Re: [Full-disclosure] A Botted Fortune 500 a Day

2007-04-13 Thread Knud Erik Højgaard
On 4/13/07, RMueller [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

 How is the information gathered?

The page mentions different types of spam, so it's really just a
matter of doing whois lookups / reverse dns checks and stuff like that
to see where the stuff comes from. Once you filter out all the end
user ranges you can easily do some manual sorting of the list to find
juicy stuff, aka things that are fun to laugh at.

--
Knud

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Re: [Full-disclosure] patch-9449

2007-04-13 Thread Wong Chee Chun

Dshied's recent diary entry might has something related about this virus i
guess. except that the filename is patch-58214.zip.

Here is the link to the diary --

http://www.dshield.org/diary.html?storyid=2618dshield=0fcfb711fed834995b1d52da5f438c11


cheers


On 4/13/07, Steward Smith [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:


Hi,

Had a funny spam today that warned about mails coming from my IP address
and I should apply the attached patch. The filename was named
patch-9449.exe which was attached in a password protected zip file -
presumably to fool your virus scanner.

I unpacked it but my up-to-date virus scanner on my Windows XP vmware
instance cannot detect any malware.

Has anyone else seen this and know what it is?

Stew

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West Malaysia
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Re: [Full-disclosure] patch-9449

2007-04-13 Thread Juha-Matti Laurio
Wong Chee Chun [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: 

Dshield (ISC) page discusses about the same issue.
The filenames are randomized. 4 or 5 numbers always.

- Juha-Matti 


 Dshied's recent diary entry might has something related about this virus i
 guess. except that the filename is patch-58214.zip.

Here is the link to the diary --

http://www.dshield.org/diary.html?storyid=2618dshield=0fcfb711fed834995b1d52da5f438c11


cheers


On 4/13/07, Steward Smith [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

Hi,

Had a funny spam today that warned about mails coming from my IP address
and I should apply the attached patch. The filename was named
patch-9449.exe which was attached in a password protected zip file -
presumably to fool your virus scanner.

I unpacked it but my up-to-date virus scanner on my Windows XP vmware
instance cannot detect any malware.

Has anyone else seen this and know what it is?

Stew

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[Full-disclosure] [OPENADS-SA-2007-004] Max Media Manager v0.1.29-rc and v0.3.31-alpha-pr2 vulnerability fixed

2007-04-13 Thread Matteo Beccati

Openads security advisoryOPENADS-SA-2007-004

Advisory ID:   OPENADS-SA-2007-004
Date:  2007-Apr-11
Security risk: medium risk
Applications affetced: Max Media Manager
Versions affected: = v0.1.29-rc, = v0.3.31-alpha-pr2
Versions not affected: = v0.3.31-alpha-pr3




Vulnerability:  HTTP response splitting


Description
---
The ck.php (or adclick.php in v0.1.x) script is vulnerable to HTTP
response splitting attacks because the maxdest parameter is not
properly sanitized.

The vulnerability DOES NOT affect those running PHP = 4.4.2 or PHP =
5.1.2, because the header function blocks this kind of attacks.

References
--
- OPENADS-SA-2007-03

Solution

- Those running MMM v0.3.x should upgrade to v0.3.31-alpha-pr3
- Those running MMM v0.1.x should replace adclick.php with the updated
   file:

https://developer.openads.org/browser/branches/max/branches/0.1/adclick.php?rev=5697format=raw


Contact informations


The security contact for Openads can be reached at:
security AT openads DOT org


Best regards
--
Matteo Beccati
http://www.openads.org
http://phpadsnew.com
http://phppgads.com

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Re: [Full-disclosure] A Botted Fortune 500 a Day

2007-04-13 Thread Randall M
Did someone get out of bed on the wrong side??


From: poo [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Friday, April 13, 2007 6:03 AM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED];
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] A Botted Fortune 500 a Day


gadi.. SHUT UP

On 4/13/07, RMueller [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

Gadi wrote:

--

Message: 8
Date: Wed, 11 Apr 2007 21:35:47 -0500 (CDT)
From: Gadi Evron [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [Full-disclosure] A Botted Fortune 500 a Day
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED],
   [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Message-ID: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII

Support Intelligence releases daily reports on different fortune 500
companies which are heavily affected by the botnet problem, with many
compromised machines on their networks.

You can find more information on their blog:
http://blog.support-intelligence.com/

They are good people, and they know botnets.

   Gadi.



