Re: [FRIAM] Is consciousness a mystery? (used to be "mystery...deeper".T
--- Frank C. Wimberly 140 Calle Ojo Feliz, Santa Fe, NM 87505 505 670-9918 Santa Fe, NM On Tue, Jul 9, 2024, 5:35 PM Santafe wrote: > Yeah; wish it were possible to say something interesting. > > The aspect of, or within, the field of experience, that “consciousness” > and other related words are somehow “about", should be general among all of > us who are made of about the same stuff. (So, the vertebrates, the > mammals, the social mammals, the hunting-social mammals; etc.) I say that > as an assertion within the network of scientific representations, in the > kind of way we normally walk around that network by extrapolation, like > spiders along threads in a web. So should have many of the familiar > successes; surely has all the recognized hazards. > > But [consciousness]-the-term is a word in a language. So it has formal > aspects. What is it doing as we use it? Maybe it is putting up “an > object” toward which attention can be directed. One would glibly say > “making consciousness available as an object of attention”, but I don’t > want to say that. The aspect of, or within, the field of experience is > whatever it is. When the capacity for, and use of, a language brings > objects into that formal world which can be targets for attention, we don’t > have any promises for how good the objects are as proxies for whatever they > are meant to be proxies for. Or even what is the nature of such “objects”, > a thing that has to be made more clear, along with whatever those objects > are proxies for, and whatever is the associational relation of the two. > > I am aware, while speaking, that what I would like is to go one step > further than the logical positivists in characterizing formal systems as > opposed to characterizing all of life. I would like to say that, when > something is really a formal system, it has been made an object in the > world. So one can mechanise it. What Hilbert imagined maybe mathematics > could be, and which we seem to be pretty sure mathematics cannot _only_ be, > though it can have parts of that nature. That means we can say things > about the mechanistic relations among tokens in formal systems. > > The positivists seemed to me (in my ignorance of almost-everything > historical) to have the tastes of logicians; they wanted to work out > technical things. They were willing to put to the side the questions of > how that logical edifice ever “stands for” “something” in the broader field > of life. If they made an important mistake, it was to go beyond putting > them to the side, to dismissing them entirely. Their notion of > “pseudo-questions” is generally apt where I can find concrete applications > of it; but in dismissing what was driving people to make those > unsatisfactory attempts, they threw out much of what is interesting to try > to do. > > That is the more-literal landscape to which my metaphor of the spider in > the web alluded. > > Anyway, whatever its form, which varied among people and changed over time > on into the modern era, that separation left what they were doing very > limited, but within that, I feel like they made category distinctions that > remain useful. They get even more useful when one is very clear about how > limited they are, and tries to put them in a Pragmatist frame. Even better > when we apply Pragmatism to itself. This is where we try to deal, for > real, with the way everything formal hangs in mid-air, as its very nature. > > Back from that digression: > > The things that we can’t export into machinery in the world (formal > systems with the definition written in the language of the formalism), may > remain actually still formal systems, but they become like a computer > program that can only run on a certain kind of hardware, which is us, and > as we don’t understand that hardware very well, we can’t make very good > proxies of it (or know whether we have done so), leaving us unsure what > formal systems can run on which hardware. > > With all those caveats and hedges in all the over-interpretations I don’t > want for wording, if I were to suggest what is different about us with > language from dogs that are not using this particular kind of formal layer > (I strongly suspect, again said like the spider walking along the web), it > is this “making consciousness an object of attention”. > > It seems to me that, if we promised to remain constantly alert to the fact > that all those terms are placeholder terms in placeholder usage > conventions, we could ask why it matters and what it does to “make > consciousness an object of attention”, while also “inhabiting” it (or > whatever word), as contrasted with mostly-just inhabiting, and letting > attention do all the other things it is already also doing. > > Eric > > > > > > On Jul 10, 2024, at 7:37 AM, Nicholas Thompson > wrote: > > > > Frank > > > > What you laid out is an abduction,,isn't it?; I don[t think I am doing > that in either of my syllogisms. But I am no log
