[Gen-art] Re: review (full) of draft-ietf-hip-mm-05.txt

2007-04-10 Thread Francis Dupont
 In your previous mail you wrote:

   I discussed briefly with the authors.  Your comment is consistent with
   some other recent comments that the draft does not fully specify a
   mobility and multihoming solution but only the readdressing mechanisms.
   
=> note that the only issue here is the (old) abstract doesn't reflect
the content of the document.
   
   After thinking about your suggestion, I would be inclined to even
   retitle the document to something like:
   "Readdressing Extensions for HIP Mobility and Multihoming" to clarify
   that there are other aspects of mobility and multihoming that are not
   addressed.  I would be inclined to keep "Mobility and Multihoming" terms
   in the title, though, because it is part of the HIP charter to produce
   such a document.
   
=> I have no problem with the title itself as soon as the abstract is clear.

   Would you agree with the following abstract?  If not, can you suggest
   specific changes?
   
   OLD:
   
  This document defines mobility and multihoming extensions to the Host
  Identity Protocol (HIP).  Specifically, this document defines a
  general "LOCATOR" parameter for HIP messages that allows for a HIP
  host to notify peers about alternate addresses at which it may be
  reached.  This document also defines elements of procedure for
  mobility of a HIP host-- the process by which a host dynamically
  changes the primary locator that it uses to receive packets.  While
  the same LOCATOR parameter can also be used to support end-host
  multihoming, detailed procedures are left for further study.
   
   NEW:
   
  This document defines readdressing extensions to the Host Identity
  Protocol (HIP) to facilitate host mobility and multihoming.
  Specifically, this document defines and specifies basic elements of
  procedure for a general "LOCATOR" parameter for HIP messages.  The
  LOCATOR parameter allows a HIP host to notify peers about alternate
  addresses at which it may be reached, and further allows it to
  express policy preferences as to which address to use in different
  situations when there exists more than one choice for a destination
  address.  Procedures for requiring a host to test the reachability of
  alternate addresses are also specified.  Using this basic
  readdressing mechanism, limited forms of host mobility and
  multihoming may be performed, but detailed procedures for a full
  solution for mobility and multihoming are left for further study.
   
=> this new abstract is far better!

   Question for the chairs/AD-- what do you think about changing the
   document title at this date in the review?
   
   >  - in 5.4 page 31, I have a real concern with "the new SPI value
   >SHOULD be random" because IPsec people took a real care to
   >*never* put such a constraint on SPI values. I simply propose
   >to not specify how to choose a new SPI value (out of the reserved
   >range of course)
   
   AFAIK, this comes from even the very first drafts on HIP by Bob
   Moskowitz in 1999.  The SPI is being used as an endpoint selector.  I do
   not know the security assumptions that led Bob to recommend the "SHOULD"
   but I will ask.
   
=> I asked in the IPsec list whether SPIs should be random and the answer
was a loud *no*. IMHO there is not good reason to have such a constraint.
I believe we should simply ask the security ADs.
   
   >  - 3.2.3 page 13: question: what happens for addresses which are not
   >in a locator? This is a generic issue, if we want to avoid 
   > this case
   >the address selection rules (RFC 3484) should be prepended with a
   >rule limiting the candidate set to locators
   
   I think the question is whether a host may use an address that was not
   learned during the base exchange or through the LOCATOR parameter.  I
   would suggest that such addresses, if learned out-of-band from the
   mechanisms specified herein, be treated as UNVERIFIED addresses.  
   
=> this is only a half solution as the interaction between the LOCATOR
notion (including the status) and the RFC 3484 has to be specified
(note this is an issue of RFC 3484: as soon as something new is introduced
the rule sets, which are in a standard track document, have to be amended
by another document at a similar level...). I can see you understand
the problem in the new P flag text.

   If my proposed changes above are acceptable, the current open issues
   are:
   1) whether the title should be changed
   2) the "SHOULD" for setting the SPI value randomly
   3) the CBA draft references need to be replaced with a permanent
   citation
   4) should addresses learned out-of-band be treated as UNVERIFIED, and
   words to that effect be put in the draft?
   
