[Full-disclosure] Wireless keyboard insecurity - any secure one available?

2008-03-10 Thread Markus Jansson
I decided to write here after not getting any real response from any
vendor or security forums that I have written about the subject in the
past few months. The issue is relatively simple and affecting a lot of
people, companies and propably even goverment officials: Wireless
keyboards.

Now, we know that most of the wireless keyboards are just stupid, if
not analog, atleast somehow buggy and cheap pieces of tech that work
on various RF bands. Some of them have been analysed and cracked wide
open and ofcourse nobody is patching them up at all. For example here
is a good example to proof my point:
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/12/03/wireless_keyboard_crypto_cracked/

Is this a big issue? Oh yes.
What point is having a good 32+ char passphrase on your www-accounts,
63marks long WPA2-PSK and PGP encryption in your emails...if you type
them all with wireless keyboard, that can be easily eavesdropped maybe
over 100yards away? Or is it just me thinking its weakest link in the
chain of security?

From my knowledge, Id say the best option for secure wireless keyboard
is somekind of bluetooth keyboard that actually, REALLY works like
bluetooth is supposed to work. You know, a wireless keyboard that
would allow its default PIN (which is usually 1234 or ) to be
changed in secure fashion to something long and complext (well, lets
say 16 or 32 marks long)...and that would only allow encrypted and
authenticated connections and would not broadcast its existance to the
rest of the world.

Sure, there has been cracks in bluetooth and its crypto, like here:
http://www.terminodes.org/micsPublicationsDetail.php?pubno=1216
that make you think that even bluetooths crypto, if it would actually
be used, is not good enought for wireless keyboards. But its still the
best we got right?

WUSB might be a good replacement for bluetooth, but are there really
any secure ones available yet - or will there ever be? How can you
know they are secure - are you trusting the same manufactorers claims
that have for years marketed and sold insecure wireless keyboards
while claiming that they are secure? I dont.

Is it just me or have someone else also payed attention to the
insecurity of the wireless keyboards - and the total silence around
this serious security issue? And how to fix this? How and where to get
wireless keyboards that are really secure?



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[Full-disclosure] Finnish thought police censors site about censorship!

2008-02-16 Thread Markus Jansson
I usually dont make this kind of politically motivated posts here, but
this is just waay too terrible to be ignored. I hope mods agree on
this.

http://www.poliisi.fi/poliisi/krp/home.nsf/pages/indexeng]Finnish
Thought Police[/url] has now used dirty tactics to silence a website
used to distribute information and discussion about the recent law
about censorship. The laws is sayed to be used to censor child porn
websites located outside Finland off the ISP customers. If the page
does not contain child porn or is located in Finland, this law should
not be applied at all.

The situation is a bit same as it was a while back, when Swedish
authorities used the same laws and same blacklists to censor access
to [url=http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Pirate_Bay]Pirate Bay[/url].
Again, without any proof that there is or has been child porn there.
Now, the same tactic is
[url=http://www.insideonlinevideo.com/2007/07/06/swedish-police-censors-pirate-bay/]apparently
soon be used again[/url] to kill the Pirate Bay off the net forever.

However, there is a HUGE difference here.
1) Laws specifically demand that site must be outside Finland to be
censored. http://lapsiporno.info is not, its located in Finland.
2) Laws specifically demand that site must host child porn to be
censored. http://lapsiporno.info does not contain any child porn.
3) The attack is not motivated by RIAA or similiar industry to kill of
P2P. The attack is purely motivated to kill of discussion and
information sharing about this censorship. http://lapsiporno.info is
the only site dedicated to this issue. This attack is direct attack
against freedom of speech by police of Finland.
4) The blacklist used to censor sites off the net doesnt really even
contain child porn sites. I personally checked the lists about 45
minutes, visiting dozens of pages (via Tor-network) and did not see a
SINGLE child porn image or movie etc. Its total bullshit and
censorship of legitimate sites.

This is the level of freedom of speech here in Finland. Im very, very
dissapointed and shamed to be a Finn. And this isnt over, they are
going to expand this censorship to block access to internet gambling,
soon hate speech etc. etc. 1984 is here today.