Re: [FRIAM] Is consciousness a mystery? (used to be "mystery...deeper".T
Yeah; wish it were possible to say something interesting. The aspect of, or within, the field of experience, that “consciousness” and other related words are somehow “about", should be general among all of us who are made of about the same stuff. (So, the vertebrates, the mammals, the social mammals, the hunting-social mammals; etc.) I say that as an assertion within the network of scientific representations, in the kind of way we normally walk around that network by extrapolation, like spiders along threads in a web. So should have many of the familiar successes; surely has all the recognized hazards. But [consciousness]-the-term is a word in a language. So it has formal aspects. What is it doing as we use it? Maybe it is putting up “an object” toward which attention can be directed. One would glibly say “making consciousness available as an object of attention”, but I don’t want to say that. The aspect of, or within, the field of experience is whatever it is. When the capacity for, and use of, a language brings objects into that formal world which can be targets for attention, we don’t have any promises for how good the objects are as proxies for whatever they are meant to be proxies for. Or even what is the nature of such “objects”, a thing that has to be made more clear, along with whatever those objects are proxies for, and whatever is the associational relation of the two. I am aware, while speaking, that what I would like is to go one step further than the logical positivists in characterizing formal systems as opposed to characterizing all of life. I would like to say that, when something is really a formal system, it has been made an object in the world. So one can mechanise it. What Hilbert imagined maybe mathematics could be, and which we seem to be pretty sure mathematics cannot _only_ be, though it can have parts of that nature. That means we can say things about the mechanistic relations among tokens in formal systems. The positivists seemed to me (in my ignorance of almost-everything historical) to have the tastes of logicians; they wanted to work out technical things. They were willing to put to the side the questions of how that logical edifice ever “stands for” “something” in the broader field of life. If they made an important mistake, it was to go beyond putting them to the side, to dismissing them entirely. Their notion of “pseudo-questions” is generally apt where I can find concrete applications of it; but in dismissing what was driving people to make those unsatisfactory attempts, they threw out much of what is interesting to try to do. That is the more-literal landscape to which my metaphor of the spider in the web alluded. Anyway, whatever its form, which varied among people and changed over time on into the modern era, that separation left what they were doing very limited, but within that, I feel like they made category distinctions that remain useful. They get even more useful when one is very clear about how limited they are, and tries to put them in a Pragmatist frame. Even better when we apply Pragmatism to itself. This is where we try to deal, for real, with the way everything formal hangs in mid-air, as its very nature. Back from that digression: The things that we can’t export into machinery in the world (formal systems with the definition written in the language of the formalism), may remain actually still formal systems, but they become like a computer program that can only run on a certain kind of hardware, which is us, and as we don’t understand that hardware very well, we can’t make very good proxies of it (or know whether we have done so), leaving us unsure what formal systems can run on which hardware. With all those caveats and hedges in all the over-interpretations I don’t want for wording, if I were to suggest what is different about us with language from dogs that are not using this particular kind of formal layer (I strongly suspect, again said like the spider walking along the web), it is this “making consciousness an object of attention”. It seems to me that, if we promised to remain constantly alert to the fact that all those terms are placeholder terms in placeholder usage conventions, we could ask why it matters and what it does to “make consciousness an object of attention”, while also “inhabiting” it (or whatever word), as contrasted with mostly-just inhabiting, and letting attention do all the other things it is already also doing. Eric > On Jul 10, 2024, at 7:37 AM, Nicholas Thompson > wrote: > > Frank > > What you laid out is an abduction,,isn't it?; I don[t think I am doing that > in either of my syllogisms. But I am no logician; > > An induction is a valid inference, although a probabilistic one, at least on > Peirce's account. > > David, > > If humans are conscious, I am pretty sure that animals are conscious, . > > I am just not sure th
