Re: [Full-disclosure] CCAvenue.com Payment Gateway Vulnerable SQL Injection UPDATE

2011-05-19 Thread webDEViL
Let's trust software from Microsoft or Apple.

On Thu, May 19, 2011 at 12:33 PM, David Blanc davidblanc1...@gmail.comwrote:

 On Sat, May 7, 2011 at 6:53 PM, Xa Buri xab...@yahoo.com wrote:
 
  So who finally did it and when? ispy or d3hydr8? and I still don't buy
 the
  whole SQL Injection theory. There is no proof. Looks more like an insider
  dump.
 

 Never trust an Indian software company.

 http://hackerstreet.in/item?id=6323

 http://blog.susam.in/2011/05/infosys-tcs-or-wipro.html

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Re: [Full-disclosure] CCAvenue.com Payment Gateway Vulnerable SQL Injection UPDATE

2011-05-19 Thread Vipul Agarwal
And let's trust HBGary.

On Thu, May 19, 2011 at 7:03 AM, David Blanc davidblanc1...@gmail.comwrote:

 On Sat, May 7, 2011 at 6:53 PM, Xa Buri xab...@yahoo.com wrote:
 
  So who finally did it and when? ispy or d3hydr8? and I still don't buy
 the
  whole SQL Injection theory. There is no proof. Looks more like an insider
  dump.
 

 Never trust an Indian software company.

 http://hackerstreet.in/item?id=6323

 http://blog.susam.in/2011/05/infosys-tcs-or-wipro.html

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-- 
Thanks and Regards,
Vipul Agarwal
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Re: [Full-disclosure] CCAvenue.com Payment Gateway Vulnerable SQLInjection UPDATE

2011-05-19 Thread w0lfd33m
Lol . 

David, security vulnerabilities are not related to hometown of the developer in 
anyways ;) 
 
Regards;
w0lf
www.maestro-sec.com
-- sent from BlackBerry --

-Original Message-
From: Vipul Agarwal vi...@nuttygeeks.com
Sender: full-disclosure-boun...@lists.grok.org.uk
Date: Thu, 19 May 2011 07:30:13 
To: David Blancdavidblanc1...@gmail.com
Cc: full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk
Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] CCAvenue.com Payment Gateway Vulnerable SQL
 Injection UPDATE

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Re: [Full-disclosure] CCAvenue.com Payment Gateway Vulnerable SQL Injection UPDATE

2011-05-19 Thread Jeffrey Walton
On Thu, May 19, 2011 at 3:30 AM, Vipul Agarwal vi...@nuttygeeks.com wrote:
 And let's trust HBGary.
:)

 On Thu, May 19, 2011 at 7:03 AM, David Blanc davidblanc1...@gmail.com
 wrote:

 On Sat, May 7, 2011 at 6:53 PM, Xa Buri xab...@yahoo.com wrote:
 
  So who finally did it and when? ispy or d3hydr8? and I still don't buy
  the
  whole SQL Injection theory. There is no proof. Looks more like an
  insider
  dump.
 

 Never trust an Indian software company.

 http://hackerstreet.in/item?id=6323

 http://blog.susam.in/2011/05/infosys-tcs-or-wipro.html


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Re: [Full-disclosure] CCAvenue.com Payment Gateway Vulnerable SQL Injection UPDATE

2011-05-19 Thread gold flake
 Never trust an Indian software company.

Sure, go ahead and trust the Pakis instead ;-)

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Re: [Full-disclosure] Linux kernel 2011 local root does it exist

2011-05-19 Thread Rove Monteux
Actually FreeBSD copyright protected its latest FreeBSD X, you can only
jailbreak OpenBSD now.

-Original Message-
From: root ro...@fibertel.com.ar
To: full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk
Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Linux kernel 2011 local root does it
exist
Date: Wed, 18 May 2011 14:59:28 -0300

You can only jailbreak FreeBSD devices.

On 05/18/2011 01:37 PM, Mario Vilas wrote:
 Hi, just a quick question, do those exploits you mention work in a
 jailbroken device? I'm running Linux Leopard lOS 4.3 on my iAndroid tablet.
 
