Re: Key Revocation
On Fri, Apr 20, 2007 at 10:40:19PM -0500, Chris wrote:
> I 'assume' at the "Command>" prompt I'd enter adduid and my new
> embarqmail.com address.
Yes.
> Once that is done, in order to make it the primary key would I then
> have to again run gpg --edit-key and my new uid and at the Command>
> prompt enter primary?
This will work, but you don't actually have to do it. The most
recently added user ID is automatically treated as the primary if
there is no primary set. If you want to set it anyway, just select
the new uid ("uid 1") and enter "primary".
> If I understand this right I'll still be using the same key only
> with a different address. Since I've now, hopefully, made my embarq
> address my primary is it just a simple matter of exporting this to
> the keyservers? Then later down the road when I'm sure that all
> mailing lists and so forth have changed to the new address I just
> run all the above and at the Command> prompt run revuid
> [EMAIL PROTECTED]
You select the user id with "uid x" where x is the number of the user
ID. Then "revuid".
David
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Re: Key Revocation
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 Chris wrote: > I'll be changing over to my new email address tomorrow so I want to make sure > I understand the procedure. According to the manpage I want to run $gpg > --edit-key [EMAIL PROTECTED] I'm then presented with this info: > > [EMAIL PROTECTED] ~]$ gpg --edit-key [EMAIL PROTECTED] > gpg (GnuPG) 1.4.6; Copyright (C) 2006 Free Software Foundation, Inc. > This program comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY. > This is free software, and you are welcome to redistribute it > under certain conditions. See the file COPYING for details. > > Secret key is available. > > pub 1024D/98E6705C created: 2005-11-23 expires: never usage: SCA > trust: ultimate validity: ultimate > > Command> > > I 'assume' at the "Command>" prompt I'd enter adduid and my new > embarqmail.com > address. Once that is done, in order to make it the primary key would I then > have to again run gpg --edit-key and my new uid and at the Command> prompt > enter primary? If I understand this right I'll still be using the same key > only with a different address. Since I've now, hopefully, made my embarq > address my primary is it just a simple matter of exporting this to the > keyservers? Then later down the road when I'm sure that all mailing lists > and so forth have changed to the new address I just run all the above and at > the Command> prompt run revuid [EMAIL PROTECTED] Please let me know if > I've got something wrong in the way I understand this. Just type "adduid" (w/o quotes) then follow the prompts to Enter the Name; Comment & Email Address. For "Comment" You may either leave it blank or put whatever. You might wish to use this to say: New Email Address Whatever is in the Comment field here will have no effect upon the Key. It is for informational purposes only; but remember, it *cannot* be changed or Deleted in the future without re-creating another UID! You will then be prompted to Enter the Passphrase and then be returned to the Command Prompt. At this time Your Key will be showing _both_ UID's. You may then either type "save" and be done or; type "2" and see the asterisk appear next to the New UID. Then type "primary" and change the New UID to the Primary UID at this time. Then type "save" and have it all done at one time. Later, You can decide whether or not You wish to Revoke the Old UID or simply Disable it. Opinions will vary and I won't suggest either one. Just remember to ignore the quotes I've placed around the commands I listed above. :) JOHN ;) Timestamp: Saturday 21 Apr 2007, 00:11 --400 (Eastern Daylight Time) -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v1.4.8-svn4485: (MingW32) Comment: Public Key at: http://tinyurl.com/8cpho Comment: Gossamer Spider Web of Trust: http://www.gswot.org Comment: My Homepage: http://tinyurl.com/yzhbhx iQEcBAEBCgAGBQJGKY8lAAoJEBCGy9eAtCsPvZgH/jk/VRsS7sSoSJTJv1OZdQMS IFI3VXoTkaozFbcxkKWYwFhv3cwTUM98h99Q5namr0rLJG0K/vEU8jlLvHUjlDCW jLvQv6ryqsg+PdjdxdqmyMujYKlaVwBchR23/jiCLblp9POU1yqstefMIOlm7aeO Zdd/JOzyCjsfSBQrdzWlRFIVt3LMIYn1pT0gg7ghjdogBjMgBiNV/b2jXYq9EKLr UizD6+oGxzyWDtAAWmAaPtuXUSt2ZbIs5ydbFB0eYUTL6MqpDZPsQXZMYDUgKJcO KA741eo/FyoJDoJqZnHTlPBfexHs8qA6IEmqRoVtKRfTmB3wB1AbdhRyFT1ts/M= =N33i -END PGP SIGNATURE- ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Key Revocation
On Friday 13 April 2007 11:36 pm, John Clizbe wrote: > Chris wrote: > > This may sound simple, but I want to make sure I get it done right. My > > ISP/DSL provider, Embarq, has dumped Earthlink as their mail provider > > sine 9 April and setup their own mail servers. Simple, revoke the EL key > > and make a new key for Embarq, except, the two have come to an agreement > > and that is that Earthlink will continue to forward mail for Embarq users > > until 31 Oct. Question being do I keep the Earthlink key and also > > generate one for my Embarq address or once I have everything setup for > > the Embarq servers generate one for Embarq and at that time reovke the > > Earthlink key? > > Why revoke and create a new key? Why not just add the new address on a new > UID, and make it primary. Sometime between now and Oct 31, you can revoke > the