today than traditional classifications such as IP-PBX,
softswitch, SIP Server, etc.

Brian West wrote:
 It depends on how you look at it... most will say there is no
 difference... but last I checked you usually don't run heavy apps on a
 softswitch.
 
 FreeSWITCH can be everything from softphone to softswitch and everything
 in between including PBX. The default config comes configured as a PBX.
 
 /b
 
 On Feb 28, 2009, at 9:47 AM, Fred wrote:
 
 Hello

 Even though I successfully set up an Asterisk voice server, I'm no 
 telecom expert, and would like some clarification about the following
 things:
 - What is an SIP server as opposed to a IP PBX?
 - What is the different between a PBX like Asterisk and a softswitch?

 Thank you.
 
 
 
 
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Re: [Freeswitch-users] Freeswitch optimization as a registrar

2008-12-30 Thread David Sugar
You actually have potentially ~1320 effective SIP transactions per
second to support 4 registered ua's with a 60s refresh.  This is
because the ua sends it's registration refresh unauthenticated.  The
registrar will then push back an authentication challenge request so the
ua can prove its identity, at which point the ua then repeats the same
transaction, but with authentication credentials attached.

rod wrote:
 Hi all,
 
 I know that freeswitch has not been designed as a pure sip 
 proxy/registrar, but I'm wondering how many subscribers could be handled 
 by FS.
 
 I setup the following test environment:
 - Kamailio 1.4.2 as the registrar
 - all invite requests are flowing through FS, even for a call 
 between 2 registered subscribers. Many reasons for this: the calls CDR 
 are centralized in the same format, I can easily add a billing ID to a 
 call, proceed to recording, set the caller as anonymous if requested...
 - FS is used also as a SBC

 There is still a lot of work to do, mainly on the call forwarding 
 feature and this is why I'm wondering (simply out of curiosity) what 
 could have been achieved using only FS (easier to setup when only one 
 equipment is involved :) ).
 
 I'd like to register 40 000 subscribers (if each user registers every 
 60s, you have approx 670 registration per second, this setup is working 
 on Kamailio).
 
 I did the following to increase FS performance regarding registration:
 - put the directory containing users in a RAMDISK
 - put the db directory in a RAMDISK
 
 with this I was able to reach 190 registration per second (50 without 
 the ramdisk) but for one SIP account, not too useful :p (for your 
 information I see a huge improvement when switching from 1.0.1 phoenix: 
 150cps to FS svn 105xx: 190)
 When trying with 25000 SIP accounts, I got no more than 30cps.
 
 Then I tried to use the odbc mysql for registration, using this I was 
 able to achieve 50cps. The mysql DB is not in a RAMDISK. For all these 
 tests, the presence support has been disabled.
 
 As the IO performance seems to be a bottleneck, I'd like to know if 
 there is a way to store the registration in memory only without database 
 persistency.
 
 This thread is there only to share tips, not to complain about FS poor 
 performance as a SIP registrar when compared to Kamailio. If I compare 
 FS to a commercial SBC I'm using in production, I have to say that FS is 
 really a great piece of software (lacks only statistics module, snmp, 
 and heartbeat redundancy for failover).
 
 regards,
 rod
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Re: [Freeswitch-users] Freeswitch optimization as a registrar - a cute hack

2008-12-30 Thread David Sugar
I actually have found an alternate approach that we optionally use in
sipwitch.  Basically, sipwitch can be set to recognize a trusted
subnet, and automatically accepts a refresh from any actively registered
ua on the trusted subnet(s) without requesting an authentication
challenge, so long as the ua refreshes from the same sip port and ip
address it originally registered and authenticated from.  It will also
do the same for invites and other otherwise authentication challenge
sip requests that can originate from ua's on the trusted subnet(s).

Using this option of course kills any ability to proxy register multiple
ua's through another sip server, although this can be solved by
recognizing certain id's as explicitly not trustable.  However, for most
common configurations and use cases, it works very well and does
effectively halve sip network traffic :).

Michael Giagnocavo wrote:
  This is
 because the ua sends it's registration refresh unauthenticated.  The
 registrar will then push back an authentication challenge request so the
 ua can prove its identity, at which point the ua then repeats the same
 transaction, but with authentication credentials attached.
 Why does it do that?  Every time I do a debug, I see the first request
 denied as unauthorized and then it always comes right back and gets
 
 Welcome to HTTP Digest authentication. The request has to get challenged to 
 get a new nonce from the server (so as to mitigate replay attacks).
 
 You could TLS and auth off of the client cert, except few devices support 
 that, and you'd have the overhead of TCP (which is like bad or something).
 
 -Michael
 
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