Re: [geo] The Common Law of Geoengineering: Building an Effective Governance for Stratospheric Injections; Edward J. Larson

[Ronal W. Larson]

Dr.  Reynolds, cc list

1.  Thanks for your responses and for identifying the (free) Tracy 
Hester article “Remaking the World to Save It: Applying U.S. Environmental Laws 
to Climate Engineering Projects” is at:

http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1982&context=elq

I am unqualified to comment on any of the legal issues/topics raised, 
but can see that there is going to be an interesting legal journey ahead for 
the SRM part of climate engineering - in all sorts of courts.  Thanks for your 
own work in this area

2.  I had thought there was no similar legal analysis for biochar, but 
did find these two (both free) at the IBI bibliography.

a.   ADJUSTING CARBON MANAGEMENT POLICIES TO ENCOURAGE RENEWABLE, NET-NEGATIVE 
PROJECTS SUCH AS BIOCHAR SEQUESTRATION, Fruth, Darrell A., and Ponzi Joseph A. 
, William Mitchell Law Review, p.992-1013, (2010)
http://open.wmitchell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1350&context=wmlr

b.   T Laer, P Smedt, F Ronsse, G Ruysschaert… - GCB …, 2015
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/store/10./gcbb.12114/asset/gcbb12114.pdf?v=1&t=iay10ior&s=2a72a9241bf6968fdcb48ffc99448b8ea55315de

3.  The second of these, coming from Belgium, made a major point about 
the relationship of biochar to the word “waste”.  They cited this article, 
which was free only for the first page:
https://www.kluwerlawonline.com/abstract.php?id=EELR2009020&PHPSESSID=26959rr9pksp2ejai75ntph7s7

4.  I thought, without reading any carefully, all of the above were 
trying to be helpful - and so would still like to hear more on likely future 
legal challenges to (not support for) biochar - and in general to all the CDR 
approaches.  There are numerous biochar trials occurring now - and I am unaware 
of any major hurdles to those taking place.  For sure there are issues related 
to accreditation.  I know of two lawsuits against biochar promoters (one on 
raising funds, one on quality of product);  unfortunate, but thank goodness 
neither is of the public welfare type that the above publications are 
addressing.

Ron



On Jun 15, 2015, at 3:02 AM, J.L. Reynolds  wrote:

> Ron and others,
>  
> The final paragraph of the paper and the sentence which you cite below lead 
> to numerous further details and caveats. Briefly, national and subnational 
> (e.g. US states) laws are binding on individuals and backed by the implicit 
> threat of force. Some of these could be immediately adapted with varying 
> degrees of ease to climate engineering (CE), broadly defined. For example, 
> the paper cites (via Tracy Hester) the application of US Clean Air Act and 
> stratospheric aerosol injection, and Texas case law with respect to weather 
> modification. Further, nations and subnational units can implement new 
> legislation (and case law) on a moderate time frame, depending on the urgency 
> and the effectiveness of the institutions.
>  
> But national and subnational laws generally do not regulate transboundary 
> impacts, which some CE methods would have at sufficient scale. We turn to 
> international law, which is binding on states, not individuals (with few 
> exceptions), is more general, and changes much more slowly. Some components 
> of international law can also be adapted with varying degrees of ease to 
> climate engineering (CE). The paper cites some of these. However, the 
> national governments generally must implement these international commitments 
> in some way. And due to the absence of centralized enforcer, states have much 
> ‘wiggle room’ in how they implement their commitments.
>  
> This is a long way to get to your question. In the short term, national and 
> subnational law is probably more important for regulating CE. This is both 
> because this law is binding on individuals and because in the short term CE 
> will likely not have transboundary impacts (e.g. most CDR, and small scale 
> SRM field tests). In the long term, existing and possibly new international 
> law will provide guidance and perhaps even some sort of regulatory system. In 
> the even longer term, looking toward a scenario of global SRM implementation, 
> I am of the mind that international politics ultimately trumps international 
> law, although the latter can provide guidance and can influence state 
> behaviour at the margin.
>  
> Cheers,
> -Jesse
>  
> -
> Jesse L. Reynolds, PhD
> Postdoctoral researcher
> Research funding coordinator, sustainability and climate
> European and International Public Law
> Tilburg Sustainability Center
> Tilburg University, The Netherlands
> Book review editor, Law, Innovation, and Technology
> email: j.l.reyno...@uvt.nl  
> http://works.bepress.com/jessreyn/
>  
> From: Ronal W. Larson [mailto:rongretlar...@comcast.net] 
> Sent: 15 June 2015 02:30
> To: J.L. Reynolds
> Cc: Geoengineering; ed.lar...@pepperdine.edu
> Subject: Re: [geo] The Common Law of Geoengineering: Bu

