Re: [Full-disclosure] [Professional IT Security Providers - Exposed] QuietMove ( D - )

2008-01-01 Thread Jeffrey Denton
On Jan 1, 2008 7:33 PM, reepex [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

 http://www.tssci-security.com/bookshelf/

 Is this list up to date?  It makes it seem as if you are learning basic
 linux commands, sed, and basic perl. Also why are you reading operating
 system design and implementation when you do not know C? ( Seeing as C books
 are in your 'to-read' list ).

The C programming book listed on the bookshelf has be given a Not
Recommended review by the ACCU.

___
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/


Re: [Full-disclosure] [+] Vulnerability in less version 394 and prior

2007-10-31 Thread Jeffrey Denton
On 10/31/07, glopeda. com [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 Application: less 394 and prior
 Type: Format strings vulnerability
 Priority: Low

 Meager demonstration:
 $ export LESSOPEN=%s%n
 $ less somefile
 Segmentation fault
 $

Interesting...

$ echo $LESSOPEN
|lesspipe.sh %s
$ export LESSOPEN=%s%n
$ less iptraf.txt
/bin/bash: ./iptraf.txt: Permission denied
: No such file or directory
$ less --version
less 394
Copyright (C) 1984-2005 Mark Nudelman

less comes with NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.
For information about the terms of redistribution,
see the file named README in the less distribution.
Homepage: http://www.greenwoodsoftware.com/less
$ id
uid=1000(dentonj) gid=100(users)
groups=11(floppy),17(audio),18(video),19(cdrom),83(plugdev),100(users)
$ ls -l iptraf.txt
-rw-r--r-- 1 dentonj users 300 2007-10-25 08:04 iptraf.txt
$ echo $LESSOPEN
%s%n
$ cat /etc/slackware-version
Slackware 12.0.0

