Re: [FRIAM] fripm
Fripm October 12. When worlds collide. On Sep 24, 2012, at 9:39 PM, Douglas Roberts wrote: Worksforme. On Sep 24, 2012 9:34 PM, Victoria Hughes victo...@toryhughes.com wrote: Perhaps one could rename or subset the meeting as FRIPM. Meet at Sas' and finally combine the whiskey, the cast of characters, and the table-pounding. After October 10. On Sep 24, 2012, at 9:28 PM, Douglas Roberts wrote: Yikes. I might just have to break tradition and attend an actual FRIAM meeting. Has there ever been an actual fist fight at a FRIAM meeting? -Doug Sent from Android. On Sep 24, 2012 9:17 PM, Nicholas Thompson nickthomp...@earthlink.net wrote: Hi Russ, Whatever SEP may have to say, we still have to talk to one another, right? Notice that all these meanings have to do with God. If SEP is correct, a person not concerned with god in one way or another would never use the word. Do you put faith in the advice of your stockbroker? Forgive me if I am being abit trollish, here; I perhaps am not following closely enough, due to packing, etc., to get back to Santa Fe. This week I won’t make it for Friday’s meeting, but NEXT WEEK, look out! From: friam-boun...@redfish.com [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of Russ Abbott Sent: Monday, September 24, 2012 9:42 PM To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group Subject: Re: [FRIAM] faith Robert Holmes quoted the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy as listing these senses of faith. · the ‘purely affective’ model: faith as a feeling of existential confidence · the ‘special knowledge’ model: faith as knowledge of specific truths, revealed by God · the ‘belief’ model: faith as belief that God exists · the ‘trust’ model: faith as belief in (trust in) God · the ‘doxastic venture’ model: faith as practical commitment beyond the evidence to one's belief that God exists · the ‘sub-doxastic venture’ model: faith as practical commitment without belief · the ‘hope’ model: faith as hoping—or acting in the hope that—the God who saves exists. Has the discussion done better than this? It seems to me that we are getting into trouble because (as this list illustrates) we (in English) use the word faith to mean a number of different things, which are only sometimes related to each other. My original concern was with faith in the sense of the fifth bullet. (The third bullet is explicitly based on belief in God.) According to the article, On the doxastic venture model, faith involves full commitment, in the face of the recognition that this is not ‘objectively’ justified on the evidence. That's pretty close to how I would use the term. To a great extent the article has a theological focus, which clouds the issue as far as I'm concerned. But here is more of what it says about faith as a doxastic venture. A possible view of theistic faith-commitment is that it is wholly independent of the epistemic concern that cares about evidential support: faith then reveals its authenticity most clearly when it takes faith-propositions to be true contrary to the weight of the evidence. This view is widely described as ‘fideist’, but ought more fairly to be called arational fideism, or, where commitment contrary to the evidence is positively favoured, irrational or counter-rational fideism. and Serious philosophical defence of a doxastic venture model of faith amounts to a supra-rational fideism, for which epistemic concern is not overridden and for which, therefore, it is a constraint on faith-commitment that it not accept what is known, or justifiably believed on the evidence, to be false. Rather, faith commits itself onlybeyond, and not against, the evidence—and it does so out of epistemic concern to grasp truth on matters of vital existential importance. The thought that one may be entitled to commit to an existentially momentous truth-claim in principle undecidable on the evidence when forced to decide either to do so or not is what motivates William James's ‘justification of faith’ in ‘The Will to Believe’ (James 1896/1956). If such faith can be justified, its cognitive content will (on realist assumptions) have to cohere with our best evidence-based theories about the real world. Faith may extend our scientific grasp of the real, but may not counter it. Whether the desire to grasp more truth about the real than science can supply is a noble aspiration or a dangerous delusion is at the heart of the debate about entitlement to faith on this supra- rational fideist doxastic venture model. -- Russ On Mon, Sep 24, 2012 at 5:00 PM, glen g...@ropella.name wrote: Robert J. Cordingley wrote at 09/24/2012 04:38 PM: But my point (regarding God) was an expectation of action by whatever I have faith in and has nothing to do with action on my part. The expected action can be provision of n