old UID. > > My AT&T address became Comcast; that became Roadrunner. > > Same person. Same key. Just a new email address. Plus the revoked address > gives clueful folks the hint that email shouldn't be sent there. I'll be changing over to my new email address tomorrow so I want to make sure I understand the procedure. According to the manpage I want to run $gpg --edit-key [EMAIL PROTECTED] I'm then presented with this info: [EMAIL PROTECTED] ~]$ gpg --edit-key [EMAIL PROTECTED] gpg (GnuPG) 1.4.6; Copyright (C) 2006 Free Software Foundation, Inc. This program comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY. This is free software, and you are welcome to redistribute it under certain conditions. See the file COPYING for details. Secret key is available. pub 1024D/98E6705C created: 2005-11-23 expires: never usage: SCA trust: ultimate validity: ultimate Command> I 'assume' at the "Command>" prompt I'd enter adduid and my new embarqmail.com address. Once that is done, in order to make it the primary key would I then have to again run gpg --edit-key and my new uid and at the Command> prompt enter primary? If I understand this right I'll still be using the same key only with a different address. Since I've now, hopefully, made my embarq address my primary is it just a simple matter of exporting this to the keyservers? Then later down the road when I'm sure that all mailing lists and so forth have changed to the new address I just run all the above and at the Command> prompt run revuid [EMAIL PROTECTED] Please let me know if I've got something wrong in the way I understand this. Thanks Chris -- Chris KeyID 0xE372A7DA98E6705C pgp3Eqn3ExQXa.pgp Description: PGP signature ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Movies that get it right
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 Robert J. Hansen wrote: > And while we're handing out movie recommendations, try for a 1974 > Francis Ford Coppola movie called "The Conversation". Easily the > best fictional movie I've ever seen about real-world communications > security. Actually, "The Conversation" is a lovely real world example of why SIGINT without HUMINT is an inferior intelligence gathering operation. Machines will never totally replace the Human Brain. Relying sole upon Intercepts definitely lead to a bad conclusion for the Character played by Gene Hackman. One time pads, while theoretically perfect, are most vulnerable to "Man-in-the-Middle" attacks. Research the damage the Walker's did to US Naval Communications. JOHN ;) Timestamp: Friday 20 Apr 2007, 16:28 --400 (Eastern Daylight Time) -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v1.4.8-svn4485: (MingW32) Comment: Public Key at: http://tinyurl.com/8cpho Comment: Gossamer Spider Web of Trust: http://www.gswot.org Comment: My Homepage: http://tinyurl.com/yzhbhx iQEcBAEBCgAGBQJGKSJZAAoJEBCGy9eAtCsPQ/EH/jNkkCbo567Udxh/kallkDFn spcUi0KuN4M78zcYbu5Gc+lmymP76kNqHLJZC3IMEg6gyUrtoS791wZrznWbf6D7 MWA/EYWYnbPTLI9iUyLZhX5P4T3O5AC5mktMEmjpcF/3Pp5k2bdYce5Bm8/Z9QDW 8QcApkvzab147deTJBVqWrTF58WeES5GeigHQPIiLjRR7tTY9D7FLy4BUnF/PV5p 3I5Yxv7ENHQtM0nd+PhFlaHOP88jqDDXFV1C3af4TAMSzCbMrLpavqi/3oIx5NkH jpH9X1YSnG5DX/2KCPsZRZX0Y72AlyqD7Sn1r3YZcrhEURjjScP1s9HFMvMKYbI= =NXoW -END PGP SIGNATURE- ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Movies that get it right
> OpenPGP and GPG is about making the idea-based mathematic apparatus > suited to survive in the real world. If you want to see what it takes, > find a movie called "In ascolto" or "The Listening" (it was shot in > Italy by Italians, and was released both in Italian and English), it > is a somewhat loose on technical side, but shows the difference > between mathematical/theoretical and real life security. P2P file > details on (encrypted) request. And while we're handing out movie recommendations, try for a 1974 Francis Ford Coppola movie called "The Conversation". Easily the best fictional movie I've ever seen about real-world communications security. Phil Alden Robinson's 1992 movie "Sneakers" is also appropriate here, although "Sneakers" is a little inferior to "The Conversation". Both those movies are absolutely brilliant when it comes to the subject of communications security. http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0071360/ http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0105435/ ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Quantum computing
On Fri, Apr 20, 2007 at 01:57:46PM +0200, Anders Breindahl wrote: > Saying that ``there is no such thing'' seems harsh and as if you ignore > reality. The European Union put its hopes up for implementing a > ``quantum cryptography'' network of communications. That sort of makes > the term real in itself. This is because they are a governement and gov't usually wants to have super secure comm network for gov't super secret communication. > However, quantum cryptography does have that nice inherent benefit, that > it _can't_ be eavesdropped, according to said article. That is, after > authenticity has been established and the line has been paid for: It can be eavesdropped, but it is impossible to intercept information that way and the eavesdropping is detectable. Or rather should be: eavesdropping on QC link is detectable if by rule single photons are used as transmission units. This is because there's