Re: [Full-disclosure] Megaupload Anonymous hacker retaliation, nobody wins

2012-01-26 Thread Levente Peres
Hi Marcio,

Thanks for your answer.

On 01/26/2012 02:07 PM, Marcio B. Jr. wrote:
>> I don't want to get into any
>> "conspiracy theory" - either one thinks that way or doesn't, but if you
>> look at the patterns, then let's just say that strong interest groups
>> somehow always seem to get past these democratic barriers to create
>> situations in which they can generate profit.
>
> "conspiracy theory"?? "let's just say"??
>
> That happens. It is, say, a fact.
I agree, unfortunately...

>> Fortunately, most of the
>> time they still need to play for the public and ask "nicely" first
>> before they can do whatever they damn well please.
>
> Wrong.
>
> Corporations do whatever they please, and that is achieved through
> propaganda, which in turn, prepares the masses to think they are being
> asked "nicely".
If we break it down then yes, it effectively comes down to this. However 
disgusting. But I don't believe this is so much black and white. I don't 
think they have managed to brainwash everyone so much yet so that they 
don't need some RPG to justify their actions. We can call this 
propaganda or whatever. But we still have some nerve and some power in 
our hands to say no to things that we don't like, and this constitutes 
our own "propaganda". And when we do say no loud enough, they usually 
back off and try another way. If this was not the case, actions like the 
previous blackouts wouldn't have meant a damn thing, the bills would 
have passed immediately. Why play around when you can just do it without 
consequence? I think "they", or rather, the pawns they control, do need 
our - however limited - approval for now, and we should take advantage 
of that.

>
>> But I feel that is
>> changing.
>
> Yes, it's getting internationally worst. Search for ACTA.
>
> One crackdown we're living in. Goal is: keeping knowledge away from the 
> people.
Don't we know that over here with the EU scandal... Citizens here (and 
not just here, sadly) still think that our national bank is a "National" 
bank... some even go out as far as saying it is, as far as they honestly 
believe, answerable to the government or to the people. Then, just when 
a straightforward-looking thing, like an obligation for the president of 
the "National" bank having to take a sworn oath to the constitution 
creates an uproar among EU interests and we are suddenly branded almost 
fascists as a country because of this and similar issues, do some start 
to question what the heck is going on with the world they think they knew...

>
>> Yes, we have such thing
>> as democracy out there
>
> Where is it? Switzerland maybe? The kibbutzim of Israel?
I'm afraid I misphrased this. Let me try the other way... maybe seen 
just as wrong, but perhaps more correctly put... We have the fabric of 
democracy - filled for the most part, with pawns. Pawns we're being 
offered as a "choice". Hard to work a democracy or make any kind of 
serious vote when your only choice is, more often than not, pawn A and 
pawn B.

>> Lately, after Wikipedia and many others stood by the people, peacefully
>> but with great resolve, public will has won. Not necessarily because
>> that was the will of the people - to have none of PIPA etc... -
>
> Not the people as a whole (which would be ideal) but a small part of
> it who is trying to participate more often in wide scope decisions.

But this also shows that even if there're only a small part of 
"activists", people who are rather passive can still be influenced by 
their actions, change their view no matter what CNN noise propagates... 
thereby possibly negating the effect of the mainstream "washing 
machine". Even if only (for the sake of saying it) 10 people are 
shouting, many more could start to quietly agree with them and it will, 
inevitably, influence their future actions. And, for now at least, 
public opinion does matter, otherwise there would be no need for the 
propaganda system.

>
>> but more
>> likely because we have triggered this protection of "self interest" in
>> the officials.
>
> Which is still a "will".
A will, yes. But at least our will. We show them our will that unless 
they satisfy our needs now and again, we will not vote for them and they 
won't get money, very simply put. They still be stuck between two 
masters, but they will not be so easily convinced to ignore us.

>> Quite simply, elected ones got afraid of not being
>> re-elected, or just going too far and getting into something they cannot
>> handle with a popular face. They appeared to have no "valid" moral
>> reason anymore to cooperate with the passing, so they bailed out.
>
> That is not democracy but a rotten representative system. Masses were
> taught to accept it as fair.
No argument there... But unfortunately, it all comes down to human 
nature... As far as I've seen it, anyone having the "initiative" to be 
any kind of serious leader or official - respect goes out to the few 
exceptions - has the inherent capacity for greed. Greed is a he