Luckily the site is already mirrored in several places (and if needed,
I will get them dozen or so more mirrors, I couldnt care less what
happens then). Also, it has raised little critics about this law and
police actions. Unfortunally, this issue hasnt been discussed much
outside Finland. Hopefully it is now.

More info in english
http://en.wikinews.org/wiki/Finnish_internet_censorship_critic_blacklisted

And in finnish
http://markusjansson.blogspot.com/2008/02/ajatuspoliisi-sensuroi-netist-sensuuria.html

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Re: [Full-disclosure] PWDumpX v1.4 (and GUI:s)

2008-01-09 Thread Markus Jansson
OK, OK, I get your point. If you use GUI, you are lamer, because you
could do fine without them 20 years ago so you should be able to do
just fine without them now too. Its just lazy mans way of doing
things to use GUI, and especially lazy and now knowledge enought
peoples way of doing things.

The same logic should also point us, that its lame to use cars,
because we humans have had two legs for millions of years. Anyone who
travel by car, bus, train, bike, or any other mean of transportation
than just using their 2 legs, is therefore to be concidered a lazy
lamer. After all, it takes guts and stamina to walk/run to places,
and not everyone can really do it. Besides, you can go to many places
by foot where its very difficult to travel using, for example, car. Id
say its pretty damm hard trying to climb Mount Everest using car, but
you can somehow do it with your 2 legs.

Wake up to this day people. Things evolve. DOS is 20 years old stuff.
If you are still running only DOS or other command line OS stuff, I
think that you really should concider upgrading to OS and stuff that
have clean, easy and fast GUI:s.

(BTW. My doubleclicking on desktop icon is maybe 200x faster than you
writing two lines of command line crap to get the program to do the
same thing I make it do with just doubleclicking it with my mouse.)



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Re: [Full-disclosure] PWDumpX v1.4

2008-01-08 Thread Markus Jansson
How about a nice GUI? Or atleast some kind of GUI?

I dont know what OS are you using, but I stopped using MS-DOS about 15
years ago. Im sure there are folks out there who just lve command
line crap, mostly Linux users I suppose, they obiously are still
missing what even Windows 3.11 had. But most of us who live in this
day are used on using OS and programs that work via GUI.

Thank you.



Markus Jansson
Finland
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[Full-disclosure] Re: Backdooring PDF Files

2006-09-13 Thread Markus Jansson
POC did nothing for my Foxit PDF reader. No www-page was opened and no 
script was executed. Maybe you folks should just dump the clumsy and 
insecure Acrobat Reader and move onto something better for reading .pdf 
documents? ;)



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[Full-disclosure] Re: Tabloid phone-tapping net widens

2006-08-10 Thread Markus Jansson

It seems to me that this may be a global, not UK-specific
vulnerability which probably affects all of the world's 1 billion
mobile phones (just a guess) on each of the world's carriers.  My
question is, what are the vendors doing about it? The usefulness of
their technology is undermined if it cannot be trusted. The immediate
remedial step for users appears to be to make their PINs difficult to
guess.

One simple solution would be to make it possible for users to disable 
voice mail access to all other than the actual phone(number) that is 
using that voice mail account. Kinda make it trusted number and 
concider all others untrusted unless trusted number tells the system 
that number X can also be concidered trusted.


Ofcourse this makes no difference if anyone can fake the phone number 
they are calling or sending SMS from. In Finland, atleast, this is not 
possible since phone numbers are not directly trusted when 
authenticating phone or SMS senders, but the trust comes from the 
operator who confirms that number X really belongs to phonecall Y.


(Ofcourse I think it might be a bit paranoid solution to encrypt all 
voice mail with users publickey and then allow them to be decrypted only 
by the privatekey stored in protected area of the recipients SIM card, 
but anyway...)


