Re: [FRIAM] experience monism
While Dear Professor Thomspon has, over the years, become good at understand the experience monist position, I feel he has yet to become great at it, and so I feel the urge to put on my William James Hat, and give more forceful answers to some of the queries the Ever-Enthusiastic Professor West has asked. William James's "Radical Empiricism" is, I believe, the quintessential experience monism, so channeling him is a good way to try to respond, even though I know I cannot be as eloquent as he was. I ask that these replies be read not as contradicting anything our generously eye-browed colleague offered, but rather be read as supplementing and extending upon the beginning he provided. 1) Is an *Experience* a whole or a composite? I.e., (scent of cinnamon)—(heat of oven)—(grandmother's smile) OR (scent of cinnamon) + (heat of oven) + (grandmothers smile)? Another analogy a single photograph or a Photoshopped collage? This is putting the cart before the horse. Is it not the case that, as you move through the world you experience things *as *whole, and experience other things *as* composite? Sometimes you may even experience something *as *being The Same Thing, despite experiencing it as whole one minute, and as composite the next minute. Each of these experiences is what it is, and we must at all costs resist the urge to deny that. It is tempting, for example, after one has learned to draw a chair - after having been taught to "see" the chair as a collection of shapes and colors, projected at particular angles - to retrospectively pretend that new way we have learned to experience the chair is how the chair must have come to us in the first instance. But the initial experience was what *it *was, and the later experience is what *it is*, and while the retrospective experience gets to be acknowledged for what *it* is (in its own turn), we must always keep in mind that the retrospective experience is not the original experience. There is no refuge to be found in *a priori* assertions that wholes-must-be-parts, that parts-must-be-wholes, or any other metaphysical claims. There is only an examination of the experiences - actual experiences - to determine what those particular experiences are or are not. 1A) If an *Experience* is is a composite- there must be 'atomic' *Experience* from which it is composed. Is it possible to *Experience* and "atomic *Experience*" in isolation? This is an odd assertion. *SOME* experiences are composites, and they are composed of exactly the components present. It may be the case that (*in future experiences*) each person can break their experiences down up to some limit. But there is no reason *a priori* to assume that each person's limit will be the same, or that whatever residue one person is left with will match the residue another is left with (one person, for example, coming at the task with a background in traditions of western analytic philosophy, and another coming at the task with a background in monastic buddhist traditions, or a third having studied for decades under the tutelage of Timothy Leary). Given around 200 years of people in Psychology attempting, under various research conditions, to forge out agreement amongst themselves about the smallest elements introspectively identifiable in experience, it seems reasonable to conclude - at least tentatively - that no such "atomic" components exist in the sense implied. 2) Does an *Experience* have duration, or is each *Experience* akin to a frame of a film and continuity simply an artifact of being presented at some rate; e.g., 30 frames per nanosecond? Of course experiences have durations! One may experience a slap on the back, or a song on the radio, or the slow decay of western civilization under the assault of whichever political group they happen to distrust. All of those experiences have a duration, but they all have quite different durations. I am not sure, however, what the reference to the film is. The closest I can come, myself, to making sense of it, suggests the thinking is once again backwards. There is wonderful research in the field of "psychophysics" showing that continuity vs impulse are experienced in different ways in different senses, and even in many different ways within a single "sense" depending on the circumstances. For example, if you make a device tap someone fast enough, it will eventually be experienced as a solid (i.e., non-tapping) touch. But the frequency at which this happens will depend on the part of the body being tapped (the upper back, for example, requiring a lower frequency for the transition than, say, the inside of the forearm). This is similar to what is seen with the "flicker fusion" frequency for movies, which can vary depending on the part of the eye being stimulated. But note that we view such experiments *without *the arrogatation common among the hard sciences and followers of scientism - where dualism is still commonplace - that any part of those experiments
Re: [FRIAM] experience monism
