Re: [Full-disclosure] Arbitrary DDoS PoC
I will not answer this anymore, sorry for feeding trolls. On 15-02-2012 17:34, Sanguinarious Rose wrote: On Wed, Feb 15, 2012 at 7:53 AM, Lucas Fernando Amorim lf.amo...@yahoo.com.br wrote: I do not know what you expect of public repos at Github, really do not understand, you think that I would deliver the gold as well? Well, I think you're a guy too uninformed to find that the maximum is 200 threads with pthread. Have you tried ulimit -a? I even described in the readme. Missing the point that async would have drastic improvements on anything network base, even if you increase it to say 500 threads a async model still pawns anything using threads for simple connect/disconnect handling. Feel free to implement. ;) As the algorithm recaptcha, you really thought it would have all code in the main file? Why would I do that? I distributed in classes. No, there wasn't. It was 12 lines of code which just called another OCR library. (could be why you deleted the public repo this morning) I did hear google cache does a good job of uncovering OMG RAGE DELETE http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache%3Ahttps%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2Flfamorim%2Frebreakerie=utf-8oe=utf-8aq=trls=org.mozilla:en-US:officialclient=firefox-a I do have to declare myself the defaulted winner of this engagement now because if you have to delete stuff in order to claim facts about it... Winner of what? Thats a priv8 repos now. Did you looked at utils directory? There was an algorithm to find the ellipses of the captcha, that he was developing to walk the edge, correcting the distortion. And why do you think IntensiveDoS accepts arguments and opens and closes a socket? Why is a snippet of code to not only HTTP DoS. I read the code could be why. I'm making another question. Why you think IntesiveDoS accepts arguments? As for the trojan, you really think I would do something better and leave the public? What planet do you live? Totally because a bindshell trojan that connects to a port is something highly special that the world will end if someone got a hold of such a dangerous piece of code. In fact, why isn't the world ended yet when you can just google and get a few dozen of them? Should I tell you how dangerous and what planet do you live on to release your so so very dangerous innovative python code? (hypocrisy for the win!) There's nothing special, but is the only code of this on GitHub. Fell free to fork and share. And thats dangerous? I think not, but run nowadays. And Curl is a great project to parallel HTTP connections, python is not so much, and that is why only the fork stays with him. Curl is indeed great I agree. The rest I don't see as even a point going anywhere? If curl is a good project and written in C, why reason I will implement the same thing in Python? On 14-02-2012 02:48, Lucas Fernando Amorim wrote: On Feb 13, 2012 4:37 AM, Lucas Fernando Amorimlf.amo...@yahoo.com.br wrote: With the recent wave of DDoS, a concern that was not taken is the model where the zombies were not compromised by a Trojan. In the standard modeling of DDoS attack, the machines are purchased, usually in a VPS, or are obtained through Trojans, thus forming a botnet. But the arbitrary shape doesn't need acquire a collection of computers. Programs, servers and protocols are used to arbitrarily make requests on the target. P2P programs are especially vulnerable, DNS, internet proxies, and many sites that make requests of user like Facebook or W3C, also are. Precisely I made a proof-of-concept script of 60 lines hitting most of HTTP servers on the Internet, even if they have protections likely mod_security, mod_evasive. This can be found on this link [1] at GitHub. The solution of the problem depends only on the reformulation of protocols and limitations on the number of concurrent requests and totals by proxies and programs for a given site, when exceeded returning a cached copy of the last request. [1] https://github.com/lfamorim/barrelroll Cheers, Lucas Fernando Amorim http://twitter.com/lfamorim ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/ ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
Re: [Full-disclosure] Arbitrary DDoS PoC
How do I subscribe only to the short list have to keep answering this bizarre way, so I apologize. If someone has an alternative way, please tell me. I do not know what you expect of public repos at Github, really do not understand, you think that I would deliver the gold as well? Well, I think you're a guy too uninformed to find that the maximum is 200 threads with pthread. Have you tried ulimit -a? I even described in the readme. As the algorithm recaptcha, you really thought it would have all code in the main file? Why would I do that? I distributed in classes. And why do you think IntensiveDoS accepts arguments and opens and closes a socket? Why is a snippet of code to not only HTTP DoS. As for the trojan, you really think I would do something better and leave the public? What planet do you live? And Curl is a great project to parallel HTTP connections, python is not so much, and that is why only the fork stays with him. On 14-02-2012 02:48, Lucas Fernando Amorim wrote: On Feb 13, 2012 4:37 AM, Lucas Fernando Amorim lf.amo...@yahoo.com.br mailto:lf.amo...@yahoo.com.br wrote: With the recent wave of DDoS, a concern that was not taken is the model where the zombies were not compromised by a Trojan. In the standard modeling of DDoS attack, the machines are purchased, usually in a VPS, or are obtained through Trojans, thus forming a botnet. But the arbitrary shape doesn't need acquire a collection of computers. Programs, servers and protocols are used to arbitrarily make requests on the target. P2P programs are especially vulnerable, DNS, internet proxies, and many sites that make requests of user like Facebook or W3C, also are. Precisely I made a proof-of-concept script of 60 lines hitting most of HTTP servers on the Internet, even if they have protections likely mod_security, mod_evasive. This can be found on this link [1] at GitHub. The solution of the problem depends only on the reformulation of protocols and limitations on the number of concurrent requests and totals by proxies and programs for a given site, when exceeded returning a cached copy of the last request. [1] https://github.com/lfamorim/barrelroll Cheers, Lucas Fernando Amorim http://twitter.com/lfamorim ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/ ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