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[Full-disclosure] Fw: Researchers hack Wi-Fi driver to breach laptop

2006-06-23 Thread Markus Jansson
I bet I wasnt the only one just waiting first publications about these 
kinds of attacks. The drivers of various WiFi hardware are vulnerable 
and can be exploited very efficiently, even if the computer is not 
connecting/trying to connect to some network. Only defence is to turn 
them physically off when you dont need them and limit your usage of them 
to somewhere safe. Concidering the range of these devices (BT over a 
mile away, WLAN even more, HSDPA even much more), threath is serious.




http://www.infoworld.com/article/06/06/21/79536_HNwifibreach_1.html
Security researchers have found a way to seize control of a laptop 
computer by manipulating buggy code in the system's wireless device driver.

...
Using tools like LORCON, Maynor and Ellch were able to discover many 
examples of wireless device driver flaws, including one that allowed 
them to take over a laptop by exploiting a bug in an 802.11 wireless 
driver. They also examined other networking technologies including 
Bluetooth, Ev-Do (EVolution-Data Only), and HSDPA (High Speed Downlink 
Packet Access).

...
The victim would not even need to connect to a network for the attack to 
work...You don't have to necessarily be connected for these device 
driver flaws to come into play, Ellch said. Just because your wireless 
card is on and looking for a network could be enough.

...
More than half of the flaws that the two researchers found could be 
exploited even before the wireless device connected to a network.




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[Full-disclosure] Re: PGP Truecrypt A Nasty Security Bug

2006-05-27 Thread Markus Jansson
From what I understod, this is really not any kind of bug. The issue is 
simple: If you have encrypted something the way PGP/Truecrypt does (that 
is, it creates encryption key and encrypts that with encryption key 
created from your passphrase), you can ofcourse do this.


How? Well, since you can always hold the original encryption key used. 
It doesnt matter how many times the passphrase is changed, since the 
original master encryption key remains the same. This is the basic 
issue here.


Lesson: Dont just change passphrases when re-using encrypted containers 
etc. but RECRYPT the container.


Point: Anything encrypted with PGP/Truecrypt is still secure if you have 
complex passphrase on it and dont let anyone else know what it is.


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[Full-disclosure] Re: Windows XP Home LSA secrets storesXP loginpassphrase in plain text (John Doe)

2006-05-07 Thread Markus Jansson

John Doe sayed:
 As what comes to EFS, once you get hold of the administrator
 account, you can decrypt the EFS for _all_ users on the computer. It
 doesn't matter how you acquired the password.

In Windows 2000 this is true, however, in Windows XP this is NOT TRUE. 
In Windows XP the EFS private key is encrypted using users passphrase 
and without the passphrase, you cannot decrypt it.


In Win2k this is not the case, in Win2k
1) Administrator is the (compulsory) recovery agent and can decrypt all 
EFS files anyway.
2) Users private keys are not stored encrypted in the system and anyone 
who can simply sign in with that users credentials (like with 3rd party 
tools) can decrypt users EFS files.


If you dont believe me, I promise to give you 1 euros if you can 
decrypt my EFS files by simply signing into my computer as 
administrator. If you cannot do that, you will pay me 1000 euros, ok?


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[Full-disclosure] Re: Windows XP Home LSA secrets stores XP login passphrase in plain text

2006-05-05 Thread Markus Jansson

Heh, couple minor corrections to the original post:

  Now, let me clear few things up, ok:

- Im not talking about bruteforcing NL/NTLM/NTLMv2/NT hashes.


Im ofcourse talking about LM/NTLM/NTLMv2/NT hashes.

- HOWEVER, if you can actually GET the users password (he is currently 
using) the way Im talking about now, you can do a lot of harm with that. 
You can, for example, decrypt all EFS encrypted files in normal 
situations (since users EFS privatekey is encrypted using users 
passphrase).


Ofcourse XP Home edition does not have EFS at all, but this attack/bug 
is also present in some XP Pro.



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[Full-disclosure] Windows XP Home LSA secrets stores XP login passphrase in plain text

2006-05-05 Thread Markus Jansson
This again proves the reason to do some hacking of your own system, 
things like these would otherwise go unnoticed...


OK, I setup Windows XP Home, did the regular securing up (the much you 
can do with Home edition), like for example setting that users must use 
passwords and usernames to sign in, use control+alt+delete to sign in, 
disabled automatic login to Windows etc. etc. Rebooted, changed my 
account X passphrase, then rebooted again. Then I signed in to other 
admin level account (account Y) and ran Cain  Abel and used it to dump 
LSA secrets...wellwellwell...Windows stores my account X Windows XP 
login passphrase in plaintext in DefaultPassword field!


