Re: [FRIAM] Bayes Rules and Base Rates Count

[David Eric Smith]

Yes, while the clip was a nice explanation about Bayesian updating, the 
narrator’s statement that we need to make assumptions about prevalence seem to 
me like they send the viewer on a wrong turn.

It’s just an affine transform.  If you know the sensitivity and the selectivity 
of your test (which presumably you get from the design process before you 
deploy it), then the fraction of test-positives and test-negatives is just a 
linear function of the fraction of true-positives and true-negatives, +/- 
sampling noise.  In a large sample, the noise can be pushed down as a fraction 
of the mean.

So the test-positives and test-negatives do not equal the true-positives and 
true-negatives, but the former are an invertible function of the latter.  This 
is a simplification of a binary variable, I think.  But I haven’t taken a 
minute to go looking for a range of examples to show where non-invertibility 
starts.  I imagine again all this was largely worked out between 1500 and 1700, 
and is in basic stats textbooks.

I think everything I have said above is right.  I did take a minute to just 
write out the decomposition in terms of priors, likelihoods, and posteriors on 
a sheet of paper, and the linear function sits there and looks at me, so I 
don’t think I am spouting off the cuff.

Anyway,

Eric



> On May 1, 2020, at 8:39 AM, Tom Johnson  wrote:
> 
> Good explanation.  But it always comes back to the basic question: What are 
> the methods and data informing our assumptions about prevalence, at this 
> moment, in a population?  Or am I wrong?
> Tom
>  
> 
> 
> Tom Johnson - t...@jtjohnson.com 
> Institute for Analytic Journalism   -- Santa Fe, NM USA
> 505.577.6482(c)505.473.9646(h)
> NM Foundation for Open Government 
> Check out It's The People's Data 
> 
>  
> 
> 
> 
> On Wed, Apr 29, 2020 at 4:03 PM George Duncan  > wrote:
> Here's an easy numerical example of why conditional probabilities as employed 
> in Bayes Rule are important:
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x5FfTjJtV3E&feature=share 
> 
>  
>  
> George Duncan
> Emeritus Professor of Statistics, Carnegie Mellon University
> georgeduncanart.com 
> See posts on Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram
> Land: (505) 983-6895  
> Mobile: (505) 469-4671
>  
> My art theme: Dynamic exposition of the tension between matrix order and 
> luminous chaos.
> 
> "Attempt what is not certain. Certainty may or may not come later. It may 
> then be a valuable delusion."
> From "Notes to myself on beginning a painting" by Richard Diebenkorn. 
> "It's that knife-edge of uncertainty where we come alive to our truest 
> power." Joanna Macy.
> 
> 
> 
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Re: [FRIAM] At the limits of thought

[thompnickson2]

Russell, 

I have both research gate and Academia.  Academia can't tell me from anybody
that has the name nicholas or thompson or ns thompson or... nick thompson
or and, believe you me, there are a lot of us.  Research Gate doesn't
make that sort of mistake near as often.  Academia is a bit better at
finding things for me to read, but I am overwhelmed as it is, so that's not
of much use to me.  I don't think I am going to renew it. 

Nick 

Nicholas Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology
Clark University
thompnicks...@gmail.com
https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/
 


-Original Message-
From: Friam  On Behalf Of Russell Standish
Sent: Thursday, April 30, 2020 8:07 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group 
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] At the limits of thought

On Mon, Apr 27, 2020 at 05:04:52PM -0600, Frank Wimberly wrote:
> Academia does something like that.  "You have [so many] mentions.  To 
> see your mentions come a full member"
> i.e. send money.  I think mentions is slightly more general than 
> citations. They might mention your name without citing a paper?

I did wonder - I keep getting messages congratulating on my 700th (or
whatever) mention. But it exceeds my citation count according to Google
scholar. But I'm not curious enough to fork over the money to find out :).


-- 


Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: [FRIAM] At the limits of thought

[Russell Standish]

On Mon, Apr 27, 2020 at 05:04:52PM -0600, Frank Wimberly wrote:
> Academia does something like that.  "You have [so many] mentions.  To see your
> mentions come a full member"
> i.e. send money.  I think mentions is slightly more general than citations. 
> They might mention your name without citing a paper?

I did wonder - I keep getting messages congratulating on my 700th (or
whatever) mention. But it exceeds my citation count according to
Google scholar. But I'm not curious enough to fork over the money to
find out :).


-- 


Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: [FRIAM] Bayes Rules and Base Rates Count

[George Duncan]

You indeed are indeed correct, Tom. That is the fundamental question for
Bayesian applications. For a time it was considered to be an impossible
hurdle that blocked Bayesian statistical analysis. Today there are a
variety of conceptualizations that have changed that view, and so Bayes
Rules!