=> fine with me.

Thanks

[EMAIL PROTECTED]


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[Gen-art] Gen-art review of draft-ietf-rmt-fec-bb-revised-06

2007-04-10 Thread Elwyn Davies

I have been selected as the General Area Review Team (Gen-ART)
reviewer for this draft (for background on Gen-ART, please see
http://www.alvestrand.no/ietf/gen/art/gen-art-FAQ.html).

Please resolve these comments along with any other Last Call comments
you may receive.


Document: draft-ietf-rmt-fec-bb-revised-06.txt
Reviewer: Elwyn Davies
Review Date:  11 April 2007
IETF LC End Date: 12 April 2007
IESG Telechat date: (if known) -

Summary:
Almost ready for PS.  There are some minor issues and editorial nits that 
should be addressed before it goes to the IESG.

Comments:

Minor Issues:
s6:  As well as data packets, para 1 introduces session-control and 
feedback packets, but then para 4 says that we are specifying stuff 
about data packets.  Session-control and feedback packets disappear into 
the void.  Some words about what is or is not specified about these 
other kinds of packets would help - even if only to say they are out of 
scope.


s6.1:  The implication of the last para is that an 8 bit field is enough 
to hold the FEC Encoding ID (confirmed more or less in 6.2.3).  2 * 128 
possible values may be enough but given that proprietary schemes are 
allowed and lots of different CDPs might have different schemes, one 
wonders if this might be constraining - and I see no means of expanding 
the range. Justify?  Also there isn't an experimental range.


s6.2.1, para 4: Make it explicit whether the choice of (a) or (b) for 
the encoding is allowed to be per object or per CDP/FEC Scheme.  Even 
though it is probably obvious, it would be wise to state that if there 
is an option the CDP has to provide means to transmit which choice has 
been made.


s6.2.1, last para: The statements about the length of the field read as 
if there has been previous statements about the length of Common Object 
encodings.  There hasn't been.  Either reword to cover all lengths here 
or add words to the earlier paragraphs about the Common Objects.


s6.3:  I would have expected (I think) that a maximum range for FEC 
Payload IDs should be given to give a hint to CDPs on the field size 
needed, but I may be wrong - perhaps some words of explanation as to why 
it is not needed (if that is the case) would help others.


s11: Should we still be, even indirectly, suggesting that MD5 would be a 
suitable hash functtion?


Editorial
=
Global: s/[Aa]n FEC/[Aa] FEC/ (OK, maybe an sounds more euphonious but 
it is wrong).  I'm sure the RFC Editor will have a view.


Global: Prefer octet rather than byte.

s1: It would be good to explicitly state the section (4.2 I assume) of 
RFC 3048 ([10]) which this draft covers.


s1: Worth expanding RMT for future generations (or remove the note about 
the wg that produced it).


s1, para 6: Helpful to add a forward ref to s4 or s6.1 where 
Fully/Under-Specified are defined.


s4, para 1:  'A FEC code is a valuable component...':  I am not sure if 
this the best phraseology.  Maybe: A FEC coding scheme is a valuable 
component...  Actually I found the term 'FEC code' somewhat distracting 
throughout - it doesn't sound quite right when referring to the adjuncts 
needed to provide the extra FEC information and the encoding used to 
generate them.


s4, para 4: s/ancilliary/anciliary/ (last instance)

s5, para 1: Might be good to refer explicitly to s3.2 of RFC 2357.


s6.1, para 5: s/FEc/FEC/

s6.2.2, paras 2 and 3:  It would be better to start these paras with 
'Any' rather than 'The'.  At present it is very easy to read paras 2 and 
3 as contradictory.


s6.2.4, last para: s/EXT-FTI/EXT_FTI/.  Also need to expand LCT acronym.

s6.3, last para:  The term 'systematic FEC codes' appears to be a term 
of art that is not defined.  Explanation would be appreciated.


s11: s/to many receivers/at many receivers/


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