[Full-disclosure] CORE-2009-0910: Autodesk Maya Script Nodes Arbitrary Command Execution
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Hash: SHA1
Core Security Technologies - CoreLabs Advisory
http://www.coresecurity.com/corelabs/
Autodesk Maya Script Nodes Arbitrary Command Execution
1. *Advisory Information*
Title: Autodesk Maya Script Nodes Arbitrary Command Execution
Advisory Id: CORE-2009-0910
Advisory URL:
http://www.coresecurity.com/content/maya-arbitrary-command-execution
Date published: 2009-11-23
Date of last update: 2009-11-20
Vendors contacted: Autodesk
Release mode: User release
2. *Vulnerability Information*
Class: Failure to Sanitize Data into a Different Plane [CWE-74]
Impact: Code execution
Remotely Exploitable: Yes
Locally Exploitable: No
Bugtraq ID: 36636
CVE Name: CVE-2009-3578
3. *Vulnerability Description*
Autodesk Maya [2] is a high-end 3D computer graphics and 3D modeling
software package.
Autodesk Maya offers so called "Script Nodes" as a way to program
animation behavior using MEL (Maya Embedded Language) and the Python
programming language. The Autodesk Maya file formats support embedding
of scripting code as part of a scene package. Programs embeded in Maya
files using scripting code are automatically executed upon opening of
the file. An attacker can take control of a system where Maya is
installed by sending a specially crafted scene package and enticing
the user to open it. The scripting code will run with the privileges
of the user running the Maya application.
4. *Vulnerable packages*
. Autodesk Maya 2010
. Autodesk Maya 2009
. Autodesk Maya 2008
. Autodesk Maya 8.5
. Autodesk Maya 8.0
. Alias Wavefront Maya 7.0
. Alias Wavefront Maya 6.5
5. *Vendor Information, Solutions and Workarounds*
The vendor did not provide fixes or workaround information.
You can prevent script nodes from executing when you open a file by
following these steps:
. Select File > Open Scene > .
. Turn off Execute Script Nodes.
. Click Open.
6. *Credits*
This vulnerability was discovered and researched by Diego Juarez from
Core Security Technologies during Bugweek 2009 [1].
The publication of this advisory was coordinated by Fernando Russ from
Core Security Advisories Team.
7. *Technical Description / Proof of Concept Code*
Autodesk Maya offers so called "Script Nodes" as a way to program
animation behavior using MEL (the proprietary Maya scripting language)
and the Python programming language. Script nodes are saved on the
'.mb' and '.ma' file formats along with geometry and the rest of the
scene data. By using files with embedded scripting code it is possible
to execute arbitrary commands without any restriction and without
requiring any user interaction after a user opened a malicious scene
file.
The following steps work as Proof of Concept:
. Open Maya.
. Add some geometry.
. Go to Window/Animation Editors/Expression Editor.
. Put a name on it, set "Evaluate On" to "Open/Close", insert
python code within quotes like this:
/-
python("import os");
python("os.system('%SystemRoot%\\system32\\calc.exe')");
- -/
Save scene to a file with '.mb' or '.ma' format. Next time you open
the scene, calc.exe will be run. This same behavior can be obtained
using pure MEL code.
8. *Report Timeline*
. 2009-08-25:
Core Security Technologies ask the Autodesk Assistance Team for a
security contact to report the vulnerability.
. 2009-09-22:
Core asks the Autodesk Assistance Team for a security contact to
report the vulnerability.
. 2009-10-09:
Core contacts CERT to obtain security contact information for Autodesk.
. 2009-10-16:
CERT acknowledges the communication.
. 2009-10-19:
CERT sends their available contact information for Autodesk.
. 2009-10-19:
Core notifies Autodesk of the vulnerabilty report and announces its
initial plan to publish the content on November 2nd, 2009. Core
requests an acknoledgement within two working days and asks whehter
the details should be sent encrypted or in plaintext.
. 2009-10-19:
Autodesk acknowledges the report and requests the information to be
provided in encrypted form.
. 2009-10-20:
Core sends draft advisory and steps to reproduce the issue.
. 2009-10-27:
Core asks Autodesk about the status of the vulnerability report sent
on October 20th, 2009.
. 2009-10-27:
Autodesk acknowledges the communication indicating that the pertinent
Product Managers have been informed and are formulating a response.
. 2009-11-06:
Core notifies Autodesk about the missed deadline of November 2nd, 2009
and reuqests an status update. Publication of CORE-2009-0910 is
re-scheduled to November 16th, 2009 and is subject to change based on
concrete feedback from Autodesk.
. 2009-11-23:
Given the lack of response from Autodesk, Core decides to publish the
advisory CORE-2009-0910 as "user release".
9. *References*
[1] The author participated in Core Bugweek 2009 as member of the team
"Gimbal Lock N Load".
[2]
http://usa.autodesk.com/adsk/servlet/pc/index?siteID=12
[Full-disclosure] CORE-2009-0909: Autodesk 3DS Max Application Callbacks Arbitrary Command Execution
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Core Security Technologies - CoreLabs Advisory
http://www.coresecurity.com/corelabs/
Autodesk 3DS Max Application Callbacks Arbitrary Command Execution
1. *Advisory Information*
Title: Autodesk 3DS Max Application Callbacks Arbitrary Command Execution
Advisory Id: CORE-2009-0909
Advisory URL:
http://www.coresecurity.com/content/3dsmax-arbitrary-command-execution
Date published: 2009-11-23
Date of last update: 2009-11-20
Vendors contacted: Autodesk
Release mode: User release
2. *Vulnerability Information*
Class: Failure to Sanitize Data into a Different Plane [CWE-74]
Impact: Code execution
Remotely Exploitable: Yes
Locally Exploitable: No
Bugtraq ID: 36634
CVE Name: CVE-2009-3577
3. *Vulnerability Description*
Autodesk 3D Studio Max [2] is a modeling, animation and redering
package widely used for video game , film , multimedia and web content
developement. The software provides a built-in scripting language,
allowing users to bind custome code to actions performed in the
applciation. Execution of scripting code does not require explicit
permission from the user. This mechanim can be exploited by an
attacker to execute arbitrary code by enticing a victim to open .max
file with MaxScript application callbacks embedded.
4. *Vulnerable packages*
. Autodesk 3DSMax 2010
. Autodesk 3DSMax 2009
. Autodesk 3DSMax 2008
. Autodesk 3DSMax 9
. Autodesk 3DSMax 8
. Autodesk 3DSMax 7
. Autodesk 3DSMax 6
5. *Vendor Information, Solutions and Workarounds*
The vendor did not provide fixes or workaround information.
You can disable the automatic loading of embedded MaxScript by
following these steps:
. Go to Customize menu > Preferences > Preference Settings dialog >
MAXScript.
. Uncheck "Load/Save Scene Scripts".
. Uncheck "Load/Save Persistent Globals".
6. *Credits*
This vulnerability was discovered and researched by Sebastian Tello
from Core Security Technologies during Bugweek 2009 [1].
The publication of this advisory was coordinated by Fernando Russ from
Core Security Advisories Team.
7. *Technical Description / Proof of Concept Code*
Autodesk 3D Studio Max provides built-in scripting language called
MaxScript, which can be used to automate repetitive tasks, combine
existing functionality in new ways, develop new tools and user
interfaces and much more. Max allows users to bind MaxScript to
application callbacks in a way that could be exploited by an attacker
to execute arbitrary code by enticing a victim to open .max file with
MaxScript application callbacks embedded.
A Proof of Concept file can be obtained by following these simple
steps. Open Max, press F11 (MaxScript Listener), and paste this code:
/-
callbacks.addScript #filePostOpen ("DOSCommand(\"calc.exe\")")
id:#mbLoadCallback persistent:true
- -/
8. *Report Timeline*
. 2009-08-25:
Core Security Technologies ask the Autodesk Assistance Team for a
security contact to report the vulnerability.
. 2009-09-22:
Core asks the Autodesk Assistance Team for a security contact to
report the vulnerability.
. 2009-10-09:
Core contacts CERT to obtain security contact information for Autodesk.
. 2009-10-16:
CERT acknowledges the communication.
. 2009-10-19:
CERT sends their available contact information for Autodesk.
. 2009-10-19:
Core notifies Autodesk of the vulnerabilty report and announces its
initial plan to publish the content on November 2nd, 2009. Core
requests an acknoledgement within two working days and asks whehter
the details should be sent encrypted or in plaintext.
. 2009-10-19:
Autodesk acknowledges the report and requests the information to be
provided in encrypted form.
. 2009-10-20:
Core sends draft advisory and steps to reproduce the issue.
. 2009-10-27:
Core asks Autodesk about the status of the vulnerability report sent
on October 20th, 2009.
. 2009-10-27:
Autodesk acknowledges the communication indicating that the pertinent
Product Managers have been informed and are formulating a response.
. 2009-11-06:
Core notifies Autodesk about the missed deadline of November 2nd, 2009
and reuqests an status update. Publication of CORE-2009-0909 is
re-scheduled to November 16th, 2009 and is subject to change based on
concrete feedback from Autodesk.
. 2009-11-23:
Given the lack of response from Autodesk, Core decides to publish the
advisory CORE-2009-0909 as "user release".
9. *References*
[1] The author participated in Core Bugweek 2009 as member of the team
"Gimbal Lock N Load".
[2]
http://usa.autodesk.com/adsk/servlet/pc/index?id=13567410&siteID=123112
10. *About CoreLabs*
CoreLabs, the research center of Core Security Technologies, is
charged with anticipating the future needs and requirements for
information security technologies. We conduct our research in several
important areas of computer security including system vulnerabilities,
cyber attack planning and simulation, source code auditing, a
[Full-disclosure] CORE-2009-0908: Autodesk SoftImage Scene TOC Arbitrary Command Execution
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Core Security Technologies - CoreLabs Advisory http://www.coresecurity.com/corelabs/ Autodesk SoftImage Scene TOC Arbitrary Command Execution 1. *Advisory Information* Title: Autodesk SoftImage Scene TOC Arbitrary Command Execution Advisory Id: CORE-2009-0908 Advisory URL: http://www.coresecurity.com/content/softimage-arbitrary-command-execution Date published: 2009-11-23 Date of last update: 2009-11-20 Vendors contacted: Autodesk Release mode: User release 2. *Vulnerability Information* Class: Failure to Sanitize Data into a Different Plane [CWE-74] Impact: Code execution Remotely Exploitable: Yes Locally Exploitable: No Bugtraq ID: 36637 CVE Name: CVE-2009-3576 3. *Vulnerability Description* Autodesk Softimage [2] is a 3D computer graphics application for producing 3D computer graphics, 3D modeling, and computer animation. Autodesk Softimage by default saves a .scntoc file along with the scene content tree. The scene TOC (scene table of contents) is an XML-based file that contains scene information. When you open a scene file, Softimage looks for a corresponding scene TOC file and automatically reads and applies the information it contains. Scene TOC XML files can be modified to execute arbitrary commands without user intervention by design. An attacker can take full control of the machine where SoftImage is installed by sending a specially crafted scene package and enticing the user to open it. 4. *Vulnerable packages* . Autodesk Softimage 7.x . Autodesk Softimage XSI 6.x 5. *Vendor Information, Solutions and Workarounds* The vendor did not provide fixes or workaround information. You can disable the default reading of SCTOC script by following these steps: . Go to File > Preferences > Data Management > Files tab . Uncheck "Read scene TOC (Table of Contents) file on load". 6. *Credits* This vulnerability was discovered and researched by Diego Juarez, Fernando Arnaboldi and Federico Charosky from Core Security Technologies during Bugweek 2009 [1]. The publication of this advisory was coordinated by Fernando Russ from Core Security Advisories Team. 7. *Technical Description / Proof of Concept Code* Autodesk Softimage by default saves a .scntoc file along with the scene content tree. The scene TOC (scene table of contents) is an XML-based file that contains scene information. When you open a scene file, Softimage looks for a corresponding scene TOC file and automatically reads and applies the information it contains. One of the "benefits" of the TOC file is that you can edit it to run a script automatically after loading a scene without user intervention by default. As Proof of Concept we created a new project in Softimage, added some geometry, and saved it. Sure enough, along the .scn a .scntoc was created. We then proceeded to modify the XML like this: /- JScript - -/ 8. *Report Timeline* . 2009-08-25: Core Security Technologies ask the Autodesk Assistance Team for a security contact to report the vulnerability. . 2009-09-22: Core asks the Autodesk Assistance Team for a security contact to report the vulnerability. . 2009-10-09: Core contacts CERT to obtain security contact information for Autodesk. . 2009-10-16: CERT acknowledges the communication. . 2009-10-19: CERT sends their available contact information for Autodesk. . 2009-10-19: Core notifies Autodesk of the vulnerabilty report and announces its initial plan to publish the content on November 2nd, 2009. Core requests an acknoledgement within two working days and asks whehter the details should be sent encrypted or in plaintext. . 2009-10-19: Autodesk acknowledges the report and requests the information to be provided in encrypted form. . 2009-10-20: Core sends draft advisory and steps to reproduce the issue. . 2009-10-27: Core asks Autodesk about the status of the vulnerability report sent on October 20th, 2009. . 2009-10-27: Autodesk acknowledges the communication indicating that the pertinent Product Managers have been informed and are formulating a response. . 2009-11-06: Core notifies Autodesk about the missed deadline of November 2nd, 2009 and reuqests an status update. Publication of CORE-2009-0908 is re-scheduled to November 16th, 2009 and is subject to change based on concrete feedback from Autodesk. . 2009-11-23: Given the lack of response from Autodesk, Core decides to publish the advisory CORE-2009-0908 as "user release". 9. *References* [1] The authors participated in Core Bugweek 2009 as members of the team "Gimbal Lock N Load". [2] http://usa.autodesk.com/adsk/servlet/pc/index?siteID=123112&id=13571168 10. *About CoreLabs* CoreLabs, the research center of Core Security Technologies, is charged with anticipating the future needs and requirements for information security technologies. We conduct our research in several important areas of computer security includ
[Full-disclosure] [SECURITY] [DSA 1938-1] New php-mail packages fix insufficient input sanitising
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 - Debian Security Advisory DSA-1938-1 secur...@debian.org http://www.debian.org/security/ Steffen Joeris November 23, 2009 http://www.debian.org/security/faq - Package: php-mail Vulnerability : programming error Problem type : remote Debian-specific: no CVE Id : No CVE id yet It was discovered that php-mail, a PHP PEAR module for sending email, has insufficient input sanitising, which might be used to obtain sensitive data from the system that uses php-mail. For the stable distribution (lenny), this problem has been fixed in version 1.1.14-1+lenny1. For the oldstable distribution (etch), this problem has been fixed in version 1.1.6-2+etch1. For the testing distribution (squeeze), this problem will be fixed soon. For the unstable distribution (sid), this problem has been fixed in version 1.1.14-2. We recommend that you upgrade your php-mail packages. Upgrade instructions - wget url will fetch the file for you dpkg -i file.deb will install the referenced file. If you are using the apt-get package manager, use the line for sources.list as given below: apt-get update will update the internal database apt-get upgrade will install corrected packages You may use an automated update by adding the resources from the footer to the proper configuration. Debian GNU/Linux 4.0 alias etch - --- Debian (oldstable) - -- Oldstable updates are available for alpha, amd64, arm, hppa, i386, ia64, mips, mipsel, powerpc, s390 and sparc. Source archives: http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/php-mail/php-mail_1.1.6.orig.tar.gz Size/MD5 checksum:13702 47b38a06acdec73c4d8c01f9d7e5e8e2 http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/php-mail/php-mail_1.1.6-2+etch1.diff.gz Size/MD5 checksum: 3310 64425237844fed79a4b71aa34ccb0cee http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/php-mail/php-mail_1.1.6-2+etch1.dsc Size/MD5 checksum: 689 93c32b0cb655191ac6edb48013d18921 Architecture independent packages: http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/php-mail/php-mail_1.1.6-2+etch1_all.deb Size/MD5 checksum:17884 a2abda15da9ddab5f1590198cc852b3f Debian GNU/Linux 5.0 alias lenny - Debian (stable) - --- Stable updates are available for alpha, amd64, arm, armel, hppa, i386, ia64, mips, mipsel, powerpc, s390 and sparc. Source archives: http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/php-mail/php-mail_1.1.14-1+lenny1.dsc Size/MD5 checksum: 1258 6d361bf9406e9195813b4396bb7d5c13 http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/php-mail/php-mail_1.1.14.orig.tar.gz Size/MD5 checksum:17537 e50da58b6b787b3903ce4d07dc791bb2 http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/php-mail/php-mail_1.1.14-1+lenny1.diff.gz Size/MD5 checksum: 4105 a8154d9e86e98a591dfc9e84210ce163 Architecture independent packages: http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/php-mail/php-mail_1.1.14-1+lenny1_all.deb Size/MD5 checksum:21904 d5184514df44b348582071748e855c32 These files will probably be moved into the stable distribution on its next update. - - For apt-get: deb http://security.debian.org/ stable/updates main For dpkg-ftp: ftp://security.debian.org/debian-security dists/stable/updates/main Mailing list: debian-security-annou...@lists.debian.org Package info: `apt-cache show ' and http://packages.debian.org/ -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v1.4.10 (GNU/Linux) iEYEARECAAYFAksKPD4ACgkQ62zWxYk/rQelCQCfSj7eMrmJHQfKyjU3uQ3RVH89 8EwAnjtlML3vVJ0bh4icip/4NQWuRZHK =u2Qx -END PGP SIGNATURE- ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
Re: [Full-disclosure] Millions of PDF invisibly embedded with your internal disk paths
Hi Juha-Matti, Thanks for contributing to this thread. I did play a lot with the pdf queries and the simple query you mentioned gives many false positives (on google's first page, it gives 3 false positives and on bing's search, it completely fails). So, I would still advise to use "filetype:pdf file c (htm OR html OR mhtml)" (without quotes) which works well for both google and bing. Your suggestion to expand the query for further reconnaissance sounds very interesting. Like "winnt" dir is good to identify w2k/nt4 systems, "users" dir for vista/win7 and "documents and settings" for winxp, etc. E.g. query "filetype:pdf file c documents and settings (htm OR html OR mhtml)" without quotes. Cheers, Inferno -Original Message- From: full-disclosure-boun...@lists.grok.org.uk [mailto:full-disclosure-boun...@lists.grok.org.uk] On Behalf Of Juha-Matti Laurio Sent: Sunday, November 22, 2009 2:27 PM To: Inferno; full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Millions of PDF invisibly embedded with your internal disk paths The local path is being disclosed with a simple query too without putting .HTM/.MHT to the string: http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=filetype%3Apdf+file+c Another issue is the disclosure of user names - you can simply find the author's full name John Smith from the pdf document and see that his user name is josmith (C:\Documents and Settings\josmith\Desktop\Misc) By simply checking some documents from the same domain you'll see that this company's user names are in this format: John Smith - josmith Kate Allison - kaallis James L. Parker - jalpark (not real-life examples) And a query filetype:pdf file c winnt tells that a company is using W2K or NT4. Juha-Matti Inferno [infe...@securethoughts.com] kirjoitti: > Millions of PDF invisibly embedded with your internal disk paths > > > I found an interesting privacy issue while analyzing PDF files. This bug > occurs when you are using Internet Explorer to print locally saved web pages > as PDF and affects all IE versions including IE8. It does not matter which > PDF generation software you are using like Adobe Acrobat Professional, > CutePDF, PrimoPDF, etc as long as you are invoking it from inside the IE > print function. In Windows, even when your default browser is not IE and if > you right click a file to select the PRINT from the context menu, then by > default it invokes the IE print handler. So, you will still see this issue > in the generated PDF. > > This bug is NOT ABOUT the local disk path appearing in the FOOTER of your > pdf since it is clearly visible and already known by most people. This is > easy enough to hide by just going File -> Page Setup -> Change the Footer > value from URL to -Empty-. After doing that, you will not expect your > internal disk path being put anywhere else. However, that does not happen. > > The privacy issue arises from the fact that your local disk path gets > invisibly embedded inside your PDF in the title attribute. Only when you > open the file in an Editor like Notepad, you will see it. Currently, there > is no option in IE to disable it. The only workaround is to manually nullify > this value by editing the PDF file. Note that this problem does not occur > when using other browsers such as Firefox and Chrome. In fact, Chrome > handles the other footer issue intelligently as well by showing your disk > path as , rather than exposing it. > > Proof of Concept: > - > > Steps to reproduce: > --- > 1. Pick a .HTM or .HTML or .MHT file on your local computer. > 2. Open this file in IE and click Ctrl-P. > OR Right-click the file in explorer and select PRINT from context menu. > 4. Select any PDF writer as Printer such as Adobe PDF / CutePDF / PrimoPDF / > etc. > 5. Click Print. When the PDF writer asks for a filename, provide any name. > 6. Open the generated pdf in notepad, and search for file:// without > quotes. > > Search for this on your favorite search engine (Google/Bing) > > filetype:pdf file c (htm OR html OR mhtml) > > Google Search 1 (for drive C) > [http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=filetype%3Apdf+file+c+%28htm+OR+html+O > R+mhtml%29&btnG=Search&aq=f&oq=&aqi=] 4 million results > Google Search 2 (for drive D) > [http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=filetype%3Apdf+file+d+%28htm+OR+html+O > R+mhtml%29&btnG=Search&aq=f&oq=&aqi=] 13 million results > and so on . (I added till drive letter J and total was more than 50 > million .) > > So, out of 280 million pdfs accessible on the internet, more than 20% look > to be exposing internal disk paths which is a huge number. I have contacted > the Microsoft and Adobe Security Teams about this issue. Microsoft has plans > to fix this in IE9, while Adobe has opened the case but hasnt planned the > timelines yet. > > Examples: > http://www.eda.gov/PDF