My Windows XP should NOT store any Windows passphrases in clear text on 
the hdd, but only stores the passphrases hash 
(LM/NTLM/NTLMv2/NT)...UNLESS specific settings are set (allowing 
automatic login to Windows). But it does. Other people have also 
verified Windows sometimes does this, even if specifically set not to 
save it.


I understand that LSA Secrets might / should store user X password in 
memory for the time the user X is signed in, so it can be used to 
authenticate the user to maybe third-party sites, network drives, etc. 
But when user X is logged out of the system, user Y cannot/should not 
see users X:s Windows XP password since it is NOT loaded into memory 
(from where it could be loaded into memory if user has not entered it 
yet because user X hasnt signed in on this session yet?!?). So, in this 
case, its seems that Windows IS storing the users passphrase in 
somewhere in plaintext, what it should not do.


Now, let me clear few things up, ok:
- Im not talking about bruteforcing NL/NTLM/NTLMv2/NT hashes.
- Im not talking about using rainbowtables to fetch the password.
- Im not saving anything under any Outlook Express, MSN, saved passwords 
or anything in the whole XP Home computer (so that if I used same 
passphrase on them too, CA could somehow recover that).
- Yes, its true that inorder to do this, you must have SeDebug 
priveledge set to the user and admins can always reset any users 
passphrase (and anyone with physical access to the computer can always 
get admin permissions using 3rd party tools).
- HOWEVER, if you can actually GET the users password (he is currently 
using) the way Im talking about now, you can do a lot of harm with that. 
You can, for example, decrypt all EFS encrypted files in normal 
situations (since users EFS privatekey is encrypted using users 
passphrase). You can, for example, try that same password in all kinds 
of places where that users is logging in (since chances are hes using 
the same password or variations of it elsewhere).
- Yes, if/when villan can get admin permissions or physical access to 
the computer, the game is lost in sense, that it can be loaded with all 
kinds of hardware and software keyloggers and insecure settings, so that 
the next time users sign in to the computer, their passwords etc. can be 
recorded and abused by villan. However, notice the words next time 
users sign in! If someone steals the computer, that doesnt happen. If 
someone leaves hints that system is tampered, that doesnt happen. BUT, 
in this scenario I have told you, all you need is to GET the access to 
the computer and game is over, you dont have to wait users to sign in 
next time to the computer! This is very important issue when thinking 
about this bug  regular keylogging/insecuring the system.
- Nobody, including admins, should NOT be able to see plaintext 
passwords and Windows should NOT store them in the computer unless 
specially ordered to do because of some weird configuration or 
usability thing.


Now, the funny thing is, that if I changed my password via Control Panel 
- User Accounts, the new password would always be recorded in the LSA 
Secrets and recovered by CA. However, if I used control 
userpasswords2 to SET my password, the new password would NOT be 
recorded to LSA Secrets and CA could not recover it from there.


This similiar bug has been discussed earlier in here, but with no 
solution or idea about why its there:

http://www.derkeiler.com/Newsgroups/microsoft.public.security/2005-05/0765.html

Ongoing discussion about the subject in:
http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,16012871



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[Full-disclosure] Windows XP Home LSA secrets stores XP loginpassphrase in plain text

2006-05-05 Thread Markus Jansson

Johd Doe sayed:
Markus, if a villain has physical access to
your computer you have bigger issues than this.

You obiously didnt bother to read these part of my message:
- You can, for example, decrypt all EFS encrypted files
- You can, for example, try that same password in all kinds
of places where that users is logging in (since chances are hes using
the same password or variations of it elsewhere).
You can NOT do these if you just get physical access to the computer 
(without this bug), since EFS remains secure and your password unknown 
to attacker.


Especially focus on the following I sayed:
- ..The next time users sign in to the computer, their passwords etc. 
can be recorded and abused by villan. However, notice the words next 
time users sign in! If someone steals the computer, that doesnt happen. 
If someone leaves hints that system is tampered, that doesnt happen.


