Re: [FRIAM] models

[David Eric Smith]

Glen, it looks like there were two copies of the same pain link there.  The one 
on ethical intuitionism seems to have been missing.  Do you still have it handy?

Eric


> On Dec 9, 2022, at 4:11 PM, glen  wrote:
> 
> Well, sure. You can always split hairs. But, generally, they're not such 
> divergent uses of the word. The difference between a testable scientific 
> thesis and an as yet unproven math sentence isn't that large. Science, in 
> general, is more tolerant to inconsistency than math languages. But as EricS 
> broached, things like intuitionism, hott's univalence, proof assistants, etc. 
> seem to me similar to some well-honed domains of science.
> 
> I do see a stark difference when we get up to the higher order languages like 
> psychology, though. In particular, I'm trying to make sense of the psycho 
> part of the biopsychosocial [cough] model (BPS): 
> https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=https%3a%2f%2fcoepes.nih.gov%2fmodule%2fmr-lane-acute-farm-injury-chronic-pain%2fbiopsychosocial-model-health&c=E,1,rdU9xOlBczOzL-oUXcUH7nFJTLCyAERIIxyENQJOC5cTrdQkJuCJyA8yZtH10cNdmUPU-Xgn1Tn0Pcc1DTlMGTHG1Nu4erAxILXmQZpVlQ,,&typo=1
> 
> It reminds me of "ethical intuitionism": 
> https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=https%3a%2f%2fcoepes.nih.gov%2fmodule%2fmr-lane-acute-farm-injury-chronic-pain%2fbiopsychosocial-model-health&c=E,1,OlgPHfTROYLaKSGwpwtboiBkbroLvIXHUDR_iadGfT5k2QlRuyMBiSGCI64AUiwopal3SvdixbcA2y0Tqe8kV031dIy3BfGJUgCmBY-0knThW7U,&typo=1
>  or things like "natural law": 
> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/natural-law-ethics/ Or perhaps Nick's 
> definition of "logic". All these uses of "theory" seem closer to some sort of 
> anthropocentric sense of *mind* or mental activity. And that's pretty far 
> away from math's usage. But it still feels like a spectrum, not so much a 
> difference in kind. The main parameter(s) is(are) whatever methodology for 
> error correction, validation. *How* one claims to predict with and validate 
> the BPS is as diverse as the people who use the term. At best, the methods 
> are difficult to export from your mind/lab. At  worst, it's not a coherent 
> theory at all.
> 
> 
> On 12/9/22 11:11, Frank Wimberly wrote:
>> The use of the word "theory" in mathematics is different than in other 
>> realms.  For example group theory and measure theory are, to mathematicians, 
>> self contained systems of axioms and theorems.
>> ---
>> Frank C. Wimberly
>> 140 Calle Ojo Feliz,
>> Santa Fe, NM 87505
>> 505 670-9918
>> Santa Fe, NM
>> On Fri, Dec 9, 2022, 11:50 AM glen > > wrote:
>>Following a common thread between EricS' and SteveS' responses, I'm 
>> compelled to say that "model" is a useless term and we should find any and 
>> every reason to *stop* using it. I've found "analog" to be a more useful 
>> term. To EricS' point, an analog is something outside our selves. And to 
>> SteveS' point, it refines one's intention down to a more manageable subset 
>> of whatever some other might be trying to say. (And it further addresses the 
>> maps we call analogies and [ptouie] metaphors.) It's not objective, of 
>> course. But it's better than the nonsensical mess whatever yahoo might mean 
>> when they use the useless word "model".
>>As for "theory", my own arbitrary interactions with that word imply that 
>> a theory is nothing but a collection of hypo-theses. The extent to which the 
>> theses are more than hypo then tells us the extent to which the "theory" is 
>> operationally reliable (thanks for that phrase, Eric). The composition of 
>> theses into a theory isn't trivial. Again, in my limited and arbitrary 
>> experience, people vary a great deal in the extent to which they consider 
>> the ways one thesis can be combined with another. If composition of theses 
>> into theory is *not* explicitly considered, the result is garbage, even if 
>> you're composing hyper-theses. c.f. my prior screeds on the unjustified 
>> dominance of *consistency* as fundamental to theoretical coherence, almost 
>> totally ignoring completeness.
>> At a recent conference, a friend presented knowledge graphs (KGs) 
>> as a way to organize "facts" (actually just cryptically justified 
>> sentences). We'd intended for me to give my arching presentation couching 
>> KGs in the larger space of computation, data lakes, warehousing, etc. But my 
>> friend had to talk first because we were late and he had a hard time wall. 
>> At the end of his talk (without the context I intended to paint), an 
>> audience member asked a "question": 'How is this any different than what we 
>> used to do in the '60s, writing ideas on index cards and laying them out on 
>> the floor? That's a KG!' My friend gave a polite and professional answer ... 
>> way more polite than how I would have answered. >8^D You've been warned. Do 
>> not invite me to your cocktail party.
>>Then I gave my talk, wherein I explained how multigraphs might resolve 
>> the apparent contradiction be