Re: [Full-disclosure] Megaupload Anonymous hacker retaliation, nobody wins

2012-01-26 Thread Levente Peres
On 01/26/2012 03:04 AM, Marcio B. Jr. wrote:
> On Wed, Jan 25, 2012 at 6:53 PM, Levente Peres  wrote:
>> This will give decision makers EXACTLY what they WANT.
>
> Those who have already given up democracy think that way.
Not necessarily. I strongly believe in the principle of democracy. In 
fact I'm from a country where people fought and died for it, similar to 
the US and many others. And I also hear simple people like me and 
politicians alike, talk about it, and cite it over again, but more often 
than not, I just don't see it happening. I don't want to get into any 
"conspiracy theory" - either one thinks that way or doesn't, but if you 
look at the patterns, then let's just say that strong interest groups 
somehow always seem to get past these democratic barriers to create 
situations in which they can generate profit. Fortunately, most of the 
time they still need to play for the public and ask "nicely" first 
before they can do whatever they damn well please. But I feel that is 
changing. They get more and more bold, for example, just yesterday I 
read Chris Dodd saying something like...

“Those who count on ‘Hollywood’ for support need to understand that this 
industry is watching very carefully who’s going to stand up for them 
when their job is at stake. Don’t ask me to write a check for you when 
you think your job is at risk and then don’t pay any attention to me 
when my job is at stake.”

... in "plain daylight", on Fox News I believe. Yes, we have such thing 
as democracy out there - but we also have self-interest, and this 
self-interest also exists in officials, and it can be exploited.

Lately, after Wikipedia and many others stood by the people, peacefully 
but with great resolve, public will has won. Not necessarily because 
that was the will of the people - to have none of PIPA etc... - but more 
likely because we have triggered this protection of "self interest" in 
the officials. Quite simply, elected ones got afraid of not being 
re-elected, or just going too far and getting into something they cannot 
handle with a popular face. They appeared to have no "valid" moral 
reason anymore to cooperate with the passing, so they bailed out.

This is what peaceful show of resolve and public will has achieved and 
I'm immensely proud of that... I honestly believe that this is a very 
effective way to resist if enough people stand behind it, like with the 
blackouts. But these interest groups know that officials also have a 
mandate to protect "security", which is a largely different matter. If 
they can picture it so that security's being violated somehow, and start 
making enough noise about "security" and telling people that "you could 
be attacked next" as so on, then quite simply, people will start 
demanding them to do whatever they wanted to do in the first place. "We 
want to be secure, now you are our officials, so do whatever needs to be 
done!" Not all people of course... not everyone will react this way. But 
just enough to allow them to move on, the "majority", or so they will 
make it appear trough mainstream media. That way they can proceed 
without loosing chance for re-election, in fact they may even be lauded 
as heros who can make hard decisions. A nice abuse of democratic 
principles. On the other hand, if this "threat" can be pumped up big 
enough to warrant an "attack on the country", then it's even worse. Then 
they won't need you to agree to/with anything, they can do whatever they 
want to do by definition of "protecting national security". This is why 
I believe that going to cyberwar (essentially: hard violence) over this 
or anything else is counter-effective.

Levente

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Re: [Full-disclosure] Megaupload Anonymous hacker retaliation, nobody wins

2012-01-25 Thread Levente Peres

On a personal note, maybe OFF...

I fail to see the gain in such retaliations, especially in organized 
ones... First the Megaupload retaliation, now the UN... and for what... 
I know people want to be heard, but this is plainly sending the wrong 
message.


This will give decision makers EXACTLY what they WANT. They coax 
otherwise smart people into acting out violently, thereby creating just 
the false-flag "anarchy" to prove their point, which is: "yes, we need 
to censor and control everything especially the Internet, because see, 
there's already a 'war out there at the gates and we need to protect 
etc. whatever'". We've seen it before countless times and this reverse 
strategy almost always works.


If anyone from the "responsible" groups are reading this, please know 
that I'm not against the point that you are trying to make... You are 
all learned and knowledgable people, otherwise you wouldn't have been 
able to pull this complicated scheme off... but I implore you to 
reconsider such outbursts in the future for the sake of the very thing 
that you are trying to protect... What's done is done, but let's not 
give these goons one more reason to take away freedom even more so... 
Please. Just consider this. That's all I'm asking... And I guess that's 
all I wanted to say.


Levente

On 01/25/2012 08:20 AM, karma cyberintel wrote:




(CBS) - The week began on a high note for Internet activist. The 
biggest organized effort to blackout websites in solidarity over the 
Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) and Protect IP Act (PIPA) was a huge success


sources form


for more details
http://www.karmacyberintel.net/2012/01/megaupload-anonymous-hacker-retaliation-nobody-wins/


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Re: [Full-disclosure] Apache Killer

2011-08-20 Thread Levente Peres
My findings, hope it helps... Properly configured HAProxy with queue 
management and per-server limits can dampen the effects quite drastically.