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[Full-disclosure] NISCC DNS Protocol Vulnerability

2006-04-28 Thread Markus Jansson

http://www.niscc.gov.uk/niscc/vulnAdv-en.html
The vulnerabilities described in this advisory affect implementations 
of the Domain Name System (DNS) protocol. Many vendors include support 
for this protocol in their products and may be impacted to varying 
degrees, if at all.


Impact:
..DoS...memory corruption...stack corruption...buffer overflow exploits

Vendors affected:
Cisco, Delegate, Ethereal, Hitachi, ISC, Juniper Networks, MyDNS, pdnsd, 
Sun, Wind River  Microsoft


Whole stuff in .pdf format
http://www.niscc.gov.uk/niscc/docs/re-20060425-00312.pdf?lang=en



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[Full-disclosure] PasswordSafe 3.0 weak random number generator allows key recovery attack

2006-03-23 Thread Markus Jansson
I wonder why havent anyone posted this one here yet?!? Concidering the 
fact that Password Safe is used to create and store users secure 
passphrases in one database, the compromise of this database could be 
horrible...therefore I see this attack/bug also as horrible.




http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/428552/30/0/threaded
Title : PasswordSafe 3.0 weak random number generator allows key 
recovery attack

Date : March 23, 2006
Product : PasswordSafe 3.0
Discovered by : ElcomSoft Co.Ltd.
...
PasswordSafe 3.0 utilizes two different random number generator (RNG)
functions: Win32 API RtlGenRandom() and standart Visual C++ rand().
RtlGenRandom() is not available on Windows prior to Windows XP (i.e.
Windows 2000, Windows NT, Windows Me) so rand() is used instead.
Specifically, rand() is used to generate 256-bit database encryption
key. It is widely known that using rand() in cryptographic
applications is not secure due to its predictbility and small
internal state.
...
It is possible to mount guaranteed decryption attack on PasswordSafe
3.0 databases created under OS prior to Windows XP. The attack is
very simple:
1. Generate 256-bit key for every possible seed value
2. Decrypt first database record (the structure is documented, so
we have known plaintext attack)
3) Check decrypted value against the known plaintext
...
The total number of all possible seed values is limited by 2^32, so
it is quite feasible. Our experiments show that the key can be
recovered in less than 6 hours on the single PC (Pentium 4).



Can anyone confirm
1) Is version 2.xx also vulnerable (either on XP or other OS)?
2) Password Safe has ability to create secure passphrases, are they too 
insecure because PRNG is insecure in PSv3?

3) Is there a fix available?
4) Is there a more secure password manager solution available? ;)

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Re: [Full-Disclosure] Insecurity in Finnish parlament (computers)

2006-02-23 Thread Markus Jansson

Olli Haukkovaara sayed:
Your answer below is in fact what I expected - you can not
be sure about this issue, because you can not proof it.

I am (pretty darn) sure about the issue, even I cannot provide you with 
specific facts  about some vendors and model numbers. I have received 
information and talked about the subject with people who are into this 
business. Its like that you would say that Australia exists and I would 
start to argue against you, that you cannot be sure it exists, because 
you cannot provide me exact information about the lenght of the 
coastline of Australia etc. Wake up.


Besides, all of this is irrelevant to the subject in hand: Insecurity of 
TeliaSonera  A5/1 and the fact that our goverment/parlament would need 
to have some people working in the compsec/infosec section that would 
understand and care about these issues.




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Re: [Full-Disclosure] Insecurity in Finnish parlament (computers)

2006-02-22 Thread Markus Jansson

Olli Haukkovaara sayed:
Can you state some models of GSM base stations
/,message centers that support A5/3 in GSM
networks?

No, I cant, because Im not an expert on GSM base station hardware 
systems. :) I bet you better ask Nokia  Elisa about that issue (and 
hope that they will answer you anything)...unless someone in the list 
can point out references? I only know that there is hardware for that 
and it is used. I cant name the brand and model of it. ;)



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re: [Full-Disclosure] Insecurity in Finnish parlament (computers)

2006-02-21 Thread Markus Jansson

Juha-Matti Laurio:
http://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/299
entitled as Cell phone operator sent 7000-large government account
information with unprotected e-mail.

