Re: [Full-disclosure] Linux - Indicators of compromise
On Wed, Jul 18, 2012 at 3:18 AM, Giles Coochey gi...@coochey.net wrote: Is you have much more to worry than is ICMP/GRE tunnels. Is I send to Broadcast and I am is on your network, how do you is plan to pinpoint who I am when is everyone see broadcast By your source MAC address -- Regards, Really? I am so glad your company is has you for security. So a message is broadcast to everyone. Everyone on say is /21 is listen and you is going to pick me out, out of is everyone else who is listen? Genius! Nobel Prize A+++ number one is seller! Is not only is idea you mention genius, is good that no one can is change their MAC address! Is proof MusntLive must go back is study CISSP and now is CCNA ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
Re: [Full-disclosure] Linux - Indicators of compromise
On Wed, Jul 18, 2012 at 8:30 AM, alex f...@daloo.de wrote: Source MAC faking would result in switchport shutdown in some environments. Further you cannot communicate with outside world using broadcasts. ICMP payloads is quite common and hard to detect. Me study CISSP, too. Already CCNA Security. CCNA not worth the money. Better get CISA/CISM. You miss point. If I sent data to broadcast, original poster is say: I will know who you are via MAC address to which I say: You is need to go back to Cisco bootcamp Everyone is receive broadcast, no way for him to detect who I am since I am is not alone in receiving the broadcast. Needle in is haystack. Second, ICMP tunneling, GRE tunneling is too much trouble. Advanced Persistent Threats as defined by (is now give North Korean title to him) Super Grand Master of the Internet Universe Richard Bejtlich as advanced and is persistent. But is also stupid and lazy. Will not waste time on this is vector. Will use SSL and HTTP to is stay under radar. Attacker Own is your data post data in $WBEDIR visit $WEBDIR using proxy [small packets] Is how else can attacker download 867 terabytes of data (http://www.eddupdate.com/2012/02/cyberthieves-stole-867-terabytes-in-2011.html)? You believe attackers is using FTP, ICMP, GRE tunnels? No. Too noisy is this. Better to visit website like everyone else use proxy of another country, this is country take blame. MusntLive use is never use 213.24.76.77 address use proxy 210.75.193.49 download data \ Supreme Grand Master of Internet Universe analyze see proxy chant APT APT APT See I told you is China \ Fox News report on Chinese threat \ MusntLive facepalm at report and go back is drink Stoli CISA/CISM is have nothing on InfoSecInstitute! ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
Re: [Full-disclosure] how i stopped worrying and loved the backdoor
On Fri, Dec 24, 2010 at 5:08 PM, Dan Kaminsky d...@doxpara.com wrote: ... Don't we have hardware RNG in most motherboard chipsets nowadays? clearly not enough of them! 'Mining Your Ps and Qs: Detection of Widespread Weak Keys in Network Devices' https://factorable.net/weakkeys12.extended.pdf RSA and DSA can fail catastrophically when used with malfunctioning random number generators, but the extent to which these problems arise in practice has never been comprehensively studied at Internet scale. We perform the largest ever network survey of TLS and SSH servers and present evidence that vulnerable keys are surprisingly widespread. We find that 0.75% of TLS certificates share keys due to insufficient entropy during key generation, and we suspect that another 1.70% come from the same faulty implementations and may be susceptible to compromise. Even more alarmingly, we are able to obtain RSA private keys for 0.50% of TLS hosts and 0.03% of SSH hosts, because their public keys shared nontrivial common factors due to entropy problems, and DSA private keys for 1.03% of SSH hosts, because of insufficient signature randomness. We cluster and investigate the vulnerable hosts, finding that the vast majority appear to be headless or embedded devices. infosec comedy gold :P ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
