Re: [FRIAM] Model, Metaphor, Analogy

[Tom Johnson]

Dave West writes: "... An example, "the future is in front of us."

Unless you're a member of some Andean tribe whose name I've forgotten.
Then the past is in front of use because we know what it is, we can see
it.  And the future is behind us because we know not what it is.  (Source:
a recent SAR lecture that isn't online yet.)

TJ



Tom Johnson
Institute for Analytic Journalism   -- Santa Fe, NM USA
505.577.6482(c)505.473.9646(h)
Society of Professional Journalists 
*Check out It's The People's Data
*
http://www.jtjohnson.com   t...@jtjohnson.com


On Sat, Jun 10, 2017 at 8:53 PM, Jenny Quillien 
wrote:

> If there is a WedTech on this thread I would also certainly attend. So I
> vote that Dave gets busy and leads us toward the light.
>
> Jenny Quillien
>
> On 6/10/2017 8:24 PM, Prof David West wrote:
>
> Hi Nick, hope you are enjoying the east.
>
> The contrast class for "conceptual metaphor" is "embedded metaphor" ala
> Lakoff, et. al. An example, "the future is in front of us." Unless, of
> course you speak Aymaran in which case "the future is behind us."
>
> Steve, I do not regularly attend WedTech, but if this thread becomes a
> featured topic, I certainly would be there.
>
> davew
>
>
>
> On Sat, Jun 10, 2017, at 07:35 PM, Nick Thompson wrote:
>
> Hi, Dave,
>
>
>
> Thanks for taking the time to lay this out.  I wonder what you call the
> present status of “natural selection” as a metaphor. In this case, the
> analogues between the natural situation and the pigeon coop remain strong,
> but most users of the theory have become ignorant about the salient
> features of the breeding situation.  So the metaphor hasn’t died, exactly;
> it’s been sucked dry of its meaning by the ignorance of its practitioners.
>
>
>
> I balk at the idea of a “conceptual metaphor”.  It’s one of those terms
> that smothers its object with love.  What is the contrast class?  How could
> a metaphor be other than conceptual?  I think the term  subtly makes a case
> for vague metaphors.  In my own ‘umble view, metaphors should be as
> specific as possible.  Brain/mind is a case two things that we know almost
> nothing about are used as metaphors for one another resulting in the vast
> promulgation of gibberish. Metaphors should sort knowledge into three
> categories, stuff we know that is consistent with the metaphor, stuff we
> know that is IN consistent with the metaphor, and stuff we don’t know,
> which is implied by the metaphor.  This last is the heuristic “wet edge” of
> the metaphor.  The vaguer a metaphor, the more difficult it is to
> distinguish between these three categories, and the less useful the
> metaphor is.  Dawkins “selfish gene” metaphor, with all its phony
> reductionist panache, would not have survived thirty seconds if anybody had
> bothered to think carefully about what selfishness is and how it works.
> See, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/311767990_On_the_
> use_of_mental_terms_in_behavioral_ecology_and_sociobiologyThTh
>
>
>
> This is why it is so important to have something quite specific in mind
> when one talks of layers.   Only if you are specific will you know when you
> are wrong.
>
>
>
> I once got into a wonderful tangle with some meteorologists concerning
> “Elevated Mixed Layers”  Meteorologists insisted that  air masses, of
> different characteristics, DO NOT MIX.   It turns out that we had wildly
> different models of “mixing”.  They were thinking of it as a spontaneous
> process, as when sugar dissolves into water; I was thinking of it as
> including active processes, as when one substance is stirred into another.
> They would say, “Oil and water don’t mix.”  I would say, “bloody hell, they
> do, too, mix.  They mix every time I make pancakes.”  The argument drove me
> nuts for several years because any fool, watching hard edged thunderheads
> rise over the Jemez, can plainly see both that the atmosphere is being
> stirred AND that the most air in the thunderhead is not readily diffusing
> into the dryer descending air around it.  From my point of view, convection
> is something the atmosphere does, like mixing; from their point of view,
> convection is something that is DONE TO the atmosphere, like stirring.  You
> get to that distinction only by thinking of very specific examples of
> mixing as you deploy the metaphor.
>
>
>
> Nick
>
>
>
> Nicholas S. Thompson
>
> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
>
> Clark University
>
> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/
>
>
>
> *From:* Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com
> ] *On Behalf Of *Prof David West
> *Sent:* Saturday, June 10, 2017 11:36 AM
> *To:* friam@redfish.com
> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Model, Metaphor, Analogy
>

Re: [FRIAM] Model, Metaphor, Analogy

[Jenny Quillien]

If there is a WedTech on this thread I would also certainly attend. So I 
vote that Dave gets busy and leads us toward the light.


Jenny Quillien


On 6/10/2017 8:24 PM, Prof David West wrote:

Hi Nick, hope you are enjoying the east.

The contrast class for "conceptual metaphor" is "embedded metaphor" 
ala Lakoff, et. al. An example, "the future is in front of us." 
Unless, of course you speak Aymaran in which case "the future is 
behind us."


Steve, I do not regularly attend WedTech, but if this thread becomes a 
featured topic, I certainly would be there.


davew



On Sat, Jun 10, 2017, at 07:35 PM, Nick Thompson wrote:


Hi, Dave,


Thanks for taking the time to lay this out.  I wonder what you call 
the present status of “natural selection” as a metaphor. In this 
case, the analogues between the natural situation and the pigeon coop 
remain strong, but most users of the theory have become ignorant 
about the salient features of the breeding situation.  So the 
metaphor hasn’t died, exactly; it’s been sucked dry of its meaning by 
the ignorance of its practitioners.



I balk at the idea of a “conceptual metaphor”.  It’s one of those 
terms that smothers its object with love. What is the contrast 
class?  How could a metaphor be other than conceptual?  I think the 
term  subtly makes a case for vague metaphors.  In my own ‘umble 
view, metaphors should be as specific as possible.  Brain/mind is a 
case two things that we know almost nothing about are used as 
metaphors for one another resulting in the vast promulgation of 
gibberish. Metaphors should sort knowledge into three categories, 
stuff we know that is consistent with the metaphor, stuff we know 
that is IN consistent with the metaphor, and stuff we don’t know, 
which is implied by the metaphor.  This last is the heuristic “wet 
edge” of the metaphor.  The vaguer a metaphor, the more difficult it 
is to distinguish between these three categories, and the less useful 
the metaphor is.  Dawkins “selfish gene” metaphor, with all its phony 
reductionist panache, would not have survived thirty seconds if 
anybody had bothered to think carefully about what selfishness is and 
how it works.  See, 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/311767990_On_the_use_of_mental_terms_in_behavioral_ecology_and_sociobiologyThTh



This is why it is so important to have something quite specific in 
mind when one talks of layers.   Only if you are specific will you 
know when you are wrong.



I once got into a wonderful tangle with some meteorologists 
concerning “Elevated Mixed Layers” Meteorologists insisted that  air 
masses, of different characteristics, DO NOT MIX.   It turns out that 
we had wildly different models of “mixing”.  They were thinking of it 
as a spontaneous process, as when sugar dissolves into water; I was 
thinking of it as including active processes, as when one substance 
is stirred into another.  They would say, “Oil and water don’t mix.”  
I would say, “bloody hell, they do, too, mix.  They mix every time I 
make pancakes.”  The argument drove me nuts for several years because 
any fool, watching hard edged thunderheads rise over the Jemez, can 
plainly see both that the atmosphere is being stirred AND that the 
most air in the thunderhead is not readily diffusing into the dryer 
descending air around it.  From my point of view, convection is 
something the atmosphere does, like mixing; from their point of view, 
convection is something that is DONE TO the atmosphere, like 
stirring.  You get to that distinction only by thinking of very 
specific examples of mixing as you deploy the metaphor.