 On Wed, May 18, 2011 at 11:41 AM, Joxean Koret joxeanko...@yahoo.es wrote:
 
 Sorry men, there is no exploit for Linux Kernel(TM) 2011. But you have
 exploits for Linux XP.

 I would like to know is there any local root exploit exist for linux
 kernel 2011 .

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-- 
Rove Monteux
Senior Systems Administrator

Twitter: @rovemonteux
PGP Key: http://mcaf.ee/daf29


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Re: [Full-disclosure] Google chrome sending strange DNS queries

2011-05-19 Thread Mario Vilas
http://isc.sans.org/diary.html?storyid=10312;

On Wed, May 18, 2011 at 11:07 PM, Eric dkn...@gmail.com wrote:

 Greetings,

 Has anyone ever noticed, the sort of DNS queries when you fire/running
 Google-chrome?
 The DNS queries for domain names likes:
 bsjghxplor
 hrrtjswxtt
 epjyptuure

 etc.

 Behavior has been observed on Linux as well as Windows systems.
 See the attached screenshot of wireshark dump.

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of the state, the other serves and protects the people. When the military
becomes both, then the enemies of the state tend to become the people.”
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[Full-disclosure] Any POC code for policykit root encapsulation

2011-05-19 Thread tehseen sagar

Greetings,
   Is there any POC code for root encapsulation for the following 
cvs .


https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=692922#c0

Looking forward for your kind response.

 Regards
   Net_Spy

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Re: [Full-disclosure] Linux kernel 2011 local root does it exist

2011-05-19 Thread baldr
On 19 May 2011 11:03, Rove Monteux rove.mont...@fluid-rock.com wrote:
 Actually FreeBSD copyright protected its latest FreeBSD X, you can only
 jailbreak OpenBSD now.
you can't jail break OpenBSD its secured by its pf (Proprietary
Firewall) and StrlCpy (Strong Trusted Registered License Copyright
Protection Yin)

ok i couldn't think of a good word for the Y

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Re: [Full-disclosure] Google chrome sending strange DNS queries

2011-05-19 Thread Sherwyn
Interesting I will have to test this one and see. I know recently someone did a 
writeup about Microsoft doing a similar phone home when you launch I.E  so it 
can verify you internet connection. 

http://blog.superuser.com/2011/05/16/windows-7-network-awareness/ 
Infolookup
http://infolookup.securegossip.com
www.twitter.com/infolookup


-Original Message-
From: Eric dkn...@gmail.com
Sender: full-disclosure-boun...@lists.grok.org.uk
Date: Thu, 19 May 2011 02:37:35 
To: full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk
Subject: [Full-disclosure] Google chrome sending strange DNS queries

Greetings,

Has anyone ever noticed, the sort of DNS queries when you fire/running
Google-chrome?
The DNS queries for domain names likes:
bsjghxplor
hrrtjswxtt
epjyptuure

etc.

Behavior has been observed on Linux as well as Windows systems.
See the attached screenshot of wireshark dump.


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Re: [Full-disclosure] MalBox Release! A Program Behavior Analysis System!

2011-05-19 Thread DFlower
Hi, everyone
We've published a whitepaper on Malbox's site, which will introduce 
Malbox's architecture and workflow. You can download it from 
http://malbox.xjtu.edu.cn.


 On Sat, May 14, 2011 at 10:55:30PM +0100, Chris M wrote:
 Not convinced.

 Tried to upload a few samples, only support EXE files  no DLLs? yet
 you take URLs? only to exes?

 The file I upped was a PE file. Just with a renamed extension.

 Also submitted a couple of known bad files and got a list of tcp ports
 back how is this operating? _SHARED_ sandbox?

 Whats it based on?

 More information would be appreciated :)

 -C
 I can still get HTTP 500 errors easily. That service is running vulnerable 
 version of Tomcat and still saying wrong TCP-connections with any scan 
 url/exe-sample. JS checks aren't done in backend.