[Full-disclosure] ZDI-12-126 : (0 day) HP StorageWorks File Migration Agent RsaCIFS.dll Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 ZDI-12-126 : (0 day) HP StorageWorks File Migration Agent RsaCIFS.dll Remote Code Execution Vulnerability http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-12-126 July 18, 2012 - -- CVE ID: - -- CVSS: 10, AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C - -- Affected Vendors: Hewlett-Packard - -- Affected Products: Hewlett-Packard StorageWorks - -- TippingPoint(TM) IPS Customer Protection: TippingPoint IPS customers have been protected against this vulnerability by Digital Vaccine protection filter ID 12455. For further product information on the TippingPoint IPS, visit: http://www.tippingpoint.com - -- Vulnerability Details: This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on vulnerable installations of HP StorageWorks File Migration Agent. Authentication is not required to exploit this vulnerability. The specific flaw exists within the HsmCfgSvc.exe service which listens by default on TCP port 9111. When processing CIFS archives the process does not properly validate the size of the archive name and proceeds to copy the string into a fixed-length buffer on the stack. This can be exploited to execute arbitrary remote code under the context of the running service. - -- Vendor Response: Hewlett-Packard states: The overall design of the File Migration Agent (FMA) assumes it runs as an application on a Windows server. Given the stated purpose of FMA, and the nature of the vulnerability, the only salient mitigation strategy is to restrict interaction with the service to trusted machines. Only the clients and servers that have a legitimate procedural relationship with the HP StorageWorks File Migration Agent should be permitted to communicate with it. This could be accomplished in a number of ways, most notably with firewall rules/whitelisting. These features are available in the native Windows Firewall, as described in http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc725770%28WS.10%29.aspx and numerous other Microsoft Knowledge Base articles. - -- Disclosure Timeline: 2011-04-11 - Vulnerability reported to vendor 2012-07-18 - 0-Day advisory released - -- Credit: This vulnerability was discovered by: * AbdulAziz Hariri - -- About the Zero Day Initiative (ZDI): Established by TippingPoint, The Zero Day Initiative (ZDI) represents a best-of-breed model for rewarding security researchers for responsibly disclosing discovered vulnerabilities. Researchers interested in getting paid for their security research through the ZDI can find more information and sign-up at: http://www.zerodayinitiative.com The ZDI is unique in how the acquired vulnerability information is used. TippingPoint does not re-sell the vulnerability details or any exploit code. Instead, upon notifying the affected product vendor, TippingPoint provides its customers with zero day protection through its intrusion prevention technology. Explicit details regarding the specifics of the vulnerability are not exposed to any parties until an official vendor patch is publicly available. Furthermore, with the altruistic aim of helping to secure a broader user base, TippingPoint provides this vulnerability information confidentially to security vendors (including competitors) who have a vulnerability protection or mitigation product. Our vulnerability disclosure policy is available online at: http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/disclosure_policy/ Follow the ZDI on Twitter: http://twitter.com/thezdi -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: PGP Desktop 10.2.0 (Build 1950) Charset: utf-8 wsBVAwUBUAcgc1VtgMGTo1scAQJnNQf/eoP1MhV/r6rMOagx7Vvbitd6oUOwF8Ic 4OdBpfRb5gJuybjzPWt1dYbzynvNcnzgNnWUcIIkYNG3cAS+dlHm8scrXkoFdEXR r6QsQTMN5KkpGUZn9z5k4fWQbS1KybAS2VUycxS3LYhNY2YnpPkXHhhWTELuDJBK z6XFv6rD/ZWxEanpFOUb1kPFkapl7S2wY+DA6GOn/2tUPTpjevjBdtNhCsegUBRt HG6KQeWcvSsiSfYXiMCBCtIuO4YzddS18N365HS+xfLYnNISHQqHu5Q2H4AZOPm1 VEXQC+V3OTRUGSxSpgd0imwvpYrmenrOhQIWDd9kE6qV5N19r6HJ+w== =AVh6 -END PGP SIGNATURE- ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
[Full-disclosure] ZDI-12-127 : (0Day) HP StorageWorks File Migration Agent RsaFTP.dll Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 ZDI-12-127 : (0Day) HP StorageWorks File Migration Agent RsaFTP.dll Remote Code Execution Vulnerability http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-12-127 July 18, 2012 - -- CVE ID: - -- CVSS: 10, AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C - -- Affected Vendors: Hewlett-Packard - -- Affected Products: Hewlett-Packard StorageWorks - -- TippingPoint(TM) IPS Customer Protection: TippingPoint IPS customers have been protected against this vulnerability by Digital Vaccine protection filter ID 11980. For further product information on the TippingPoint IPS, visit: http://www.tippingpoint.com - -- Vulnerability Details: This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on vulnerable installations of HP StorageWorks File Migration Agent. Authentication is not required to exploit this vulnerability. The specific flaw exists within the HsmCfgSvc.exe service which listens by default on TCP port 9111. When processing FTP archives the process does not properly validate the size of the root path specified and proceeds to copy the string into a fixed-length buffer on the stack. This can be exploited to execute arbitrary remote code under the context of the running service. - -- Vendor Response: Hewlett-Packard states: The overall design of the File Migration Agent (FMA) assumes it runs as an application on a Windows server. Given the stated purpose of FMA, and the nature of the vulnerability, the only salient mitigation strategy is to restrict interaction with the service to trusted machines. Only the clients and servers that have a legitimate procedural relationship with the HP StorageWorks File Migration Agent should be permitted to communicate with it. This could be accomplished in a number of ways, most notably with firewall rules/whitelisting. These features are available in the native Windows Firewall, as described in http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc725770%28WS.10%29.aspx and numerous other Microsoft Knowledge Base articles. - -- Disclosure Timeline: 2011-04-11 - Vulnerability reported to vendor 2012-07-18 - 0-Day advisory release - -- Credit: This vulnerability was discovered by: * AbdulAziz Hariri - -- About the Zero Day Initiative (ZDI): Established by TippingPoint, The Zero Day Initiative (ZDI) represents a best-of-breed model for rewarding security researchers for responsibly disclosing discovered vulnerabilities. Researchers interested in getting paid for their security research through the ZDI can find more information and sign-up at: http://www.zerodayinitiative.com The ZDI is unique in how the acquired vulnerability information is used. TippingPoint does not re-sell the vulnerability details or any exploit code. Instead, upon notifying the affected product vendor, TippingPoint provides its customers with zero day protection through its intrusion prevention technology. Explicit details regarding the specifics of the vulnerability are not exposed to any parties until an official vendor patch is publicly available. Furthermore, with the altruistic aim of helping to secure a broader user base, TippingPoint provides this vulnerability information confidentially to security vendors (including competitors) who have a vulnerability protection or mitigation product. Our vulnerability disclosure policy is available online at: http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/disclosure_policy/ Follow the ZDI on Twitter: http://twitter.com/thezdi -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: PGP Desktop 10.2.0 (Build 1950) Charset: utf-8 wsBVAwUBUAch11VtgMGTo1scAQI4tgf/TvzF7WYWTvUBbsmAW+9Z29M+RCnGhotX 2j3Q1aV+yfTQqGDkpgRxgv2O44iMiVEDuivykmtSklgyIQY/+EX+O/HoH5kcIpwj pXMuk6NgE4QPuAmB4zOl0HqQG6XHx11ARLny87w0YTbxoBD1wY3QaDJgiMDERgKj Cl2p7NhHL2d0pygVdAwAnR7npAVKw0XU+JivLSuOa86JVV+S92Z9ghl0vAUOpm0W ltpS6evJXjSGgaB+2lluDxsJ62RLQbfOe5yTuZJeGdRXchlj9ZhudaiH50HSGtFS Bwyon3JMABl4yxlA3nqZol5krwzUrMEIUBRwEteOWmNz65xVbA== =9p95 -END PGP SIGNATURE- ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