Nick


Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ 




*From:*Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] *On Behalf Of *Prof 
David West

*Sent:* Saturday, June 10, 2017 11:36 AM
*To:* friam@redfish.com
*Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Model, Metaphor, Analogy


long long ago, my master's thesis in computer science and my phd 
dissertation in cognitive anthropology dealt extensively with the 
issue of metaphor and model, specifically in the area of artificial 
intelligence and cognitive models of "mind." the very first academic 
papers I published dealt with this issue (They were in AI MAgazine, 
the 'journal of record' in the field at the time.



My own musings were deeply informed by the work of Earl R. MacCormac: 
/A Cognitive Theory of Metaphor/ and /Metaphor and Myth in Science 
and Religion./



MacCormac argues that metaphor 'evolves' from "epiphor" the first 
suggestion that something is like something else to either "dead 
metaphor" or "lexical term" depending on the extent to which 
referents suggested by the first 'something'  are confirmed to 
correlate to similar referents in the second "something." E.G. an 
atom is like a solar system suggests that a nucleus is like the sun 
and 

Re: [FRIAM] Model, Metaphor, Analogy

[Prof David West]

Hi Nick, hope you are enjoying the east.

The contrast class for "conceptual metaphor" is "embedded metaphor" ala
Lakoff, et. al. An example, "the future is in front of us." Unless, of
course you speak Aymaran in which case "the future is behind us."
Steve, I do not regularly attend WedTech, but if this thread becomes a
featured topic, I certainly would be there.
davew



On Sat, Jun 10, 2017, at 07:35 PM, Nick Thompson wrote:
> Hi, Dave,


>  


> Thanks for taking the time to lay this out.  I wonder what you call
> the present status of “natural selection” as a metaphor. In this case,
> the analogues between the natural situation and the pigeon coop remain
> strong, but most users of the theory have become ignorant about the
> salient features of the breeding situation.  So the metaphor hasn’t
> died, exactly; it’s been sucked dry of its meaning by the ignorance of
> its practitioners.>  


> I balk at the idea of a “conceptual metaphor”.  It’s one of those
> terms that smothers its object with love.  What is the contrast class?
> How could a metaphor be other than conceptual?  I think the term
> subtly makes a case for vague metaphors.  In my own ‘umble view,
> metaphors should be as specific as possible.  Brain/mind is a case two
> things that we know almost nothing about are used as metaphors for one
> another resulting in the vast promulgation of gibberish. Metaphors
> should sort knowledge into three categories, stuff we know that is
> consistent with the metaphor, stuff we know that is IN consistent with
> the metaphor, and stuff we don’t know, which is implied by the
> metaphor.  This last is the heuristic “wet edge” of the metaphor.  The
> vaguer a metaphor, the more difficult it is to distinguish between
> these three categories, and the less useful the metaphor is.  Dawkins
> “selfish gene” metaphor, with all its phony reductionist panache,
> would not have survived thirty seconds if anybody had bothered to
> think carefully about what selfishness is and how it works.  See,
> https://www.researchgate.net/publication/311767990_On_the_use_of_mental_terms_in_behavioral_ecology_and_sociobiologyThTh>
>   


> This is why it is so important to have something quite specific in
> mind when one talks of layers.   Only if you are specific will you
> know when you are wrong.>  


> I once got into a wonderful tangle with some meteorologists concerning
> “Elevated Mixed Layers”  Meteorologists insisted that  air masses, of
> different characteristics, DO NOT MIX.   It turns out that we had
> wildly different models of “mixing”.  They were thinking of it as a
> spontaneous process, as when sugar dissolves into water; I was
> thinking of it as including active processes, as when one substance is
> stirred into another.  They would say, “Oil and water don’t mix.”  I
> would say, “bloody hell, they do, too, mix.  They mix every time I
> make pancakes.”  The argument drove me nuts for several years because
> any fool, watching hard edged thunderheads rise over the Jemez, can
> plainly see both that the atmosphere is being stirred AND that the
> most air in the thunderhead is not readily diffusing into the dryer
> descending air around it.  From my point of view, convection is
> something the atmosphere does, like mixing; from their point of view,
> convection is something that is DONE TO the atmosphere, like stirring.
> You get to that distinction only by thinking of very specific examples
> of mixing as you deploy the metaphor.>  


> Nick


>  


> Nicholas S. Thompson


> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology


> Clark University


> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/


>  


> *From:* Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] *On Behalf Of *Prof
> David West *Sent:* Saturday, June 10, 2017 11:36 AM *To:*
> friam@redfish.com *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Model, Metaphor, Analogy>  


> long long ago, my master's thesis in computer science and my phd
> dissertation in cognitive anthropology dealt extensively with the
> issue of metaphor and model, specifically in the area of artificial
> intelligence and cognitive models of "mind." the very first academic
> papers I published dealt with this issue (They were in AI MAgazine,
> the 'journal of record' in the field at the time.>  


> My own musings were deeply informed by the work of Earl R. MacCormac:
> *A Cognitive Theory of Metaphor* and *Metaphor and Myth in Science and
> Religion.*>  


> MacCormac argues that metaphor 'evolves' from "epiphor" the first
> suggestion that something is like something else to either "dead
> metaphor" or "lexical term" depending on the extent to which referents
> suggested by the first 'something'  are confirmed to correlate to
> similar referents in the second "something." E.G. an atom is like a
> solar system suggests that a nucleus is like the sun and electrons are
> like planets plus orbits are at specific intervals and electrons can
> be moved from one orbit to another by adding energy (acceleration)

Re: [FRIAM] Model, Metaphor, Analogy

[Nick Thompson]

Steve, 

 

Notice that you use a metaphor, here to account for creative activity in
science.

 

, it was backed into while bumping around looking for something entirely
different

 

I can imagine you and I sitting down and describing a particular case in
which we found something while looking for something else and applying that
metaphor to a case of scientific discovery . to good effect. 

 

The thing about my man Peirce is that he was interested in describing
science as it was actually practiced by people who did it well.  He would
say that that sort of serendipity happens only to prepared minds, and he
gave those flashes of insight a name, "abduction."  It's quite similar in
many ways to metaphor making.  

 

Nick 

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

 
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of Steven A Smith
Sent: Saturday, June 10, 2017 3:22 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group 
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Model, Metaphor, Analogy

 

Dave -

Thanks for weighing in here, my own studies have not been so formal nor
probably as deep.   I have to admit to not knowing that cognitive
anthropology was a subject, just as Nick introduced me to evolutionary
psychology as it's own field!

I appreciate your introduction of epiphor, paraphor and dead metaphor.  I
began a discursion here (which I fortunately deleted) which lead me to read
some MacCormac and more to the point Philip Wheelwright on the modern,
technical usage of epiphor and diaphor, from the Greek/Aristotelian
epiphoria and diaphoria.   I particularly find your coining of paraphor, as
I think this is as common in our modern discourse/thinking as "confirmation
bias".

I also like your point that the "Scientific Method" is more metaphor than
reality, or more to the point, a narrative device to show how a discovery
"might have been made" when more often than not, it was backed into while
bumping around looking for something entirely different, and often involving
a "flash of insight" before then being laboriously wrung out and
demonstrated using the somewhat more "engineering" oriented methods of the
"Scientific Method" to move from motivated hypothesis to strongly validated
theory.

I don't know if you regularly attend WedTech, but this depth/topic of
discussion might motivate me to make the long trek into town...   

- Steve

On 6/10/17 9:36 AM, Prof David West wrote:

long long ago, my master's thesis in computer science and my phd
dissertation in cognitive anthropology dealt extensively with the issue of
metaphor and model, specifically in the area of artificial intelligence and
cognitive models of "mind." the very first academic papers I published dealt
with this issue (They were in AI MAgazine, the 'journal of record' in the
field at the time.

 

My own musings were deeply informed by the work of Earl R. MacCormac: A
Cognitive Theory of Metaphor and Metaphor and Myth in Science and Religion.