[FRIAM] Competitive Excel

[Tom Johnson]

A new armchair and mouse sport.
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2022/12/world-cup-microsoft-excel/672320/?utm_campaign=article_email&utm_content=article-9334&utm_source=sg&utm_medium=email


TJ

===
Tom Johnson
Inst. for Analytic Journalism
Santa Fe, New Mexico
505-577-6482
===
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FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
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Re: [FRIAM] Competitive Excel

[Gillian Densmore]

theatlantic.com

The Excel World Championship Is the Internet at Its Best
Jacob Stern
1–2 minutes
--


The World Cup of Microsoft Excel

How can watching people fiddle with spreadsheets possibly be this fun?
[image: People dancing in front of the Microsoft Excel logo]
Getty; The Atlantic

A few weeks ago, you very likely missed what were very likely the most
thrilling moments in the history of Microsoft Excel. Allow me to set the
scene: The semifinal of the Excel World Championship was streaming
 live on YouTube and ESPN3.
Defending champion Andrew Ngai had steamrolled his previous three
opponents, but he now trailed the unseeded newcomer Brittany Deaton
316–390—not an insignificant margin, but by no means insurmountable.
“Andrew is lost,” GolferMike1 commented in the YouTube chat. “He’s shaken.”
The game clock ticked under four minutes.

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On Sat, Dec 10, 2022 at 9:53 AM Tom Johnson  wrote:

> A new armchair and mouse sport.
>
> https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2022/12/world-cup-microsoft-excel/672320/?utm_campaign=article_email&utm_content=article-9334&utm_source=sg&utm_medium=email
>
>
> TJ
>
> ===
> Tom Johnson
> Inst. for Analytic Journalism
> Santa Fe, New Mexico
> 505-577-6482
> ===
> -. --- - / ...- .- .-.. .. -.. / -- --- .-. ... . / -.-. --- -.. .
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Fridays 9a-12p Friday St. Johns Cafe   /   Thursdays 9a-12p Zoom
> https://bit.ly/virtualfriam
> to (un)subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/
> archives:  5/2017 thru present
> https://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/
>   1/2003 thru 6/2021  http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/
>
-. --- - / ...- .- .-.. .. -.. / -- --- .-. ... . / -.-. --- -.. .
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Fridays 9a-12p Friday St. Johns Cafe   /   Thursdays 9a-12p Zoom 
https://bit.ly/virtualfriam
to (un)subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/
archives:  5/2017 thru present https://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/
  1/2003 thru 6/2021  http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/

Re: [FRIAM] models

[glen]

Ah, sorry. It was just the SEP entry: 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intuitionism-ethics/
I recommend Michael Huemer  ... 
though I disagree with almost everything he writes. 8^D


On 12/10/22 07:45, David Eric Smith wrote:

Glen, it looks like there were two copies of the same pain link there.  The one 
on ethical intuitionism seems to have been missing.  Do you still have it handy?

Eric



On Dec 9, 2022, at 4:11 PM, glen  wrote:

Well, sure. You can always split hairs. But, generally, they're not such 
divergent uses of the word. The difference between a testable scientific thesis 
and an as yet unproven math sentence isn't that large. Science, in general, is 
more tolerant to inconsistency than math languages. But as EricS broached, 
things like intuitionism, hott's univalence, proof assistants, etc. seem to me 
similar to some well-honed domains of science.