In my testing (three low-end SunFire servers and a LB) an attack volume 
of well over a 1000 threads was necessary to notice any small speed 
degradation on the frontend - which triggeres anti DOS immediately if 
done from outside LAN. System immediately recovers fully when the attack 
stops, no coredumps, nothing, not even after half an hour of sustained 
attack. No crashing or unstability whatsoever happened on any servers, 
not even at 2000, but dared not to test further on a live system... If 
performed from multiple IPs or varied content etc however, a pattern 
recognition scheme would be necessary to block it I believe... Also 
tested it with a simple one-server setup with Squid as frontend before 
apache, it reported not vulnerable... Not tested any further yet.

Done on a "barefoot" apache however, it was devastating even at 100 
threads regardless the lots of RAM and quadcode setup :-(

Levente

2011.08.20. 14:31 keltezéssel, HI-TECH . írta:
> Disabling mod_gzip/mod_deflate is a workaround I guess.
>
> 2011/8/20 Moritz Naumann:
>> On 20.08.2011 00:23 HI-TECH . wrote:
>>> (see attachment)
>>> /Kingcope
>> Works (too) well here. Are there any workarounds other than rate
>> limiting or detecting + dropping the traffic IPS-wise?
>>
>> Moritz
>>
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[Full-disclosure] Possible issues with encrypted Linux filesystems?

2010-12-13 Thread Levente Peres
Dear All,

Yesterday I had a very interesting conversation with Anthony G. Basile, 
Ph. D. of D'Youville College about filesystem security. We thought that 
we should continue this discussion here, so we could all contemplate on 
the possibility of such a thing being possible.

After reading Anthony's article, which you may find here...

http://opensource.dyc.edu/random-vs-encrypted


...I've became worried about something very alarming, which I'd like to hear 
your opinion about.

You see, it's one thing that you encrypt data, and then make backups, encrypt 
those backups, and the attacker could get valuable information by comparing the 
patterns of the two... But when encrypting an entire operating system space, 
you actually encrypt much more than the data you wish to protect: you encrypt 
your system files, your packages, all of it. Now this may sound like an ideal 
thing to do, but I'm not so sure about that anymore.

Now, as we know, most Linux distributions have at least some files, 
directories, whatever that are bound to be the same on all systems. For 
example, binaries of gcc, some base directory names like /var, /usr, /home, 
layouts, and things like that. Even more, if you are using a "standard" distro 
like CentOS, you are assured to have literally gigabytes of data in forms of 
binary RPM packages on a default "base" installation, which not only are sure 
to be the same on all systems, but even their distribution across filesystems 
are prone to be predictable. For simplicity's sake, let's just put these into 
one bucket and call them "known artefacts".

I'm now worried that if an attacker knows, or "guesses" that you are using, 
say, CentOS Linux 5.5, (or at least some mutation of Red Hat), he might use 
this knowledge of "known artefacts" to his advantage, by starting out from the 
data he knows "must be there", and looking for it's "patterns". I don't know... 
This may be a longshot, wishful thinking or both, but somehow it feels to me 
like it's a lot easier to break a code when you already know exactly what the 
decrypted data is, and what it looks like. It should be like 
reverse-engineering ancient-egyptian text by seeing the same damn text in two 
or three other different languages you can actually understand... Essentially 
you could at the very least improve your chances at success if you have several 
certain, fixed points of reference for the decryption procedure (these 
"artefacts" we mentioned).

I'll dare to go even further... Even if you are not encrypting your entire 
system, just the data... you could be leaving behind arefacts like file format 
headers, etc etc... or in case of LVM, logical flesystems within the LVM could 
leave behind headers, identifiers to mark the type, end or beginning, etc. of 
FS, whatever. I agree it's not much, and probably no concern, but if you want 
to be extremely paranoid, it's something.

Now I'm not pretending to be an encryption expert... But I've go to tell it to 
you, If there's any possibility to this - then it creeps me out. Worst case 
scenario, we could be looking at the possibility of breaking virtually any
"standard" distro as long as one could "guess" (or "brute-force-guess") the 
version and type of the distro, AND the system is encrypted along with the data 
to be protected...

I'd like you guys to put me back to ease by either proving me fatally wrong, or 
if there's anything to this... well, then we should discuss anyway.

Best Regards,

Levente Peres

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Re: [Full-disclosure] Just how secure encrypted linux partitions really are?

2010-12-12 Thread Levente Peres
stormrider, Jeffrey, Thor... and all others,

You gave me quite a bit of thinking, reading and reconsidering to do. 
I'm going to have to redesign the whole issue from scratch - not that 
it's a bad thing. Better investing some more time and effort now, than 
sweat maybe later. Thank you so much for taking the time to answer me.