$ strace /usr/bin/less iptraf.txt
execve(/usr/bin/less, [/usr/bin/less, iptraf.txt], [/* 47 vars */]) = 0
brk(0)  = 0x8065000
mmap2(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1,
0) = 0xb7efb000
access(/etc/ld.so.preload, R_OK)  = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory)
open(/etc/ld.so.cache, O_RDONLY)  = 3
fstat64(3, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=111039, ...}) = 0
mmap2(NULL, 111039, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, 3, 0) = 0xb7edf000
close(3)= 0
open(/lib/libncursesw.so.5, O_RDONLY) = 3
read(3, \177ELF\1\1\1\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\3\0\3\0\1\0\0\0\20\352..., 512) = 512
fstat64(3, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0755, st_size=309276, ...}) = 0
mmap2(NULL, 311172, PROT_READ|PROT_EXEC, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_DENYWRITE, 3,
0) = 0xb7e93000
mmap2(0xb7ed7000, 32768, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE,
MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_FIXED|MAP_DENYWRITE, 3, 0x43) = 0xb7ed7000
close(3)= 0
open(/lib/libc.so.6, O_RDONLY)= 3
read(3, [EMAIL PROTECTED]..., 512) = 512
fstat64(3, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0755, st_size=1528742, ...}) = 0
mmap2(NULL, 1316260, PROT_READ|PROT_EXEC, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_DENYWRITE,
3, 0) = 0xb7d51000
mmap2(0xb7e8d000, 12288, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE,
MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_FIXED|MAP_DENYWRITE, 3, 0x13c) = 0xb7e8d000
mmap2(0xb7e9, 9636, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE,
MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_FIXED|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0) = 0xb7e9
close(3)= 0
open(/lib/libdl.so.2, O_RDONLY)   = 3
read(3, \177ELF\1\1\1\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\3\0\3\0\1\0\0\0P\n\0\000...,
512) = 512
fstat64(3, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0755, st_size=13506, ...}) = 0
mmap2(NULL, 12412, PROT_READ|PROT_EXEC, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_DENYWRITE, 3,
0) = 0xb7d4d000
mmap2(0xb7d4f000, 8192, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE,
MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_FIXED|MAP_DENYWRITE, 3, 0x1) = 0xb7d4f000
close(3)= 0
mmap2(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1,
0) = 0xb7d4c000
set_thread_area({entry_number:-1 - 6, base_addr:0xb7d4c8d0,
limit:1048575, seg_32bit:1, contents:0, read_exec_only:0,
limit_in_pages:1, seg_not_present:0, useable:1}) = 0
mprotect(0xb7e8d000, 4096, PROT_READ)   = 0
munmap(0xb7edf000, 111039)  = 0
ioctl(1, SNDCTL_TMR_TIMEBASE or TCGETS, {B38400 opost isig icanon echo ...}) = 0
ioctl(1, SNDCTL_TMR_TIMEBASE or TCGETS, {B38400 opost isig icanon echo ...}) = 0
brk(0)  = 0x8065000
brk(0x8086000)  = 0x8086000
stat64(/home/dentonj/.terminfo, 0xbfc67624) = -1 ENOENT (No such
file or directory)
stat64(/usr/share/terminfo, {st_mode=S_IFDIR|0755, st_size=4096, ...}) = 0
access(/usr/share/terminfo/x/xterm, R_OK) = 0
open(/usr/share/terminfo/x/xterm, O_RDONLY|O_LARGEFILE) = 3
read(3, \32\0010\0\0\17\0\235\1F\5xterm|xterm terminal..., 4097) = 2522
close(3)= 0
ioctl(1, SNDCTL_TMR_TIMEBASE or TCGETS, {B38400 opost isig icanon echo ...}) = 0
ioctl(1, SNDCTL_TMR_TIMEBASE or TCGETS, {B38400 opost isig icanon echo ...}) = 0
ioctl(1, SNDCTL_TMR_TIMEBASE or TCGETS, {B38400 opost isig icanon echo ...}) = 0
ioctl(1, TIOCGWINSZ, {ws_row=25, ws_col=80, ws_xpixel=0, ws_ypixel=0}) = 0
ioctl(2, TIOCGWINSZ, {ws_row=25, ws_col=80, ws_xpixel=0, ws_ypixel=0}) = 0
open(/usr/bin/.sysless, O_RDONLY|O_LARGEFILE) = -1 ENOENT (No such
file or directory)
open(/etc/sysless, O_RDONLY|O_LARGEFILE) = -1 ENOENT (No such file
or directory)
open(/home/dentonj/.less, O_RDONLY|O_LARGEFILE) = -1 ENOENT (No such
file or directory)
open(/usr/lib/locale/locale-archive, O_RDONLY|O_LARGEFILE) = -1
ENOENT (No such file or directory)
open(/usr/share/locale/locale.alias, O_RDONLY) = 3
fstat64(3, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=2586, ...}) = 0
mmap2(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1,
0) = 0xb7efa000
read(3, # Locale name alias data base.\n#..., 4096) = 2586
read(3, , 4096)   = 0
close(3)= 0
munmap(0xb7efa000, 4096)= 0
open(/usr/lib/locale/en_US/LC_IDENTIFICATION, O_RDONLY) = 3
fstat64(3, 

Re: [Full-disclosure] New RFID Mailing List Owner 0day

2007-09-29 Thread Jeffrey Denton
Your script assumes a few things that are not part of a default
Slackware install.

# This script was created for use on Slackware!

 exit 5

What is the purpose of the exit status code of 5?  Yes, any non-zero
number indicates an error.  Common exit codes are 0 (succeeded), 1 (or
any non-zero number, failure), 126 (command found but not executable),
127 (command not found), and 128+N (fatal error where N is the SIGNAL
that caused the exit).  An exit status of 5 works, just curious as to
its purpose.

 chown root.staff ping

staff is not a default group in Slackware.  Your script assumes that
it has already been created.

 chmod 500 ttysnoop

ttysnoop is not installed by Slackware.

 chmod 600 inetd.conf

It would also be a good idea to remove the execute permissions from
/etc/rc.d/rc.inetd and any other service in /etc/rc.d that isn't
needed.  Restricting the read permissions of the contents of that
directory is also a good idea.

 cp /root/slack/syslog.conf /etc

The file, /root/slack/syslog.conf does not exist by default in Slackware.