no way to intercept a photon and reinject it without destroying its quantum state. However, in commercial installations pulses (batches of photons) are used, so its perfectly possible to intercept a piece of the pulse. My quantum-fu is too weak to really know if this makes the eavesdropping undetectable, but the intuition says that yes. > I suppose that this is the feature that got the European Union's > attention. EU is know for sinking money in very bizarre projects. > But the attractive part of focusing on the mathematical aspects are that > -- if provable -- it could give some guarantee ( > reassurance) > of the unbreakability of the ciphers out there. > > You may not be interested in that, but I am. I too however neither will > end up a mathematician whose life is focused on solving some single > problem. > > But I would be interested in the result. I could pick the cipher that > provably could withstand any battering thinkable over the cipher that > perhaps couldn't. But the point is that the ciphers live in the real world and in the real world it is much easier to do HUMINT (like "ale and whores" mentioned before, or rubberhose cryptanalysis) instead of trying to break the mathematically unbreakable. Be it provably unbreakable or not. OpenPGP and GPG is about making the idea-based mathematic apparatus suited to survive in the real world. If you want to see what it takes, find a movie called "In ascolto" or "The Listening" (it was shot in Italy by Italians, and was released both in Italian and English), it is a somewhat loose on technical side, but shows the difference between mathematical/theoretical and real life security. P2P file details on (encrypted) request. Alex -- JID: [EMAIL PROTECTED] PGP: 0x46399138 od zwracania uwagi na detale są lekarze, adwokaci, programiści i zegarmistrze -- Czerski ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Quantum computing
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 > Yeah, again. I completely agree on the practical aspect of it, but > would > nevertheless like to see proofs of complexity that weren't > dependent on > the current models of computations. I don't mean to sound flip, but as soon as you invent a hypercomputer I would love to revisit this issue with you. For now, all our computational theoretic proofs will be limited by the the lambda calculus. I don't mean to sound blunt there, but our current model of computation is extraordinarily robust, and there are very strong arguments that hypercomputation is both physically and mathematically impossible. (If any problem in UNDECIDABLE can be solved by an oracle, then math goes from incomplete and inconsistent straight into pervasively self-contradictory and broken. That's the rationale for hypercomputation being physically and mathematically impossible.) > I was referring to the subject that is mentioned on the Wikipedia > page: > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_cryptography Wikipedia is not an authoritative reference. "Quantum cryptography" is a nice catchphrase. I'm unaware of any respected authority in the field of crypto who takes the phrase seriously. The phrase is used in nontechnical media, and in that environment its usage is probably defensible. After all, people reading the newspaper don't want to be bothered with the details of what QKE is all about. But we're trying to be precise here, and for that reason, let's not talk about quantum cryptography. Let's be precise and talk about QKE. > Contrary to one time pads, which are provably secure -- where > ``secure'' > means ``unbreakable from theoretical standpoint, but with no thought > given to practical limits''. > > I was told that one time pads were also used by the KGB, by the way. > Mini-books whose pages were to be burned after using. The NSA was breaking the KGB's one-time pads. Look into Project VENONA. Soviet cipher clerks were making technical errors in using their one-time pads and the NSA was able to start reading their traffic. So yeah, I'm not sure why you want flawless perfect proofs of security when reality shows that provably secure systems never are. > Though it sounds sweet, it's beyond the scope of cryptography to > ensure > such protection (to some extent, though, security should limit room > for > personnel ``breakage''). It's beyond the realm of mathematical cryptography, but not the field as a whole. My day job involves security analysis of electronic voting machines for the National Science Foundation [*]. We spend far, far more time scrutinizing the human side of the cryptography than the mathematical side. Probably an order of magnitude. [*] I'm not speaking for the NSF here, obviously, I'm completely responsible for any errors I make, etc., etc. -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v1.4.7 (Darwin) iQEcBAEBCgAGBQJGKOavAAoJELcA9IL+r4EJ0cUIAKtWkRqLLXEfUfUzGmCTLXep rsaxL2M3pBooQ9IIrnaTqKJxGkwyctYELZj94q+qcO+UZQ63HQGs7cslK7o1/Wyl lN23aBlio7lABDT+jqyZYg2RWj2Urb6TKpYdTqsKiYM7MA2oxLpvIw9ear5s3Nxe 33uGKb5S3rZzjoYPgz35KXaqX7Qq9STbXFkiP70PsA8CazYXo3F9Tlqa+/n2/Wwf Ti18Ga3DVjQoFx3uuU2U/+99gAQKrU9f6J6Q0N4WDFJO3Elst+7eCB89FEuoQYOl iM2/bxTvJ+2/Uk022b++nlc7agtgMtJaVTsec7mbDqyaNinD5BR3jQgRl3oG7E8= =p91A -END PGP SIGNATURE- ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: pinentry - Impossible to disable/ignore if present?
