Re: Garbled data in keyservers

2018-12-05 Thread Stefan Claas
On Wed, 05 Dec 2018 11:24:10 -0900, justina colmena via Gnupg-users
wrote:
> A keyserver is a convenience. Of course it's not magic. Right now I
> am using K-9 Mail and OpenKeychain on Android. When I received the
> above message from the list, K-9 Mail informed me that it was signed
> with a key with fingerprint "0xff80ae9d1dec358d", and referred me to
> the OpenKeychain app, which searched keyservers and found a matching
> public key, which I was allowed to import to verify the signature,
> which I did so successfully.

Sure, thats the way it works. If Werner and you for example had an
implementation of Autocrypt installed then you would not need
a key server. ;-)

But what we are pointing out here are the problems the current key
server network has, or might face in the future.

Regards
Stefan

-- 
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Re: Garbled data in keyservers

2018-12-05 Thread justina colmena via Gnupg-users

A keyserver is a convenience. Of course it's not magic. Right now I am using 
K-9 Mail and OpenKeychain on Android. When I received the above message from 
the list, K-9 Mail informed me that it was signed with a key with fingerprint 
"0xff80ae9d1dec358d", and referred me to the OpenKeychain app, which searched 
keyservers and found a matching public key, which I was allowed to import to 
verify the signature, which I did so successfully.

The fingerprints are some collision-resistant secure hashes, and in theory it 
is extraordinarily difficult to create another public key with the same 
fingerprint.

I have never met "Werner Koch" personally, but I am about as certain as I can 
be (under the present scheme of things) that that is the key fingerprint of the 
person from GnuPG.org who posts to the mailing list, and that there would be 
quite a bit of noise on the list in case of a mistaken identity.

There is a certain "reputation effect" with a public key which in theory 
obviates the need for in-person verification and secret handshakes.

The major difficulties and points of weakness to the whole scheme, in my 
opinion, are, (a) retaining possession of the private key, and (b) denying 
others illicit access to the private key.

Point (b) is a long-term, seemingly irremediable, problem. The long key 
lifetimes and the general lack of *Perfect Forward Secrecy* greatly aggravate 
the risk of a catastrophic total compromise of all data signed with or 
encrypted to the private key.

-- 
A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the 
right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.

https://www.colmena.biz/~justina/justina.colmena.asc

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Re: Garbled data in keyservers

2018-12-05 Thread Stefan Claas
On Wed, 05 Dec 2018 18:53:20 +0100, Werner Koch wrote:
> On Wed,  5 Dec 2018 17:34, stefan.cl...@posteo.de said:
> 
> > Can you give more details about the security aspect?  
> 
> People believe that the keyservers magically return a matching key
> for a mail address.  There is no guarantee for this.  In fact all
> people from the strong had meanwhile expired faked key on the
> servers, which was not easy to detect given that they were also
> signed by faked keys from the strong set.
> 
> Thus if you have the capability to sniff mail you would upload a faked
> key and hope that future senders pick up that faked key and encrypt to
> it.  You can now intercept that mail, read it, encrypt to the real key
> and send on.  Even if you can't mount such an active MitM you can
> simply send on the newly encrypted mail with an additional line
> "sorry, I encrypted to the wrong key".
> 
> Right the Web of Trust would stop this attack, but most people are not
> part of the WoT.  Simple methods for initial /key discovery/ are
> required.  Even autocrypt is better than keyservers and with the Web
> Key Directory you can get an even better assurance that it is the
> correct key.

Agreed.

> > run their own key server and analyze the data. So what purpose
> > should your suggestion serve?  
> 
> The additional benefit is that this would take away the load from the
> servers and allow that we can get back the large mesh of keyservers.
> Without being able to search user-ids it does not anymore make sense
> to use keyservers as search engines for magnet links to Bittorrent
> distributed data.

Well, my understanding would be that a least one (search) criteria
would be needed to fetch a key, right? And if so i could also imagine
that this one criteria could be abused as well, in form of a given
link to that resource, as long as it can be fetched via the web.

Regards
Stefan

-- 
https://www.behance.net/futagoza
https://keybase.io/stefan_claas


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Re: Garbled data in keyservers

2018-12-05 Thread Werner Koch
On Wed,  5 Dec 2018 17:34, stefan.cl...@posteo.de said:

> Can you give more details about the security aspect?

People believe that the keyservers magically return a matching key for a
mail address.  There is no guarantee for this.  In fact all people from
the strong had meanwhile expired faked key on the servers, which was not
easy to detect given that they were also signed by faked keys from the
strong set.

Thus if you have the capability to sniff mail you would upload a faked
key and hope that future senders pick up that faked key and encrypt to
it.  You can now intercept that mail, read it, encrypt to the real key
and send on.  Even if you can't mount such an active MitM you can
simply send on the newly encrypted mail with an additional line "sorry, I
encrypted to the wrong key".

Right the Web of Trust would stop this attack, but most people are not
part of the WoT.  Simple methods for initial /key discovery/ are
required.  Even autocrypt is better than keyservers and with the Web Key
Directory you can get an even better assurance that it is the correct
key.

> run their own key server and analyze the data. So what purpose should
> your suggestion serve?

The additional benefit is that this would take away the load from the
servers and allow that we can get back the large mesh of keyservers.
Without being able to search user-ids it does not anymore make sense to
use keyservers as search engines for magnet links to Bittorrent
distributed data.


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner


-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.