Re: [FRIAM] fripm
Actually reading Juggler of Worlds right now. Second in Niven's Fleet of Worlds Ringworld prequils. On Sep 24, 2012 9:46 PM, Victoria Hughes victo...@toryhughes.com wrote: Fripm October 12. When worlds collide. On Sep 24, 2012, at 9:39 PM, Douglas Roberts wrote: Worksforme. On Sep 24, 2012 9:34 PM, Victoria Hughes victo...@toryhughes.com wrote: Perhaps one could rename or subset the meeting as FRIPM. Meet at Sas' and finally combine the whiskey, the cast of characters, and the table-pounding. After October 10. On Sep 24, 2012, at 9:28 PM, Douglas Roberts wrote: Yikes. I might just have to break tradition and attend an actual FRIAM meeting. Has there ever been an actual fist fight at a FRIAM meeting? -Doug Sent from Android. On Sep 24, 2012 9:17 PM, Nicholas Thompson nickthomp...@earthlink.net wrote: Hi Russ, ** ** Whatever SEP may have to say, we still have to talk to one another, right? Notice that all these meanings have to do with God. If SEP is correct, a person not concerned with god in one way or another would never use the word. Do you put faith in the advice of your stockbroker? ** ** Forgive me if I am being abit trollish, here; I perhaps am not following closely enough, due to packing, etc., to get back to Santa Fe. This week I won’t make it for Friday’s meeting, but NEXT WEEK, look out! ** ** *From:* friam-boun...@redfish.com [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] *On Behalf Of *Russ Abbott *Sent:* Monday, September 24, 2012 9:42 PM *To:* The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] faith ** ** Robert Holmes quoted the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/faith/#FaiDoxVenas listing these senses of faith. ** ** · *the ‘purely affective’ model*: faith as a feeling of existential confidence · *the ‘special knowledge’ model*: faith as knowledge of specific truths, revealed by God · *the ‘belief’ model*: faith as belief *that* God exists · *the ‘trust’ model*: faith as belief *in* (trust in) God · *the ‘doxastic venture’ model*: faith as practical commitment beyond the evidence to one's belief that God exists · *the ‘sub-doxastic venture’ model*: faith as practical commitment without belief · *the ‘hope’ model*: faith as hoping—or acting in the hope that—the God who saves exists. ** ** Has the discussion done better than this? ** ** It seems to me that we are getting into trouble because (as this list illustrates) we (in English) use the word faith to mean a number of different things, which are only sometimes related to each other. ** ** My original concern was with faith in the sense of the fifth bullet. (The third bullet is explicitly based on belief in God.) According to the article, ** ** On the doxastic venture model, faith involves *full* commitment, in the face of the recognition that this is not ‘objectively’ justified on the evidence. ** ** That's pretty close to how I would use the term. To a great extent the article has a theological focus, which clouds the issue as far as I'm concerned. But here is more of what it says about faith as a doxastic venture. ** ** A possible view of theistic faith-commitment is that it is wholly independent of the epistemic concern that cares about evidential support: faith then reveals its authenticity most clearly when it takes faith-propositions to be true *contrary to* the weight of the evidence. This view is widely described as ‘fideist’, but ought more fairly to be called *arational* fideism, or, where commitment contrary to the evidence is positively favoured, *irrational* or *counter-rational* fideism. ** ** and ** ** Serious philosophical defence of a doxastic venture model of faith amounts to a *supra-rational* fideism, for which epistemic concern is not overridden and for which, therefore, it is a constraint on faith-commitment that it *not* accept what is known, or justifiably believed on the evidence, to be false. Rather, faith commits itself only *beyond*, and not against, the evidence—and it does so *out of* epistemic concern to grasp truth on matters of vital existential importance. The thought that one may be entitled to commit to an existentially momentous truth-claim in principle undecidable on the evidence when forced to decide either to do so or not is what motivates William James's ‘justification of faith’ in ‘The Will to Believe’ (James 1896/1956). If such faith can be justified, its cognitive content will (on realist assumptions) have to cohere with our best evidence-based theories about the real world. Faith may extend our scientific grasp of the real, but may not counter it. Whether the desire to grasp more truth about the real than science can supply is a noble aspiration or a dangerous delusion is at the heart of the debate