George Duncan
Emeritus Professor of Statistics, Carnegie Mellon University
georgeduncanart.com
See posts on Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram
Land: (505) 983-6895
Mobile: (505) 469-4671

My art theme: Dynamic exposition of the tension between matrix order and
luminous chaos.

"Attempt what is not certain. Certainty may or may not come later. It may
then be a valuable delusion."
>From "Notes to myself on beginning a painting" by Richard Diebenkorn.

"It's that knife-edge of uncertainty where we come alive to our truest
power." Joanna Macy.




On Thu, Apr 30, 2020 at 5:40 PM Tom Johnson  wrote:

> Good explanation.  But it always comes back to the basic question: What
> are the methods and data informing our assumptions about prevalence, at
> this moment, in a population?  Or am I wrong?
> Tom
>
>
> 
> Tom Johnson - t...@jtjohnson.com
> Institute for Analytic Journalism   -- Santa Fe, NM USA
> 505.577.6482(c)505.473.9646(h)
> *NM Foundation for Open Government* 
> *Check out It's The People's Data
> *
>
> 
>
>
> On Wed, Apr 29, 2020 at 4:03 PM George Duncan  wrote:
>
>> Here's an easy numerical example of why conditional probabilities as
>> employed in Bayes Rule are important:
>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x5FfTjJtV3E&feature=share
>> 
>>
>>
>> George Duncan
>> Emeritus Professor of Statistics, Carnegie Mellon University
>> georgeduncanart.com
>> See posts on Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram
>> Land: (505) 983-6895
>> Mobile: (505) 469-4671
>>
>> My art theme: Dynamic exposition of the tension between matrix order and
>> luminous chaos.
>>
>> "Attempt what is not certain. Certainty may or may not come later. It may
>> then be a valuable delusion."
>> From "Notes to myself on beginning a painting" by Richard Diebenkorn.
>>
>> "It's that knife-edge of uncertainty where we come alive to our truest
>> power." Joanna Macy.
>>
>>
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>> Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6  bit.ly/virtualfriam
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Re: [FRIAM] Bayes Rules and Base Rates Count

[Tom Johnson]

Good explanation.  But it always comes back to the basic question: What are
the methods and data informing our assumptions about prevalence, at this
moment, in a population?  Or am I wrong?
Tom



Tom Johnson - t...@jtjohnson.com
Institute for Analytic Journalism   -- Santa Fe, NM USA
505.577.6482(c)505.473.9646(h)
*NM Foundation for Open Government* 
*Check out It's The People's Data
*




On Wed, Apr 29, 2020 at 4:03 PM George Duncan  wrote:

> Here's an easy numerical example of why conditional probabilities as
> employed in Bayes Rule are important:
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x5FfTjJtV3E&feature=share
> 
>
>
> George Duncan
> Emeritus Professor of Statistics, Carnegie Mellon University
> georgeduncanart.com
> See posts on Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram
> Land: (505) 983-6895
> Mobile: (505) 469-4671
>
> My art theme: Dynamic exposition of the tension between matrix order and
> luminous chaos.
>
> "Attempt what is not certain. Certainty may or may not come later. It may
> then be a valuable delusion."
> From "Notes to myself on beginning a painting" by Richard Diebenkorn.
>
> "It's that knife-edge of uncertainty where we come alive to our truest
> power." Joanna Macy.
>
>
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> Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6  bit.ly/virtualfriam
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Re: [FRIAM] Warring Darwinians for Glen, Steve

[Steven A Smith]

Nick -


> Nice thought, but I would have to ride on the bumper. 
>
>  
>
> What a time!
>

FWIW... you have referenced your own choice of clique-formation as a
"pod" which I believe exclusively? describes the second level of whale
(at least Orca) social organization.   (matriline -> pod -> clan ->
community).  Other whales (and porpoises?) also form pods I think, but
I'm not so sure if we ascribe (or recognize) larger clans for them?

I'm wondering if from an evolutionary psychologist point of view if
there is a "natural" way ( evidenced in ethnographic/anthropological
precedent) for us to form multi-scale clique structures which can
dissociate quickly as-needed during times such as this pandemic.  
Terrorist or deep-cover spy cell-networks seem to have this sorted
fairly well?

It seems natural (obviously) for a family group living under one roof to
form such a first order grouping...  and in your case if I read your
circumstance right, you have formed a 3 generation "pod" with one of
your children and spouse, and a grandchild who you may or may not live
under the same roof, but have chosen to "share the risk"?  