Re: [FRIAM] Is consciousness a mystery? (used to be "mystery...deeper".T
Nick, That is not a valid syllogism. All X have Y x has Y Therefore x is an X Is that a correct formalization of what you said? --- Frank C. Wimberly 140 Calle Ojo Feliz, Santa Fe, NM 87505 505 670-9918 Santa Fe, NM On Tue, Jul 9, 2024, 1:54 PM Nicholas Thompson wrote: > While I find all the ancillary considerations raised on the original > thread extremely interesting, I would like to reopen the discussion of > Conscious as a Mystery and ask that those that join it stay close to the > question of what consciousness is and how we know it when we see it. Baby > Steps. > > Where were we? I think I was asking Jochen, and perhaps Peitr and > anybody else who thought that animals were not conscious (i.e., not aware > of their own awareness) what basis they had in experience for thinking > that.. One offering for such an experience is the absence of language in > animals. Because my cat cannot describe his experience in words, he > cannot be conscious. This requires the following syllogism: > > Nothing that does not employ a language (or two?) is conscious. > Animals (with ;the possible exception of signing apes) do not employ > languages. > Ergo, Animals are not conscious. > > But I was trying to find out the basis for the first premise. How do we > know that there are no non-linguistic beings that are not conscious. I > hope we could rule out the answer,"because they are non-linguistic", both > in its strictly tautological or merely circular form. > > There is a closely related syllogism which we also need to explore: > > All language using beings are conscious. > George Peter Tremblay IV is a language-using being. > George Peter Tremblay IV is conscious. > > Both are valid syllogisms. But where do the premises come from. > > Nick > -. --- - / ...- .- .-.. .. -.. / -- --- .-. ... . / -.-. --- -.. . > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Fridays 9a-12p Friday St. Johns Cafe / Thursdays 9a-12p Zoom > https://bit.ly/virtualfriam > to (un)subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ > archives: 5/2017 thru present > https://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/ > 1/2003 thru 6/2021 http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/ > -. --- - / ...- .- .-.. .. -.. / -- --- .-. ... . / -.-. --- -.. . FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Fridays 9a-12p Friday St. Johns Cafe / Thursdays 9a-12p Zoom https://bit.ly/virtualfriam to (un)subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ archives: 5/2017 thru present https://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/ 1/2003 thru 6/2021 http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/
Re: [FRIAM] Is consciousness a mystery? (used to be "mystery...deeper".T
Maybe I should not be replying, as I do believe my dogs (and your cat if you have one) are conscious. I have not experienced a Vulcan Mind-Meld with either of my dogs, so I cannot say with certainty they are conscious—I must infer it from observations: 1- interactions with other dogs would seem to indicate they "remember" past interactions and do not require the same butt-sniffing protocol with dogs they have met at the park frequently. Also they seem to remember who plays with who and who doesn't. "That ball is not mine, this one is." 2-they modify their behavior depending on the tenor, sharpness, and volume of barks, ear positions, tail wagging differences, by the other dogs; e.g., "that's enough." 3-They do not communicate to me in English, but seem to accept communication from me in that language—not trained responses to commands, but "listening to conversations" between myself and Mary and reacting to words (e.g., dog park) that are exchanged in those conversations. Mary and I are totally sedentary and speaking in conversational tone, so pretty sure there we are not sending 'signals' akin to training words, training tone of voice. 4-they seem to remember trauma, (one of our dogs spent three days with dead owner before anyone knew the owner was deceased and will bite if anyone tries to forcefully remove him from my (current bonded owner) presence. 