On Fri, 2007-04-20 at 16:18 +0200, Werner Koch wrote: > On Fri, 20 Apr 2007 15:34, [EMAIL PROTECTED] said: > > > So even if I prevent pinentry to show up it will eventually be > > impossible for me to provide my own callback function? > > I don't understand this. It is in general useless to tell gpg-agent not > to use pinentry for a desktop machine. For a server you want to use > gpg-preset-passpharse or - better - use no passphrase at all. OK, a little background information is in order here I think :-) I've created a little utility daemon(*) implementing a small and very simple keyring. The idea is that the keyring is given a master passphrase to unlock it's content and to encrypt new content. The content of the keyring is generally passwords. I'm using gpgme for the encryption and decryption of those passwords. I've therefore implemented a daemon that holds the master passphrase and hands it over to the gpgme framework by the use of the passphrase callback function gpgme_set_passphrase_cb(). Having pinentry pop up whenever my callback function should be invoked will therefore prevent the correct passphrase from being handed over to gpgme. I'm using my own little gtk+ dialog to query the master passphrase and content passwords from the user. Maybe I could do this differently but I really want the passphrase dialog to look exactly like the one being used by Evolution so using pinentry-gtk-2 is sub-optimal. Any ideas on how I can: 1) make gpgme use my own callback passphrase function or, 2) make gpgme always use pinentry but using a custom dialog title and question text ?? > > Will this also hold true if I use libgcrypt instead? > > Libgcrypt is a low-level library without any relation to OpenPGP or > S/MIME. It is much like libc. Looks like I need to use it if I can't prevent gpgme from launching pinentry. The drawback is a lack of sample code using libgcrypt. Any samples out there doing encryption from a small memory buffer to a file and decrypting the other way? Thanks a lot in advance, jules (*) Full source is here: http://www.omesc.com/content/downloads/dist/testing/brutus-snapshot.tar.bz2 Look in for the keyring source. A small test program is in <../keyring-test/>. ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Key signing parties
Hello, are there some mailing list / blog / ..others.. where are mentioned key signing parties ? I expected to find something at http://www.gnupg.org/ but it seems this site does not contain any info about such parties. Thanks for attention. Bye, Bruno -- PGP key ID: 0x2e604d51 Key : http://www.costacurta.org/keys/bruno_costacurta_pgp_key.html Key fingerprint = 713F 7956 9441 7DEF 58ED 1951 7E07 569B 2E60 4D51 -- pgpKRb8p2RSWs.pgp Description: PGP signature ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Key signing parties
On Fri, Apr 20, 2007 at 02:25:48PM +0200, Bruno Costacurta wrote: > Hello, > > are there some mailing list / blog / ..others.. where are mentioned key > signing parties ? > > I expected to find something at > http://www.gnupg.org/ > but it seems this site does not contain any info about such parties. Go to http://www.biglumber.com It's the perfect site for setting up and finding key signing gatherings as well as individual signature exchanges. David ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: pinentry - Impossible to disable/ignore if present?
On Fri, 20 Apr 2007 15:34, [EMAIL PROTECTED] said: > So even if I prevent pinentry to show up it will eventually be > impossible for me to provide my own callback function? I don't understand this. It is in general useless to tell gpg-agent not to use pinentry for a desktop machine. For a server you want to use gpg-preset-passpharse or - better - use no passphrase at all. > Will this also hold true if I use libgcrypt instead? Libgcrypt is a low-level library without any relation to OpenPGP or S/MIME. It is much like libc. Shalom-Salam, Werner ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: gpgsm --sign with smartcard?
On Fri, 20 Apr 2007 15:14, [EMAIL PROTECTED] said: > Neat, although I had to manually create the trustlist.txt file first. Already fixed in SVN - guess I should do a new release. Salam-Shalom, Werner ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: pinentry - Impossible to disable/ignore if present?
On Fri, 2007-04-20 at 15:06 +0200, Werner Koch wrote: > On Fri, 20 Apr 2007 14:22, [EMAIL PROTECTED] said: > > > I find that pinentry unconditionally is being launched whenever I > > attempt to encrypt or decrypt something using gpgme. > > Depends. With gpg 1.4 you need to use --use-agent. But if you are > using gpg2 the gpg-agent is required and you won't see a passphrase > callback. That is so that we eventually can move all secret key > processing into gpg-agent. So even if I prevent pinentry to show up it will eventually be impossible for me to provide my own callback function? Will this also hold true if I use libgcrypt instead? Thanks, jules ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: OpenGPG card indifferent places ?
Matthias Barmeier schrieb: > I tried to investigate what the URL should look like, but I cannot find > an example. > Could you give me some pointers or hints howto form this URL ? Just tried it out to get a quick HOWTO: Export your key, upload it to some webserver (not keyserver) and note the URL, e.g., http://example.com/mb.asc. Then put the OpenPGP card into the reader, run "gpg --card-edit" "admin" "url", enter the URL, enter the admin PIN, then "quit". On the machine you want to set-up, insert the card, run "gpg --card-edit" "fetch" "verify" enter the normal PIN and then "quit". The "verify" will create the secret key stub (probably there are other ways to invoke this) and "fetch" will download the corresponding public key from the web. Try "gpg --list-keys" and "gpg --list-secret-keys" and "gpg --card-status" to check that all keys are where they belong. HTH, Sven ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: pinentry - Impossible to disable/ignore if present?