I do see a stark difference when we get up to the higher order languages like 
psychology, though. In particular, I'm trying to make sense of the psycho part of the 
biopsychosocial [cough] model (BPS): 
https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=https%3a%2f%2fcoepes.nih.gov%2fmodule%2fmr-lane-acute-farm-injury-chronic-pain%2fbiopsychosocial-model-health&c=E,1,rdU9xOlBczOzL-oUXcUH7nFJTLCyAERIIxyENQJOC5cTrdQkJuCJyA8yZtH10cNdmUPU-Xgn1Tn0Pcc1DTlMGTHG1Nu4erAxILXmQZpVlQ,,&typo=1

It reminds me of "ethical intuitionism": 
https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=https%3a%2f%2fcoepes.nih.gov%2fmodule%2fmr-lane-acute-farm-injury-chronic-pain%2fbiopsychosocial-model-health&c=E,1,OlgPHfTROYLaKSGwpwtboiBkbroLvIXHUDR_iadGfT5k2QlRuyMBiSGCI64AUiwopal3SvdixbcA2y0Tqe8kV031dIy3BfGJUgCmBY-0knThW7U,&typo=1
 or things like "natural law": https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/natural-law-ethics/ Or perhaps Nick's definition of 
"logic". All these uses of "theory" seem closer to some sort of anthropocentric sense of *mind* or mental 
activity. And that's pretty far away from math's usage. But it still feels like a spectrum, not so much a difference in kind. 
The main parameter(s) is(are) whatever methodology for error correction, validation. *How* one claims to predict with and 
validate the BPS is as diverse as the people who use the term. At best, the methods are difficult to export from your mind/lab. 
At  worst, it's not a coherent theory at all.


On 12/9/22 11:11, Frank Wimberly wrote:

The use of the word "theory" in mathematics is different than in other realms.  
For example group theory and measure theory are, to mathematicians, self contained 
systems of axioms and theorems.
---
Frank C. Wimberly
140 Calle Ojo Feliz,
Santa Fe, NM 87505
505 670-9918
Santa Fe, NM
On Fri, Dec 9, 2022, 11:50 AM glen mailto:geprope...@gmail.com>> wrote:
Following a common thread between EricS' and SteveS' responses, I'm compelled to say that 
"model" is a useless term and we should find any and every reason to *stop* using it. I've found 
"analog" to be a more useful term. To EricS' point, an analog is something outside our selves. And 
to SteveS' point, it refines one's intention down to a more manageable subset of whatever some other might be 
trying to say. (And it further addresses the maps we call analogies and [ptouie] metaphors.) It's not 
objective, of course. But it's better than the nonsensical mess whatever yahoo might mean when they use the 
useless word "model".
As for "theory", my own arbitrary interactions with that word imply that a theory is 
nothing but a collection of hypo-theses. The extent to which the theses are more than hypo then 
tells us the extent to which the "theory" is operationally reliable (thanks for that 
phrase, Eric). The composition of theses into a theory isn't trivial. Again, in my limited and 
arbitrary experience, people vary a great deal in the extent to which they consider the ways one 
thesis can be combined with another. If composition of theses into theory is *not* explicitly 
considered, the result is garbage, even if you're composing hyper-theses. c.f. my prior screeds on 
the unjustified dominance of *consistency* as fundamental to theoretical coherence, almost totally 
ignoring completeness.
 At a recent conference, a friend presented knowledge graphs (KGs) as a way to organize 
"facts" (actually just cryptically justified sentences). We'd intended for me to give my arching 
presentation couching KGs in the larger space of computation, data lakes, warehousing, etc. But my friend 
had to talk first because we were late and he had a hard time wall. At the end of his talk (without the 
context I intended to paint), an audience member asked a "question": 'How is this any different 
than what we used to do in the '60s, writing ideas on index cards and laying them out on the floor? That's a 
KG!' My friend gave a polite and professional answer ... way more polite than how I would have answered. 
>8^D You've been warned. Do not invite me to your cocktail party.
Then I gave my talk, w

Re: [FRIAM] models

[David Eric Smith]