5-seek "psychological comfort" by crawling into my bed and sleeping on my shoulder when the thunderstorm comes. **_All of these are grounded in anthropomorphism—long considered a deadly error by ethologists._** (Some contemporary ethologists are exploring accepting and leveraging this "error" to extend our understanding of animal behavior.) davew On Tue, Jul 9, 2024, at 2:54 PM, Nicholas Thompson wrote: > While I find all the ancillary considerations raised on the original thread > extremely interesting, I would like to reopen the discussion of Conscious as > a Mystery and ask that those that join it stay close to the question of what > consciousness is and how we know it when we see it. Baby Steps. > > Where were we? I think I was asking Jochen, and perhaps Peitr and anybody > else who thought that animals were not conscious (i.e., not aware of their > own awareness) what basis they had in experience for thinking that.. One > offering for such an experience is the absence of language in animals. > Because my cat cannot describe his experience in words, he cannot be > conscious. This requires the following syllogism: > > Nothing that does not employ a language (or two?) is conscious. > Animals (with ;the possible exception of signing apes) do not employ > languages. > Ergo, Animals are not conscious. > > But I was trying to find out the basis for the first premise. How do we know > that there are no non-linguistic beings that are not conscious. I hope we > could rule out the answer,"because they are non-linguistic", both in its > strictly tautological or merely circular form. > > There is a closely related syllogism which we also need to explore: > > All language using beings are conscious. > George Peter Tremblay IV is a language-using being. > George Peter Tremblay IV is conscious. > > Both are valid syllogisms. But where do the premises come from. > > Nick > -. --- - / ...- .- .-.. .. -.. / -- --- .-. ... . / -.-. --- -.. . > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Fridays 9a-12p Friday St. Johns Cafe / Thursdays 9a-12p Zoom > https://bit.ly/virtualfriam > to (un)subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ > archives: 5/2017 thru present > https://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/ > 1/2003 thru 6/2021 http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/ > -. --- - / ...- .- .-.. .. -.. / -- --- .-. ... . / -.-. --- -.. . FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Fridays 9a-12p Friday St. Johns Cafe / Thursdays 9a-12p Zoom https://bit.ly/virtualfriam to (un)subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ archives: 5/2017 thru present https://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/ 1/2003 thru 6/2021 http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/
Re: [FRIAM] Is consciousness a mystery? (used to be "mystery...deeper".T
You think you are taking baby steps from a clean (un-prejudicial) start. I think you are massively prejudicing the frame in a way that may not go anywhere. (Or maybe it does; I can’t say. It just seems like the one everybody has been adopting forever, re-asserted one more time.) You treat the “how we know it when we see it” as a sine qua non for ascribing a meaning to a term; making it a proper “it" (a behaviorist thing to say, said in all innocence as if this were not massively prejudicial; just the “facts” ma’am, says Mr. Bacon). But there are other frames, and some of them may be even blanker. Or also prejudiced, but in other terms, and blanker from the angle in which the behaviorist style of speaking is not blank. (Or am I wrong to think that?) We can ask: Why are we using this word? Where did it come from? Why does it “take” with us as we develop as participants in our language? And in our language-scaffolded “theory of mind” development? What are we doing with it when we use it? What are we doing with ourselves or with each other through the use of it? The one thing in that list that I did _not_ do is ask “what does this word _mean_?”; that to me would have been the prejudice that would let a gorilla walk among us and not be seen. I think Pieter’s reply yesterday — something along the lines of “not having a route to ever know if your cat (or another person, for that matter) is conscious or aware” — is probably a good starting point. It’s good both because it says let’s take this “ `knowing' this-or-that about somebody else” off the table as a prop, and ask whether systematic investigation remains possible, and also because it exposes the way that all of our “knowing” hangs in mid-air, and the sooner we reckon with that as its nature, the better we can talk about it. All that will only be of any worth, of course, if it leads to a way of using these terms that goes somewhere…. Eric > On Jul 10, 2024, at 4:54 AM, Nicholas Thompson > wrote: > > While I find all the ancillary considerations raised on the original thread > extremely interesting, I would like to reopen the discussion of Conscious as > a Mystery and ask that those that join it stay close to the question of what > consciousness is and how we know it when we see it. Baby Steps. > > Where