On Fri, 20 Apr 2007 14:22, [EMAIL PROTECTED] said: > I find that pinentry unconditionally is being launched whenever I > attempt to encrypt or decrypt something using gpgme. Depends. With gpg 1.4 you need to use --use-agent. But if you are using gpg2 the gpg-agent is required and you won't see a passphrase callback. That is so that we eventually can move all secret key processing into gpg-agent. Shalom-Salam, Werner ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Scdaemon READCERT
On Fri, 20 Apr 2007 14:14, [EMAIL PROTECTED] said: > Does this command work? I see that Scute does not use gpg-agent or > scdaemon to get the certificates, but it invokes 'gpgsm --server' and > uses DUMPKEYS. That works, but I'd rather talk to only gpg-agent and > not also gpgsm in GnuTLS. gpg-agent does not know about any protocol so there is no way to tell it to read an X.509 cetificate. However, most X.509 smartcards store a certificate and thus there is a need to allow reading it from a card. This is the reasons why Scdaemon features the > SCD READCERT 26D864C468935011B59E4F297E4B82FA34355BCC > ERR 100663420 Unsupported operation command. The OpenPGP card does not store certificates and thus this operation is not supported for this card. Although it is named OpenPGP it is not exactly an OpenPGP card but designed to allow easy working with OpenPGP by storing an OpenPGP fingerprint and the creation time of the key. If you use a X.509 card you might get this $ gpg-connect-agent --hex scd learn --force S SERIALNO D27600 0 S APPTYPE DINSIG S CERTINFO 101 DINSIG.C000 S KEYPAIRINFO 6F673AD2374E2F427634EF2BB4798092B751981E DINSIG.C000 scd readcert DINSIG.C000 D[] 30 82 05 01 30 82 03 E9 A0 03 02 01 02 02 03 00 0...0... D[0010] 99 AD 30 25 30 44 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 25 30 44 ..0%0D..*.H..%0D D[0020] 01 01 05 05 00 30 6C 31 0B 30 09 06 03 55 04 06 .0l1.0...U.. D[0030] 13 02 44 45 31 15 30 13 06 03 55 04 25 30 41 0C ..DE1.0...U.%0A. D[0040] 0C 44 2D 54 72 75 73 74 20 47 6D 62 48 31 22 30 .D-Trust GmbH1"0 D[0050] 20 06 03 55 04 03 0C 19 44 2D 54 52 55 53 54 20..UD-TRUST [...] D[0150] 77 71 7A D0 97 wqz.. OK I now that this is a bit annoying but required to keep the design clean. Shalom-Salam, Werner ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: gpgsm --sign with smartcard?
Werner Koch <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > On Fri, 20 Apr 2007 14:03, [EMAIL PROTECTED] said: > >> Use --disable-crl-checks to disable CRL checks. Also, you must put >> the CA fingerprint in your trustlist.txt: > > Or use --allow-mark-trusted in gpg-agent.conf so that the agent will ask > you whether to put it into trustlist.txt. Neat, although I had to manually create the trustlist.txt file first. Otherwise I get: [EMAIL PROTECTED]:~$ echo foo|gpgsm --sign --disable-crl-checks -a gpgsm: checking the trust list failed: No such file or directory gpgsm: error creating signature: No such file or directory [EMAIL PROTECTED]:~$ Maybe gpg-agent could create trustlist.txt if it doesn't exist, if allow-mark-trusted is used? /Simon ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
pinentry - Impossible to disable/ignore if present?
Hi, I find that pinentry unconditionally is being launched whenever I attempt to encrypt or decrypt something using gpgme. I've checked that the callback function is being set correctly using a combination of gpgme_set_passphrase_cb() and gpgme_get_passphrase_cb(). Unfortunately this is totally ignored by the underlying GnuPG framework and pinentry is unconditionally launched to query for a passphrase. My private passphrase callback function is never invoked. Any ideas? Thanks, jules ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: gpgsm --sign with smartcard?
On Fri, 20 Apr 2007 14:03, [EMAIL PROTECTED] said: > Use --disable-crl-checks to disable CRL checks. Also, you must put > the CA fingerprint in your trustlist.txt: Or use --allow-mark-trusted in gpg-agent.conf so that the agent will ask you whether to put it into trustlist.txt. Salam-Shalom, Werner ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: gpgsm --sign with smartcard?
Simon Josefsson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > I'm trying to sign something using gpgsm and a smartcard, but here is > what happens: ... > Where do I put the CRL that will be checked? > > Alternatively, how can I tell gpgsm/dirmngr to not check any CRL? I solved this myself, sorry for the noise. For the record: Use --disable-crl-checks to disable CRL checks. Also, you must put the CA fingerprint in your trustlist.txt: [EMAIL PROTECTED]:~$ cat /home/jas/.gnupg/trustlist.txt 15:32:B4:BA:5A:8A:79:88:CA:26:42:83:59:1B:A3:A2:1C:0B:CC:24 S [EMAIL PROTECTED]:~$ Then signing works: [EMAIL PROTECTED]:~$ echo foo | gpgsm --sign -u BD:5F:80:DE:63:03:4E:C9:E2:84:1E:63:09:55:2E:34:5C:5F:22:6F --disable-crl-checks > foo gpgsm: CRLs not checked due to --disable-crl-checks option gpgsm: DBG: adding certificates at level 1 gpgsm: signature created [EMAIL PROTECTED]:~$ I can't parse the output using GnuTLS 'certtool', but OpenSSL appears to handle it, so I suppose it may be a bug in GnuTLS. /Simon ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: OpenGPG card indifferent places ?
On Fri, 20 Apr 2007 12:07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] said: > I tried to investigate what the URL should look like, but I cannot find > an example. > Could you give me some pointers or hints howto form this URL ? http://myhome.foo/mykey.asc is a good choice. I consider it a good idea to have one's own key on some public location anyway and not to rely just on keyservers. See my OpenPGP mail header for another example. If you have not stored that URL on the card you can also use gpg --fetch-key http://myhome.foo/mykey.asc Salam-Shalom, Werner ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Scdaemon READCERT
Does this command work? I see that Scute does not use gpg-agent or scdaemon to get the certificates, but it invokes 'gpgsm --server' and uses DUMPKEYS. That works, but I'd rather talk to only gpg-agent and not also gpgsm in GnuTLS. This is what I tried: [EMAIL PROTECTED]:~$ gpg-connect-agent SCD LEARN --force S SERIALNO D27600012401010100010532 0 S APPTYPE OPENPGP S EXTCAP gc=1+ki=1+fc=1+pd=1 S DISP-NAME Key< SCD READCERT OPENPGP.3 ERR 100663420 Unsupported operation /Simon ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
gpgsm --sign with smartcard?