 

MacCormac argues that metaphor 'evolves' from "epiphor" the first suggestion
that something is like something else to either "dead metaphor" or "lexical
term" depending on the extent to which referents suggested by the first
'something'  are confirmed to correlate to similar referents in the second
"something." E.G. an atom is like a solar system suggests that a nucleus is
like the sun and electrons are like planets plus orbits are at specific
intervals and electrons can be moved from one orbit to another by adding
energy (acceleration) just like any other satellite. As referents like this
were confirmed the epiphor became a productive metaphor and a model, i.e.
the Bohr model. Eventually, our increasing knowledge of atoms and
particle/waves made it clear that the model/metaphor was 'wrong' in nearly
every respect and the metaphor died. Its use in beginning chemistry suggests
that it is still a useful tool for metaphorical thinking; modified to "what
might you infer/reason, if you looked at an atom as if it were a tiny solar
system."

 

In the case of AI, the joint epiphors - the computer is like a mind, the
mind is like a computer - should have rapidly become dead metaphors. Instead
they became models "physical symbol system" and most in the community
insisted that they were lexical terms (notably Pylyshyn, Newell, and Simon).
To explain this, I added the idea of a "paraphor" to MacCormac's
evolutionary sequence - a metaphor so ingrained in a paradigm that those
thinking with that paradigm cannot perceive the obvious failures of the
metaphor.

 

MacCormac's second book argues for the pervasiveness of the use and misuse
of metaphor and its relationship to models (mathematical and iillustrative)
in both science and religion. The "Scientific Method," the process of doing
science, is itself a metaphor (at best) that should have 

Re: [FRIAM] Model, Metaphor, Analogy

[Nick Thompson]

Hi, Dave, 

 

Thanks for taking the time to lay this out.  I wonder what you call the present 
status of “natural selection” as a metaphor. In this case, the analogues 
between the natural situation and the pigeon coop remain strong, but most users 
of the theory have become ignorant about the salient features of the breeding 
situation.  So the metaphor hasn’t died, exactly; it’s been sucked dry of its 
meaning by the ignorance of its practitioners.  

 

I balk at the idea of a “conceptual metaphor”.  It’s one of those terms that 
smothers its object with love.  What is the contrast class?  How could a 
metaphor be other than conceptual?  I think the term  subtly makes a case for 
vague metaphors.  In my own ‘umble view, metaphors should be as specific as 
possible.  Brain/mind is a case two things that we know almost nothing about 
are used as metaphors for one another resulting in the vast promulgation of 
gibberish. Metaphors should sort knowledge into three categories, stuff we know 
that is consistent with the metaphor, stuff we know that is IN consistent with 
the metaphor, and stuff we don’t know, which is implied by the metaphor.  This 
last is the heuristic “wet edge” of the metaphor.  The vaguer a metaphor, the 
more difficult it is to distinguish between these three categories, and the 
less useful the metaphor is.  Dawkins “selfish gene” metaphor, with all its 
phony reductionist panache, would not have survived thirty seconds if anybody 
had bothered to think carefully about what selfishness is and how it works.  
See, 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/311767990_On_the_use_of_mental_terms_in_behavioral_ecology_and_sociobiologyThTh

 

This is why it is so important to have something quite specific in mind when 
one talks of layers.   Only if you are specific will you know when you are 
wrong.  

 

I once got into a wonderful tangle with some meteorologists concerning 
“Elevated Mixed Layers”  Meteorologists insisted that  air masses, of different 
characteristics, DO NOT MIX.   It turns out that we had wildly different models 
of “mixing”.  They were thinking of it as a spontaneous process, as when sugar 
dissolves into water; I was thinking of it as including active processes, as 
when one substance is stirred into another.  They would say, “Oil and water 
don’t mix.”  I would say, “bloody hell, they do, too, mix.  They mix every time 
I make pancakes.”  The argument drove me nuts for several years because any 
fool, watching hard edged thunderheads rise over the Jemez, can plainly see 
both that the atmosphere is being stirred AND that the most air in the 
thunderhead is not readily diffusing into the dryer descending air around it.  
From my point of view, convection is something the atmosphere does, like 
mixing; from their point of view, convection is something that is DONE TO the 
atmosphere, like stirring.  You get to that distinction only by thinking of 
very specific examples of mixing as you deploy the metaphor.  

 

Nick 

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

  
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of Prof David West
Sent: Saturday, June 10, 2017 11:36 AM
To: friam@redfish.com
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Model, Metaphor, Analogy

 

long long ago, my master's thesis in computer science and my phd dissertation 
in cognitive anthropology dealt extensively with the issue of metaphor and 
model, specifically in the area of artificial intelligence and cognitive models 
of "mind." the very first academic papers I published dealt with this issue 
(They were in AI MAgazine, the 'journal of record' in the field at the time.

 

My own musings were deeply informed by the work of Earl R. MacCormac: A 
Cognitive Theory of Metaphor and Metaphor and Myth in Science and Religion.

 

MacCormac argues that metaphor 'evolves' from "epiphor" the first suggestion 
that something is like something else to either "dead metaphor" or "lexical 
term" depending on the extent to which referents suggested by the first 
'something'  are confirmed to correlate to similar referents in the second 
"something." E.G. an atom is like a solar system suggests that a nucleus is 
like the sun and electrons are like planets plus orbits are at specific 
intervals and electrons can be moved from one orbit to another by adding energy 
(acceleration) just like any other satellite. As referents like this were 
confirmed the epiphor became a productive metaphor and a model, i.e. the Bohr 
model. Eventually, our increasing knowledge of atoms and particle/waves made it 
clear that the model/metaphor was 'wrong' in nearly every respect and the 
metaphor died. Its use in beginning chemistry suggests that it is still a 
useful tool for metaphorical thinking; modified to "what might you 
infer/reason, if you looked at an atom as if it were 

Re: [FRIAM] Model, Metaphor, Analogy

[Nick Thompson]

Wow, Steve.  Wow!  He’s sompin!  n

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

 
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of Steven A Smith
Sent: Saturday, June 10, 2017 4:29 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group 
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Model, Metaphor, Analogy

 

And invoking the term "twist", he added a bit of Möbius Strip connotation!
It did feel ingenious to me as well.  

As an odd aside, I'm designing a "feathered serpent" bas-relief design for
the rocket mass heater I built last year in my sunroom...  I hadn't
considered adding the Ourobousian nature to it!  The following is not my
design, just one of many illustrative examples of the Tewa version:



Does a feathered serpent need to be more like a tapeworm to go
Ourobourosianally Möbius?

- Sieve

 

On 6/10/17 1:35 PM, Russ Abbott wrote:

I had never heard the word ouroboros
  before Dave used it. Thanks for
the term. But even though I had never heard the term, the ouroboros was the
image that came to mind when I first learned recursion!

 

On Sat, Jun 10, 2017 at 12:22 PM Steven A Smith  > wrote:

Dave -

Thanks for weighing in here, my own studies have not been so formal nor
probably as deep.   I have to admit to not knowing that cognitive
anthropology was a subject, just as Nick introduced me to evolutionary
psychology as it's own field!

I appreciate your introduction of epiphor, paraphor and dead metaphor.  I
began a discursion here (which I fortunately deleted) which lead me to read
some MacCormac and more to the point Philip Wheelwright on the modern,
technical usage of epiphor and diaphor, from the Greek/Aristotelian
epiphoria and diaphoria.   I particularly find your coining of paraphor, as
I think this is as common in our modern discourse/thinking as "confirmation
bias".

I also like your point that the "Scientific Method" is more metaphor than
reality, or more to the point, a narrative device to show how a discovery
"might have been made" when more often than not, it was backed into while
bumping around looking for something entirely different, and often involving
a "flash of insight" before then being laboriously wrung out and
demonstrated using the somewhat more "engineering" oriented methods of the
"Scientific Method" to move from motivated hypothesis to strongly validated
theory.