were we? I think I was asking Jochen, and perhaps Peitr and anybody > else who thought that animals were not conscious (i.e., not aware of their > own awareness) what basis they had in experience for thinking that.. One > offering for such an experience is the absence of language in animals. > Because my cat cannot describe his experience in words, he cannot be > conscious. This requires the following syllogism: > > Nothing that does not employ a language (or two?) is conscious. > Animals (with ;the possible exception of signing apes) do not employ > languages. > Ergo, Animals are not conscious. > > But I was trying to find out the basis for the first premise. How do we know > that there are no non-linguistic beings that are not conscious. I hope we > could rule out the answer,"because they are non-linguistic", both in its > strictly tautological or merely circular form. > > There is a closely related syllogism which we also need to explore: > > All language using beings are conscious. > George Peter Tremblay IV is a language-using being. > George Peter Tremblay IV is conscious. > > Both are valid syllogisms. But where do the premises come from. > > Nick > -. --- - / ...- .- .-.. .. -.. / -- --- .-. ... . / -.-. --- -.. . > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Fridays 9a-12p Friday St. Johns Cafe / Thursdays 9a-12p Zoom > https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=https%3a%2f%2fbit.ly%2fvirtualfriam&c=E,1,rYecoVtZ79UuCBoFzIBbx9Ehc2VjqZnDoG8Di7GA9TAfF31xUz4lvf4frOtwMM6rtT3BK_8qTHu7jKG28A4wfvAmBAL8dUj0e3xBiM7R54jG&typo=1 > to (un)subscribe > https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=http%3a%2f%2fredfish.com%2fmailman%2flistinfo%2ffriam_redfish.com&c=E,1,T_QK7er9FF5mNdkdKr71i9shQdGzrg7k49StOsE8hIPiteH-keU7ppn_n_ulVelvGAtra9Wlo3S9fo5qYh7eTTsmKez6XBAVRLs-2OyTD-dAl-AKo48,&typo=1 > FRIAM-COMIC > https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=http%3a%2f%2ffriam-comic.blogspot.com%2f&c=E,1,5XzQSFn4T1ktMf5Bs7ur6n1ShaoqdBWo7mRb0xkhkpkL50hWj1_CE9vrerw0hdvMPAKABQ_sPjTaaDPO1mCj6-GcVMlIsa0ILoMVdJ755VYsc25cplY,&typo=1 > archives: 5/2017 thru present > https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=https%3a%2f%2fredfish.com%2fpipermail%2ffriam_redfish.com%2f&c=E,1,NuW5VnoXtmjr6UZlRjtrv5CGuWrT9zYKzgdo8MaGOjHx0V-tfNplPCCRjjq3VJByyeeIvwlNlVIf6uYYJETqvmUkPSv5j6RU3ruCK_rwhw,,&typo=1 > 1/2003 thru 6/2021 http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/ -. --- - / ...- .- .-.. .. -.. / -- --- .-. ... . / -.-. --- -.. . FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Fridays 9a-12p Friday St. Johns Cafe / Thursdays 9a-12p Zoom https://bit.ly/virtualfriam to (un)subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FR
[FRIAM] Is consciousness a mystery? (used to be "mystery...deeper".T
While I find all the ancillary considerations raised on the original thread extremely interesting, I would like to reopen the discussion of Conscious as a Mystery and ask that those that join it stay close to the question of what consciousness is and how we know it when we see it. Baby Steps. Where were we? I think I was asking Jochen, and perhaps Peitr and anybody else who thought that animals were not conscious (i.e., not aware of their own awareness) what basis they had in experience for thinking that.. One offering for such an experience is the absence of language in animals. Because my cat cannot describe his experience in words, he cannot be conscious. This requires the following syllogism: Nothing that does not employ a language (or two?) is conscious. Animals (with ;the possible exception of signing apes) do not employ languages. Ergo, Animals are not conscious. But I was trying to find out the basis for the first premise. How do we know that there are no non-linguistic beings that are not conscious. I hope we could rule out the answer,"because they are non-linguistic", both in its strictly tautological or merely circular form. There is a closely related syllogism which we also need to explore: All language using beings are conscious. George Peter Tremblay IV is a language-using being. George Peter Tremblay IV is conscious. Both are valid syllogisms. But where do the premises come from. Nick -. --- - / ...- .- .-.. .. -.. / -- --- .-. ... . / -.-. --- -.. . FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Fridays 9a-12p Friday St. Johns Cafe / Thursdays 9a-12p Zoom https://bit.ly/virtualfriam to (un)subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ archives: 5/2017 thru present https://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/ 1/2003 thru 6/2021 http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/
Re: [FRIAM] Why the Mystery of Consciousness Is Deeper Than We Thought