I'm trying to sign something using gpgsm and a smartcard, but here is what happens: [EMAIL PROTECTED]:~$ gpgsm --sign -u BD:5F:80:DE:63:03:4E:C9:E2:84:1E:63:09:55:2E:34:5C:5F:22:6F dirmngr[21860]: error opening `/home/jas/.gnupg/dirmngr_ldapservers.conf': No such file or directory dirmngr[21860]: permanently loaded certificates: 0 dirmngr[21860]: runtime cached certificates: 0 dirmngr[21860]: no CRL available for issuer id 73504958EC804B0DA5501605CFEC58754F0864FE dirmngr[21860]: crl_fetch via issuer failed: Configuration error dirmngr[21860]: command ISVALID failed: Configuration error gpgsm: certificate #4628A165/CN=GnuTLS test CA gpgsm: checking the CRL failed: Configuration error gpgsm: can't sign using `BD:5F:80:DE:63:03:4E:C9:E2:84:1E:63:09:55:2E:34:5C:5F:22:6F': Configuration error [EMAIL PROTECTED]:~$ Where do I put the CRL that will be checked? Alternatively, how can I tell gpgsm/dirmngr to not check any CRL? Thanks, Simon [EMAIL PROTECTED]:~$ gpgsm -K /home/jas/.gnupg/pubring.kbx Serial number: 4628A165 Issuer: /CN=GnuTLS test CA Subject: /CN=Test Key/O=Simon Josefsson aka: (dns-name josefsson.org) validity: 2007-04-20 11:17:59 through 2007-10-17 11:18:02 key type: 1024 bit RSA key usage: digitalSignature keyEncipherment ext key usage: clientAuth (suggested), serverAuth (suggested) fingerprint: BD:5F:80:DE:63:03:4E:C9:E2:84:1E:63:09:55:2E:34:5C:5F:22:6F [EMAIL PROTECTED]:~$ gpgsm -k /home/jas/.gnupg/pubring.kbx Serial number: 4628A165 Issuer: /CN=GnuTLS test CA Subject: /CN=Test Key/O=Simon Josefsson aka: (dns-name josefsson.org) validity: 2007-04-20 11:17:59 through 2007-10-17 11:18:02 key type: 1024 bit RSA key usage: digitalSignature keyEncipherment ext key usage: clientAuth (suggested), serverAuth (suggested) fingerprint: BD:5F:80:DE:63:03:4E:C9:E2:84:1E:63:09:55:2E:34:5C:5F:22:6F Serial number: 46261D27 Issuer: /CN=GnuTLS test CA Subject: /CN=GnuTLS test CA validity: 2007-04-18 13:29:11 through 2008-04-17 13:29:11 key type: 1024 bit RSA key usage: certSign chain length: unlimited fingerprint: 15:32:B4:BA:5A:8A:79:88:CA:26:42:83:59:1B:A3:A2:1C:0B:CC:24 [EMAIL PROTECTED]:~$ ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Quantum computing
[ Please interrupt if this is getting too off-topic. ] On 200704200441, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > Anders Breindahl wrote: > > Well. Yeah. But the thing that was and is fascinating about cryptography > > is that it -- assuming some model of computing -- is ``provable too > > hard'' to bypass. I'm worried that the future holds in store revolutions > > in computability that will shake those assumptions on ``too hard''. > > I forget who said this, but it's my favorite quote about predicting the > future. "The future never comes to us well-ordered." It's always > punctuated with unpredictable advances and inexplicable delays. You can > either obsess over the fact that crypto is a branch of mathematics, and > thus a human endeavor subject to the disordered-future rule, or you can > smile and shrug and say "well, we'll do the best with what we have, and > keep our eyes open for the future." > > My best advice is to not worry about it. :) Yeah, again. I completely agree on the practical aspect of it, but would nevertheless like to see proofs of complexity that weren't dependent on the current models of computations. However, then you'll just invent the hardware-coming-in-3050 model, that does all its calculations by solving RSA. Or whatever I aim to defend. > > This is in contrast to quantum cryptography, which, IINM, is provably > > There is no such thing as quantum cryptography. "Cryptography" is a > broad term encompassing a great many subjects, and we simply don't have > that for the quantum world. I was referring to the subject that is mentioned on the Wikipedia page: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_cryptography Saying that ``there is no such thing'' seems harsh and as if you ignore reality. The European Union put its hopes up for implementing a ``quantum cryptography'' network of communications. That sort of makes the term real in itself. Link to that statement in Danish: http://ing.dk/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20040826/IT/108270093 That doesn't mean that it (quantum cryptography) by any means is practical. It would seem from Werner's forward that it's so deeply buried in its own infancy or -- more seriously -- inherent technicalities, that it won't find any practical use ever. However, quantum cryptography does have that nice inherent benefit, that it _can't_ be eavesdropped, according to said article. That is, after authenticity has been established and the line has been paid for: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_cryptography#Attacks: In Quantum Cryptography, traditional man-in-the-middle attacks are impossible due to the Observer Effect. If Mallory attempts to intercept the stream of photons, he will inevitably alter them. He cannot re-emit the photons to Bob correctly, since his measurement has destroyed information about the photon's full state and correlations. I suppose that this is the feature that got the European Union's attention. > > Again, if I got it correctly, Rice' theorem came into a world where > > science was occupied with proving that this and that property was > > undecidable. Something ``like'' Rice' theorem would in a similar way > > alter the way that the scientific field is on. > > [scratches head] Are you talking about the second Hilbert problem? That > one generally goes to Gödel or Turing. Rice's theorem is an interesting > bit of work with some deep consequences for computer science, but it's > not anywhere near as big of a shakeup as incompleteness. Then take that for an example. My point is that proofs can alter the heading of a scientific field in the time it takes to they're generally accepted. > > Both are convenient. However, the proofs that consolidate the security > > of programs like gnupg, assume some model of