 Best regards,
 Henri Salo

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Re: [Full-disclosure] Google chrome sending strange DNS queries

2011-05-19 Thread TAS
Start Chrome and start Wireshark. Apply the filter udp.port==5355

For Link Local Multicast Name Resolution protocol (LLMNR) protocol you
will similar output in wireshark.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Link-local_Multicast_Name_Resolution

This protocol was implemented Windows Vista onwards, so you should
this in Windows Server 2008 and Windows 7 as well.

-
TAS
http://twitter.com/p0wnsauc3




On 19 May 2011 17:50, Sherwyn infoloo...@gmail.com wrote:
 Interesting I will have to test this one and see. I know recently someone did 
 a writeup about Microsoft doing a similar phone home when you launch I.E  so 
 it can verify you internet connection.

 http://blog.superuser.com/2011/05/16/windows-7-network-awareness/
 Infolookup
 http://infolookup.securegossip.com
 www.twitter.com/infolookup


 -Original Message-
 From: Eric dkn...@gmail.com
 Sender: full-disclosure-boun...@lists.grok.org.uk
 Date: Thu, 19 May 2011 02:37:35
 To: full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk
 Subject: [Full-disclosure] Google chrome sending strange DNS queries

 Greetings,

 Has anyone ever noticed, the sort of DNS queries when you fire/running
 Google-chrome?
 The DNS queries for domain names likes:
 bsjghxplor
 hrrtjswxtt
 epjyptuure

 etc.

 Behavior has been observed on Linux as well as Windows systems.
 See the attached screenshot of wireshark dump.


 ___
 Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
 Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
 Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/


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[Full-disclosure] Ubuntu Security Notice publication update

2011-05-19 Thread Jamie Strandboge
Historically, Ubuntu sends Ubuntu Security Notices (USNs) to bugtraq,
full-disclosure and our own announce mailing list. After a recent review
of our publication process, we decided we will no longer post USNs to
bugtraq and full-disclosure.

People interested in receiving USNs by email should subscribe to the
ubuntu-security-announce mailing list directly:
https://lists.ubuntu.com/mailman/listinfo/ubuntu-security-announce

An archive of all USNs can be found at:
https://lists.ubuntu.com/archives/ubuntu-security-announce/

Alternatively, people can view USNs and subscribe to news feeds on our
website: http://www.ubuntu.com/usn/

-- 
Jamie Strandboge | http://www.canonical.com



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[Full-disclosure] New DDoS attack vector

2011-05-19 Thread minor float
Dear list readers, on today we officially published our observations
regarding the new attack vector of the DDoS against the DNS servers.

A full story can be read here http://www.zone-h.org/news/id/4739

Here is the excerpt.


The attack phases are as follows:

The attacker obtains the IP address /​host­name of the tar­get DNS server.

The attacker updates the NS records of the pre-​registered domain foo
-domain​.com with the IP address /​host­name of the tar­get DNS
server. Some reg­is­trars or host­ing providers do not pro­vide this
func­tion­al­ity, many other do. There are known host­ing com­pa­nies
and ISP that are sup­port­ing the spam [5]. After the NS records
update the attacker waits at least 24 hours until the new records are
prop­a­gated all over the Internet.
Now the attacker pre­pares a spam cam­paign. There are few aspects to
note: as first, the sender mail address for the MAIL FROM can con­tain
the same user name, but the sub­do­main — 3rd level domain must vary
per each spam mes­sage (for exam­ple first spam mes­sage has the
sender james@​subdom1​.​foo-​domain.​com but the sec­ond sender has to
be james@​subdom2​.​foo-​domain.​com).

The sec­ond impor­tant aspect is the selec­tion of the white horse
sys­tems. White horse sys­tems are the SMTP incom­ing mail servers
with a high bandwidth.

Once the spam cam­paign has been started to the white horse sys­tems
using the spam bot­net, these sys­tems check on the back­ground
whether the sender’s domain resolves to the domain MX or at least to
an A record. Since the NS record is set to the tar­get DNS server, the
DNS requests will be per­formed to the tar­get DNS server.