I don't know if you regularly attend WedTech, but this depth/topic of
discussion might motivate me to make the long trek into town...   

- Steve

On 6/10/17 9:36 AM, Prof David West wrote:

long long ago, my master's thesis in computer science and my phd
dissertation in cognitive anthropology dealt extensively with the issue of
metaphor and model, specifically in the area of artificial intelligence and
cognitive models of "mind." the very first academic papers I published dealt
with this issue (They were in AI MAgazine, the 'journal of record' in the
field at the time.

 

My own musings were deeply informed by the work of Earl R. MacCormac: A
Cognitive Theory of Metaphor and Metaphor and Myth in Science and Religion.

 

MacCormac argues that metaphor 'evolves' from "epiphor" the first suggestion
that something is like something else to either "dead metaphor" or "lexical
term" depending on the extent to which referents suggested by the first
'something'  are confirmed to correlate to similar referents in the second
"something." E.G. an atom is like a solar system suggests that a nucleus is
like the sun and electrons are like planets plus orbits are at specific
intervals and electrons can be moved from one orbit to another by adding
energy (acceleration) just like any other satellite. As referents like this
were confirmed the epiphor became a productive metaphor and a model, i.e.
the Bohr model. Eventually, our increasing knowledge of atoms and
particle/waves made it clear that the model/metaphor was 'wrong' in nearly
every respect and the metaphor died. Its use in beginning chemistry suggests
that it is still a useful tool for metaphorical thinking; modified to "what
might you infer/reason, if you looked at an atom as if it were a tiny solar
system."

 

In the case of AI, the joint epiphors — the computer is like a mind, the
mind is like a computer — should have rapidly become dead metaphors. Instead
they became models "physical symbol system" and most in the community
insisted that they were lexical terms (notably Pylyshyn, Newell, and Simon).
To explain this, I added the idea of a "paraphor" to MacCormac's
evolutionary sequence — a metaphor so ingrained in a paradigm that those
thinking with that paradigm cannot perceive the obvious failures of the
metaphor.

 

MacCormac's second book argues for the pervasiveness of the use and misuse
of metaphor and 

Re: [FRIAM] Model, Metaphor, Analogy

[Steven A Smith]

And invoking the term "twist", he added a bit of Möbius Strip 
connotation!  It did feel ingenious to me as well.


As an odd aside, I'm designing a "feathered serpent" bas-relief design 
for the rocket mass heater I built last year in my sunroom...  I hadn't 
considered adding the Ourobousian nature to it!  The following is not my 
design, just one of many illustrative examples of the Tewa version:



Does a feathered serpent need to be more like a tapeworm to go 
Ourobourosianally Möbius?


- Sieve


On 6/10/17 1:35 PM, Russ Abbott wrote:
I had never heard the word ouroboros 
 before Dave used it. Thanks 
for the term. But even though I had never heard the term, the 
ouroboros was the image that came to mind when I first learned recursion!


On Sat, Jun 10, 2017 at 12:22 PM Steven A Smith > wrote:


Dave -

Thanks for weighing in here, my own studies have not been so
formal nor probably as deep.   I have to admit to not knowing that
cognitive anthropology was a subject, just as Nick introduced me
to evolutionary psychology as it's own field!

I appreciate your introduction of /epiphor/, /paraphor/ and /dead
metaphor/.  I began a discursion here (which I fortunately
deleted) which lead me to read some MacCormac and more to the
point Philip Wheelwright on the modern, technical usage of
/epiphor/ and /diaphor/, from the Greek/Aristotelian /epiphoria/
and /diaphoria. /I particularly find your coining of /paraphor/,
as I think this is as common in our modern discourse/thinking as
"confirmation bias".

I also like your point that the "Scientific Method" is more
metaphor than reality, or more to the point, a narrative device to
show how a discovery "might have been made" when more often than
not, it was backed into while bumping around looking for something
entirely different, and often involving a "flash of insight"
before then being laboriously wrung out and demonstrated using the
somewhat more "engineering" oriented methods of the "Scientific
Method" to move from motivated hypothesis to strongly validated
theory.

I don't know if you regularly attend WedTech, but this depth/topic
of discussion might motivate me to make the long trek into town...

- Steve

On 6/10/17 9:36 AM, Prof David West wrote:

long long ago, my master's thesis in computer science and my phd
dissertation in cognitive anthropology dealt extensively with the
issue of metaphor and model, specifically in the area of
artificial intelligence and cognitive models of "mind." the very
first academic papers I published dealt with this issue (They
were in AI MAgazine, the 'journal of record' in the field at the
time.

My own musings were deeply informed by the work of Earl R.
MacCormac: /A Cognitive Theory of Metaphor/ and /Metaphor and
Myth in Science and Religion./

MacCormac argues that metaphor 'evolves' from "epiphor" the first
suggestion that something is like something else to either "dead
metaphor" or "lexical term" depending on the extent to which
referents suggested by the first 'something'  are confirmed to
correlate to similar referents in the second "something." E.G. an
atom is like a solar system suggests that a nucleus is like the
sun and electrons are like planets plus orbits are at specific
intervals and electrons can be moved from one orbit to another by
adding energy (acceleration) just like any other satellite. As
referents like this were confirmed the epiphor became a
productive metaphor and a model, i.e. the Bohr model. Eventually,
our increasing knowledge of atoms and particle/waves made it
clear that the model/metaphor was 'wrong' in nearly every respect
and the metaphor died. Its use in beginning chemistry suggests
that it is still a useful tool for metaphorical thinking;
modified to "what might you infer/reason, if you looked at an
atom _as if_ it were a tiny solar system."

In the case of AI, the joint epiphors — the computer is like a
mind, the mind is like a computer — should have rapidly become
dead metaphors. Instead they became models "physical symbol
system" and most in the community insisted that they were lexical
terms (notably Pylyshyn, Newell, and Simon). To explain this, I
added the idea of a "paraphor" to MacCormac's evolutionary
sequence — a metaphor so ingrained in a paradigm that those
thinking with that paradigm cannot perceive the obvious failures
of the metaphor.

MacCormac's second book argues for the pervasiveness of the use
and misuse of metaphor and its relationship to models
(mathematical and iillustrative) in both science and religion.
The "Scientific Method," the process of doing science, is itself
a metaphor (at best) that should have become a dead 

Re: [FRIAM] Model, Metaphor, Analogy

[Russ Abbott]

I had never heard the word ouroboros
 before Dave used it. Thanks for
the term. But even though I had never heard the term, the ouroboros was the
image that came to mind when I first learned recursion!

On Sat, Jun 10, 2017 at 12:22 PM Steven A Smith  wrote:

> Dave -
>
> Thanks for weighing in here, my own studies have not been so formal nor
> probably as deep.   I have to admit to not knowing that cognitive
> anthropology was a subject, just as Nick introduced me to evolutionary
> psychology as it's own field!
>
> I appreciate your introduction of *epiphor*, *paraphor* and *dead
> metaphor*.  I began a discursion here (which I fortunately deleted) which
> lead me to read some MacCormac and more to the point Philip Wheelwright on
> the modern, technical usage of *epiphor* and *diaphor*, from the
> Greek/Aristotelian *epiphoria* and *diaphoria.   *I particularly find
> your coining of *paraphor*, as I think this is as common in our modern
> discourse/thinking as "confirmation bias".
>
> I also like your point that the "Scientific Method" is more metaphor than
> reality, or more to the point, a narrative device to show how a discovery
> "might have been made" when more often than not, it was backed into while
> bumping around looking for something entirely different, and often
> involving a "flash of insight" before then being laboriously wrung out and
> demonstrated using the somewhat more "engineering" oriented methods of the
> "Scientific Method" to move from motivated hypothesis to strongly validated
> theory.
>
> I don't know if you regularly attend WedTech, but this depth/topic of
> discussion might motivate me to make the long trek into town...
>
> - Steve
> On 6/10/17 9:36 AM, Prof David West wrote:
>
> long long ago, my master's thesis in computer science and my phd
> dissertation in cognitive anthropology dealt extensively with the issue of
> metaphor and model, specifically in the area of artificial intelligence and
> cognitive models of "mind." the very first academic papers I published
> dealt with this issue (They were in AI MAgazine, the 'journal of record' in
> the field at the time.
>
> My own musings were deeply informed by the work of Earl R. MacCormac: *A
> Cognitive Theory of Metaphor* and *Metaphor and Myth in Science and
> Religion.*
>
> MacCormac argues that metaphor 'evolves' from "epiphor" the first
> suggestion that something is like something else to either "dead metaphor"
> or "lexical term" depending on the extent to which referents suggested by
> the first 'something'  are confirmed to correlate to similar referents in
> the second "something." E.G. an atom is like a solar system suggests that a
> nucleus is like the sun and electrons are like planets plus orbits are at
> specific intervals and electrons can be moved from one orbit to another by
> adding energy (acceleration) just like any other satellite. As referents
> like this were confirmed the epiphor became a productive metaphor and a
> model, i.e. the Bohr model. Eventually, our increasing knowledge of atoms
> and particle/waves made it clear that the model/metaphor was 'wrong' in
> nearly every respect and the metaphor died. Its use in beginning chemistry
> suggests that it is still a useful tool for metaphorical thinking; modified
> to "what might you infer/reason, if you looked at an atom *as if* it were
> a tiny solar system."
>
> In the case of AI, the joint epiphors — the computer is like a mind, the
> mind is like a computer — should have rapidly become dead metaphors.
> Instead they became models "physical symbol system" and most in the
> community insisted that they were lexical terms (notably Pylyshyn, Newell,
> and Simon). To explain this, I added the idea of a "paraphor" to
> MacCormac's evolutionary sequence — a metaphor so ingrained in a paradigm
> that those thinking with that paradigm cannot perceive the obvious failures
> of the metaphor.
>
> MacCormac's second book argues for the pervasiveness of the use and misuse
> of metaphor and its relationship to models (mathematical and iillustrative)
> in both science and religion. The "Scientific Method," the process of doing
> science, is itself a metaphor (at best) that should have become a dead
> metaphor as there is abundant evidence that 'science' is not done 'that
> way' but only after the fact as if it had been done that way. In an
> Ouroborosian twist, even MacCormac;s theory of metaphor is itself a
> metaphor.
>
> If this thread attracts interest, I think the work of MacCormac would
> provide a rich mine of potential ideas and a framework for the discussion.
> Unfortunately, it mostly seems to be behind pay walls — the books and JSTOR
> or its ilk.
>
> dave west
>
>
>
> On Fri, Jun 9, 2017, at 03:11 PM, Steven A Smith wrote:
>
> I meant to spawn a fresh proto-thread here, sorry.
>
> Given that we have been splitting hairs on terminology, I wanted to at
> least OPEN the topic that has been 

Re: [FRIAM] Model, Metaphor, Analogy

[Steven A Smith]

Dave -

Thanks for weighing in here, my own studies have not been so formal nor 
probably as deep.   I have to admit to not knowing that cognitive 
anthropology was a subject, just as Nick introduced me to evolutionary 
psychology as it's own field!


I appreciate your introduction of /epiphor/, /paraphor/ and /dead 
metaphor/.  I began a discursion here (which I fortunately deleted) 
which lead me to read some MacCormac and more to the point Philip 
Wheelwright on the modern, technical usage of /epiphor/ and /diaphor/, 
from the Greek/Aristotelian /epiphoria/ and /diaphoria. /I particularly 
find your coining of /paraphor/, as I think this is as common in our 
modern discourse/thinking as "confirmation bias".


I also like your point that the "Scientific Method" is more metaphor 
than reality, or more to the point, a narrative device to show how a 
discovery "might have been made" when more often than not, it was backed 
into while bumping around looking for something entirely different, and 
often involving a "flash of insight" before then being laboriously wrung 
out and demonstrated using the somewhat more "engineering" oriented 
methods of the "Scientific Method" to move from motivated hypothesis to 
strongly validated theory.


I don't know if you regularly attend WedTech, but this depth/topic of 
discussion might motivate me to make the long trek into town...


- Steve

On 6/10/17 9:36 AM, Prof David West wrote:
long long ago, my master's thesis in computer science and my phd 
dissertation in cognitive anthropology dealt extensively with the 
issue of metaphor and model, specifically in the area of artificial 
intelligence and cognitive models of "mind." the very first academic 
papers I published dealt with this issue (They were in AI MAgazine, 
the 'journal of record' in the field at the time.


My own musings were deeply informed by the work of Earl R. MacCormac: 
/A Cognitive Theory of Metaphor/ and /Metaphor and Myth in Science and 
Religion./


MacCormac argues that metaphor 'evolves' from "epiphor" the first 
suggestion that something is like something else to either "dead 
metaphor" or "lexical term" depending on the extent to which referents 
suggested by the first 'something'  are confirmed to correlate to 
similar referents in the second "something." E.G. an atom is like a 
solar system suggests that a nucleus is like the sun and electrons are 
like planets plus orbits are at specific intervals and electrons can 
be moved from one orbit to another by adding energy (acceleration) 
just like any other satellite. As referents like this were confirmed 
the epiphor became a productive metaphor and a model, i.e. the Bohr 
model. Eventually, our increasing knowledge of atoms and 
particle/waves made it clear that the model/metaphor was 'wrong' in 
nearly every respect and the metaphor died. Its use in beginning 
chemistry suggests that it is still a useful tool for metaphorical 
thinking; modified to "what might you infer/reason, if you looked at 
an atom _as if_ it were a tiny solar system."


In the case of AI, the joint epiphors — the computer is like a mind, 
the mind is like a computer — should have rapidly become dead 
metaphors. Instead they became models "physical symbol system" and 
most in the community insisted that they were lexical terms (notably 
Pylyshyn, Newell, and Simon). To explain this, I added the idea of a 
"paraphor" to MacCormac's evolutionary sequence — a metaphor so 
ingrained in a paradigm that those thinking with that paradigm cannot 
perceive the obvious failures of the metaphor.


MacCormac's second book argues for the pervasiveness of the use and 
misuse of metaphor and its relationship to models (mathematical and 
iillustrative) in both science and religion. The "Scientific Method," 
the process of doing science, is itself a metaphor (at best) that 
should have become a dead metaphor as there is abundant evidence that 
'science' is not done 'that way' but only after the fact as if it had 
been done that way. In an Ouroborosian twist, even MacCormac;s theory 
of metaphor is itself a metaphor.


If this thread attracts interest, I think the work of MacCormac would 
provide a rich mine of potential ideas and a framework for the 
discussion. Unfortunately, it mostly seems to be behind pay walls — 
the books and JSTOR or its ilk.


dave west



On Fri, Jun 9, 2017, at 03:11 PM, Steven A Smith wrote:

I meant to spawn a fresh proto-thread here, sorry.

Given that we have been splitting hairs on terminology, I wanted to 
at least OPEN the topic that has been grazed over and over, and that 
is the distinction between Model, Metaphor, and Analogy.


I specifically mean

 1. Mathematical Model

 2. Conceptual Metaphor

 3. Formal Analogy 

I don't know if this narrows it down enough to discuss but I think 
these three terms 

Re: [FRIAM] IS: Does Complexity have a circularity problem WAS: Any non-biological complex systems?

[Steven A Smith]

Nick -

I'm not sure I've observed a "fingers in the ears shouting" here, but I 
do understand the point I think.