to friam Dear David and other helpful persons, Thanks again for your help here. Man! Do I look forward to your definitive work on experience! All this cogitation is exhausting me. Your comment that I might dismiss your questions has an edge that I didn’t see when you first made it. There is, perhaps, a sense in which I* should* dismiss them. The questions you ask have the feel of metaphysics. You know, How many angels can dance on the head of a pin? Pragmatists try to dissolve metaphysical questions either into non-questions or empirical questions. “After all, if the answer to the question isn’t to find some angels and measure their feet, then what *are* we talking about, eh?” Perhaps we might devote our time to a more productive discussion? Notice that the whole notion of a “productive” discussion itself reeks of pragmatism with its convergentist aspirations. The only thing that can be positively asserted about metaphysics – by which I mean that vast spongy fetid cloud of supposition that surrounds and infects everything we explicitly believe -- is that it is inevitable. Thus, though debating metaphysics is useless, failing to own up to it is dishonest. Metaphysics is not something we propose; it’s something we confess to. So, I feel obligated to go on and answer these questions, even though their answers may indeed be unrelated to the proper thrust of “experience monism”. Whatever metaphysics might be offered to support my experience monism, it’s value will always be in its capacity to root important concepts such as truth and reality, not in relations between our experiences and some notional world-beyond-experience, but in relations among experiences, themselves. *The eloquence and perspicacity of Professor Thompson has convinced me to become an Experience monist. In my naive sophomoric enthusiasm, I have set about writing THE definitive work on Experience. But I have a few questions:* * 1A) If an Experience is is a composite- there must be 'atomic' Experience from which it is composed. Is it possible to Experience and "atomic Experience" in isolation?* Any whole with different properties can be analyzed into parts. If your first experience of apple pie your gramma took from her oven and sliced, then all of that is apple pie in the first instance. As cinnamon is experienced in other contexts and apple pie is eaten in other contexts, the experience of apple pie can be analyzed into parts, meaning that one can begin to experience cinnamon as something apart from the experience of apple pie. The analysis of any experience into component experiences is as much a cognitive achievement as its unification. *2) Does an Experience have duration, or is each Experience akin to a frame of a film and continuity simply an artifact of being presented at some rate; e.g., 30 frames per nanosecond?* I like, for the moment, to think of experiences as successive lightning-like illuminations of a landscape of associations. I would call these associations “signs” if my grasp of semeiotics were not so protean. You did not quite ask me, but I must answer the question of time, or order of experiences. Peirce at one offers the quasi-neural notion of the fading of nodes in the network of associations since each was last illuminated. So parts of this landscape of associations gets harder to illuminate as they are illuminated less often. But these questions seem like candidates for empirical investigation using tachistiscopes, and that sort of thing. *3) Can Experiences be differentiated as "potential" and "actual?" To illustrate: I turn on the camera on my phone and images pass through the lens and appear on the screen, but a photograph does not come into existence until I press the shutter button. Does something similar happen with experience? They are potential until I "press the conscious awareness button" at which point they become actual?* Potentiality and actuality are themselves cognitive achievements and experiences in their own right. *4) Can Experiences be categorized? To borrow vocabulary (somewhat tortured( from Peter Sjostedt-Hughes' pentad of perception;* Peters’s pentad doesn’t make a whole lot of sense to me, laced as it is with apriorist dualist appeals to physiology and an external world. I think a disrupted experience is one that doesn’t fit well with existing networks of association. - *Experience grounded in/originating from the spatio-temporal environment (Sensed Experience)* - *Experience of an atemporal quality, e.g., color or scent (Perceived Experience)* - *An Experience partly caused by an external physicality—e.g., motion of molecules partly causative of the Experience of heat (Ecto-Physical Experience)* - *An Experience that is partly caused by an internal physicality—e.g., synapses firing in the brain (Endo-Physical Experience)* - *Experiences not grounded in/originating from the spatio-temporal environment, e.g.,
Re: [FRIAM] experience monism
David, Thank you David for helping me think. I don't know about anybody else, but your questions certainly tend to my edification. I am going to take them for coffee and try to answer them, if only for my self. You are VERY, VERY kind. NIck On Sat, Feb 4, 2023 at 8:46 AM Prof David West wrote: > The eloquence and perspicacity of Professor Thompson has convinced me to > become an *Experience* monist. In my naive sophomoric enthusiasm I have > set about writing THE definitive work on *Experience*. But I have a few > questions ... > > 1) Is an *Experience* a whole or a composite? I.e., (scent of > cinnamon)—(heat of oven)—(grandmother's smile) OR (scent of cinnamon) + > (heat of oven) + (grandmothers smile)? Another analogy a single photograph > or a Photoshopped collage? >1A) If an *Experience* is is a composite- there must be 'atomic' > *Experience* from which it is composed. Is it possible to *Experience* > and "atomic *Experience*" in isolation? > > 2) Does an *Experience* have duration, or is each *Experience* akin to a > frame of a film and continuity simply an artifact of being presented at > some rate; e.g., 30 frames per nanosecond? > > 3) Can *Experiences* be differentiated as "potential" and "actual?" To > illustrate: I turn on the camera on my phone and images pass through the > lens and appear on the screen, but a photograph does not come into > existence