--


How is the information gathered?

___
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Re: [Full-disclosure] A Botted Fortune 500 a Day

2007-04-13 Thread Steven Adair
Is this in anyway surprising?  I think we all know the answer is no.  Many
Fortune 500 companies have more employees than some ISPs have customers. 
Should we really expect differently?

Also, as a side note, I would like to add that just because SPAM is coming
from a certain gateway does not necessarily mean that the machines on
their network are infected.  We could assume this, but then again I would
have to assume Microsoft's network is full of bots because I get SPAM
originating from Hotmail.com.  It might be logical and in many cases to
assume this, but it's worth noting this may not be the case.

Steven

 Support Intelligence releases daily reports on different fortune 500
 companies which are heavily affected by the botnet problem, with many
 compromised machines on their networks.

 You can find more information on their blog:
 http://blog.support-intelligence.com/

 They are good people, and they know botnets.

   Gadi.

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 Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/

 !DSPAM:461e546e15211693416514!



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Re: [Full-disclosure] A Botted Fortune 500 a Day

2007-04-13 Thread Jamie Riden
On 13/04/07, Steven Adair [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 Is this in anyway surprising?  I think we all know the answer is no.  Many
 Fortune 500 companies have more employees than some ISPs have customers.
 Should we really expect differently?

Yes! Off the top of my head:

1. Corporations should have more of an economic incentive to prevent
compromises on their internal networks. E.g. TJX breach could cost
company $1B - 
http://weblog.infoworld.com/zeroday/archives/2007/04/tjx_breach_coul.html
Now, a typical spambot will cost almost nothing compared with that,
but the point is you don't know the extent of the compromise until
you've examined the machines involved.

2. Corporations have a lot more influence over their employee's
behaviour than ISPs do over their customers. Customers can walk away
to a new ISP with minimal fuss if sanctions are threatened.

3. Corporations can lock down their firewalls a lot tighter than ISPs
can. If my ISP blocked the way my employer does, I would be looking
for a new ISP.

4. ISPs don't own the data on their customer's computers. Corps very
much do own most of the data on their employees computers. Therefore
they need to worry about confidentiality in a way that ISPs do not.

I used to look after security at a large-ish university and odd
activity would stand out because there the baseline was largely
'normal' traffic. ISPs have little chance to detect 'odd' behaviour
because everyone is doing 'odd' things. Corps should only have a very
few 'odd' things happening on their networks and a single outgoing
portscan or IRC session are grounds for serious concern. (Assuming IRC
is forbidden by policy - if not, you can still profile the IRC servers
you expect to be talking to and those you don't.) It's not hard to
find infected machines at a corp.

 Also, as a side note, I would like to add that just because SPAM is coming
 from a certain gateway does not necessarily mean that the machines on
 their network are infected.  We could assume this, but then again I would
 have to assume Microsoft's network is full of bots because I get SPAM
 originating from Hotmail.com.  It might be logical and in many cases to
 assume this, but it's worth noting this may not be the case.

Based on the Received headers, or just on the From line ? The latter
is trivial to forge and has been routinely forged pretty much forever.

If Received headers show that mail has been relayed from within your
organisation, then you have a serious problem, and it's better to
learn of it by checking for outgoing spam than when someone notices
something worse six months down the line.

cheers,
 Jamie
-- 
Jamie Riden / [EMAIL PROTECTED] / [EMAIL PROTECTED]
UK Honeynet Project: http://www.ukhoneynet.org/

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Re: [Full-disclosure] Spam is funny!

2007-04-13 Thread neal.krawetz
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1

Yes, it's interesting to find that attacks of all sorts (spam,
phishing, and infiltration) are becoming targeted now.  Previously,
attacks were unsophisticated and limited to the unsecured, random
hosts that were vulnerable to dropstatd.  Now it seems these
attackers are catching up and developing slightly more
sophisticated tools for everything.

I fear we are entering a brave new world of information security,
and we need to worry about the next generation of threats.

- - neal

http://www.hackerfactor.com/blog/

On Thu, 12 Apr 2007 20:54:03 -0400 Saeed Abu Nimeh
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
good find. i think the same thing applies to ebay users. i have
seen
some phishing mailers that look for ebay userIDs in ebay listing
pages
and send bulk emails to these userids attached to famous email
domains
like yahoo, hotmail, aol, etc. This means that if you've never
used ebay
it is less likely that you will receive an ebay scam.
Thanks,
Saeed

[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 In my last article at Security Focus, I mentioned that phishing
is
 directed (based on your online profile) and not blast-o-gram
 (everyone gets one). My example used Arizona. I said:

 For example, if you are likely in Arizona then you are more
 likely to receive an Arizona Credit Union phish. They can guess
 where you are based on the forums you use. If you post in a
Tucson
 forum or write about Flagstaff and Phoenix, then you might be in
 Arizona.