Counter "culture of absurd caution" RE: [geo] Harvard Kennedy School - David Keith, Shaking the Establishment

[markcapron]

Andrew,Concerning the "culture of absurd caution" - more of us might want to suggest our government agencies employ a different R&D agreement mechanism.  DOE recently requested feedback on how they could do a better job funding R&D.  One of the categories was "Agreement Mechanism."  The mechanism I suggested could be applied for any CO2 capture technology.  One would substitute $/ton of C stored into the energy example I used.  If thickening Arctic sea ice, one might substitute $/hectare of ice cover increased from Summer 2014 minimum:Agreement mechanisms – Current agreements which pay a large
fraction of R&D costs are appropriate for early stage R&D.  The loan program is Ok for really large ($100
million) late-stage full scale production projects.  DOE should add another kind of agreement for
moving technologies from about Technical Readiness Level 4-5 to TRL 8-9.  That is: if it works, DOE pays.  If it doesn’t work, DOE doesn’t pay. Many
of DOE’s potential partners and customers hit a wall when the project cost is
$1m to $20m and technology is unproven at that scale.  The potential customers (particularly local
governments) do not want to chance even an “only pay, if it works” because they
cannot define “works” within their infrastructure due to uncertainties on
possible interactions with existing infrastructure.  (It’s a question of going first.  Customers need large rewards to overcome
their aversion to going first on a new technology.)  Investors for the technology provider would
be willing to accept an “only paid, if it works” contract, but only if the rewards
justify the risks. For
example – The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory’s hydrothermal
waste-to-energy process combined with an ammonia, phosphorus, potassium and
other metals recovery process appears economically viable on Guam.  But the first $10 million TRL 7 demonstration
to transform wastewater treatment plant sludge and used lubrication oils into
electricity has insufficient reward, given the first-time risk, for both
customers and investors.  Once past the
first-time risk, it can grow to transform general wet organic municipal
waste-to-energy in Guam and Hawaii.  Then
grow to transform global wastes (particularly refugee camps) to energy.  Then become a component for converting ocean
nutrient deserts into food, energy, and ocean acidification solving ecosystems. Solution
– Increase the rewards of the project, while reducing DOE’s risk.  Facilitate “only pay, if it works” contracts
by offering to increase the reward on a unit quantity basis.  In the Guam example, DOE might contribute
$0.05/kWh for ten years of produced energy, paid to the Guam Power Authority as
it is produced by the Guam Power Authority from the hydrothermal biogas.DOE risk tolerance – See above agreement mechanism.  Use “only pay for useful products” contracts
with a minimum of application paperwork to sidestep risk assessments.  Aim for, advertise, and recruit for a 50%
failure rate.  It’s not DOE money on the
line for a failure.  Ideally, the
RDD&D providers and their investors select themselves.  DOE tweaks the ease of application and tunes
the incentives to compensate for the 50% failure rate. DOE
can also negotiate more technologies into projects.  For example, suppose DOE wants to prototype a
1 MW fuel cell for combined heat and power. 
DOE might convince the parties participating in the Guam project to
employ the fuel cell by increasing DOE’s ten-year electricity subsidy.  (The hydrothermal process needs
high-temperature waste heat, like that from many fuel cells.) 







DOE might need to set aside
10% of project costs for the customer (not the technology provider) to use when
removing “didn’t work” projects.