I've seen any number of opportunities *lost* to form such larger pods
(my sister's family separating into one couple and 3 singletons who do
not mix)...   but I suspect that there are plenty of examples along the
lines of extended families... where for example, a group of siblings
choose to maintain contact and support/allow contact among their
children (first cousins) in groups therefore of 5 or 10 or even as large
as 30 or 40, with some group-pressure to remain isolated *outside* of
that group... possibly even assign as small of a number as 2 or 3 who
are trusted to go out in the world and forage at the grocery or
hardware... possibly those with the best discipline around social
distance, PPE, etc.

I don't know how close the "clan structure" of Orcas is to that of
various (usually matrilineal?) first-nations clans, and if there is any
kind of useful parallel.  From my limited anthropology background, I
seem to remember that clan-structures provide a kind of formula for how
to "weave a community" of individuals without too much risk of creating
bad-blood (socially as well as genetically)?

This is perhaps thinner ice, but my own experience within my social
circles is that "the decider" (regarding style and level of isolation)
in most "pods" I know of is a woman...  not always the eldest, but one
who has significant dominance outside of such a pandemic...  a thought
leader in nuclear or extended family or perhaps neighborhood.  

One of my social-circle groups consists of a modestly isolated
"country-lane" of about 6 households of retirees and empty nesters.   So
roughly 12 individuals with roughly 3 in the high-age-risk (>80)
category and 1 > 70 with acute preexisting conditions.   The 3 high-risk
are men, and are supported in self-isolation by their (younger) partners
(2 women, one man), and there are two significantly dominant women in
the group who alternatively trigger social events among this larger pod
normally but have taken on a "policing" role amongst their neighbors,
making sure everyone has what they need but also shaming anyone who
considers what they believe to be "risky behaviour".   A less assertive
woman is also a practicing (semi-retired) nurse who seems to decline to
try to "manage" the rest of the lane even though she seems to be more
technically competent in this context.   One couple are Native American
(Picuris/Dine) and they have mostly left the pod/lane to rejoin the Dine
family-pod which I believe needs their influence/help in these times.  
They remain friendly but non-contacting with the lane when they are
there ( a few days ever week or two).    We are normally considered part
of their "clan" but have declined virtually all in-person contact,
allowing for a few socially-distanced meetups in the backyard with one
of the couples (BYOEverything).   The "lane" has a good dozen other
orbiters/clan-members like us who seem to have the same relationship to
that "pod"... 

Another of my extended social circle is an organic farm-complex that
consisted of 2 women in their early 60s, each with their own
home/aspect-of-farming and a full time tenant in a casita and a rotating
medley of temporary farm-help who either live for weeks or months *on*
the farm, or are CSA-trade workers who come in for a few hours here and
there to help with acute things like harvest/clean for market-day.   
The primary *farmer* recently took on a young couple (30ish) to whom she
is sharecropping... giving them her house and the fields she has built
over the last 10 years to "make what they will" of it with fresh ideas
and energy.   They were on their way here from Michigan when the
pandemic got hot...  they had "day jobs" on two other organic farms in
the area but after arriving self-isolated on the farm rather than risk
bringing something with them...  once past the two weeks (which was a
good time

[FRIAM] FRIAM Regular Session 9 a

[Tom Johnson (via Google Docs)]

I've shared an item with you:

FRIAM Regular Session 9 a
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1Cgu8mvXeGOCyVG2fRjwY646nv1D7n4Zl6hFhWkWkXf0/edit?usp=sharing&ts=5eab5006

It's not an attachment -- it's stored online. To open this item, just click  
the link above.


See ya on the morrow.
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Re: [FRIAM] Warring Darwinians for Glen, Steve

[Steven A Smith]

> Acceleration can be a changing, non-constant function of time.  The
> change is necessarily continuous.  Want to go for a ride?

Quick, before anyone else inserts the bad pun...   "what a jerk!"



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Re: [FRIAM] Warring Darwinians for Glen, Steve

[thompnickson2]

Nice thought, but I would have to ride on the bumper.  

 

What a time!

 

N

 

Nicholas Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology

Clark University

  thompnicks...@gmail.com

  
https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/

 

 

From: Friam  On Behalf Of Frank Wimberly
Sent: Thursday, April 30, 2020 3:27 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group 
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Warring Darwinians for Glen, Steve

 

Acceleration can be a changing, non-constant function of time.  The change is 
necessarily continuous.  Want to go for a ride?

