Re: Hide UID From Public Key Server By Poison Your Key?

2018-01-14 Thread Robert J. Hansen
> Let's say, you have accidentally associated your
> real name to the key under your online name and
> upload it to public key server, which allows
> anyone to connect your online identity to the
> person in real life.

Uh -- how?

There is no mechanism in the keyserver to do this.  That's why you have
to validate certificates you receive from the keyserver.  The fact
there's a UID named "Robert J. Hansen " on key
0xB44427C7 provides you with precisely *zero* evidence that I'm Rob
Hansen or that Rob Hansen even exists.  For all you know my name is
Maurice Micklethorpe.

> Since you can never remove
> anything from the public key server, You are
> wondering if you can add something to it -- for
> example, add another 100 of UIDs with other
> people's real name and emails so people can not
> find out which one is yours, and append another
> 100 of digital signature so people get tired
> before figure out which one is from valid user.

I rarely use language like this, but this time I think it's warranted:

This is a total dick move.  Don't do this.  You'll make yourself a lot
of enemies, and if you pick the wrong real names and emails, some of
those people are pretty damn good at figuring out what's going on.

Don't put real names and emails belonging to other people on your cert.
It's *rude*.  If someone goes looking for "Robert J. Hansen
" I want them to see one cert is newest and I want
them to use that one.  If you go about putting my name and email address
on your cert, I'm going to get cross.

Again: this is a total dick move.  Don't do this.

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Hide UID From Public Key Server By Poison Your Key?

2018-01-14 Thread Jason Lawrence
Hi all,

For of all, I am sorry for using a temporary email
address. 

Let's say, you have accidentally associated your
real name to the key under your online name and
upload it to public key server, which allows
anyone to connect your online identity to the
person in real life. Since you can never remove
anything from the public key server, You are
wondering if you can add something to it -- for
example, add another 100 of UIDs with other
people's real name and emails so people can not
find out which one is yours, and append another
100 of digital signature so people get tired
before figure out which one is from valid user.
Since it is easy to fake system time for PGP, you
can mix my real UID in middle of all these. 

The problem is, how will the public key server
handle 2 keys with duplicated timestamp?

Just an idea, it might be more efficient if I just
commit online suicide (throw away my current
identity).

Best regret

Jason

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Re: Upgrading from gpg1 to gpg2: lots of trouble, need help

2018-01-14 Thread gnupg
Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:

> On Sun 2018-01-07 23:23:16 +1100, gn...@raf.org wrote:
> > For the actual decryption, I'm using sudo. From the original
> > post, the command to set things up contains something like:
> >
> >   /usr/bin/screen -- \
> >   /usr/bin/sudo -u thing --set-home -- \
> >   /usr/bin/gpg-agent --homedir /etc/thing/.gnupg \
> > --allow-preset-passphrase \
> > --default-cache-ttl 3600 \
> > --max-cache-ttl 3600 \
> > --daemon $gpg_agent_info -- \
> >   /bin/bash --login
> 
> this is deliberately launching a second agent, outside of the basic
> supervision that should already be in place.

No. It's starting the *first* agent. Remember, I had disabled
systemd's handling of gpg-agent so there is no supervising
gpg-agent process started by systemd.

When I showed the two gpg-agent processes that existed after the
incoming ssh connection ran gpg, they were the only two
gpg-agent processes owned by the 'thing' user. There was no
supervising one or I would have shown that one as well.

The problem is that the subsequent incoming ssh connection runs
gpg and that gpg process starts a second gpg-agent process
(which has no knowledge of the passphrase) rather than
connecting to this first gpg-agent process (which does have
knowledge of the passphrase - at least it does until the new
gpg-agent is started possibly because it took over the sockets
that were created by the first gpg-agent process).

> If you want to use the standard system agent, please do not launch a
> separate agent.

As I stated some time ago, I don't want to use the "standard
system agent" because I don't trust systemd to know when it's ok
to remove resources. I have had too much trouble caused by
systemd concluding that it was time to remove crucial resources
to be able trust it with anything that I need to rely on.

> This should be as simple as:
> 
>   screen -- sudo -u thing --login
> 
> or, if you're doing this as root already, then you don't need sudo at
> all, and it could just be:
>
>   screen -- su - testuser

It's not run as root.

> If this is run from cron, it will spawn a new session, and that session
> will have a systemd session manager capable of spawning gpg-agent as
> needed.

It's not run from cron. It wouldn't make sense to run it from cron.

> unfortunately, it will not spawn a new session if run from an existing
> session, see the discussion at
> https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/7451 .
> 
> if you want to manually start a new session for a new user from within
> an existing session on a machine managed by systemd, apparently
> machinectl may be the way to go, but i haven't explored that in full.

That must explain why systemd didn't create a /var/run
subdirectory for the 'thing' user during the sudo process (when
I re-enabled systemd's handling of gpg-agent).

But machinectl seems to be for containers. I'd rather not go
there since it might not be right since I'm not using
containers. It seems like a hack.

I think this is just another argument/example to support my
preference for avoiding the additional complexity of systemd
here and just using gnupg by itself.

> hope this helps,
> 
> --dkg

Thanks. I appreciate the effort and research but it doesn't
really help. It doesn't address the issue of the incoming ssh
connection's gpg process starting up a new gpg-agent process
rather than connecting to the existing one.

But don't worry. I'm sure I've wasted enough of your time. When
I get time, I'll debug what's happening and either realise what
needs to be done or work around it somehow.

Thanks,
raf


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Re: BUG report gnupg-2.2.4 (or npth)

2018-01-14 Thread NIIBE Yutaka
Hello,

I think that you have some different Pthread library in /usr/local.

Henry  wrote:
> /usr/local/include/pthread.h:357:18: error: conflicting types for
  ^^^

I wonder if you have installed GNU Pth.  Please try without Pth.
-- 

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