 Mark E. Capron, PEVentura, Californiawww.PODenergy.org


 Original Message 
Subject: [geo] Harvard Kennedy School - David Keith, Shaking the
Establishment
From: Andrew Lockley 
Date: Mon, June 15, 2015 12:07 am
To: geoengineering 

http://www.hks.harvard.edu/news-events/news/articles/david-keith Extract Planning his next Arctic wilderness trip. Keith says we’re at an environmental inflection point. Despite promising technology and social movements that will nudge smarter policies, public investment in focused energy R&D is “pitifully small” – less than we spend on nuclear weapons development. Given the importance of these efforts, Keith says, “that’s just goofy.” Culture of “absurd caution” Even more important than higher budgets, he says, is something counterintuitive: higher tolerance for failure. A major contributor of technological stagnation, he argues, is a “culture of absurd caution.” Scientific institutions like NASA and parts of DOE have become bureaucracies with minimal tolerance for failure. “If failure cannot be tolerated,” Keith says, “then you are certain to avoid success.” This culture cannot be changed by blaming agencies. Government leaders need the

[geo] Climate Engineering Symposium (Berlin, Jul) registration deadline is today

[Andrew Lockley]

Climate Engineering Symposium (Berlin, Jul) registration deadline is today
: http://t.co/GohQJNdc1S

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RE: [geo] The Common Law of Geoengineering: Building an Effective Governance for Stratospheric Injections; Edward J. Larson

[J.L. Reynolds]

Ron and others,

The final paragraph of the paper and the sentence which you cite below lead to 
numerous further details and caveats. Briefly, national and subnational (e.g. 
US states) laws are binding on individuals and backed by the implicit threat of 
force. Some of these could be immediately adapted with varying degrees of ease 
to climate engineering (CE), broadly defined. For example, the paper cites (via 
Tracy Hester) the application of US Clean Air Act and stratospheric aerosol 
injection, and Texas case law with respect to weather modification. Further, 
nations and subnational units can implement new legislation (and case law) on a 
moderate time frame, depending on the urgency and the effectiveness of the 
institutions.

But national and subnational laws generally do not regulate transboundary 
impacts, which some CE methods would have at sufficient scale. We turn to 
international law, which is binding on states, not individuals (with few 
exceptions), is more general, and changes much more slowly. Some components of 
international law can also be adapted with varying degrees of ease to climate 
engineering (CE). The paper cites some of these. However, the national 
governments generally must implement these international commitments in some 
way. And due to the absence of centralized enforcer, states have much 'wiggle 
room' in how they implement their commitments.

This is a long way to get to your question. In the short term, national and 
subnational law is probably more important for regulating CE. This is both 
because this law is binding on individuals and because in the short term CE 
will likely not have transboundary impacts (e.g. most CDR, and small scale SRM 
field tests). In the long term, existing and possibly new international law 
will provide guidance and perhaps even some sort of regulatory system. In the 
even longer term, looking toward a scenario of global SRM implementation, I am 
of the mind that international politics ultimately trumps international law, 
although the latter can provide guidance and can influence state behaviour at 
the margin.

Cheers,
-Jesse

-
Jesse L. Reynolds, PhD
Postdoctoral researcher
Research funding coordinator, sustainability and climate
European and International Public Law
Tilburg Sustainability Center
Tilburg University, The Netherlands
Book review editor, Law, Innovation, and Technology
email: j.l.reyno...@uvt.nl
http://works.bepress.com/jessreyn/

From: Ronal W. Larson [mailto:rongretlar...@comcast.net]
Sent: 15 June 2015 02:30
To: J.L. Reynolds
Cc: Geoengineering; ed.lar...@pepperdine.edu
Subject: Re: [geo] The Common Law of Geoengineering: Building an Effective 
Governance for Stratospheric Injections; Edward J. Larson

Dr.  Reynolds, cc List   (adding Prof. Ed Larson as a courtesy cc)

1.  Thanks for forwarding this Edward Larson paper (which cites you 
three times).   Being a non-lawyer, I thought it well referenced on SRM (but 
wished there were more on CDR legalities).

2.  Do you agree with the final two sentences of this paper, which 
say (perhaps new, emphases added), referring  (I believe only) to SRM:  " In 
the absence of a rational international governance regime, which appears 
unattainable at present, existing national environmental statutes and state 
common law may offer our only starting point for regulation. We must work with 
what we have even as we hope for more. "

3.  I have been assuming that only international bodies would be 
involved - so this conclusion is new.  Any opinion (from anyone) on how those 
two (non-international) courts might rule on SRM?

4.  I presume these two sentences would apply also to CDR; that an 
international court would only rarely (as for OIF) act on a CDR approach.  But 
any thoughts on how any non-international court might rule on CDR issues - 
where negative impacts should be generally seen by only one party?