 

On Thu, Apr 30, 2020 at 3:06 PM mailto:thompnicks...@gmail.com> > wrote:

Glen, and all, 

 

This is very good, so good that I am in danger of getting lost in thought and 
never giving it any reply.

 

So let me attempt a short reply.  

 

Following Holt, I am going to take the metaphor (if you will) of point of view. 
 Let's say we are all blindfolded philosophers palpating an extremely patient 
elephant.  Even without introducing the qualia problem,  there is an odd sense 
in which we all feel the same thing and an equally odd sense in which we each 
feel a different thing.  And to know what you are feeling, I have to question 
you (and ask you to use metaphors) to convey what you are feeling to me.  Here 
there is no question of qualia.  If I were standing where you are and feeling 
the same part of the elephant that you feel, then I would feel the same thing 
(ex hypothesi).  

 

One of the challenges here, of course, is how we come to the conclusion that we 
are all palpating the SAME thing.  We could all behave as some of my 
"qualitative" colleagues at Clark wanted to behave, and simply "share our 
experiences"--.  "I am having a scaley experience; I am having a fuzzy 
experience."  "I am having a mucussy experience" "Ugh! Something just wacked me 
over the head." -- and then walk away.   There has to be the possibility of 
classes of objects for us to appeal to before we can begin to integrate the 
various information that each of us is gathering.  And there is philosophical 
difficulty enough here to concern us without introducing the problem of whether 
each of us experiences fuzziness, say, in the same way that each of the others 
do.  

 

Now if we were determined to study THAT problem, we could take a group of 
extremely standardized objects ... a perfect steel sphere, a perfect cylinder, 
etc., say, and ask each of us to report on what we feel as we feel them.  We 
might notice, from this research, that one of us focusses on weight, another on 
surface texture, another on warmth and coldness, etc.  And across objects we 
might find individual differences in how each of us describes the objects.  
That might get at our individual uniqueness in how we approach the touching of 
objects.  And just as we could agree, after a time that we were surrounding an 
elephant, we could agree, after a time and a discussion, that you approach 
objects in one way and I approach them in an other.  We could, with the 
diligent application of metaphors, come to see the world approximately from one 
another's point of view  

 

To me, the mystery of consciousness is no greater than the fact that we never 
stand in exactly the same place when we look at something.  But as steve Guerin 
has pointed out, just as we can work out where the fire is by all of us 
pointing our differently located cameras at it, we can as easily work out the 
location of each of the cameras from the same information.  This is no accident 
because Steve is a student of Gibson and Gibson was a student of Holt, and 
Holt's metaphor of consciousness is a point of view metaphor.

 

I note with particular interest this paragraph in Glen's letter: 

 

The hard problem of consciousness is that any given 
creature/object/thing/situation has a qualitative experience, a *comprehension* 
of the situation/state/condition that creature finds itself it at any given 
time, any given place, or any given trajectory through time and space. The hard 
problem is one of uniqueness. The uniqueness of that experience.

 

I just don’t think “experience” is that sort of thing.  Experience is always a 
step from one thing to another.  A “unique experience” is like acceleration an 
instant.  A fiction that is useful for some purposes.  We know how to study the 
elephant; and we know how to study the uniqueness of the observers of the 
elephant.  But those are distinct objects of study.  

 

Not short.  Ugh.  Glen, you are allowed to say I begged your question.  

 

Nick 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Nicholas Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology

Clark University

thompnicks...@gmail.com  

https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/

 

 

-Original Message-
From: Friam mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com> > On 
Behalf Of u?l? ?
Sent: Thursday, April 30, 2020 9:44 AM
To: FriAM ma

Re: [FRIAM] Warring Darwinians for Glen, Steve

[Frank Wimberly]

Acceleration can be a changing, non-constant function of time.  The change
is necessarily continuous.  Want to go for a ride?

On Thu, Apr 30, 2020 at 3:06 PM  wrote:

> Glen, and all,
>
>
>
> This is very good, so good that I am in danger of getting lost in thought
> and never giving it any reply.
>
>
>
> So let me attempt a short reply.
>
>
>
> Following Holt, I am going to take the metaphor (if you will) of point of
> view.  Let's say we are all blindfolded philosophers palpating an extremely
> patient elephant.  Even without introducing the qualia problem,  there is
> an odd sense in which we all feel the same thing and an equally odd sense
> in which we each feel a different thing.  And to know what you are feeling,
> I have to question you (and ask you to use metaphors) to convey what you
> are feeling to me.  Here there is no question of qualia.  If I were
> standing where you are and feeling the same part of the elephant that you
> feel, then I would feel the same thing (ex hypothesi).
>
>
>
> One of the challenges here, of course, is how we come to the conclusion
> that we are all palpating the SAME thing.  We could all behave as some of
> my "qualitative" colleagues at Clark wanted to behave, and simply "share
> our experiences"--.  "I am having a scaley experience; I am having a fuzzy
> experience."  "I am having a mucussy experience" "Ugh! Something just
> wacked me over the head." -- and then walk away.   There has to be the
> possibility of classes of objects for us to appeal to before we can begin
> to integrate the various information that each of us is gathering.  And
> there is philosophical difficulty enough here to concern us without
> introducing the problem of whether each of us experiences fuzziness, say,
> in the same way that each of the others do.
>
>
>
> Now if we were determined to study THAT problem, we could take a group of
> extremely standardized objects ... a perfect steel sphere, a perfect
> cylinder, etc., say, and ask each of us to report on what we feel as we
> feel them.  We might notice, from this research, that one of us focusses on
> weight, another on surface texture, another on warmth and coldness, etc.
> And across objects we might find individual differences in how each of us
> describes the objects.  That might get at our individual uniqueness in how
> we approach the touching of objects.  And just as we could agree, after a
> time that we were surrounding an elephant, we could agree, after a time and
> a discussion, that you approach objects in one way and I approach them in
> an other.  We could, with the diligent application of metaphors, come to
> see the world approximately from one another's point of view
>
>
>
> To me, the mystery of consciousness is no greater than the fact that we
> never stand in exactly the same place when we look at something.  But as
> steve Guerin has pointed out, just as we can work out where the fire is by
> all of us pointing our differently located cameras at it, we can as easily
> work out the location of each of the cameras from the same information.
> This is no accident because Steve is a student of Gibson and Gibson was a
> student of Holt, and Holt's metaphor of consciousness is a point of view
> metaphor.
>
>
>
> I note with particular interest this paragraph in Glen's letter:
>
>
>
> The hard problem of consciousness is that any given
> creature/object/thing/situation has a qualitative experience, a
> *comprehension* of the situation/state/condition that creature finds itself
> it at any given time, any given place, or any given trajectory through time
> and space. The hard problem is one of uniqueness. The uniqueness of that
> experience.
>
>
>
> I just don’t think “experience” is that sort of thing.  Experience is
> always a step from one thing to another.  A “unique experience” is like
> acceleration an instant.  A fiction that is useful for some purposes.  We
> know how to study the elephant; and we know how to study the uniqueness of
> the observers of the elephant.  But those are distinct objects of study.
>
>
>
> Not short.  Ugh.  Glen, you are allowed to say I begged your question.
>
>
>
> Nick
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Nicholas Thompson
>
> Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology
>
> Clark University
>
> thompnicks...@gmail.com
>
> https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/
>
>
>
>
>
> -Original Message-
> From: Friam  On Behalf Of u?l? ?
> Sent: Thursday, April 30, 2020 9:44 AM
> To: FriAM 
> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Warring Darwinians for Glen, Steve
>
>
>
> OK. Here's the setup:
>
>
>
> Nick says 1: Metaphorical thinker maps their experience onto another's
> experience, modeling that other's experience with their own.
>
>
>
> Nick says 2: I don't understand the hard problem of consciousness.
>
>
>
> Glen says: Expressions 1 and 2 are contradictory.
>
>
>
> I suppose it's on me to show that they're contradictory. The idea that
> abduction is an inference from the unique to a class might be helpf

Re: [FRIAM] Warring Darwinians for Glen, Steve

[thompnickson2]

Glen, and all, 

 

This is very good, so good that I am in danger of getting lost in thought and 
never giving it any reply.

 

So let me attempt a short reply.  

 

Following Holt, I am going to take the metaphor (if you will) of point of view. 
 Let's say we are all blindfolded philosophers palpating an extremely patient 
elephant.  Even without introducing the qualia problem,  there is an odd sense 
in which we all feel the same thing and an equally odd sense in which we each 
feel a different thing.  And to know what you are feeling, I have to question 
you (and ask you to use metaphors) to convey what you are feeling to me.  Here 
there is no question of qualia.  If I were standing where you are and feeling 
the same part of the elephant that you feel, then I would feel the same thing 
(ex hypothesi).  

 

One of the challenges here, of course, is how we come to the conclusion that we 
are all palpating the SAME thing.  We could all behave as some of my 
"qualitative" colleagues at Clark wanted to behave, and simply "share our 
experiences"--.  "I am having a scaley experience; I am having a fuzzy 
experience."  "I am having a mucussy experience" "Ugh! Something just wacked me 
over the head." -- and then walk away.   There has to be the possibility of 
classes of objects for us to appeal to before we can begin to integrate the 
various information that each of us is gathering.  And there is philosophical 
difficulty enough here to concern us without introducing the problem of whether 
each of us experiences fuzziness, say, in the same way that each of the others 
do.  