computation... > > What proofs? There are none. I was merely assuming that such proofs existed. But, when I think again, formal proofs of correctness are hard to get, too, so why would common cryptography be provable? > > So what I would love to see is some proof that -- even when faced with > > this new model of computing, ignoring its practical limitations -- > > Why? Seriously. Why? By and large, cryptanalysis of intercepts is a > dead issue. Nobody with half a brain does it. It's the you-don't-know-that-question. *Probably*, it's secure, and all data supports it, but it hasn't been proved to be secure. Therefore, it's restricted to being ``probably'' or ``very probably'' secure. Right? Contrary to one time pads, which are provably secure -- where ``secure'' means ``unbreakable from theoretical standpoint, but with no thought given to practical limits''. I was told that one time pads were also used by the KGB, by the way. Mini-books whose pages were to be burned after using. > According to the best information available, during the entire Cold War > the KGB and GRU were never able to break a single United States cipher > cleared for top-secret information. That's not to say the KGB and GRU > weren't
Re: OpenGPG card indifferent places ?
Werner Koch wrote: > On Thu, 19 Apr 2007 23:25, [EMAIL PROTECTED] said: > > >> Ooops, just checked. Secret key on the keyring contains the stub. Export the >> public and secret parts of the card's key and import them on your home >> machine. >> > > The secret key stub will be automagically created. However itis > required to import the public key as the card has not enough space to > store OpenPGp keyblocks. If the URL field of the card has been set, you > can just give the command "fetch" in the --card-edit menu. > If I understand you correctly I only have to call something like gpg --armor --export 0x123456 > key.pub on my office PC and somthing like gpg --import key.pub is this correct ?? I tried to investigate what the URL should look like, but I cannot find an example. Could you give me some pointers or hints howto form this URL ? Thanx. Ciao Matthias ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Quantum computing
Anders Breindahl wrote: > Well. Yeah. But the thing that was and is fascinating about cryptography > is that it -- assuming some model of computing -- is ``provable too > hard'' to bypass. I'm worried that the future holds in store revolutions > in computability that will shake those assumptions on ``too hard''. I forget who said this, but it's my favorite quote about predicting the future. "The future never comes to us well-ordered." It's always punctuated with unpredictable advances and inexplicable delays. You can either obsess over the fact that crypto is a branch of mathematics, and thus a human endeavor subject to the disordered-future rule, or you can smile and shrug and say "well, we'll do the best with what we have, and keep our eyes open for the future." My best advice is to not worry about it. :) > This is in contrast to quantum cryptography, which, IINM, is provably There is no such thing as quantum cryptography. "Cryptography" is a broad term encompassing a great many subjects, and we simply don't have that for the quantum world. Quantum key exchange is an interesting trick of physics. But that's all "quantum cryptography" is at this point--a simple key exchange algorithm. There are no quantum encryption algorithms, no quantum signature schemes, no quantum hash functions. Just quantum key exchange... which is nowhere near as cool as people make it out to be. It's an interesting parlor trick. It's not anything new in the world of crypto. > Again, if I got it correctly, Rice' theorem came into a world where > science was occupied with proving that this and that property was > undecidable. Something ``like'' Rice' theorem would in a similar way > alter the way that the scientific field is on. [scratches head] Are you talking about the second Hilbert problem? That one generally goes to Gödel or Turing. Rice's theorem is an interesting bit of work with some deep consequences for computer science, but it's not anywhere near as big of a shakeup as incompleteness. > Both are convenient. However, the proofs that consolidate the security > of programs like gnupg, assume some model of computation... What proofs? There are none. There are just lines of reasoning which we believe to have substantial weight, but nobody has delivered an actual proof of security for any cipher or hash. To do so you'd have to prove P != NP, and that's one of the Holy Grails of CompSci. Look at something as simple as RSA. There are three major conjectures that go into RSA. 1. The RSA problem (RSAP) is equivalent to the integer factorization problem. 2. The Integer Factorization Problem is not in P. 3. P != NP. None of those have been proven. None. We like to pretend that they have been, we like to handwave them, but the reality is those conjectures are unproven... and, in fact, #1 is probably false. See Boneh and Venkatesan, "Breaking RSA May Be Easier than Factoring". http://theory.stanford.edu/~dabo/papers/no_rsa_red.pdf > So what I would love to see is some proof that -- even when faced with > this new model of computing, ignoring its practical limitations -- Why? Seriously. Why? By and large, cryptanalysis of intercepts is a dead issue. Nobody with half a brain does it. According to the best information available, during the entire Cold War the KGB and GRU were never able to break a single United States cipher cleared for top-secret information. That's not to say the KGB and GRU weren't reading top-secret cables on a regular basis. Instead of cryptanalyzing the traffic, they just sent expensive hookers and good bourbon to cipher clerks in the American embassy. There are literally thousands of ways to skin this cat. Focusing on purely the mathematical aspect is very shortsighted. ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: OpenGPG card indifferent places ?