Ron



On Jun 6, 2015, at 7:36 AM, J.L. Reynolds 
mailto:j.l.reyno...@uvt.nl>> wrote:


A paper is attached. Disclaimer: I've not yet read it.
Cheers
-Jesse

The COMMON LAW OF GEOENGINEERING
BUILDING AN EFFECTIVE GOVERNANCE FOR STRATOSPHERIC INJECTIONS
EDWARD J. LARSON
Pepperdine University School of Law
A landmark report by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) issued in 2015
is the latest in a series of scientific studies to assess the feasibility of 
geoengineering
with stratospheric aerosols to offset anthropogenic global warming and to
conclude that they offers a possibly viable supplement or back-up alternative 
to 329
reducing carbon dioxide emissions. Evidence for this once taboo form of climate
intervention relies heavily on the known past effect of major explosive volcanic
eruptions to moderate average worldwide temperatures temporarily. In the
most extensive study to date, an elite NAS committee now suggests that such
processes for adjusting global temp

[geo] Harvard Kennedy School - David Keith, Shaking the Establishment

[Andrew Lockley]

http://www.hks.harvard.edu/news-events/news/articles/david-keith

Extract

Planning his next Arctic wilderness trip.
Keith says we’re at an environmental inflection point. Despite promising
technology and social movements that will nudge smarter policies, public
investment in focused energy R&D is “pitifully small” – less than we spend
on nuclear weapons development. Given the importance of these efforts,
Keith says, “that’s just goofy.”

Culture of “absurd caution”

Even more important than higher budgets, he says, is something
counterintuitive: higher tolerance for failure. A major contributor of
technological stagnation, he argues, is a “culture of absurd caution.”
Scientific institutions like NASA and parts of DOE have become
bureaucracies with minimal tolerance for failure. “If failure cannot be
tolerated,” Keith says, “then you are certain to avoid success.”

This culture cannot be changed by blaming agencies. Government leaders need
the courage to reframe fiascos like Solyndra as part of the discovery
process. And Congress must prioritize a culture of competitiveness over
“gotcha” hearings when things go wrong. Without such a shift, Keith says,
America will lose the innovation race with China.

Keith is doing his part, working to build momentum for a once-taboo
technology that could be one of our most effective tactics against climate
change: solar geoengineering, also known as solar radiation management
(SRM). In a nutshell, SRM injects aerosols into the stratosphere to block a
portion of inbound sunlight, reversing the warming effect of carbon
emissions.

SRM manages the symptoms of greenhouse gases only; it does not undo decades
of damaging greenhouse gases, nor does it obviate the need for huge efforts
to lower carbon emissions. Still, at a time when even the most aggressive
global carbon treaties simply stop the problem from getting worse at a
faster rate, Keith says this low-cost, high-impact technology represents
one of the few tools we have to stop the planet’s dangerous warming.

Benefits and Risks

He is up-front about the risks of SRM, both to nature and national
security, in which states could be drawn into conflict over earth’s
thermostat. The need for greater clarity about both SRM’s promise and
potential pitfalls, Keith says, are exactly why governments should support
controlled experiments. Dispassionate analysis soon, he argues, will save
us from desperate, ill-considered measures later. Meanwhile, Keith is
leading a fundraising effort for Harvard’s own geoengineering initiative.

Keith is mindful that technological innovation alone won’t solve our
climate problems. “There is absolutely no possibility of this issue getting
solved by some kind of policy-free technology invention,” Keith says. “It’s
all about policy.” Carbon, he explains, is basically a global public good.
“We have to coordinate the provision of this public good. It’s a free-rider
problem.”

To address this, policymakers must establish a carbon price. Despite major
political barriers, Kieth says even conservatives who find “carbon taxes” a
non-starter should embrace a competitive policy that would diminish today’s
crony capitalism and lobbying-driven subsidies.

Just as the Belfer Center took the lead in confronting nuclear weapons and
nuclear proliferation, Keith hopes the Center will lead the effort to
reduce the dangers of climate change. Stronger programs to help students
gain mastery at the intersection of policy and science, he argues, are a
must for Harvard Kennedy School. “We need the convening power of the
Kennedy School to bear on the cutting edge of science and technology.”