Good article, but it lacks one important aspect of the fiasco:
TeliaSonera also disabled crypto (A5/1) on GSM:s for some time, which 
made it possible to eavesdrop on its/goverments GSM:s. This was a the 
big fuzz.


OK, basically whether or not you are using A5/1 or A5/0 makes no 
difference, since A5/1 is so easily cracked that any serious attacker 
can do it anyway (or crack COMP-128-1 or COMP-128-2). If you have the 
tools to capture/listen GSM calls, you can relatively easily get the 
stuff to attack A5/1 and COMP-128-1 or 2 anyway. But ofcourse it was 
nice to hype about the fact that TeliaSonera disabled crypto too. And 
maybe some folks dont still understand that A5/1 is broken and think 
that it offers some protection. LOL.


Anyway, only sensible way to secure govermental cellurar phones would be 
use strong crypto/suitable GMS:s, like http://www.cryptophone.de/ so 
that every member of goverment/parlament could talk securely with any 
other member of govermenet/parlament and some officials too. Ofcourse if 
people in Finnish parlament or infosec/compsec sections would know a 
drek about crypto and security, they would have already done it. ;) 
Putting all their eggs again in one basket (Elisa) and without strong 
end-to-end-crypto does not help much.


BTW. How long would you think it would take them to spot 
false-base-station type of attacks near our parlament house? ;)


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re: [Full-Disclosure] Insecurity in Finnish parlament (computers)

2006-02-21 Thread Markus Jansson
On Tue, 21 Feb 2006 14:07:50 +0200 Juha-Matti Laurio juha-
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 TeliaSonera also disabled crypto (A5/1) on GSM:s for some time, 
 which made it possible to eavesdrop on its/goverments GSM:s. 
This was
 a the big fuzz.

I'm aware about these claims, but Mr. Esa Korvenmaa, spokeperson 
of TeliaSonera Finland says this is not true.

Well, several people in different discussion forums in Finland 
found it out by GSM analysing tools and posted it up. Those tools 
shown that peoples phones (in TeliaSonera network) used A5/0 
cipher, meaning that no encryption was used. I doubt that all of 
them are simultaneously lying and TeliaSonera is telling the truth. 
:D



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Re: [Full-Disclosure] Insecurity in Finnish parlament (computers)

2006-02-21 Thread Markus Jansson

Cruzan wrote:
I know that there is a documented case that Russian KGB
authorities switched GSM crypto off from base stations
in St. Petersburg area during 2003 when there were lots
of foreigners visiting at St. Petersburg's 300 years
celebreations.

I guess you refer to FAPSI/GRU authorities? ;)


But I have not seen any document about the incident that
Markus refers below. Can you show us some evidence about
that or is that just another urban security legend?

Finnish, sorry
http://mikropc.net/uutiset/index.jsp?categoryId=atkday=20060215#w200602150926118974
Ministeriö varoitti henkilöstöään välttämään arkaluontoisista asioista 
keskustelemista matkapuhelimessa viime perjantaina. 
MuroBBS-verkkopalvelussa sekä keskusteluryhmissä esiintyneiden tietojen 
mukaan Soneran gsm-salaus on kyseisenä ajankohtana ollut pois päältä. 
Nokia network monitor -työkalulla verkkoa tarkkailleet ovat raportoineet 
verkon Ciphering-arvon olleen tilassa 'OFF' esimerkiksi Elisan verkon 
näyttäessä normaalia A51-salaustietoa.


Also, it was discussed in the newsgroups I recall...


What do you mean by message center ? Do you mean MSC
(mobile service switching centre)? Encryption/decryption
in GSM is done in between MS (mobile station) and BS
(base station). Keys are stored in SIM and AuC
(authentication center).

Maybe some with more expertise in english and technical terms could help 
me out here... :) Anyway, the point is that GSM encryption is NOT done 
literally between BS and user. Its done in message center and user. 
Sometimes MC is in same location as BS, but sometimes not (for example, 
in countryside where there are fewer BS and its impossible to physically 
secure them so tightly, so the encryption/decryption is done in more 
secure enviroment in message center, behind some datalinks).