Re: [Full-disclosure] Arbitrary DDoS PoC
I could argue that an attack targeted at a service, especially HTTP, is not measured by the band, but the requests, especially the heavier, could argue that a technique is the most inherent characteristic of multiple sources of traffic and still relying on trust. I could still say that is an implementation that relates only to say - Look, it exists!, I could still prolong explaining about overheads, and using about the same time many sites that make the requests, thus reducing the wake of a failure, even if you say easily diagnosable. But I'd rather say that it is actually very pedantic of you label something as inefficient, especially when not done a single test, only the pedantic observation of someone whose interests it is reprehensible. I will not say you're one of those, but this is really an attitude typical of this kind, which is certainly not a hacker. Thanks to people like that, do not know if you like, there are many flaws yet to be explored. If anyone wants more information, obviously I will ask to send an email or call me to give a presentation, I will not think about anything. My goal in was invited researchers to study DDoS on this model, because anytime someone can direct thousands to generate a network congestion. On 13-02-2012 11:17, Gage Bystrom wrote: Uhh...looks pretty standard boss. You aren't going to DoS a halfway decent server with that using a single box. Sending your request through multiple proxies does not magically increase the resource usage of the target, its still your output power vs their input pipe. Sure it gives a slight boost in anonymity and obfuscation but does not actually increase effectiveness. It would even decrease effectiveness because you bear the burden of having to send to a proxy, giving them ample time to recover from a given request. Even if you look at it as a tactic to bypass blacklisting, you still aren't going to overwhelm the server. That means you need more pawns to do your bidding. This creates a bit of a problem however as then all your slaves are running through a limited selection of proxies, reducing the amount of threats the server needs to blacklist. The circumvention is quite obvious, which is to not utilize proxies for the pawnsand rely on shear numbers and/or superior resource exhaustion methods On Feb 13, 2012 4:37 AM, Lucas Fernando Amorim lf.amo...@yahoo.com.br mailto:lf.amo...@yahoo.com.br wrote: With the recent wave of DDoS, a concern that was not taken is the model where the zombies were not compromised by a Trojan. In the standard modeling of DDoS attack, the machines are purchased, usually in a VPS, or are obtained through Trojans, thus forming a botnet. But the arbitrary shape doesn't need acquire a collection of computers. Programs, servers and protocols are used to arbitrarily make requests on the target. P2P programs are especially vulnerable, DNS, internet proxies, and many sites that make requests of user like Facebook or W3C, also are. Precisely I made a proof-of-concept script of 60 lines hitting most of HTTP servers on the Internet, even if they have protections likely mod_security, mod_evasive. This can be found on this link [1] at GitHub. The solution of the problem depends only on the reformulation of protocols and limitations on the number of concurrent requests and totals by proxies and programs for a given site, when exceeded returning a cached copy of the last request. [1] https://github.com/lfamorim/barrelroll Cheers, Lucas Fernando Amorim http://twitter.com/lfamorim ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/ ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
[Full-disclosure] Arbitrary DDoS PoC
With the recent wave of DDoS, a concern that was not taken is the model where the zombies were not compromised by a Trojan. In the standard modeling of DDoS attack, the machines are purchased, usually in a VPS, or are obtained through Trojans, thus forming a botnet. But the arbitrary shape doesn't need acquire a collection of computers. Programs, servers and protocols are used to arbitrarily make requests on the target. P2P programs are especially vulnerable, DNS, internet proxies, and many sites that make requests of user like Facebook or W3C, also are. Precisely I made a proof-of-concept script of 60 lines hitting most of HTTP servers on the Internet, even if they have protections likely mod_security, mod_evasive. This can be found on this link [1] at GitHub. The solution of the problem depends only on the reformulation of protocols and limitations on the number of concurrent requests and totals by proxies and programs for a given site, when exceeded returning a cached copy of the last request. [1] https://github.com/lfamorim/barrelroll Cheers, Lucas Fernando Amorim http://twitter.com/lfamorim ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