On Thu, 19 Apr 2007 23:25, [EMAIL PROTECTED] said: > Ooops, just checked. Secret key on the keyring contains the stub. Export the > public and secret parts of the card's key and import them on your home > machine. The secret key stub will be automagically created. However itis required to import the public key as the card has not enough space to store OpenPGp keyblocks. If the URL field of the card has been set, you can just give the command "fetch" in the --card-edit menu. Shalom-Salam, Werner ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Quantum computing
On Fri, 20 Apr 2007 09:09, [EMAIL PROTECTED] said: > This is in contrast to quantum cryptography, which, IINM, is provably > uninterceptable (but, unlike traditional cryptography, has many > weaknesses beyond the purely theoretical ones). While you mention this, I can't resist to forward Perry E. Metzger's comments: To: cryptography at metzdowd Subject: my periodic rant on quantum crypto From: "Perry E. Metzger" Date: Mon, 12 Apr 2004 15:37:33 -0400 /. is running yet another story on quantum cryptography today, with the usual breathless hype: http://science.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=04/04/12/133623 I'm especially unimpressed with the "Does this spell the end of the field of cryptography?" comment. For those who don't know much about what it is, "Quantum Cryptography" is a very expensive way of producing an unauthenticated link encryption device. It is useless for any application other than link encryption over a short distance and requires a dedicated optical fiber to work. QC has no properties that render it especially better for link encryption than, say, a box from one of several vendors running AES on the link instead. It is perhaps theoretically safer, but in practice no one is going to break AES either -- they're going to bribe the minimum wage guard at your colo to have 20 minutes alone with your box while they install a tap on the clear side of it (or worse, they'll slip in while the guard is asleep at his desk.) QC still requires link authentication (lest someone else other than the people you think you're talking to terminate your fiber instead). As a result of this, you can't really get rid of key management, so QC isn't going to buy you freedom from that. QC can only run over a dedicated fiber over a short run, where more normal mechanisms can work fine over any sort of medium -- copper, the PSTN, the internet, etc, and can operate without distance limitation. QC is fiendishly costly -- orders of magnitude more expensive than an AES based link encryption box. QC is extremely hard to test to assure there are no hardware or other failures -- given the key in use, I can use intercepted traffic to assure my AES link encryption box is working correctly, but I have no such mechanism for a QC box. On top of all of this, the real problems in computer security these days have nothing to do with stuff like how your link encryption box works and everything to do with stuff like buffer overflows, bad network architecture, etc. Given that what we're dealing with is a very limited technology that for a very high price will render you security that is at best not particularly better than what much more economical solutions will yield, why do people keep hyping this? Indeed, why do people buy these boxes, if indeed anyone is buying them? It is stunning that a lab curiosity continues to be mentioned over and over again, not to mention to see venture capitalists dump money after it. BTW, none of this has anything to do with "Quantum Computing", which may indeed yield breakthroughs someday in areas such as factoring but which is totally unrelated... Perry Salam-Shalom, Werner ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Quantum computing
On 200704191925, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > While I agree that commercial development _may_ lead to developments > in QC, I think it's equally likely that the engineering difficulties > will be insurmountable. Which means that, from where I sit, we > should just shrug and say "we really can't say with any confidence > what the future will or will not hold". Well. Yeah. But the thing that was and is fascinating about cryptography is that it -- assuming some model of computing -- is ``provable too hard'' to bypass. I'm worried that the future holds in store revolutions in computability that will shake those assumptions on ``too hard''. This is in contrast to quantum cryptography, which, IINM, is provably uninterceptable (but, unlike traditional cryptography, has many weaknesses beyond the purely theoretical ones). > > found -- this pragmatism causes me to ponder the scenario in which > > something like Rice' theorem could be established for quantum > > computers' > > ability (or traditional computers' inability): > > What do you mean? Rice's theorem applies to QC. Again, if I got it correctly, Rice' theorem came into a world where science was occupied with proving that this and that property was undecidable. Something ``like'' Rice' theorem would in a similar way alter the way that the scientific field is on. > It's true that in mathematics there could always be a proof delivered > tomorrow by some hungry graduate student which will utterly shatter > our knowledge of math as we know it. But this is true for all of > mathematics. It's not as if this risk is special to QC. I was mostly focusing on positive proofs, by which I mean those that define what _is_ doable or assumable, rather than the negative proofs that define what is undoable. Both are convenient. However, the proofs that consolidate the security of programs like gnupg, assume some model of computation... And in the face of quantum computing, that assumption may (=has the potential to) radically change. So what I would love to see is some proof that -- even when faced with this new model of computing, ignoring its practical limitations -- the best-known attack on gnupg's algorithms takes factor ten of the lifetime of the universe or would cost twice the energy of the sun. Which can't be said of RSA on a huge quantum computer, if I understood you correctly. > You should be just as concerned about the prospect of P=NP. I haven't had my introductory courses in computability theory yet. I don't know what that is, and will patiently wait for it. Thanks for the lecture. Regards, skrewz. signature.asc Description: Digital signature ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