Tar­get DNS server receives mul­ti­ple reg­u­lar DNS requests for the
bogus sub­do­main records(note that in the pre­vi­ous Denial of
Ser­vice attacks against the DNS servers received either mal­formed,
frag­mented, ICMP mes­sages or TCP SYN, with invalid length, or
over­sized and some of these can be fil­tered by the fire­walls or
secu­rity appli­ances). Since the DNS server does not have the records
for the foo​-domain​.com, it has to respond neg­a­tively to the
request. If the spam cam­paign is suc­cess­ful, the white horse
sys­tems flood the DNS server with mul­ti­ple valid DNS requests.

Regards

Jakub Alimov [Seznam.cz]
minor [zone-h.org]

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Re: [Full-disclosure] CA20110420-02: Security Notice for CA Output Management Web Viewer

2011-05-19 Thread Williams, James K
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1

CA20110420-01: Security Notice for CA SiteMinder


Issued:  April 20, 2011
Updated:  May 19, 2011


CA Technologies support is alerting customers to a security risk 
associated with CA SiteMinder. A vulnerability exists that can allow a 
malicious user to impersonate another user.  CA Technologies has 
issued patches to address the vulnerability.

The vulnerability, CVE-2011-1718, is due to improper handling of 
multi-line headers. A malicious user can send specially crafted data 
to impersonate another user.


Risk Rating 

Medium


Platform 

Windows


Affected Products 

CA SiteMinder R6 IIS 6.0 Web Agents prior to R6 SP6 CR2
CA SiteMinder R12 IIS 6.0 Web Agents prior to R12 SP3 CR2


How to determine if the installation is affected 

Check the Web Agent log to obtain the installed release version. Note 
that the webagent.log file name is configurable by the SiteMinder 
administrator.


Solution

CA has issued patches to address the vulnerability.

CA SiteMinder R6:
Upgrade to R6 SP6 CR2 or later

CA SiteMinder R12: 
Upgrade to R12 SP3 CR2 or later

CR releases can be found on the CA SiteMinder Hotfix / Cumulative 
Release page:
(URL may wrap)
support.ca.com/irj/portal/anonymous/phpdocs?filePath=0/5262/5262_fixinde
x.h
tml


References

CVE-2011-1718 - CA SiteMinder Multi-line Header Vulnerability


Acknowledgement

April King (ap...@twoevils.org)


Change History

Version 1.0: Initial Release
Version 1.1: Updated Affected Products section to clarify that only 
 the IIS 6.0 Web Agents are affected.  ISS 7 is not 
 affected by this issue.


If additional information is required, please contact CA Technologies 
Support at https://support.ca.com.

If you discover a vulnerability in a CA Technologies product, please 
report your findings to the CA Technologies Product Vulnerability 
Response Team.
support.ca.com/irj/portal/anonymous/phpsupcontent?contentID=177782

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Re: [Full-disclosure] New DDoS attack vector

2011-05-19 Thread joris dedieu
2011/5/19 minor float minor.fl...@gmail.com

 Dear list readers, on today we officially published our observations
 regarding the new attack vector of the DDoS against the DNS servers.

 A full story can be read here http://www.zone-h.org/news/id/4739

 Here is the excerpt.


 The attack phases are as follows:

 The attacker obtains the IP address /​host­name of the tar­get DNS server.

 The attacker updates the NS records of the pre-​registered domain foo
 -domain​.com with the IP address /​host­name of the tar­get DNS
 server. Some reg­is­trars or host­ing providers do not pro­vide this
 func­tion­al­ity, many other do. There are known host­ing com­pa­nies
 and ISP that are sup­port­ing the spam [5]. After the NS records
 update the attacker waits at least 24 hours until the new records are
 prop­a­gated all over the Internet.


Note that it's not possible with several tld. Eg : fr  nic, afinc.net (and I
hope some other)
checks that an SOA record is present  (and much more. See
http://www.zonecheck.fr)
on the name server before updating NS records in the registry.

Now the attacker pre­pares a spam cam­paign. There are few aspects to
 note: as first, the sender mail address for the MAIL FROM can con­tain
 the same user name, but the sub­do­main — 3rd level domain must vary
 per each spam mes­sage (for exam­ple first spam mes­sage has the
 sender james@​subdom1​.​foo-​domain.​com but the sec­ond sender has to
 be james@​subdom2​.​foo-​domain.​com).