until I press the shutter button. Does something similar happen > with experience? They are potential until I "press the conscious awareness > button" at which point they become actual? > > 4) Can *Experiences* be categorized? To borrow vocabulary (somewhat > tortured( from Peter Sjostedt-Hughes' pentad of perception; > >- *Experience* grounded in/originating from the spatio-temporal >environment (Sensed Experience) >- *Experience* of an atemporal quality, e.g., color or scent >(Perceived Experience) >- An *Experience* partly caused by an external physicality—e.g., >motion of molecules partly causative of the *Experience* of heat >(Ecto-Physical Experience) >- An *Experience* that is partly caused by an internal >physicality—e.g., synapses firing in the brain (Endo-Physical Experience) >- *Experiences* not grounded in/originating from the spatio-temporal >environment, e.g., imaginations (Demeteption Experience) >- A sixth, of my own, a variation of Endo-Physical, where the internal >physicality is "disrupted," e.g., by taking a drug. > > 5) Does *Experience* 'exist' apart from an experiencer? > 5A) if not, how can we have "common experiences" > 5B) if yes, do we not have a faux monism, with two metaphysical > things: experience and experiencer? > > 6) Do *Experiences* persist? Perhaps as memories? > 6A) If yes, what exactly is the difference between an > *Experience*-in-"memory" > and one "being experienced?" Analogy to a computer program executing and > the same program stored on disk. > > > I would have asked Professor Thompson these questions, but I fear he would > have dismissed them as "tending not to edification." > > davew > > > -. --- - / ...- .- .-.. .. -.. / -- --- .-. ... . / -.-. --- -.. . > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Fridays 9a-12p Friday St. Johns Cafe / Thursdays 9a-12p Zoom > https://bit.ly/virtualfriam > to (un)subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ > archives: 5/2017 thru present > https://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/ > 1/2003 thru 6/2021 http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/ > -. --- - / ...- .- .-.. .. -.. / -- --- .-. ... . / -.-. --- -.. . FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Fridays 9a-12p Friday St. Johns Cafe / Thursdays 9a-12p Zoom https://bit.ly/virtualfriam to (un)subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ archives: 5/2017 thru present https://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/ 1/2003 thru 6/2021 http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/
[FRIAM] experience monism
The eloquence and perspicacity of Professor Thompson has convinced me to become an *Experience* monist. In my naive sophomoric enthusiasm I have set about writing THE definitive work on *Experience*. But I have a few questions ... 1) Is an *Experience* a whole or a composite? I.e., (scent of cinnamon)—(heat of oven)—(grandmother's smile) OR (scent of cinnamon) + (heat of oven) + (grandmothers smile)? Another analogy a single photograph or a Photoshopped collage? 1A) If an *Experience* is is a composite- there must be 'atomic' *Experience* from which it is composed. Is it possible to *Experience* and "atomic *Experience*" in isolation? 2) Does an *Experience* have duration, or is each *Experience* akin to a frame of a film and continuity simply an artifact of being presented at some rate; e.g., 30 frames per nanosecond? 3) Can *Experiences* be differentiated as "potential" and "actual?" To illustrate: I turn on the camera on my phone and images pass through the lens and appear on the screen, but a photograph does not come into existence until I press the shutter button. Does something similar happen with experience? They are potential until I "press the conscious awareness button" at which point they become actual? 4) Can *Experiences* be categorized? To borrow vocabulary (somewhat tortured( from Peter Sjostedt-Hughes' pentad of perception; * *Experience* grounded in/originating from the spatio-temporal environment (Sensed Experience) * *Experience* of an atemporal quality, e.g., color or scent (Perceived Experience) * An *Experience* partly caused by an external physicality—e.g., motion of molecules partly causative of the *Experience* of heat (Ecto-Physical Experience) * An *Experience* that is partly caused by an internal physicality—e.g., synapses firing in the brain (Endo-Physical Experience) * *Experiences* not grounded in/originating from the spatio-temporal environment, e.g., imaginations (Demeteption Experience) * A sixth, of my own, a variation of Endo-Physical, where the internal physicality is "disrupted," e.g., by taking a drug. 5) Does *Experience* 'exist' apart from an experiencer? 5A) if not, how can we have "common experiences" 5B) if yes, do we not have a faux monism, with two metaphysical things: experience and experiencer? 6) Do *Experiences* persist? Perhaps as memories? 6A) If yes, what exactly is the difference between an *Experience*-in-"memory" and one "being experienced?" Analogy to a computer program executing and the same program stored on disk. I would have asked Professor Thompson these questions, but I fear he would have dismissed them as "tending not to edification." davew -. --- - / ...- .- .-.. .. -.. / -- --- .-. ... . / -.-. --- -.. . FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Fridays 9a-12p Friday St. Johns Cafe / Thursdays 9a-12p Zoom https://bit.ly/virtualfriam to (un)subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ archives: 5/2017 thru present https://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/ 1/2003 thru 6/2021 http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/
