Re: Fedora GPG Key Server
This whole NSA blackmailing situation is causing strange reactions in you, sir. Marcio Barbado, Jr. On Sat, Sep 7, 2013 at 7:28 AM, Werner Koch wrote: > On Thu, 5 Sep 2013 22:22, marcio.barb...@gmail.com said: >> https://lists.fedoraproject.org/pipermail/announce/2013-September/003180.html > > Please do not post a mere link. This assume that everyone is online and > able to read a web page. At least an excerpt from the page would be > useful. > > > Salam-Shalom, > >Werner > > -- > Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. > ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Fedora GPG Key Server
https://lists.fedoraproject.org/pipermail/announce/2013-September/003180.html Marcio Barbado, Jr. ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
kernel.org status: establishing a PGP web of trust
http://lwn.net/Articles/461236/ Marcio Barbado, Jr. ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: secring and dropbox
https://twitter.com/#!/csoghoian/status/98116328677834752 On Fri, Jul 22, 2011 at 9:07 PM, Aaron Toponce wrote: > On Fri, Jul 22, 2011 at 09:37:09PM +0200, Michel Messerschmidt wrote: >> set pgp_auto_decode = yes > > Perfect! That was the variable I was looking for! Thanks! > > -- > . o . o . o . . o o . . . o . > . . o . o o o . o . o o . . o > o o o . o . . o o o o . o o o > > ___ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users@gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users > > Marcio Barbado, Jr. ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Is the OpenPGP model still useful?
Hi Daniel, On Sat, Jul 23, 2011 at 2:21 PM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote: > On 07/23/2011 07:04 PM, Marcio B. Jr. wrote: >> On Wed, Jul 6, 2011 at 5:49 PM, Robert J. Hansen >> wrote: >>>> So far, OTR adoption seems unjustifiable, really. I mean, it uses the >>>> Diffie-Hellman key exchange method with block ciphers. >>> >>> Why is this a problem? >> >> You know, secrets are shared. 100% increase (at least) in "exposing" risks. > > I am struggling with how to respond to your messages since i find them > confusing. Ok, I am grateful for that struggle. > Are you aware that the purpose of OTR is to allow two parties to > communicate confidentially? Right now, I'm trying to study OTR within some US Fifth Amendment contexts. So I'll answer that in a later time. > OpenPGP itself uses this sort of symmetric encryption to encrypt > messages with a random session key, and only uses asymmetric encryption > to encrypt the session key itself. So, say, my subkey's public part encrypts some session key, not the message itself? Regards, Marcio Barbado, Jr. ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Is the OpenPGP model still useful?
Hi Robert. Secrecy sharing constitutes sort of a "symmetric fact" when more than one instance is involved and you ask me for a citation? I resumed this thread in order to clarify whether Kopete's OpenPGP plugin was really superior, compared to the OTR one, and all people say is OTR and its Diffie-Hellman algo are great, but no comparison is ever made because choice depends on threat model. Come on, this is not an academic seminar. It would be simpler to put some hypothetical situation in which you'd choose one of the options, and explain the reason behind that choice. What can I say? My situation is a regular one. Privacy and/or authenticity are needed in varying degrees. Regards, On Sat, Jul 23, 2011 at 2:16 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > On 7/23/11 1:04 PM, Marcio B. Jr. wrote: >> You know, secrets are shared. 100% increase (at least) in "exposing" >> risks. > > I need to see a citation for this. What you're claiming is at odds with > everything I've ever learned about how DHKEA operates. > Marcio Barbado, Jr. ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: OT: IM encryption options [was: Re: Is the OpenPGP model still useful?]
Hi Aron, you are somewhat arrogant. Please read what I wrote till completion. Regards, On Fri, Jul 22, 2011 at 9:17 PM, Aaron Toponce wrote: > On Fri, Jul 22, 2011 at 07:56:42PM -0300, Marcio B. Jr. wrote: >> Hello Daniel, >> sorry for such a delay; this has been a wild JULY. >> >> >> On Wed, Jul 6, 2011 at 4:09 PM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote: >> > On 07/06/2011 01:28 PM, Marcio B. Jr. wrote: >> >> So far, OTR adoption seems unjustifiable, really. I mean, it uses the >> >> Diffie-Hellman key exchange method with block ciphers. >> > >> > Why does this seem unjustifiable to you? DH and block ciphers are >> > widely-reviewed parts of the standard crypto toolkit. Do you have >> > reason to believe they're generally bad? >> >> It seems unjustifiable because there exists an option in which secret >> keys need not to take risks. And if there's any security concern and >> one's to choose between zero risk and any other positive-value risk, >> it's reasonable to pick the former. > > Are you familiar with the DH key exchange? It doesn't seem that you are. > There is no risk in sharing the private key between the two parties. It > basically goes like this: > > Step 1: A generates the private key. > Step 2: A encrypts the private key with a one-time session key. > Step 3: A sends the encrypted private key to B. > Step 4: B encrypts the encrypted private key with his 1-time key. > Step 5: B sends the doubly-encrypted private key to A. > Step 6: A decrypts what he can with his one-time session key. > Step 7: A sends the resulting encrypted key to B. > Step 8: B decrypts the private key with his 1-time key. > > B now has the private key. > > The one-time session keys are never shared, but stored locally on the > machine. Once the DH key exchange finished, the session keys are destroyed. > No where in the exchange is there any risk of the private key being > compromised. A MITM can grab all the packets he likes. Unless he has one or > both session keys, he's not getting the private key. > > -- > . o . o . o . . o o . . . o . > . . o . o o o . o . o o . . o > o o o . o . . o o o o . o o o > > ___ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users@gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users > > Marcio Barbado, Jr. ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Is the OpenPGP model still useful?