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[geo] Why don't we just terraform Earth? — Hopes&Fears — flow "Science"

[Andrew Lockley]

http://www.hopesandfears.com/hopes/future/science/213981-terraform-earth

Why don't we just terraform Earth?
YESTERDAY

Chris McKay
Senior scientist at NASA's
Planetary Systems Branch

MCKAY'S RESEARCH focuses on the evolution of the solar system and the
origin of life. McKay is currently involved in planning future Mars
missions and has authored a number of studies on terraforming Mars as well
as geo-engineering Earth.

When Elon Musk launches his rocket out to retire onto the
possibly-habitable wilds of Mars, one can safely assume that you and I and
everyone we know will not be on that flight.

Nor will 50 million climate change refugees, like the people of the
Carteret Islands, whose home is expected to go completely underwater this
year. If it's possible to alter an entire planet's climate to make it
habitable, then why doesn't our news feed fixate on renovating Earth?
Amongst armageddon prophecies of climate change's global environmental
destruction, is our desire to start over on Mars– terraforming an entire
planetary atmosphere from scratch– a basic concession that Earth's
non-super rich are evolution's losers?

In the past few years, science has lurched closer to envisioning habitable
Mars, though at the moment estimates for creating breathable oxygen range
from hundreds to 100,000 years in the future, the soil is currently toxic
to astronauts, and travel is so unwieldy that scientists have proposed
"printing" humans on Mars. Meanwhile, I wondered why not make Earth's
increasingly inhospitable deserts greener.

We talked to NASA scientist Christopher McKay, who has written a number of
studies and articles on geo-engineering and terraforming. This includes
co-authoring an early influential article "Making Mars Habitable," which
was released two years before Kim Stanley Robinson's Mars Trilogy captured
the public's imagination. Below, we discuss renegade attempts to fertilize
the ocean, plans to spray aerosols into the atmosphere, the delicate
balance of climate alterations, as well as a realistic timeline for blue
Mars.

HOPES&FEARS: Five years ago, the public probably would have laughed off the
idea of somebody like Elon Musk, for example, saying "I'd like to retire on
Mars.” Have you seen a major shift in people's ideas about how seriously
they should take terraforming? And how feasible it actually could be to
intentionally design a planet's atmosphere?

CHRIS MCKAY: Well, on Earth, geo-engineering is taken very seriously. As
you may remember, there was a group up in British Columbia that tried to
take geo-engineering into their own hands by dumping a lot of iron in an
attempt to fertilize the ocean. It is certainly feasible, and, as some
would argue, it's desirable.

>From a scientist's point of view, there's no difference between physics of
doing something unintentionally or intentionally. From a public policy
point of view, there's a big difference, obviously. That is where the
debate is focusing– should we take up geo-engineering as a matter of policy?

Somebody saying "I want to go live on Mars" was just silly ten years ago–
how are you going to get there? Musk, by himself, has made it credible. His
company has done things that previously were considered only doable by
nation states, for example, putting a capsule in orbit around the Earth and
bring it safely back. John Glenn got a ticker tape parade for doing that.
Yuri Gagarin and Sputnik, that was all he did: get launched, go around the
Earth a few times, and land on land, and it revolutionized the world. The
Chinese did it a few years ago, to much fanfare. Orbiting and safely
returning a capsule was always considered an entry-level move by a nation
as it develops its space capability. To everyone's surprise, Elon Musk, a
single individual, formed a private company, and he did it in just a few
years with spectacular success.

Nobody laughs anymore at Musk saying "I'm going to go retire on Mars,"
because he is doing what previously we thought only national programs could
do.
— Spraying atmospheric aerosols has been compared to the cooling effects of
aerosols emitted by volcanos. The eruption of Mount Pinatubo in 1991
created a stratospheric aerosol layer which caused a global cooling.

H&F: About the idea of moving to Mars– because of the toxic chemical
perchlorate, the soil on Mars would be considered toxic if it were on
Earth. That makes me wonder how much more possible it would be to make the
Sahara, for example, a thriving rainforest versus terraforming all of Mars?
Is it possible to terraform locally?

CHRIS MCKAY: Well, first of all, perchlorate in the soil makes it toxic,
but I don't think it ends the discussion of terraforming. It just adds both
challenge and an opportunity. I co-authored a research paper in which we
found that though it would be hazardous to astronauts, it could be an
important source of oxygen.

In answer to your question about terraforming locally, it is possible to go
to Mars and create a large scale ecosystem i