 

Now if we were determined to study THAT problem, we could take a group of 
extremely standardized objects ... a perfect steel sphere, a perfect cylinder, 
etc., say, and ask each of us to report on what we feel as we feel them.  We 
might notice, from this research, that one of us focusses on weight, another on 
surface texture, another on warmth and coldness, etc.  And across objects we 
might find individual differences in how each of us describes the objects.  
That might get at our individual uniqueness in how we approach the touching of 
objects.  And just as we could agree, after a time that we were surrounding an 
elephant, we could agree, after a time and a discussion, that you approach 
objects in one way and I approach them in an other.  We could, with the 
diligent application of metaphors, come to see the world approximately from one 
another's point of view  

 

To me, the mystery of consciousness is no greater than the fact that we never 
stand in exactly the same place when we look at something.  But as steve Guerin 
has pointed out, just as we can work out where the fire is by all of us 
pointing our differently located cameras at it, we can as easily work out the 
location of each of the cameras from the same information.  This is no accident 
because Steve is a student of Gibson and Gibson was a student of Holt, and 
Holt's metaphor of consciousness is a point of view metaphor.

 

I note with particular interest this paragraph in Glen's letter: 

 

The hard problem of consciousness is that any given 
creature/object/thing/situation has a qualitative experience, a *comprehension* 
of the situation/state/condition that creature finds itself it at any given 
time, any given place, or any given trajectory through time and space. The hard 
problem is one of uniqueness. The uniqueness of that experience.

 

I just don’t think “experience” is that sort of thing.  Experience is always a 
step from one thing to another.  A “unique experience” is like acceleration an 
instant.  A fiction that is useful for some purposes.  We know how to study the 
elephant; and we know how to study the uniqueness of the observers of the 
elephant.  But those are distinct objects of study.  

 

Not short.  Ugh.  Glen, you are allowed to say I begged your question.  

 

Nick 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Nicholas Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology

Clark University

thompnicks...@gmail.com

https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/

 

 

-Original Message-
From: Friam  On Behalf Of u?l? ?
Sent: Thursday, April 30, 2020 9:44 AM
To: FriAM 
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Warring Darwinians for Glen, Steve

 

OK. Here's the setup:

 

Nick says 1: Metaphorical thinker maps their experience onto another's 
experience, modeling that other's experience with their own.

 

Nick says 2: I don't understand the hard problem of consciousness.

 

Glen says: Expressions 1 and 2 are contradictory.

 

I suppose it's on me to show that they're contradictory. The idea that 
abduction is an inference from the unique to a class might be helpful. But I 
think it's a jargonal distraction. So, here goes.

 

Let's propose that there exist unique situations/objects ... things or points 
in time or whatever that are not, cannot be, exactly the same anywhere else or 
at any other time. They are absolutely, completely unique in the entire 
unive

Re: [FRIAM] Warring Darwinians for Glen, Steve

[Steven A Smith]

On 4/30/20 1:41 PM, Prof David West wrote:
>
> Steve likes to sign off with "mumble"  I'll stop with
>
> babble

Touche'...

    bumble


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Re: [FRIAM] Warring Darwinians for Glen, Steve

[Prof David West]

Two contributions, hopefully, to this conversation — first to something Nick 
said, then Glen.

Nick said: "It was me that floated the thought that “all thinking is 
metaphorical”. (I was trying to draw Dave West in on my side of the argument, 
at the time.)" I remember the conversation — at St. John's — quite a while 
back.  I also remember that the statement was quickly qualified. (And Nick, you 
should be ashamed of having uttered such a universal statement seeing as the 
speed with which you chastise others, especially me, for doing the same.)

Not all thinking is metaphorical. A major exception is thinking about things of 
which we know enough to speak in formalisms: mathematical expressions, logical 
statements, formulas ala any of the hard sciences, etc. No metaphor there. 
(Nick will object saying that even those things express models and all models 
are metaphors, but ignore him.)

Metaphors are an essential (so says Quine) device for extending our knowledge - 
for attempts to understand that which is not reducible to formal expressions. 
In science this is at the 'fringe,"with the fringe being a moving target.

A metaphor, in this case is just a working hypothesis: can we think about, come 
to understand, this unknown thing in terms of something we already understand, 
know about? The metaphor provides a framework that we can use to confirm or 
refute the hypothesis. If confirmed, we gain the ability to think formally 
about the new thing and the fringe of science moves outward.