 The sec­ond impor­tant aspect is the selec­tion of the white horse
 sys­tems. White horse sys­tems are the SMTP incom­ing mail servers
 with a high bandwidth.

 Once the spam cam­paign has been started to the white horse sys­tems
 using the spam bot­net, these sys­tems check on the back­ground
 whether the sender’s domain resolves to the domain MX or at least to
 an A record. Since the NS record is set to the tar­get DNS server, the
 DNS requests will be per­formed to the tar­get DNS server.

 Tar­get DNS server receives mul­ti­ple reg­u­lar DNS requests for the
 bogus sub­do­main records(note that in the pre­vi­ous Denial of
 Ser­vice attacks against the DNS servers received either mal­formed,
 frag­mented, ICMP mes­sages or TCP SYN, with invalid length, or
 over­sized and some of these can be fil­tered by the fire­walls or
 secu­rity appli­ances). Since the DNS server does not have the records
 for the foo​-domain​.com, it has to respond neg­a­tively to the
 request. If the spam cam­paign is suc­cess­ful, the white horse
 sys­tems flood the DNS server with mul­ti­ple valid DNS requests.

 Regards

 Jakub Alimov [Seznam.cz]
 minor [zone-h.org]

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[Full-disclosure] [ MDVSA-2011:094 ] pure-ftpd

2011-05-19 Thread security
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1

 ___

 Mandriva Linux Security Advisory MDVSA-2011:094
 http://www.mandriva.com/security/
 ___

 Package : pure-ftpd
 Date: May 19, 2011
 Affected: 2009.0, 2010.1, Corporate 4.0, Enterprise Server 5.0
 ___

 Problem Description:

 A denial-of-service (DoS) attack related to glob brace expansion was
 discovered and fixed in pure-ftpd (CVE-2011-0418).
 
 Packages for 2009.0 are provided as of the Extended Maintenance
 Program. Please visit this link to learn more:
 http://store.mandriva.com/product_info.php?cPath=149amp;products_id=490
 
 The updated packages have been upgraded to the latest 1.0.32 version
 which is not vulnerable to this issue.
 ___

 References:

 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2011-0418
 http://www.pureftpd.org/project/pure-ftpd/news
 ___

 Updated Packages:

 Mandriva Linux 2009.0:
 2acd88195b55f8a53e0f22ccd5260c24  
2009.0/i586/pure-ftpd-1.0.32-0.1mdv2009.0.i586.rpm
 bfac76c40846a52ddf9b8a1abc5edf3c  
2009.0/i586/pure-ftpd-anon-upload-1.0.32-0.1mdv2009.0.i586.rpm
 b1e3fcd7ffa2259f02e186d4c5dc50a3  
2009.0/i586/pure-ftpd-anonymous-1.0.32-0.1mdv2009.0.i586.rpm 
 f58daf4b54a354e82a794d100d4781a6  
2009.0/SRPMS/pure-ftpd-1.0.32-0.1mdv2009.0.src.rpm

 Mandriva Linux 2009.0/X86_64:
 1ef86906a451c694bdba178f9371ff9d  
2009.0/x86_64/pure-ftpd-1.0.32-0.1mdv2009.0.x86_64.rpm
 4f68287740f187b37b3e7d5cf081e197  
2009.0/x86_64/pure-ftpd-anon-upload-1.0.32-0.1mdv2009.0.x86_64.rpm
 4b257580afe20999e43f34fa921d70d6  
2009.0/x86_64/pure-ftpd-anonymous-1.0.32-0.1mdv2009.0.x86_64.rpm 
 f58daf4b54a354e82a794d100d4781a6  
2009.0/SRPMS/pure-ftpd-1.0.32-0.1mdv2009.0.src.rpm