 Well, the email address associated with that article just
received
 an Arizona State Credit Union phish. It had never received one
of
 those before.

 Man, spammers are predictable and funny.

 - Dr Neal Krawetz, PhD
 Author of Yggdrasil Linux Unleashed and Other Stupid Shit

--
Click for free info on Hollywood careers and quit your boring job
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Note: This signature can be verified at https://www.hushtools.com/verify
Version: Hush 2.5

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--
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Re: [Full-disclosure] A Botted Fortune 500 a Day

2007-04-13 Thread Steven Adair
 On 13/04/07, Steven Adair [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 Is this in anyway surprising?  I think we all know the answer is no.
 Many
 Fortune 500 companies have more employees than some ISPs have customers.
 Should we really expect differently?

 Yes! Off the top of my head:

 1. Corporations should have more of an economic incentive to prevent
 compromises on their internal networks. E.g. TJX breach could cost
 company $1B -
 http://weblog.infoworld.com/zeroday/archives/2007/04/tjx_breach_coul.html
 Now, a typical spambot will cost almost nothing compared with that,
 but the point is you don't know the extent of the compromise until
 you've examined the machines involved.


You list incentives but this doesn't mean I should really expect any
differently.  You are also equating a compromise into TJ MAXX servers for
which details have not been given.  I doubt and hope the same user that's
an account for TJ MAXX and using e-mail isn't conencted or able to get to
a server that processes credit card transactions.

 2. Corporations have a lot more influence over their employee's
 behaviour than ISPs do over their customers. Customers can walk away
 to a new ISP with minimal fuss if sanctions are threatened.


Well this is true but you seem to be missing the point of the comparison. 
These are large corporations with tens of thousands (some more, some less)
that are geographically dispersed across the countries.  This isn't a
small shop of 50 elite IT users.  This is probably like most other places
were 90% of the users can barely use Microsoft Word and Excel.  Once
again.. do I expect differently? No.

 3. Corporations can lock down their firewalls a lot tighter than ISPs
 can. If my ISP blocked the way my employer does, I would be looking
 for a new ISP.


Sure they can in some instances.  How would locking down a firewall stop
this e-mail from going out?  Maybe you can lock down SPAM firewalls but
that doesn't stop the root cause.  You have 100,000 users at a Fortune 500
company with admin access to their Windows laptops.  Are you going to
block them form using the Internet and using e-mail?  If not I am going to
continue to expect them to keep getting infected.

 4. ISPs don't own the data on their customer's computers. Corps very
 much do own most of the data on their employees computers. Therefore
 they need to worry about confidentiality in a way that ISPs do not.


Well usually corporations not only own the data on the machines, they own
the computers themselves as well.  You are equating a need and want for
protection with what would really be expected.

 I used to look after security at a large-ish university and odd
 activity would stand out because there the baseline was largely
 'normal' traffic. ISPs have little chance to detect 'odd' behaviour
 because everyone is doing 'odd' things. Corps should only have a very
 few 'odd' things happening on their networks and a single outgoing
 portscan or IRC session are grounds for serious concern. (Assuming IRC
 is forbidden by policy - if not, you can still profile the IRC servers
 you expect to be talking to and those you don't.) It's not hard to
 find infected machines at a corp.


Not sure last time you ever looked at XDCC/iroffer bots, but they can
range from 10-50% .edu hosts.  Universities are ripe for the picking. 
I've participated in UNISOG related lists and I know it's getting better
and just like any organization it can very from location to location.  I
don't expect anything different here either.

 Also, as a side note, I would like to add that just because SPAM is
 coming
 from a certain gateway does not necessarily mean that the machines on
 their network are infected.  We could assume this, but then again I
 would
 have to assume Microsoft's network is full of bots because I get SPAM
 originating from Hotmail.com.  It might be logical and in many cases to
 assume this, but it's worth noting this may not be the case.

 Based on the Received headers, or just on the From line ? The latter
 is trivial to forge and has been routinely forged pretty much forever.