I always read FriAM discussions as if the goal is exactly what you 
stated... to find a common language/model/metaphor to use to discuss.


As Glen aptly put it, these threads often DO get polluted perhaps by too 
much hair splitting or discursions from the OT (original topic) and I 
might be one of the guiltier parties to that.I think we DO wear 
ourselves (and one another as well as not-so-innocent bystanders who 
might otherwise participate) out with the long winded discussions of 
details (see the mass exodus/defection of WedTech a few years ago).


I believe that the argument (discussion) over levels vs layers was 
fueled partly by Glen's trying to hold us responsible for not enforcing 
a strong idea of hierarchy into the ideas of complex systems.So I'm 
game for helping to explore (but maybe not resolve) this question of how 
models of complex systems are structured.   But to avoid the risk of 
being mistaken for shouting with my ears plugged, I hope someone else 
will make a next step?


My own limited throwdown might be as follows:

Complex (biological?) systems do tend to exhibit (some) hierarchy as a 
consequence of self-organizing principles building larger units from 
smaller subunits (e.g. C, H, O, N molecules forming into carboxyl 
groups, glycerol groups, phosphate groups, which in turn form amino, 
nucleic, and fatty acids which form into macromolecules like fats, 
carbohydrates and polypeptide chains which fold into proteins which then 
go on to self-organize (or be assembled or catalyzed) into structures 
such as cellular and nuclear membranes as well as cytoskeletal 
membrane/tubules, flagella, etc. on up through the formation of 
organelles, viruses, microphages, and then unicellular life like 
bacteria/amoebae/protozoa/archaea/algae/fungi, and then multicellular 
life into complex organisms which then organize into units like 
flocks/herds/tribes/packs/murders/crowder/school/crudeness/troop/rabble/flange/etc 
and then perhaps proto-organisms like hive/city/state/nation/etc.   But 
following Vlad's lead and other's complementary offerings... there IS 
interaction between these levels of hierarchy...  cell membranes and 
other organelles "process" macro(and micro)molecular structures,  groups 
interact collectively with individuals, etc.


I'm with Glen intuitively that even though there are MANY examples of 
hierarchy in complex systems,  it isn't clear that they are either 
necessary nor sufficient to explain self-organization, emergence, 
sensitive dependence on initial conditions, punctuated 
criticality/equilibrium, etc.


I fear I may have muddied (polluted) a little here...

- Steve



On 6/10/17 12:04 PM, Nick Thompson wrote:


Dear Vib,

So, perhaps the question we should all be asking ourselves is “How far 
do we engage in a conversation in which we don’t really understand one 
another?  And, when we find ourselves engaged in such a conversation 
what do we do?  One option, of course, is for each us to put his 
fingers in his ears and continue to shout at one another, each using 
his own language and his own favorite metaphor.  Another option, is to 
give up, with graceful acknowledgements of one another’s wisdom.


Is there a third option? I think so.  (Surprise!)  I think it is to 
find a common “model” to work with.  Now to me, a “model” is a formal 
scientific metaphor.  To serve as a model, a metaphor has to be a 
specific phenomenon that is  thoroughly understood by all participants 
in the discussion.  “Natural Selection” was such a model in its time 
because everybody understood how to breed domestic animals. That funny 
reaction that Steve Guerin describes which spontaneously organizes 
into cells has often served as a “model” for his and my discussions of 
convection, although I am not as familiar with its details as I should 
be.


So, is there a model of layers that we want to work with?  If so, then 
we might study together on that model until we are all thoroughly 
familiar with it.   If not, then giving up would seem to be better 
than the “fingers-in-the-ears-shouting” method.


I take it that our interest in a layers model arises from our shared 
intuition that all complex phenomena are layered, in some important 
sense?


Nick

Nick

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ 



*From:*Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] *On Behalf Of *Vladimyr
*Sent:* Saturday, June 10, 2017 1:26 AM
*To:* 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group' 

*Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] IS: Does Complexity have a circularity problem 
WAS: Any non-biological complex systems?


Frank and the Congregation,

Shame on me for neglecting the obvious biological intermingling but 

Re: [FRIAM] IS: Does Complexity have a circularity problem WAS: Any non-biological complex systems?

[Frank Wimberly]

The Hearsay system might serve.  It was a speech understanding system
developed at CMU in the 1970s.  It could take sound and, if it were
connected human speech, produce a written version.  Raj Reddy constantly
used the phrase "signal to symbol" to describe what we were working on in
general.  The point is it had levels.  The segmentation level determined at
what time one phoneme ended and the next began, for example.  Other levels
were the phoneme, word, syntax, semantic, etc.  (World peace vs whirled
peas in a political discussion).  Levels revised each other's hypotheses
based on their own.  I may have some of the details wrong.This was done
using knowledge sources etc.  The classic reference is

Lesser, et al.  Organization of the Hearsay-II speech understanding
system.  IEEE Tran. Acoustics, Speech, Signal Processing​ ASSP-23, 1975.

Frank

Frank Wimberly
Phone (505) 670-9918

On Jun 10, 2017 12:05 PM, "Nick Thompson" 
wrote:

> Dear Vib,
>
>
>
> So, perhaps the question we should all be asking ourselves is “How far do
> we engage in a conversation in which we don’t really understand one
> another?  And, when we find ourselves engaged in such a conversation what
> do we do?  One option, of course, is for each us to put his fingers in his
> ears and continue to shout at one another, each using his own language and
> his own favorite metaphor.  Another option, is to give up, with graceful
> acknowledgements of one another’s wisdom.
>
>
>
> Is there a third option? I think so.  (Surprise!)  I think it is to find a
> common “model” to work with.  Now to me, a “model” is a formal scientific
> metaphor.  To serve as a model, a metaphor has to be a specific phenomenon
> that is  thoroughly understood by all participants in the discussion.
> “Natural Selection” was such a model in its time because everybody
> understood how to breed domestic animals. That funny reaction that Steve
> Guerin describes which spontaneously organizes into cells has often served
> as a “model” for his and my discussions of convection, although I am not as
> familiar with its details as I should be.
>
>
>
> So, is there a model of layers that we want to work with?  If so, then we
> might study together on that model until we are all thoroughly familiar
> with it.   If not, then giving up would seem to be better than the
> “fingers-in-the-ears-shouting” method.
>
>
>
> I take it that our interest in a layers model arises from our shared
> intuition that all complex phenomena are layered, in some important sense?
>
>
>
> Nick
>
>
>
> Nick
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Nicholas S. Thompson
>
> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
>
> Clark University
>
> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/
>
>
>
> *From:* Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] *On Behalf Of *Vladimyr
> *Sent:* Saturday, June 10, 2017 1:26 AM
> *To:* 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group' <
> friam@redfish.com>
> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] IS: Does Complexity have a circularity problem
> WAS: Any non-biological complex systems?
>
>
>
> Frank and the Congregation,
>
>
>
> Shame on me for neglecting the obvious biological intermingling but stress
> redistribution
>
> is so mechanical and direction sensitive it never dawned on me.
>
> But  what I did is more like weaving using nodes as intersection points
> without breaking
>
> the filaments.
>
>
>
> Giving up at such a time seems horribly sad even pathetic.
>
>
>
> So now do we agree, in part,  that lamina can penetrate other lamina and
> generate very complex systems.
>
> Is a lamina a real entity then with properties. I can already  make these
> flowers with cold rolled steel for edges.
>
> The complex system is interacting or intersecting laminae. Every view
> point presents a different structure.
>
> It seems insufficient to treat lamina as inert since they could just as
> easily become transit or vascular systems.
>
> So information can be accommodated…
>
> I had to pause to think about this but will let it stand. Pumping networks
> are very real.
>
> But this code is now close to my own physical limit.
>
> Time is short for all of us.
>
> vib
>
>
>
> *From:* Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com
> ] *On Behalf Of *Frank Wimberly
> *Sent:* June-09-17 11:21 PM
> *To:* The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] IS: Does Complexity have a circularity problem
> WAS: Any non-biological complex systems?
>
>
>
> "strata in geology have *some* precedent (shears and folds) for that, but
> I can't think of a biological example"
>
>
>
> Epidermis, dermis, hypodermis?  They interact.
>
> Frank Wimberly
> Phone (505) 670-9918
>
>
>
> On Jun 9, 2017 10:12 PM, "Steven A Smith"  wrote:
>
> Vlad -
>
> I find your use/choice/settling-upon "lamina/laminae" seems very
> motivated, though I can't articulate why.  I suppose because it has some
> connotation related to concepts like "laminar flow" which is 

Re: [FRIAM] IS: Does Complexity have a circularity problem WAS: Any non-biological complex systems?