Anyway, can you point some vendors that provide hardware
that supports A5/3 ?

Its been out there for almost 4 years, there is hardware support for it. 
Also, in Finland 3G networks are getting up everywhere and they ofcourse 
support A5/3. ;) For example

http://www.ttpcom.com/en/products/silicon/cbemacro.htm


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re: [Full-Disclosure] Insecurity in Finnish parlament (computers)

2006-02-20 Thread Markus Jansson

Olli Haukkovaara cruzan at gmail.com
Mon Feb 20 08:52:01 GMT 2006
Or can someone point me some GSM base station model that supports A5/3
? At least I googled a lot, but could not find any...

Its not about base stations. The encryption/decryption is not done in 
base stations, but in message centers. Sometimes, true, they are located 
in same spot. But they are still not the same thing, but two different 
components of the GSM network.


BTW. Talking about insecurity of Finnish parlament and TeliaSonera:s 
GSM, take a look at these (sorry, only in Finnish) latest issues about 
TeliaSonera having no idea about security whatsoever. Luckily, they are 
moving to their GSM:s on Elisa networks... :)

http://www.digitoday.fi/showPage.php?page_id=14news_id=53413
http://www.digitoday.fi/showPage.php?page_id=14news_id=53434



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Re: [Full-disclosure] Mozilla Thunderbird SMTP down-negotiation weakness

2005-10-15 Thread Markus Jansson

Tim wrote:

I agree that this is less than optimal.  Could you point me to the bug
report you filed in bugzilla that requests these changes?


Here is one, you can follow the links to other ones :)
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=154641


It probably isn't that hard.  Why don't you write a patch? 


I dont have any knowledge of programming.



Honestly though, this stuff is such a miniscule portion of overall
security...  How many users actually care when websites don't even have
valid certificates?  Heck, most browsers don't even check for CRLs by
default, including IE.


True, but the ones who would like to check, they find that it is 
impossible. And the ones who are not used to check it, take an example 
from Opera how to make them check it: It clearly displays the symmetric 
and asymmetric key sizes in the addresslike/statusline when you are in 
https connection. Also, it warns if the symmetric keysize is secure, but 
asymmetric is insecure.




There are many many more, much easier ways to steal someone's sensitive
info without attacking the crypto.


Sometimes. But that doesnt mean that obious weakness should not be 
fixed. Heck, why even bother patching at all, since the weakest link 
is always the dumb user who will execute any file you email to 
them...lets just forget Windowsupdate then, and new versions to Firefox, 
right? ;)



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[Full-disclosure] Mozilla Thunderbird SMTP down-negotiation weakness

2005-10-14 Thread Markus Jansson

Madison, Marc wrote:
When will Mozilla get it right?  There products
seems to be riddle with encryption problems?
My suggestion; hire someone that knows how to
implement encryption CORRECTLY.

I have to agree. Lets not forget that STILL all Mozilla products fail to 
show RSA/asymmetric keysize in any sensible format. Users of Mozilla 
products have no idea about safety of SSL/TLS connections, since the 
information about asymmetric keysize is not shown properly (= read: Its 
not shown at all unless you want to start calculating it from the raw 
form of the asymmetric key).


You can easily check the symmetric (RC4/AES) keysize (40/56/64/128/256 
bits) when selecting Page info - Security, but nothing shows you how 
large the asymmetric keysize is (512/1024/2048/4096 bits)! This is very, 
very stupid.


Firefox, for example tells you that you have high grade encryption 
when you have AES-256-CBC with 512bit RSA! Since 512bit RSA only gives a 
work factor of about 2^60 and AES-256-CBC about 2^120 (if you think the 
most advanced attacks that only work in very, very theoretical form 
could be implemented against it)...well, who would even dream on 
cracking AES-256 when all they have to do is to crack 512bit RSA to get 
even better solution!


It cant be THAT HARD to implement a feature onto Mozilla products that 
would show asymmetric keysize. Opera does it. IE does it. Why cant the 
geeks at Mozilla do it too? Because the seem to lack even basic 
knowledge of crypto...   :(



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