Now we can pay attention to Nick again and accept the fact that some models are 
indeed metaphors, but other models are formalisms. It matters not, that a 
formal model is inaccurate because we are never going to measure the coast of 
Portugal in microns and therefore discover that it is near infinitely long 
instead of being 1793 Km.  We think in practicial terms and think formally, not 
metaphorically.

 Towards the hard problem of consciousness. On The Origin of Objects by Brian 
Cantwell Smith can provide some solid background ideas, especially with regard 
how we get to the general from the particular. Glen parallels Smith's insights 
in what he presented - including the Object ---> Class issue.

I would propose that the hard problem of consciousness is the lack of any known 
thing that might be used as a metaphor to understand the unknown thing, 
consciousness.

We might (Nick excepted) agree that consciousness is a thing. We might 
(including Nick) agree that we do not know / understand what that thing is.

But what other thing in our experience "feels" sufficiently like consciousness 
that we can say, "Oh, consciousness is like _.  If we could fill in 
the blank we would have a metaphor (perhaps a model) to think with.

We cannot use another (perhaps our internal awareness of being conscious) 
instance of consciousness because we do not know/understand it either.

If we had a computer that was incontrovertibly conscious, then maybe.

We certainly have no formalism we can use to think about and come to understand 
consciousness.

Steve likes to sign off with "mumble"  I'll stop with

babble
 



On Thu, Apr 30, 2020, at 9:44 AM, uǝlƃ ☣ wrote:
> OK. Here's the setup:
> 
> Nick says 1: Metaphorical thinker maps their experience onto another's 
> experience, modeling that other's experience with their own.
> 
> Nick says 2: I don't understand the hard problem of consciousness.
> 
> Glen says: Expressions 1 and 2 are contradictory.
> 
> I suppose it's on me to show that they're contradictory. The idea that 
> abduction is an inference from the unique to a class might be helpful. 
> But I think it's a jargonal distraction. So, here goes.
> 
> Let's propose that there exist unique situations/objects ... things or 
> points in time or whatever that are not, cannot be, exactly the same 
> anywhere else or at any other time. They are absolutely, completely 
> unique in the entire universe. Because they are unique, there's 
> absolutely no way any *other* thing/situation can perfectly model them. 
> E.g. no 2 electrons are in exactly the same state at exactly the same 
> time in exactly the same place. There will always be something 
> different about any 2 unique things. So analogies/metaphors/maps from 1 
> unique thing to another unique thing will always be slightly off.
> 
> Now, a metaphor/model/analogy/mapping thinker will accept an imperfect 
> mapping and go ahead and model a unique thing with another unique 
> thing. That's what a metaphorical thinker does, inaccurately models one 
> thing with another thing.
> 
> The hard problem of consciousness is that any given 
> creature/object/thing/situation has a qualitative experience, a 
> *comprehension* of the situation/state/condition that creature finds 
> itself it at any given time, any given place, or any given trajectory 
> through time and space. The hard problem is one of uniqueness. The 
> uniqueness of that experience.
> 
> The AI/ALife component 

Re: [FRIAM] narcissism

[uǝlƃ ☣]

That's a fantastic question! I can't answer. But I'll definitely start 
injecting that question into what I read. I have run across those communities 
that talk about techniques for increasing one's charisma, mostly in the context 
of trying to understand the alt-right, involuntary celibates, pick-up-artists, 
and their intersection with the rationalists. That concept of installing new 
triggers was from the rationalists and, I think, enlightened by cognitive 
behavior therapy.  Such conscious manipulation of other people must overlap 
with the tactics of narcissists.

But the inverse map is more interesting, I suppose. To what extent is there an 
innate charisma? And to what extent do people with innate charisma, as they 
grow up from babies, *learn* to be entitled and/or manipulative because their 
charisma facilitates such entitlement/manipulation? We've all heard that 
"beautiful people" have easier lives. To what extent is that folk psychology 
true, real, amenable to experimentation? There must be some science out there 
about that.