[Nick Thompson]

Dear Vib, 

 

So, perhaps the question we should all be asking ourselves is “How far do we 
engage in a conversation in which we don’t really understand one another?  And, 
when we find ourselves engaged in such a conversation what do we do?  One 
option, of course, is for each us to put his fingers in his ears and continue 
to shout at one another, each using his own language and his own favorite 
metaphor.  Another option, is to give up, with graceful acknowledgements of one 
another’s wisdom.  

 

Is there a third option? I think so.  (Surprise!)  I think it is to find a 
common “model” to work with.  Now to me, a “model” is a formal scientific 
metaphor.  To serve as a model, a metaphor has to be a specific phenomenon that 
is  thoroughly understood by all participants in the discussion.  “Natural 
Selection” was such a model in its time because everybody understood how to 
breed domestic animals. That funny reaction that Steve Guerin describes which 
spontaneously organizes into cells has often served as a “model” for his and my 
discussions of convection, although I am not as familiar with its details as I 
should be.  

 

So, is there a model of layers that we want to work with?  If so, then we might 
study together on that model until we are all thoroughly familiar with it.   If 
not, then giving up would seem to be better than the 
“fingers-in-the-ears-shouting” method. 

 

I take it that our interest in a layers model arises from our shared intuition 
that all complex phenomena are layered, in some important sense?  

 

Nick 

 

Nick 

 

 

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

  
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of Vladimyr
Sent: Saturday, June 10, 2017 1:26 AM
To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group' 
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] IS: Does Complexity have a circularity problem WAS: Any 
non-biological complex systems?

 

Frank and the Congregation,

 

Shame on me for neglecting the obvious biological intermingling but stress 
redistribution

is so mechanical and direction sensitive it never dawned on me.

But  what I did is more like weaving using nodes as intersection points without 
breaking

the filaments. 

 

Giving up at such a time seems horribly sad even pathetic.

 

So now do we agree, in part,  that lamina can penetrate other lamina and 
generate very complex systems.

Is a lamina a real entity then with properties. I can already  make these 
flowers with cold rolled steel for edges.   

The complex system is interacting or intersecting laminae. Every view point 
presents a different structure.

It seems insufficient to treat lamina as inert since they could just as easily 
become transit or vascular systems.

So information can be accommodated… 

I had to pause to think about this but will let it stand. Pumping networks are 
very real.

But this code is now close to my own physical limit.

Time is short for all of us.

vib 

 

From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of Frank Wimberly
Sent: June-09-17 11:21 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] IS: Does Complexity have a circularity problem WAS: Any 
non-biological complex systems?

 

"strata in geology have *some* precedent (shears and folds) for that, but I 
can't think of a biological example"

 

Epidermis, dermis, hypodermis?  They interact.

Frank Wimberly
Phone (505) 670-9918

 

On Jun 9, 2017 10:12 PM, "Steven A Smith"  > wrote:

Vlad -

I find your use/choice/settling-upon "lamina/laminae" seems very motivated, 
though I can't articulate why.  I suppose because it has some connotation 
related to concepts like "laminar flow" which is structurally similar to the 
vulgar (your implication not mine) "layer" which connotes the "laying down of" 
a series of membranes or strata.  I'm not sure I know how to think about ply 
which seems to be derived from the world of engineered "laminates", suggesting 
perhaps a small number (under 5?) and engineered rather than "grown" or 
"evolved"?

The idea of one lamina penetrating another is fascinating... it seems like 
strata in geology have *some* precedent (shears and folds) for that, but I 
can't think of a biological example, nor can I guess what you were trying to 
achieve by developing methods for said penetration?

I appreciate your offering the insight that networks (can?) offer a 
redistribution of "stress" (which I take to include engineering/mechanical 
stress, but also hydrostatic pressure, even semantic stresses in a concept 
graph/network) ?

As a long time practicioner in the field of 3D Viz, I understand your affinity 
for it, but feel it has it's limits.   Not all concepts ground directly out in 
3D Geometry, but require much more subtle and 

Re: [FRIAM] Model, Metaphor, Analogy

[Prof David West]

long long ago, my master's thesis in computer science and my phd
dissertation in cognitive anthropology dealt extensively with the issue
of metaphor and model, specifically in the area of artificial
intelligence and cognitive models of "mind." the very first academic
papers I  published dealt with this issue (They were in AI MAgazine, the
'journal of record' in the field at the time.
My own musings were deeply informed by the work of Earl R. MacCormac: *A
Cognitive Theory of Metaphor* and *Metaphor and Myth in Science and
Religion.*
MacCormac argues that metaphor 'evolves' from "epiphor" the first
suggestion that something is like something else to either "dead
metaphor" or "lexical term" depending on the extent to which referents
suggested by the first 'something'  are confirmed to correlate to
similar referents in the second "something." E.G. an atom is like a
solar system suggests that a nucleus is like the sun and electrons are
like planets plus orbits are at specific intervals and electrons can be
moved from one orbit to another by adding energy (acceleration) just
like any other satellite. As referents like this were confirmed the
epiphor became a productive metaphor and a model, i.e. the Bohr model.
Eventually, our increasing knowledge of atoms and particle/waves made
it clear that the model/metaphor was 'wrong' in nearly every respect
and the metaphor died. Its use in beginning chemistry suggests that it
is still a useful tool for metaphorical thinking; modified to "what
might you infer/reason, if you looked at an atom _as if_ it were a tiny
solar system."
In the case of AI, the joint epiphors — the computer is like a mind, the
mind is like a computer — should have rapidly become dead metaphors.
Instead they became models "physical symbol system" and most in the
community insisted that they were lexical terms (notably Pylyshyn,
Newell, and Simon). To explain this, I added the idea of a "paraphor" to
MacCormac's evolutionary sequence — a metaphor so ingrained in a
paradigm that those thinking with that paradigm cannot perceive the
obvious failures of the metaphor.
MacCormac's second book argues for the pervasiveness of the use and
misuse of metaphor and its relationship to models (mathematical and
iillustrative) in both science and religion. The "Scientific Method,"
the process of doing science, is itself a metaphor (at best) that should
have become a dead metaphor as there is abundant evidence that 'science'
is not done 'that way' but only after the fact as if it had been done
that way. In an Ouroborosian twist, even MacCormac;s theory of metaphor
is itself a metaphor.
If this thread attracts interest, I think the work of MacCormac would
provide a rich mine of potential ideas and a framework for the
discussion. Unfortunately, it mostly seems to be behind pay walls — the
books and JSTOR or its ilk.
dave west



On Fri, Jun 9, 2017, at 03:11 PM, Steven A Smith wrote:
> I meant to spawn a fresh proto-thread here, sorry.
> 
>> Given that we have been splitting hairs on terminology, I wanted to
>> at least OPEN the topic that has been grazed over and over, and that
>> is the distinction between Model, Metaphor, and Analogy.>> 
>>  I specifically mean 
>>
>>  1. Mathematical Model[1]
>>  2. Conceptual Metaphor[2]
>>  3. Formal Analogy[3]>> I don't know if this narrows it down enough to 
>> discuss but I think
>> these three terms have been bandied about loosely and widely enough
>> lately to deserve a little more explication?>> I could rattle on for pages 
>> about my own usage/opinions/distinctions
>> but trust that would just pollute a thread before it had a chance to
>> start, if start it can.>> A brief Google Search gave me THIS reference which 
>> looks promising,
>> but as usual, I'm not willing to go past a paywall or beg a
>> colleague/institution for access (I know LANL's reference library
>> will probably get this for me if I go in there!).>> 
>> http://www.blackwellreference.com/public/tocnode?id=g9780631221081_chunk_g97806312210818>>
>>  


>> 


>> 
>>
>>  FRIAM
>>  Applied
>>  Complex-
>>  ity
>>  Group
>>  listserv
>>  Meets
>>  Fridays
>>  9a-11:30
>>  at cafe
>>  at St.
>>  John's
>>  College
>> 

Re: [FRIAM] IS: Does Complexity have a circularity problem WAS: Any non-biological complex systems?