Thanks Glen,


> On Dec 10, 2022, at 2:04 PM, glen  wrote:
> 
> Ah, sorry. It was just the SEP entry: 
> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intuitionism-ethics/
> I recommend Michael Huemer 
> 
>  ... though I disagree with almost everything he writes. 8^D
> 
> 
> On 12/10/22 07:45, David Eric Smith wrote:
>> Glen, it looks like there were two copies of the same pain link there.  The 
>> one on ethical intuitionism seems to have been missing.  Do you still have 
>> it handy?
>> Eric
>>> On Dec 9, 2022, at 4:11 PM, glen  wrote:
>>> 
>>> Well, sure. You can always split hairs. But, generally, they're not such 
>>> divergent uses of the word. The difference between a testable scientific 
>>> thesis and an as yet unproven math sentence isn't that large. Science, in 
>>> general, is more tolerant to inconsistency than math languages. But as 
>>> EricS broached, things like intuitionism, hott's univalence, proof 
>>> assistants, etc. seem to me similar to some well-honed domains of science.
>>> 
>>> I do see a stark difference when we get up to the higher order languages 
>>> like psychology, though. In particular, I'm trying to make sense of the 
>>> psycho part of the biopsychosocial [cough] model (BPS): 
>>> https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=https%3a%2f%2fcoepes.nih.gov%2fmodule%2fmr-lane-acute-farm-injury-chronic-pain%2fbiopsychosocial-model-health&c=E,1,rdU9xOlBczOzL-oUXcUH7nFJTLCyAERIIxyENQJOC5cTrdQkJuCJyA8yZtH10cNdmUPU-Xgn1Tn0Pcc1DTlMGTHG1Nu4erAxILXmQZpVlQ,,&typo=1
>>> 
>>> It reminds me of "ethical intuitionism": 
>>> https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=https%3a%2f%2fcoepes.nih.gov%2fmodule%2fmr-lane-acute-farm-injury-chronic-pain%2fbiopsychosocial-model-health&c=E,1,OlgPHfTROYLaKSGwpwtboiBkbroLvIXHUDR_iadGfT5k2QlRuyMBiSGCI64AUiwopal3SvdixbcA2y0Tqe8kV031dIy3BfGJUgCmBY-0knThW7U,&typo=1
>>>  or things like "natural law": 
>>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/natural-law-ethics/ Or perhaps Nick's 
>>> definition of "logic". All these uses of "theory" seem closer to some sort 
>>> of anthropocentric sense of *mind* or mental activity. And that's pretty 
>>> far away from math's usage. But it still feels like a spectrum, not so much 
>>> a difference in kind. The main parameter(s) is(are) whatever methodology 
>>> for error correction, validation. *How* one claims to predict with and 
>>> validate the BPS is as diverse as the people who use the term. At best, the 
>>> methods are difficult to export from your mind/lab. At  worst, it's not a 
>>> coherent theory at all.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 12/9/22 11:11, Frank Wimberly wrote:
 The use of the word "theory" in mathematics is different than in other 
 realms.  For example group theory and measure theory are, to 
 mathematicians, self contained systems of axioms and theorems.
 ---
 Frank C. Wimberly
 140 Calle Ojo Feliz,
 Santa Fe, NM 87505
 505 670-9918
 Santa Fe, NM
 On Fri, Dec 9, 2022, 11:50 AM glen >>> > wrote:
Following a common thread between EricS' and SteveS' responses, I'm 
 compelled to say that "model" is a useless term and we should find any and 
 every reason to *stop* using it. I've found "analog" to be a more useful 
 term. To EricS' point, an analog is something outside our selves. And to 
 SteveS' point, it refines one's intention down to a more manageable subset 
 of whatever some other might be trying to say. (And it further addresses 
 the maps we call analogies and [ptouie] metaphors.) It's not objective, of 
 course. But it's better than the nonsensical mess whatever yahoo might 
 mean when they use the useless word "model".
As for "theory", my own arbitrary interactions with that word imply 
 that a theory is nothing but a collection of hypo-theses. The extent to 
 which the theses are more than hypo then tells us the extent to which the 
 "theory" is operationally reliable (thanks for that phrase, Eric). The 
 composition of theses into a theory isn't trivial. Again, in my limited 
 and arbitrary experience, people vary a great deal in the extent to which 
 they consider the ways one thesis can be combined with another. If 
 composition of theses into theory is *not* explicitly considered, the 
 result is garbage, even if you're composing hyper-theses. c.f. my prior 
 screeds on the unjustified dominance of *consistency* as fundamental to 
 theoretical coherence, almost totally ignoring completeness.
 At a recent conference, a friend presented knowledge graphs 
 (KGs) as a way to organize "facts" (actually just cryptically justified 
 sentences). We'd intended for me to give my arching presentation couching 
 KGs in the larger space of