 # Tighten up the log file perms now
 cd /var/log
 chmod 600 syslog log.auth log.cron log.daemon log.kern log.mail
 log.mark log.syslog
 chmod 600 log.user messages ftp.log secure.log
 chown root.wheel syslog log.auth log.cron log.daemon log.kern
 log.mail log.mark log.syslog
 chown root.wheel log.user messages ftp.log secure.log

Most of these files do not exist by default.  I'll assume that they
are the product of your custom syslog.conf.

 echo MAKE SURE YOU ADD USERS THAT YOU WANT TO BE ABLE TO SU TO
 ROOT
 echo TO THE ROOT AND WHEEL GROUPS OR THEY WON'T BE ABLE TO!!.

There is nothing in a default Slackware install that will restrict the
use of the su command.  Slackware does not use PAM.  The
/etc/suauth file does not exist by default.

___
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/


Re: [Full-disclosure] Very strange nmap scan results

2007-09-21 Thread Jeffrey Denton
Use the -sV --version-all options to determine version/service info
for each port.

On 9/21/07, scott [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
 Hash: SHA1

 Did this particular person,or persons know what you were going to do?

 Looks like a honeypot,to me.

 Been wrong before,won't be the last.I hope,for the sake of whomever
 you are auditing,that this is the case.

 Cheers,  Redwolfs always


 Juan B wrote:
  Hi all,
 
  For a client in scaning his Dmz from the internet.
 
  I know the servers are behind a pix 515 without any add security
  features ( they dont have any ips or the didnt enabled the ips
  feature of the pix).
 
  the strange is that two I receive too many open ports! for example
  I scan the mail relay and although just port 25 is open it report
  lots of more open ports! this is the nmap scan I issued:
 
  nmap -sT -vv -P0 -O -p1-1024 200.61.44.48/28 -oA cpsa.txt
 
  ( I changed the ip's here...)
 
  and the result for the mail relay for example are:
 
 
  nteresting ports on mail.cpsa.com (200.61.44.50): PORT STATE
  SERVICE 1/tcpopen tcpmux 2/tcpopen compressnet
  3/tcpopen compressnet 4/tcpopen unknown 5/tcp
  open rje 6/tcpopen unknown 7/tcpopen echo 8/tcp
  filtered unknown 9/tcpopen discard 10/tcp   open
  unknown 11/tcp   open systat 12/tcp   open unknown 13/tcp
  open daytime 14/tcp   open unknown 15/tcp   open
  netstat 16/tcp   open unknown 17/tcp   open qotd 18/tcp
  filtered msp 19/tcp   open chargen 20/tcp   open ftp-data
  21/tcp   open ftp 22/tcp   open ssh 23/tcp   open
  telnet 24/tcp   open priv-mail 25/tcp   open smtp 26/tcp
  open unknown 27/tcp   open nsw-fe 28/tcp   open unknown
   29/tcp   open msg-icp 30/tcp   open unknown 31/tcp   open
  msg-auth 32/tcp   open unknown 33/tcp   open dsp 34/tcp
  open unknown
 
  this continues up to port 1024..
 
  any ideas how to eliminate so many false positives?
 
  thanks a lot,
 
  Juan
 
 
 
  
   Catch up on fall's hot new shows on Yahoo! TV. Watch previews, get
  listings, and more! http://tv.yahoo.com/collections/3658
 

 -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
 Version: GnuPG v1.4.6 (GNU/Linux)
 Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org

 iD8DBQFG81G8srt057ENXO4RAkAoAJ9QAmp65M7nICyOvK0IBDb5ZGgdvwCg2iqL
 0AffiGeALD+T9XlXXblycek=
 =Drx9
 -END PGP SIGNATURE-

 ___
 Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
 Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
 Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/


___
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/


Re: [Full-disclosure] beginning to count the time

2005-08-23 Thread Jeffrey Denton
On 8/23/05, Adam Gardner [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 Sure, its:
 
 root:*:0:3:gecos:/home/root:/sbin/sh
 

man crypt
___
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/