I was just trying to get past the apparent equivalence of language to written, literary, use of words and grammar - citing song, cave art, and (should have but forgot) dance as means of communication sufficient to assume consciousness. My library is still in boxes in the garage, so references will need to wait a bit longer before I can provide. davew On Mon, Jul 8, 2024, at 7:20 PM, Santafe wrote: > I have wondered, Dave, why you say no words: > > I think of cave art as being ~40kA ago. Similarly for preserved > footprints that have been interpreted as dance. > > Mitochondrial modernity probably ~250kA, and Y-chromosome ~100kA, with > considerable errors. European cave art presumably followed > out-of-Africa migrations that had gone in many directions for a very > long time, and those were all fully genetically-modern people, even if > there was some local out-crossing once they were around Asia and maybe > into some of the island chains that led to a little gene flow into > less-than-the-whole-world clades of people. > > My default would have been that everybody since both male and female > lineages (and presumably most of the autosomes) arrived at the > coalescent we can see was using pretty fully-developed human language. > But if whatever adjustments are referred to in achieving Y-chromosome > modernity (or just a coalescent by reconstruction?) isn’t particularly > relevant to whatever enables full normal-human language skills, I would > push my default to much earlier times than 100kA. > > Is there a widely-circulated argument for the position that the cave > art we know about precedes languages? > > (Of course, we aren’t anywhere close to doing comparative > reconstructions of languages to that depth. _Maybe_ if we got very > lucky, we might see something we could take to coastal migrations at > ~60kA. But I think the oldest groups that anybody reasonable is trying > to propose are no older than ~20kA, and most of them no older than > ~11-14kA, and probably associated with bottlenecking at the end of the > Younger Dryas. But those are problems of signal loss, both from change > and from lack of surviving diversity that can be used to feed > comparative analysis. I don’t think the timing of those coalescents > makes any claims about a lessening of language capabiliity at the root > of what we might be able to reconstruct.) > > Interested in sources on this. > > Thanks, > > Eric > > >> On Jul 9, 2024, at 9:15 AM, Prof David West wrote: >> >> I must respectively disagree. Our ancestors—before they had 'words' >> communicated multiple worlds, of "reality" like last weeks hunt and >> "alt-reality" gods and demons and spirits, o my! (allusion to wizard of Oz). >> All with song and cave art, no words. I am pretty certain they were >> conscious and self aware. >> >> davew >> >> >> On Mon, Jul 8, 2024, at 3:48 PM, Jochen Fromm wrote: >>> IMHO it is not one language which is necessary, but more than one. >>> Languages can be used to create worlds, to move around it them, and to >>> share these wolds with others. Tolkien and J.K. Rowling have created whole >>> universes. The interesting things happen if worlds collide, if they merge >>> and melt, or if they drift apart. >>> >>> Cervantes in Spain, Goethe in Germany and Dante in Italy helped to create >>> new languages - Spanish, German and Italian, respectively. They also >>> examined in their most famous books what happens if worlds collide. >>> >>> Cervantes describes in "Don Quixote" >>> what happens when imaginary and real worlds collide and are so out of sync >>> that the actors are getting lost. >>> >>> Goethe decribes in his "Faust" what happens when collective and individual >>> worlds collide, i.e. when egoistic individuals exploit the world selfishly >>> for their own benefit (in his first book "The sorrows of young Werther" >>> Goethe focused like Fontane and Freud on the opposite). >>> >>> Dante describes in his "Divine Comedy" >>> what happens when worlds diverge and people are excluded and expelled from >>> the world. >>> >>> Language is necessary for self awareness because it provides the building >>> blocks for a new world which is connected but also independent from the old >>> one. This allows new dimensions of interactions. The connections between >>> worlds matter. A label is a simple connection between a word in one world >>> and an class of objects in another. A metaphor is a more complex connection >>> between an abstract idea and a composition of objects, etc. >>> >>> -J. >>> >>> >>> Original message >>> From: Nicholas Thompson >>> Date: 7/7/24 5:13 PM (GMT+01:00) >>> To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group >>> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Why the Mystery of Consciousness Is Deeper Than We >>> Thought >>> >>> I think of large language models as the most embodied things on the planet, >>> but let that go for a moment. Back to baby s