Levente

2010.12.12. 12:28 keltezéssel, stormrider írta:
> You should take care of a few things when encrypting hard
> drives and feeling secure with it.
>
> * Do's *
>
> A) Use a token. That means: Generate a lng key. Encrypt that key and
> put the encrypted key on a thumb-drive. Make sure you leave no trace
> when doing that step. (Good way is to make that part from a live-cd). So
> when you want to mount the disc, you use a password, that decrypts the
> *real* key from the thumb-drive and uses that to decrypt the disc.
> Make sure nobody copies your token. That gives you two access
> components: *Have* the token and *Know* the password. Just like your
> bank card.
>
> B) Mostly messed up rule: Use a strong password! You can have TPM or a
> super secret USB Token or whatsoever. When they get your password
> nothing's secure anymore. You may want to begin shivering at that point.
> (shiver less when you had time to destroy your token before. Stop
> shivering when you're 100% sure nobody made a copy of your token)
>
> * Reminds *
>
> As long as the machine is running there is almost no protection of the data!
>
> 1) Every vulnerability inside the OS or daemons or else could make
> accessing your data possible - just as if there was no encryption.
>
> 2) Other attack vectors depend on *who* might want to take a closer
> look. For some people it makes quite a lot fun to freeze your system RAM
> and read it out later. That would indeed reveal your key.
>
> 3) Any unauthorized access to your box voids the system integrity so you
> should think about countermeasures. Broken integrity means forget
> encryption as a mighty little goblin might sit on your PCI bus reading
> your RAM by DMA (also elves and fairies thinkable).
>
> So if you want to be sure about that you shouldn't leave your box alone
> and running. If you do so, make sure the power gets switched off as soon
> as someone enters the room. Also make sure that it takes a few minutes
> to gain access to your memory sticks after power loss, as it takes some
> time until the data is vanished from memory.
>
> You also shouldn't connect your box to any network - So actually the
> best thing you can do is: keep your secrets in mind, not on disc. You
> then only have to make sure not being water-boarded or so, as this might
> also break your mind (this might also make you shout out any password
> anyways - so avoid that) ;-)
>
> stromrider
>
>
> Am 12.12.2010 01:43, schrieb Levente Peres:
>> Hello to All,
>>
>> If anyone have serious hands-on experience with this, I would like to
>> know some hard facts about this matter... I thought to ask you, because
>> here're some of the top experts in this field, so I could find few
>> better places. Hope you can nodge me in the right direction, and take
>> the time to answer this.
>>
>> Let's suppose I have a CentOS server, with encrypted root partition, and
>> I put the /boot partition on a separate USB key for good measure.
>> Encryption technology is the default which "ships" with CentOS 5.5 and
>> it's LVM.
>>
>> If someone gets hold of that machine, or rather, the drives inside the
>> Smart Array, what are the chances he can "decrypt" the root partition,
>> thus gaining access to the files, if he doesn't know the key? I mean I
>> know that given enough time, probably it could be done with brute-force.
>> But seriously, how much of a hinderance this is to anyone attempting to
>> do this? Does it offer any serious protection or is it just some
>> inconvenience to the person conducting the analysis of the machine? How
>> realistic is it that one can accomplish the decryption inside a
>> reasonable amount of time (like, say, within half a year or so)?
>>
>> Could some of you please give me some of your thoughts about this? And,
>> maybe, what other methods of file system encryption are out there which
>> are more secure?
>>
>> Thanks,
>>
>> Levente
>>
>>
>>
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[Full-disclosure] Just how secure encrypted linux partitions really are?

2010-12-11 Thread Levente Peres

Hello to All,

If anyone have serious hands-on experience with this, I would like to 
know some hard facts about this matter... I thought to ask you, because 
here're some of the top experts in this field, so I could find few 
better places. Hope you can nodge me in the right direction, and take 
the time to answer this.


Let's suppose I have a CentOS server, with encrypted root partition, and 
I put the /boot partition on a separate USB key for good measure. 
Encryption technology is the default which "ships" with CentOS 5.5 and 
it's LVM.


If someone gets hold of that machine, or rather, the drives inside the 
Smart Array, what are the chances he can "decrypt" the root partition, 
thus gaining access to the files, if he doesn't know the key? I mean I 
know that given enough time, probably it could be done with brute-force. 
But seriously, how much of a hinderance this is to anyone attempting to 
do this? Does it offer any serious protection or is it just some 
inconvenience to the person conducting the analysis of the machine? How 
realistic is it that one can accomplish the decryption inside a 
reasonable amount of time (like, say, within half a year or so)?


Could some of you please give me some of your thoughts about this? And, 
maybe, what other methods of file system encryption are out there which 
are more secure?


Thanks,

Levente
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