You are talking about forging a MAIL FROM field.  This is not what I am
talking about.

 If Received headers show that mail has been relayed from within your
 organisation, then you have a serious problem, and it's better to
 learn of it by checking for outgoing spam than when someone notices
 something worse six months down the line.


There's a field in most mail programs where you can enter in an
SMTP/IMAP/Exchange address etc.  This allows you to send e-mail using that
server.  This does not mean you are located on the internal network for
that server.  In fact you could even be using a forwarder server that it
doens't show you.  Hell you could be using a web form or webmail.  My
point is that seeing a header from a particular location does not
necessarily mean the sender is behind a firewall sitting on that network.

Do you want corporations to protect their data better?  Absolutely.  

Re: [Full-disclosure] A Botted Fortune 500 a Day

2007-04-13 Thread Jamie Riden
Hi Steven,

I believe security of an organisation is orthogonal to the number of
employees/users and how savvy they are. It depends more on the will
and resources to secure the network properly. Two, corporations do
have many financial incentives to make sure they are secure - if they
are doing their risk analyses properly, they can see that. So, yes I
do expect them to fare better - a lot better - than ISPs. More
comments are in-line.

On 13/04/07, Steven Adair [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
  On 13/04/07, Steven Adair [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
  Is this in anyway surprising?  I think we all know the answer is no.
  Many
  Fortune 500 companies have more employees than some ISPs have customers.
  Should we really expect differently?
 
  Yes! Off the top of my head:
 
  1. Corporations should have more of an economic incentive to prevent
  compromises on their internal networks. E.g. TJX breach could cost
  company $1B -
  http://weblog.infoworld.com/zeroday/archives/2007/04/tjx_breach_coul.html
  Now, a typical spambot will cost almost nothing compared with that,
  but the point is you don't know the extent of the compromise until
  you've examined the machines involved.
 

 You list incentives but this doesn't mean I should really expect any
 differently.  You are also equating a compromise into TJ MAXX servers for
 which details have not been given.  I doubt and hope the same user that's
 an account for TJ MAXX and using e-mail isn't conencted or able to get to
 a server that processes credit card transactions.

A compromise is a compromise and you don't know the extent until
you've looked at everything. If one of your machines is spewing spam,
how do you know it is also not leaking confidential data to a third
party? Any compromise has the potential to be *extremely* costly.

  2. Corporations have a lot more influence over their employee's
  behaviour than ISPs do over their customers. Customers can walk away
  to a new ISP with minimal fuss if sanctions are threatened.

 Well this is true but you seem to be missing the point of the comparison.
 These are large corporations with tens of thousands (some more, some less)
 that are geographically dispersed across the countries.  This isn't a
 small shop of 50 elite IT users.  This is probably like most other places
 were 90% of the users can barely use Microsoft Word and Excel.  Once
 again.. do I expect differently? No.

There is no reason for an admin to let users compromise the company's
security. If the company cares about security, they can disable admin
rights, lock down the firewall and run an IDS.

I can buy the argument that most companies don't care sufficiently,
but this is really orthogonal to the number and experience level of
their users.

  3. Corporations can lock down their firewalls a lot tighter than ISPs
  can. If my ISP blocked the way my employer does, I would be looking
  for a new ISP.
 

 Sure they can in some instances.  How would locking down a firewall stop
 this e-mail from going out?  Maybe you can lock down SPAM firewalls but
 that doesn't stop the root cause.  You have 100,000 users at a Fortune 500
 company with admin access to their Windows laptops.  Are you going to
 block them form using the Internet and using e-mail?  If not I am going to
 continue to expect them to keep getting infected.

Block the infection vectors: screen email, http and ftp traffic. No
personal laptops on company networks. No admin rights as far as
possible. Monitor and react to new vectors and threats as they arise.

Yes, I would disable people's Internet access - in fact all intranet
access too. My main interaction with Cisco kit to date is shutting
down Ethernet ports and re-enabling them after the problem has been
resolved. If there's an incident, the plug gets pulled until someone
has examined the machine, and if necessary reinstalled from known good
media.

  4. ISPs don't own the data on their customer's computers. Corps very
  much do own most of the data on their employees computers. Therefore
  they need to worry about confidentiality in a way that ISPs do not.
 

 Well usually corporations not only own the data on the machines, they own
 the computers themselves as well.  You are equating a need and want for
 protection with what would really be expected.

They have a financial incentive to look after their machines, so I do
expect them to look after them. An ISP has no such incentive to look
after their customer's machines.

  I used to look after security at a large-ish university and odd
  activity would stand out because there the baseline was largely
  'normal' traffic. ISPs have little chance to detect 'odd' behaviour
  because everyone is doing 'odd' things. Corps should only have a very
  few 'odd' things happening on their networks and a single outgoing
  portscan or IRC session are grounds for serious concern. (Assuming IRC
  is forbidden by policy - if not, you can still profile the IRC servers
  you expect to be talking to and 

Re: [Full-disclosure] A Botted Fortune 500 a Day

2007-04-13 Thread Simon Smith
Just to add my two cents...

The fact is that the cost in damages of a single compromise is usually far
greater than the cost of implementing and maintaining good security. TJX is
a golden example of that.


On 4/13/07 11:05 AM, Jamie Riden [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

 Hi Steven,
 
 I believe security of an organisation is orthogonal to the number of
 employees/users and how savvy they are. It depends more on the will
 and resources to secure the network properly. Two, corporations do
 have many financial incentives to make sure they are secure - if they
 are doing their risk analyses properly, they can see that. So, yes I
 do expect them to fare better - a lot better - than ISPs. More
 comments are in-line.
 
 On 13/04/07, Steven Adair [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 On 13/04/07, Steven Adair [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 Is this in anyway surprising?  I think we all know the answer is no.
 Many
 Fortune 500 companies have more employees than some ISPs have customers.
 Should we really expect differently?
 
 Yes! Off the top of my head:
 
 1. Corporations should have more of an economic incentive to prevent
 compromises on their internal networks. E.g. TJX breach could cost
 company $1B -
 http://weblog.infoworld.com/zeroday/archives/2007/04/tjx_breach_coul.html
 Now, a typical spambot will cost almost nothing compared with that,
 but the point is you don't know the extent of the compromise until
 you've examined the machines involved.
 
 
 You list incentives but this doesn't mean I should really expect any
 differently.  You are also equating a compromise into TJ MAXX servers for
 which details have not been given.  I doubt and hope the same user that's
 an account for TJ MAXX and using e-mail isn't conencted or able to get to
 a server that processes credit card transactions.
 
 A compromise is a compromise and you don't know the extent until
 you've looked at everything. If one of your machines is spewing spam,
 how do you know it is also not leaking confidential data to a third
 party? Any compromise has the potential to be *extremely* costly.
 
 2. Corporations have a lot more influence over their employee's
 behaviour than ISPs do over their customers. Customers can walk away
 to a new ISP with minimal fuss if sanctions are threatened.
 
 Well this is true but you seem to be missing the point of the comparison.
 These are large corporations with tens of thousands (some more, some less)
 that are geographically dispersed across the countries.  This isn't a
 small shop of 50 elite IT users.  This is probably like most other places
 were 90% of the users can barely use Microsoft Word and Excel.  Once
 again.. do I expect differently? No.
 
 There is no reason for an admin to let users compromise the company's
 security. If the company cares about security, they can disable admin
 rights, lock down the firewall and run an IDS.
 
 I can buy the argument that most companies don't care sufficiently,
 but this is really orthogonal to the number and experience level of
 their users.
 
 3. Corporations can lock down their firewalls a lot tighter than ISPs
 can. If my ISP blocked the way my employer does, I would be looking
 for a new ISP.
 
 
 Sure they can in some instances.  How would locking down a firewall stop
 this e-mail from going out?  Maybe you can lock down SPAM firewalls but
 that doesn't stop the root cause.  You have 100,000 users at a Fortune 500
 company with admin access to their Windows laptops.  Are you going to
 block them form using the Internet and using e-mail?  If not I am going to
 continue to expect them to keep getting infected.
 
 Block the infection vectors: screen email, http and ftp traffic. No
 personal laptops on company networks. No admin rights as far as
 possible. Monitor and react to new vectors and threats as they arise.
 
 Yes, I would disable people's Internet access - in fact all intranet
 access too. My main interaction with Cisco kit to date is shutting
 down Ethernet ports and re-enabling them after the problem has been
 resolved. If there's an incident, the plug gets pulled until someone
 has examined the machine, and if necessary reinstalled from known good
 media.
 
 4. ISPs don't own the data on their customer's computers. Corps very
 much do own most of the data on their employees computers. Therefore
 they need to worry about confidentiality in a way that ISPs do not.
 
 
 Well usually corporations not only own the data on the machines, they own
 the computers themselves as well.  You are equating a need and want for
 protection with what would really be expected.
 
 They have a financial incentive to look after their machines, so I do
 expect them to look after them. An ISP has no such incentive to look
 after their customer's machines.
 
 I used to look after security at a large-ish university and odd
 activity would stand out because there the baseline was largely
 'normal' traffic. ISPs have little chance to detect 'odd' behaviour
 because everyone is doing 'odd' 

Re: [Full-disclosure] patch-9449

2007-04-13 Thread Mike Shafer
Myself and a client have received several over the past 24hrs.

I submitted one as the password protected zip file to VirusTotal and 
Kaspersky identified it as a virus/trojan as did several other AV 
products. Names varied so I didn't record them. Was most interested in 
seeing if there was a consistent identification of the archive.

Received another this morning which I unzipped on a Linux box  then 
tested with CA AV. It was identified as Win32/Pecoan.R

- Mike Shafer

Steward Smith wrote:
 Hi,

 Had a funny spam today that warned about mails coming from my IP address
 and I should apply the attached patch. The filename was named
 patch-9449.exe which was attached in a password protected zip file -
 presumably to fool your virus scanner.

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[Full-disclosure] TSRT-07-04: LANDesk Management Suite Alert Service Stack Overflow Vulnerability

2007-04-13 Thread TSRT
TSRT-07-04: LANDesk Management Suite Alert Service Stack Overflow
Vulnerability
http://www.tippingpoint.com/security/advisories/TSRT-07-04.html
April 13, 2007

-- CVE ID:
CVE-2007-1674

-- Affected Vendor:
LANDesk

-- Affected Products:
Management Suite 8.7

-- TippingPoint(TM) IPS Customer Protection:
TippingPoint IPS customers have been protected against this
vulnerability since March 23, 2007 by Digital Vaccine protection
filter ID 5210. For further product information on the TippingPoint IPS:

http://www.tippingpoint.com 

-- Vulnerability Details:
This vulnerability allows attackers to execute arbitrary code on
vulnerable installations of LANDesk Management Suite. User interaction
is not required to exploit this vulnerability.

The specific flaw exists in the Alert Service listening on UDP port
65535. The Aolnsrvr.exe process accepts user-supplied data and performs
an inline memory copy into a 268 byte stack-based buffer. Supplying
additional data results in a buffer overflow and SEH overwrite. The
vulnerable memory copy is shown here:

0041EF49 mov edi, eax  ; edi pointer to stack buffer
0041EF4B mov eax, ecx
0041EF4D shr ecx, 2; total size of data
0041EF50 rep movsd
0041EF52 mov ecx, eax
0041EF54 mov eax, ebx
0041EF56 and ecx, 3
0041EF59 rep movsb

Exploitation allows an attacker to execute arbitrary code under the
context of the SYSTEM user.

-- Vendor Response:
LANDesk has issued an update to correct this vulnerability. More details
can be found at:

http://kb.landesk.com/display/4n/kb/article.asp?aid=4142

-- Disclosure Timeline:
2007.03.08 - Vulnerability reported to vendor
2007.03.23 - Digital Vaccine released to TippingPoint customers
2007.04.13 - Coordinated public release of advisory

-- Credit:
This vulnerability was discovered by Aaron Portnoy, TippingPoint
Security Research Team.

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Re: [Full-disclosure] A Botted Fortune 500 a Day

2007-04-13 Thread Dude VanWinkle
 From: poo [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
  Sent: Friday, April 13, 2007 6:03 AM
  To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
  Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED];
 [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
  Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] A Botted Fortune 500 a Day



 gadi.. SHUT UP

On 4/13/07, Randall M [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:




 Did someone get out of bed on the wrong side??



or have their CC bots shut down :-P

-JP
aww, poor baby
-JP

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Re: [Full-disclosure] A Botted Fortune 500 a Day

2007-04-13 Thread RMueller
Dude VanWinkle [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

  From: poo [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
   Sent: Friday, April 13, 2007 6:03 AM
   To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
   Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED];
  [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
   Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] A Botted Fortune 500 a Day
 
 
 
  gadi.. SHUT UP
 
 On 4/13/07, Randall M [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 
 
 
 
  Did someone get out of bed on the wrong side??
 
 
 
 or have their CC bots shut down :-P
 
 -JP
 aww, poor baby
 -JP
 

HaHaha!! that was good. Dammit I should have thought of that!

thanks
Randall

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