 Mandriva Linux 2010.1:
 ccc0647d427a31a103ca739d0ba20bfc  
2010.1/i586/pure-ftpd-1.0.32-0.1mdv2010.2.i586.rpm
 72642833bdcc96ce5facd5952b06066a  
2010.1/i586/pure-ftpd-anon-upload-1.0.32-0.1mdv2010.2.i586.rpm
 6e4956263a8655cc5403a8f5958019b1  
2010.1/i586/pure-ftpd-anonymous-1.0.32-0.1mdv2010.2.i586.rpm 
 ca752489c3af7bd14ab5b7d1c232e72f  
2010.1/SRPMS/pure-ftpd-1.0.32-0.1mdv2010.2.src.rpm

 Mandriva Linux 2010.1/X86_64:
 c3361b5b91ee6429933b70785eba5a80  
2010.1/x86_64/pure-ftpd-1.0.32-0.1mdv2010.2.x86_64.rpm
 1a11cce6839229c1f312f56c322ca615  
2010.1/x86_64/pure-ftpd-anon-upload-1.0.32-0.1mdv2010.2.x86_64.rpm
 ccdf372f525a69dca66ed58d1241dfa2  
2010.1/x86_64/pure-ftpd-anonymous-1.0.32-0.1mdv2010.2.x86_64.rpm 
 ca752489c3af7bd14ab5b7d1c232e72f  
2010.1/SRPMS/pure-ftpd-1.0.32-0.1mdv2010.2.src.rpm

 Corporate 4.0:
 0441583b4381e946911a13795b6edccf  
corporate/4.0/i586/pure-ftpd-1.0.32-0.1.20060mlcs4.i586.rpm
 375127a30296a60eac2152905412b798  
corporate/4.0/i586/pure-ftpd-anon-upload-1.0.32-0.1.20060mlcs4.i586.rpm
 38b01d4b3584d3995ca7790b25ccaae6  
corporate/4.0/i586/pure-ftpd-anonymous-1.0.32-0.1.20060mlcs4.i586.rpm 
 dc7cec35f7bbb78c15ef04dc617a9c8a  
corporate/4.0/SRPMS/pure-ftpd-1.0.32-0.1.20060mlcs4.src.rpm

 Corporate 4.0/X86_64:
 58de36c82139959d006fe0892f66d696  
corporate/4.0/x86_64/pure-ftpd-1.0.32-0.1.20060mlcs4.x86_64.rpm
 42f29b1fd2b858908e10ffd5bcd07247  
corporate/4.0/x86_64/pure-ftpd-anon-upload-1.0.32-0.1.20060mlcs4.x86_64.rpm
 6bad2661dd405402bd966222fdaec9e0  
corporate/4.0/x86_64/pure-ftpd-anonymous-1.0.32-0.1.20060mlcs4.x86_64.rpm 
 dc7cec35f7bbb78c15ef04dc617a9c8a  
corporate/4.0/SRPMS/pure-ftpd-1.0.32-0.1.20060mlcs4.src.rpm

 Mandriva Enterprise Server 5:
 ead5a422b7e60c1af65a81c53b618260  
mes5/i586/pure-ftpd-1.0.32-0.1mdvmes5.2.i586.rpm
 ccc02756eb2130f16967487916cef75f  
mes5/i586/pure-ftpd-anon-upload-1.0.32-0.1mdvmes5.2.i586.rpm
 aca8ae84abda72076ee40a99e1d145ad  
mes5/i586/pure-ftpd-anonymous-1.0.32-0.1mdvmes5.2.i586.rpm 
 f9015d52a7cb03280973a24874bf6267  
mes5/SRPMS/pure-ftpd-1.0.32-0.1mdvmes5.2.src.rpm

 Mandriva Enterprise Server 5/X86_64:
 641b2ef9d80017720523e3102ca2b78c  
mes5/x86_64/pure-ftpd-1.0.32-0.1mdvmes5.2.x86_64.rpm
 5109cfc4c1747e0834fa47bb37269bf3  
mes5/x86_64/pure-ftpd-anon-upload-1.0.32-0.1mdvmes5.2.x86_64.rpm
 8baf20ef3e7b2b730e76d9310d8b8c09  
mes5/x86_64/pure-ftpd-anonymous-1.0.32-0.1mdvmes5.2.x86_64.rpm 
 f9015d52a7cb03280973a24874bf6267  
mes5/SRPMS/pure-ftpd-1.0.32-0.1mdvmes5.2.src.rpm
 ___

 To upgrade automatically use MandrivaUpdate or urpmi.  The verification
 of md5 checksums and GPG signatures is performed automatically for you.