[Nick Thompson]

 

Frank, 

 

These are exactly the sorts of considerations we have to bring to bear when we 
“cash out” a scientific metaphor.  What DIFFERENCE does it make when we call 
something a layer.   What EXACTLY is the experience that we are bringing to 
bear? 

 

How was Friday’s meeting of the M. C. ?

 

Nick

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

  
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of Frank Wimberly
Sent: Saturday, June 10, 2017 12:21 AM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group 
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] IS: Does Complexity have a circularity problem WAS: Any 
non-biological complex systems?

 

"strata in geology have *some* precedent (shears and folds) for that, but I 
can't think of a biological example"

 

Epidermis, dermis, hypodermis?  They interact.

Frank Wimberly
Phone (505) 670-9918

 

On Jun 9, 2017 10:12 PM, "Steven A Smith"  > wrote:

Vlad -

I find your use/choice/settling-upon "lamina/laminae" seems very motivated, 
though I can't articulate why.  I suppose because it has some connotation 
related to concepts like "laminar flow" which is structurally similar to the 
vulgar (your implication not mine) "layer" which connotes the "laying down of" 
a series of membranes or strata.  I'm not sure I know how to think about ply 
which seems to be derived from the world of engineered "laminates", suggesting 
perhaps a small number (under 5?) and engineered rather than "grown" or 
"evolved"?

The idea of one lamina penetrating another is fascinating... it seems like 
strata in geology have *some* precedent (shears and folds) for that, but I 
can't think of a biological example, nor can I guess what you were trying to 
achieve by developing methods for said penetration?

I appreciate your offering the insight that networks (can?) offer a 
redistribution of "stress" (which I take to include engineering/mechanical 
stress, but also hydrostatic pressure, even semantic stresses in a concept 
graph/network) ?

As a long time practicioner in the field of 3D Viz, I understand your affinity 
for it, but feel it has it's limits.   Not all concepts ground directly out in 
3D Geometry, but require much more subtle and complex metaphorical basis which 
in turn might be *rendered* as a 3D object (more to the point, a complex system 
projected down into a 3D space using geometric primitives?)

I do agree with what I think is your supposition that our evolution as 
animal/mammal/primate/omnivore/predator has given us tools for 3D spatial 
reasoning, but I think we are also blessed (cursed) with topological reasoning 
(graphs/networks) of which linguistics/semiotics might simply be a (signifcant) 
subset of? I would claim that code is primarily topological, though in a 
somewhat degenerate fashion.   I used to wonder why the term "spaghetti code" 
was used in such derision, I suspect the most interesting code might very well 
be so arbitrarily complex as to deserve that term.   I understand that taking 
(otherwise) simple linear structures and rendering them unrecognizeable with 
jumps/goto's is pathological.

I think I will have to think a little (lot) more about your description of your 
stack of rectangular matrices, self-avoiding walks and Hamiltonian/Eulerian 
(processes?).  I will attempt to parse more of this and respond under separate 
cover.

Referencing your (imaginary) namesake, I am feeling mildly impaled on my own 
petard here!

- Steve

On 6/9/17 6:51 PM, Vladimyr wrote:

Nicholas,
I hear your plea and would come to your defense if we were closer.

I have a small story that explains my attitude to layer from anAdvanced 
Composite Engineering view point.
It took me probably 3 years to eradicate the word in my laboratory We were 
using various materials and filament
winding with robotic machines. The basic concept is to use lamina as a term to 
describe an entity with specific material properties.
When we talked about many lamina then we used the term laminae each was 
composed of any number of lamina
having a unique material property set and referenced to local and global 
coordinates. This aggressive language facilitated
structural analysis of complex structures. Each lamina had a designation to 
allow it to function within a laminate . no one really cared
very much about what a single lamina of unidirectional Carbon fiber thought of 
the terminology. What mattered was the finished structure
with interacting laminates and monolithic components to remain intact when used 
by people.

Layer is a word used by simpletons or illiterates that never have to  analyze 
why something failed and killed good people.
The Onion is a metaphor for some complicated word gamers or a hamburger 
condiment but one must specify which context before
breaking into 

Re: [FRIAM] IS: Does Complexity have a circularity problem WAS: Any non-biological complex systems?

[gepr ⛧]

I agree with Steve that lamina is biased with the assumption of continuous 
flow. Discrete aggreagation like coral deposition or FACS based cell by cell 
deposition would not be evoked by the term lamina.

As an aside, although (serial) diffusion limited aggregation is often used to 
model coral deposition, (serial) DLA does submit to a partal order in a 
monotonic time parameter. The parallelism theorem from LTS tells us that the 
result of any parallel transition can be perfectly duplicated/simulated with a 
serial transition. But it still seems to me that parallel deposition (like in 
coral growth) might reach points in shape space not reachable by serial 
deposition.


On June 9, 2017 10:26:09 PM PDT, Vladimyr  wrote:
>So now do we agree, in part,  that lamina can penetrate other lamina
>and generate very complex systems.
>
>Is a lamina a real entity then with properties. I can already  make
>these flowers with cold rolled steel for edges.   
>
>The complex system is interacting or intersecting laminae. Every view
>point presents a different structure.
>
>It seems insufficient to treat lamina as inert since they could just as
>easily become transit or vascular systems.
>
>So information can be accommodated… 

-- 
⛧glen⛧


FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
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FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove

Re: [FRIAM] IS: Does Complexity have a circularity problem WAS: Any non-biological complex systems?

[gepr ⛧]

and mollusk shell formation. Though they don't really interact, they are 
deposited kinda like spray paint.  Coral deposition might also work well as a 
canonical example.




On June 9, 2017 9:20:37 PM PDT, Frank Wimberly  wrote:
>"strata in geology have *some* precedent (shears and folds) for that,
>but I
>can't think of a biological example"
>
>Epidermis, dermis, hypodermis?  They interact.
>
>Frank Wimberly
>Phone (505) 670-9918
>
>On Jun 9, 2017 10:12 PM, "Steven A Smith"  wrote:
>
>> Vlad -
>>
>> I find your use/choice/settling-upon "lamina/laminae" seems very
>> motivated, though I can't articulate why.  I suppose because it has
>some
>> connotation related to concepts like "laminar flow" which is
>structurally
>> similar to the vulgar (your implication not mine) "layer" which
>connotes
>> the "laying down of" a series of membranes or strata.  I'm not sure I
>know
>> how to think about ply which seems to be derived from the world of
>> engineered "laminates", suggesting perhaps a small number (under 5?)
>and
>> engineered rather than "grown" or "evolved"?
>>
>> The idea of one lamina penetrating another is fascinating... it seems
>like
>> strata in geology have *some* precedent (shears and folds) for that,
>but I
>> can't think of a biological example, nor can I guess what you were
>trying
>> to achieve by developing methods for said penetration?

-- 
⛧glen⛧


FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove