Re: [Full-disclosure] ZDI-08-088: Oracle E-Business Suite Self-Service Web Applications SQL Injection Vulnerability
The Zero Day Initiative advisory ZDI-08-088 has several inaccuracies. Oracle actually fixed this vulnerability as part of the April 2007 Critical Patch Update and subsequently in ATG_PF.H RUP5 and later. The vulnerability is a serious SQL injection bug in a Self-Service Web Application database package that is called and accessible through mod_plsql. Mod_plsql is an Apache module and part of an Oracle web framework which allows database packages to dynamically generate web pages. The vulnerable schema.package.procedure name is APPS.ICXSUPWF.DISPLAYCONTACTS and all versions 115.6 and prior are vulnerable. When creating intrusion detection/prevention rules for this vulnerability, the URL will normally only include the package/procedure name ICXSUPWF.DISPLAYCONTACTS and mod_plsql URLs are case-insensitive. This URL is normally blocked by the Oracle E-Business Suite 11i URL Firewall and should not be externally accessible. Original Oracle Advisory: Oracle Critical Patch Update April 2007 - APPS01 CVE Name: CVE-2007-2126 Affected Product and Versions: Oracle E-Business Suite 11.5.1 through 11.5.10.2 (CU2) Affected Oracle E-Business Suite Modules: Application Object Library (FND)/Self-Service Web Applications (ICX) Patch Availability: 11.5.1 - 11.5.6 - No patches are available for unsupported versions of the Oracle E-Business Suite 11.5.7 - 11.5.10.2 with ATG_PF.H RUP4 or prior - 5893391 11.5.9 - 11.5.10.2 with ATG_PF.H RUP5 or higher - No patch required as this fix was included in RUP5 and higher Additional information on the Oracle Critical Patch Update April 2007 and the impact on the Oracle E-Business Suite 11i is available at - http://www.integrigy.com/Integrigy_Oracle_CPU_April_2007_Analysis.pdf Vulnerability anthropologists may be interested in the fact that this vulnerability has existed since at least September 1999 and likely was introduced several years earlier with the release of Oracle Applications 11.0. Oracle fixed this bug in less than 2 months by simply stubbing the procedure - clearly this was old code not used anymore by the application. I wonder how much first generation web application code exists in the world that is still accessible but automated scanning tools miss since it is not directly accessible through a link? -Original Message- From: full-disclosure-boun...@lists.grok.org.uk [mailto:full-disclosure-boun...@lists.grok.org.uk] On Behalf Of zdi-disclosu...@3com.com Sent: Tuesday, December 16, 2008 2:14 PM To: full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk; bugt...@securityfocus.com Subject: [Full-disclosure] ZDI-08-088: Oracle E-Business Suite Business Intelligence SQL Injection Vulnerability ZDI-08-088: Oracle E-Business Suite Business Intelligence SQL Injection Vulnerability http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-08-088 December 16, 2008 -- Affected Vendors: Oracle -- Affected Products: Oracle Database Server -- TippingPoint(TM) IPS Customer Protection: TippingPoint IPS customers have been protected against this vulnerability by Digital Vaccine protection filter ID 4921. For further product information on the TippingPoint IPS, visit: http://www.tippingpoint.com -- Vulnerability Details: This vulnerability allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary SQL on vulnerable installations of Oracle E-Business Suite Business Intelligence. Authentication is not required to exploit this vulnerability. The specific flaw exists in the APPS.ICXSUPWF.DisplayContacts package. The procedure fails to validate the contents of a WHERE clause containing user-suppled input. This allows an attacker to execute arbitrary SQL statements in the context of the APPS user. -- Vendor Response: Oracle has issued an update to correct this vulnerability. More details can be found at: http://www.oracle.com/technology/deploy/security/critical-patch-updates/cpua pr2008.html -- Disclosure Timeline: 2007-01-29 - Vulnerability reported to vendor 2008-12-16 - Coordinated public release of advisory -- Credit: This vulnerability was discovered by: * Joxean Koret -- About the Zero Day Initiative (ZDI): Established by TippingPoint, The Zero Day Initiative (ZDI) represents a best-of-breed model for rewarding security researchers for responsibly disclosing discovered vulnerabilities. Researchers interested in getting paid for their security research through the ZDI can find more information and sign-up at: http://www.zerodayinitiative.com The ZDI is unique in how the acquired vulnerability information is used. TippingPoint does not re-sell the vulnerability details or any exploit code. Instead, upon notifying the affected product vendor, TippingPoint provides its customers with zero day protection through its intrusion prevention technology. Explicit details regarding the specifics of the vulnerability are not exposed to any parties until an official vendor patch is publicly available. Furthermore, with the altruistic aim of helping to secure a broader user base, TippingPoint
[Full-disclosure] Oracle Jinitiator 1.1.8 Vulnerabilities CVE-2007-4467 - Additional Information
US-CERT released an advisory on August 28, 2007 regarding multiple stack buffer overflows in the Oracle Jinitiator product (Vulnerability Note VU#474433/CVE-2007-4467). Due to limited public technical information on Jinitiator, no access to the Oracle support website, and maybe lack of cooperation from Oracle itself, the information released by US-CERT is incomplete as to the true scope of vulnerable Jinitiator versions, does not identify all vulnerable Jinitiator installs, and has only limited remediation steps. All released Jinitiator 1.1.8 versions from 1.1.8.3 to 1.1.8.25 contain the buffer overflows in the Jinitiator ActiveX control - the US-CERT advisory only identifies versions through 1.1.8.16 as vulnerable. Each Jinitiator 1.1.8 version install uses a separate Microsoft Windows CLSID for the vulnerable ActiveX control to allow for multiple versions to co-exist, therefore, 15 CLSIDs must be used to disable/identify the vulnerable ActiveX controls rather than the single CLSID identified in the original advisory. In addition to disabling and uninstalling the vulnerable Jinitiator software, applications currently using vulnerable Jinitiator versions must be upgraded to use version 1.3.x which may also require upgrading the Oracle Forms software running on the server. It is important to note that each Jinitiator version (1.1.8.x) is a separate installation and there could be theoretically as many as 15 versions of Jinitiator 1.1.8 simultaneously installed on a client PC, even though only one or two versions are currently being used. Oracle Jinitiator is used by many Oracle Forms applications including mission-critical applications like Oracle E-Business Suite 11i, Oracle Clinical (RDC), Retek/Oracle Retail, Sungard Banner, and i-flex FLEXCUBE. Any client PC that has accessed an Oracle Forms application may have one or more vulnerable Jinitiator versions installed, since obsolete versions are never overwritten or uninstalled. Integrigy has released a detailed analysis of these vulnerabilities to provide additional information and comprehensive remediation steps. The analysis can be downloaded from - http://www.integrigy.com/security-resources/analysis/integrigy-oracle-jiniti ator-vulnerability.pdf ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
[Full-disclosure] Oracle E-Business Suite Vulnerability Information April 2007
Integrigy has released additional information on the Oracle E-Business Suite 11i and R12 security vulnerabilities in the April 2007 Oracle Critical Patch Update. This analysis includes details (type, impact, etc.) regarding the vulnerabilities, a review of the required patches, and advice on applying the 6-10 required patches in a timely manner. http://www.integrigy.com/Oracle_CPU_April_2007.pdf Based on our discussions with clients, there seems to be continuing confusion regarding the versions (i.e., patch sets) required to apply the security patches. Oracle's policy is simple - Oracle only supports the 2 most recent patch sets that have been released in the past 12 months for the Oracle Database and Oracle Application Server. There are some exceptions to policy based on operating system support and other product dependencies. To highlight the differences between certified versions and versions supported in the April 2007 CPU we have released the following - http://www.integrigy.com/security-resources/analysis/Oracle-CPU-Support-Matr ix-April-2007.pdf ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
[Full-disclosure] Evading Oracle Database IDS and Auditing Solutions
More and more Oracle Database customers are implementing IDS and auditing solutions to satisfy legislative requirements like SOX and HIPAA. Often these tools are implemented with little testing or awareness that there are potentially multiple techniques that can easily be used to evade these solutions. To highlight this issue, Integrigy has developed a short paper on the topic to help people evaluate the effectiveness of their Oracle IDS implementations. The paper focuses on Snort and signature based products, but should be applicable to other types of IDS and Oracle specific solutions. This paper expands on three evasion techniques previously described by Joxean Koret in his paper Oracle Database IDS Evasion Techniques for SQL*Net with a number of new techniques and some variations on Joxean's techniques. Joxean's paper can be found at - http://archives.neohapsis.com/archives/fulldisclosure/2006-08/0593.html The Integrigy whitepaper can be found at - http://www.integrigy.com/security-resources/whitepapers/evade-oracle-ids Hope this helps. Stephen Kost - Integrigy ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