 All packages are signed by Mandriva for security.  You can obtain the
 GPG public key of the Mandriva Security Team by executing:

  gpg --recv-keys --keyserver pgp.mit.edu 0x22458A98

 You can view other update advisories for Mandriva Linux at:

  

[Full-disclosure] [SECURITY] [DSA 2238-1] vino security update

2011-05-19 Thread Moritz Muehlenhoff
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1

- -
Debian Security Advisory DSA-2238-1   secur...@debian.org
http://www.debian.org/security/Moritz Muehlenhoff
May 19, 2011   http://www.debian.org/security/faq
- -

Package: vino
Vulnerability  : several
Problem type   : remote
Debian-specific: no
CVE ID : CVE-2011-0904 CVE-2011-0905 

Kevin Chen discovered that incorrect processing of framebuffer requests 
in the Vino VNC server could lead to denial of service.

For the stable distribution (squeeze), this problem has been fixed in
version 2.28.2-2+squeeze1.

For the unstable distribution (sid), this problem has been fixed in
version 2.28.2-3.

We recommend that you upgrade your vino packages.

Further information about Debian Security Advisories, how to apply
these updates to your system and frequently asked questions can be
found at: http://www.debian.org/security/

Mailing list: debian-security-annou...@lists.debian.org
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (GNU/Linux)

iEYEARECAAYFAk3VYqUACgkQXm3vHE4uylpk2wCeITfrImq2r8pBuEPA5+7uH/9S
3b4AoKgMcCz2JPsMOMyItXGJEL9OWSQt
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Re: [Full-disclosure] CCAvenue.com Payment Gateway Vulnerable SQL Injection UPDATE

2011-05-19 Thread nix
 Never trust an Indian software company.

 Sure, go ahead and trust the Pakis instead ;-)


What's wrong with those countries? I've seen users from the both countries
advertising services with words such as leading, professional and when
we look at their contact emails, we'll find peng...@gmail.com etc. ;)

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Re: [Full-disclosure] New DDoS attack vector

2011-05-19 Thread Dobbins, Roland
On May 19, 2011, at 9:44 PM, minor float wrote:

 Dear list readers, on today we officially published our observations 
 regarding the new attack vector of the DDoS against the DNS servers.


Filtering out the bogus DNS queries generated by the MX-record lookups is 
pretty trivial with modern intelligent DDoS mitigation systems (IDMS).

The assertion that 'previous Denial of Service attacks against the DNS servers 
received either malformed, fragmented, ICMP messages or TCP SYN, with invalid 
length, or oversized and some of these can be filtered by the firewalls or 
security appliances' is demonstrably false.  DNS servers have been targeted by 
bogus queries intended to exhaust the DNS server resources directly, or via 
spoofed queries which are intended to generate reflection/amplification 
attacks, but which also have a deleterious effect on the performance of the 
abused open recursors, for many years.

The posited scenario is unnecessarily complex.  It's a heck of a lot easier to 
simply bombard targeted authoritative DNS servers with spoofed bogus queries 
from botnets and/or hit them with reflection/amplification attacks, rather than 
go through this elaborate steps of registering a domain, pointing the NS/MX 
records at the target, then generating lots of spam.

The proximate attack method described - layer-7 DDoS via excessive queries - 
isn't new or unique, and the NS-record-related steps are unnecessary.  There's 
simply no need to go to this amount of trouble to launch a DDoS attack against 
authoritative DNS servers, nor is such an attack as difficult to defend against 
as is claimed in the write-up, meaning that this attack methodology has no 
unique advantages to justify the extra steps regarding re-targeting NS/MX 
records and spam generation.

---
Roland Dobbins rdobb...@arbor.net // http://www.arbornetworks.com

The basis of optimism is sheer terror.

  -- Oscar Wilde

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