On 4/29/20 5:36 PM, Prof David West wrote:
> In early-mid 1970, I did a study of cults in California. It was an 
> ethnographic study and my methodology was participant observation which means 
> I spent a lot of time participating in cult activities as well as 
> interviewing and observing cult leaders cult rituals, and cult practices.
> 
> I spent the summer interacting with about twenty cults including the 
> Raelians, Heaven's Gate, Peoples Temple, Eckanar, Children of God, Source 
> Family, Fellowship of Friends ...  I met some Branch Davidians but did not 
> meet David Koresh. I did meet Jim Jones and attended several Peoples Temple 
> services in Oakland before they went to Guyana.
> 
> The smallest, and strangest, cult was three people: two of the most beautiful 
> and sexual women I have ever met and I guy that put himself in suspended 
> animation — yogic style lowered respiration, heartbeat, and body temperature 
> — for period up to 13 consecutive days. The women would anoint his body with 
> oils, clean up his eliminations, and watch over him while "working on another 
> plane" then have non-stop 3-way Roman orgies (food, drink, drugs, sex) when 
> he was "awake."
> 
> I never used the term or the description of narcissist to describe any of the 
> cult leaders I met. Charismatic was the most used descriptive term, followed 
> very closely with empathic. Empathic in the sense of being aware of the 
> psychic needs of the membership and able to cater to them. The same skill 
> used by Tarot readers and "psychics."
> 
> I am looking for the paper - it is on a Zip drive somewhere in either Word 
> 1.0 or WordPerfect format.
> 
> The question for this thread: what is the relationship, if any, between 
> narcissism and charisma?

-- 
☣ uǝlƃ

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Re: [FRIAM] Warring Darwinians for Glen, Steve

[uǝlƃ ☣]

OK. Here's the setup:

Nick says 1: Metaphorical thinker maps their experience onto another's 
experience, modeling that other's experience with their own.

Nick says 2: I don't understand the hard problem of consciousness.

Glen says: Expressions 1 and 2 are contradictory.

I suppose it's on me to show that they're contradictory. The idea that 
abduction is an inference from the unique to a class might be helpful. But I 
think it's a jargonal distraction. So, here goes.

Let's propose that there exist unique situations/objects ... things or points 
in time or whatever that are not, cannot be, exactly the same anywhere else or 
at any other time. They are absolutely, completely unique in the entire 
universe. Because they are unique, there's absolutely no way any *other* 
thing/situation can perfectly model them. E.g. no 2 electrons are in exactly 
the same state at exactly the same time in exactly the same place. There will 
always be something different about any 2 unique things. So 
analogies/metaphors/maps from 1 unique thing to another unique thing will 
always be slightly off.

Now, a metaphor/model/analogy/mapping thinker will accept an imperfect mapping 
and go ahead and model a unique thing with another unique thing. That's what a 
metaphorical thinker does, inaccurately models one thing with another thing.

The hard problem of consciousness is that any given 
creature/object/thing/situation has a qualitative experience, a *comprehension* 
of the situation/state/condition that creature finds itself it at any given 
time, any given place, or any given trajectory through time and space. The hard 
problem is one of uniqueness. The uniqueness of that experience.

The AI/ALife component of the hard problem asks how can we build a machine that 
will have these experiences. But that's not important to this conversation. The 
modeling/mapping/metaphorical component is how can any one thing (machine, 
rock, golfball, human) *understand* the experience of any other thing (car, 
elephant, galaxy, bacterium).

The answer is that one thing *models* the other thing imperfectly. The only 
reason anyone would be a "metaphorical thinker" is because they recognize the 
hard problem. If they don't recognize the hard problem, then there's no need to 
use metaphor. Sure, it might be convenient to use metaphor, but there's no NEED 
because there is no hard problem.

Therefore, Nick *does* understand the hard problem, even if only tacitly, and 
even if he doesn't *believe* in it. He states it and restates it every time he 
insists that thinking is metaphorical.


On 4/29/20 8:19 PM, thompnicks...@gmail.com wrote:
> I think the first was Glen, and I agree, I don’t see how a belief in the 
> centrality of metaphor to thought commits one to a belief in the hardness of, 
> or even the existence of, the hard problem. 
> 
>  
> 
> It was me that floated the thought that “all thinking is metaphorical”. (I 
> was trying to draw Dave West in on my side of the argument, at the time.)  I 
> meant only to say that the application of any word (save perhaps grammatical 
> operators or proper names) involves abduction, which I think we both believe, 
> is a very close relative of metaphor.  You and I have struggled over this for 
> years, decades, almost, but I think we believe that abduction is an inference 
> from the properties of an object to the class to which it belongs whereas a 
> metaphor carries the process further in some way I have trouble defining.  
> For instance, when Darwin said that evolution was caused by selection, it 
> definitely was an abduction of sort.  But as selection was understood at the 
> time, it involved the intentional intervention of a breeder.  So the metaphor 
> not only abduces selection, it seems also rupture the original concept in 
> some say. 


-- 
☣ uǝlƃ

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