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Re: Garbled data in keyservers

2018-12-05 Thread Stefan Claas
On Wed, 05 Dec 2018 13:28:50 +0100, Werner Koch wrote:

> A better way of using keyservers would be to entire disable their
> search by name or mail address capabilities.  Not only in the web
> interface but also in their API.  Of course that will be a radical
> change but I consider it better for security: 

Can you give more details about the security aspect?

Currently users can still search sks key servers by names, with
Lynx... :-) As understood key server operators can still give a whole
dump to 3rd parties, which like to analyze the data, or third parties
run their own key server and analyze the data. So what purpose should
your suggestion serve?

If you are talking about GDPR issues, those keys server operators
are not "licensed" by governmental institutions and run their servers
according to some strict regulations.

Regards
Stefan

-- 
https://www.behance.net/futagoza
https://keybase.io/stefan_claas


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Re: Garbled data in keyservers

2018-12-05 Thread Werner Koch
On Wed,  5 Dec 2018 10:31, c...@cod-web.net said:

> On pool.sks-keyservers.net eveything works well while on other
> keyservers I get 47Mb of garbled data from Yegor Timoshenko key, which I
> never signed and I don't know exactly why it's included in search

There are several problem with the keyservers due to their policy of
being a plain data store.  Actually this policy is a Good Thing because
it allows to sync with other servers and their is no need for a central
authority.

The problem is that the keyservers are abused as data store and, worse,
as a public search engine for such data.  The latter point can be
mitigated by not having a web interface which displays everything.

Restricting user-ids and such does not help because there are other ways
to store arbitrary data in a OpenPGP keyblock.  Even keyservers which
would checking the signatures won't help because key signatures can be
made using an arbitrary amount of new keys.

A better way of using keyservers would be to entire disable their search
by name or mail address capabilities.  Not only in the web interface but
also in their API.  Of course that will be a radical change but I
consider it better for security: Too many users assume that the
keyservers return a correct key; which they don't.  In fact their is no
way to get a key for a given mail address from a web server.  It used to
work just out of luck and because all keyserver users used to be fair
netizens.

The keyserver would then be used for getting the keys to verify a
signature (because the lookup is by fingerprint) and to distribute
revocations.  That is still a useful thing to have.  Further the
keyservers should stop to accept key signature; for Web of Trust things
signed keys should be mailed directly instead (caff already does that).

FWIW, I have the problem of a garbled key for quite some time which I
can fix for me using things like

import-filter drop-sig=   sig_created_d=2015-12-24
import-filter drop-sig=|| sig_created_d=2016-03-16

in my gpg.conf.  But that is just a stopgap. 


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner



-- 
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Re: Garbled data in keyservers

2018-12-05 Thread Claudio Canavese
Thank you.

Fun fact:
https://bitbucket.org/skskeyserver/sks-keyserver/issues/57
> https://bitbucket.org/skskeyserver/sks-keyserver/issues/60
> 
were opened by Yegor Timoshenko himself ^__^


Thank you again for your quick and sharp answer!


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Re: Garbled data in keyservers

2018-12-05 Thread Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users
Hi Claudio,

You may find these SKS issues relevant:

https://bitbucket.org/skskeyserver/sks-keyserver/issues/41
https://bitbucket.org/skskeyserver/sks-keyserver/issues/57
https://bitbucket.org/skskeyserver/sks-keyserver/issues/60

I'm not able to comment on the specifics of search implementation in SKS 
though...

Kind regards,
Wiktor

On 05.12.2018 10:31, Claudio Canavese wrote:
> Hi everyone,
> I'm experiencing a strange behavior when looking for my email address on
> many keyserver web interfaces: I get al lot of garbled output from a key
> of someone else.
>
> I can't find and answer in this mailing list archives, so I decided to
> ask directly. Forgive me if it's a silly question.
>
> How to test this:
> 1) pick any keyserver, I tried  https://pgp.mit.edu/ ,
> https://keyserver.ubuntu.com/ , http://pool.sks-keyservers.net
> 2) search any key but mine by email: works? Well, so it was for me
> 3) now try with this email address
>
> On pool.sks-keyservers.net eveything works well while on other
> keyservers I get 47Mb of garbled data from Yegor Timoshenko key, which I
> never signed and I don't know exactly why it's included in search
> results. I had to use wget to download the web page since any browser
> will crash.
>
> Is this a bug I should submit somewhere? 
> Can a key break the html output of a keyserver?
>
>
> Thanks you for your time ;-)
>
>
> --
> CoD
>
>
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Garbled data in keyservers

2018-12-05 Thread Claudio Canavese
Hi everyone,
I'm experiencing a strange behavior when looking for my email address on
many keyserver web interfaces: I get al lot of garbled output from a key
of someone else.

I can't find and answer in this mailing list archives, so I decided to
ask directly. Forgive me if it's a silly question.

How to test this:
1) pick any keyserver, I tried  https://pgp.mit.edu/ ,
https://keyserver.ubuntu.com/ , http://pool.sks-keyservers.net
2) search any key but mine by email: works? Well, so it was for me
3) now try with this email address

On pool.sks-keyservers.net eveything works well while on other
keyservers I get 47Mb of garbled data from Yegor Timoshenko key, which I
never signed and I don't know exactly why it's included in search
results. I had to use wget to download the web page since any browser
will crash.

Is this a bug I should submit somewhere? 
Can a key break the html output of a keyserver?


Thanks you for your time ;-)


--
CoD


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