Hello Robert. On Wed, Jul 6, 2011 at 5:49 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: >> So far, OTR adoption seems unjustifiable, really. I mean, it uses the >> Diffie-Hellman key exchange method with block ciphers. > > Why is this a problem? You know, secrets are shared. 100% increase (at least) in "exposing" risks. Regards, Marcio Barbado, Jr. ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: OT: IM encryption options [was: Re: Is the OpenPGP model still useful?]
Hello Daniel, sorry for such a delay; this has been a wild JULY. On Wed, Jul 6, 2011 at 4:09 PM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote: > On 07/06/2011 01:28 PM, Marcio B. Jr. wrote: >> So far, OTR adoption seems unjustifiable, really. I mean, it uses the >> Diffie-Hellman key exchange method with block ciphers. > > Why does this seem unjustifiable to you? DH and block ciphers are > widely-reviewed parts of the standard crypto toolkit. Do you have > reason to believe they're generally bad? It seems unjustifiable because there exists an option in which secret keys need not to take risks. And if there's any security concern and one's to choose between zero risk and any other positive-value risk, it's reasonable to pick the former. >> As of what I got from your (Robert) explanation plus some preliminary >> conclusions of my studies, making use of asymmetric algos with OpenPGP >> would be more coherent and secure, mathematically. Is it correct? > > Not all of these decisions should be made on purely mathematical > grounds. Consider, for example, pidgin's old GPG plugin (i dont know > whether it is still in use or under development) > > It worked by signing and encrypting each message before it was sent, and > decrypting and verifying each response. > > However, IM messages tend to be heavily context-dependent, which makes > them vulnerable to replay attacks. No secret key can ever be intercepted or shared. > For example, how many times have you written on IRC (or whatever IM > network you use) the simple phrase "i agree"? > > If each message is individually signed and verified, it'd be relatively > easy for an attacker to replay your "i agree" in another conversation, > making it look like you agreed to something you hadn't actually agreed > to. OTR's stream-based approach ensures that messages are only > authenticated as part of a single, two-party conversation. There is no > room for a replay attack. I am obviously considering signing and encrypting. > OTR also is designed so that a third-party (one not involved in the > original communication can't conclusively prove that you wrote > something. this is the "off the record" part of OTR. It's debatable > how useful this so-called "repudiability" would be in, say, a court of > law; but individually-signed messages clearly do *not* have this kind of > repudiability; anyone in possession of one of these messages can > convince any third party that you did in fact write the message. There is secrecy sharing so maintenance of this repudiability's effectiveness is not entirely up to you. Regards, Marcio Barbado, Jr. ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Is the OpenPGP model still useful?
Dear Doug, I don't know what "IDOYTM" is supposed to mean, "and am" afraid I'm not enough-of-a-teenager to get really concerned with that. If the existence of big fans justifies quality, Amy Winehouse would be Teresa of Calcutta. My question, which, I must emphasize for you, is a question — not an assertion, was on mathematical coherence. Regards, On Wed, Jul 6, 2011 at 4:37 PM, Doug Barton wrote: > On 07/06/2011 10:28, Marcio B. Jr. wrote: >> >> Hello, >> resuming this thread because I'm studying encryption options for KDE's >> Kopete IM client. >> >> So far, OTR adoption seems unjustifiable, really. I mean, it uses the >> Diffie-Hellman key exchange method with block ciphers. >> >> As of what I got from your (Robert) explanation plus some preliminary >> conclusions of my studies, making use of asymmetric algos with OpenPGP >> would be more coherent and secure, mathematically. Is it correct? > > IDOYTM, which you haven't defined. > > Personally I've used OTR for years, and am a big fan. > > -- > > Nothin' ever doesn't change, but nothin' changes much. > -- OK Go > > Breadth of IT experience, and depth of knowledge in the DNS. > Yours for the right price. :) http://SupersetSolutions.com/ > > Marcio Barbado, Jr. ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Is the OpenPGP model still useful?
Hello, resuming this thread because I'm studying encryption options for KDE's Kopete IM client. So far, OTR adoption seems unjustifiable, really. I mean, it uses the Diffie-Hellman key exchange method with block ciphers. As of what I got from your (Robert) explanation plus some preliminary conclusions of my studies, making use of asymmetric algos with OpenPGP would be more coherent and secure, mathematically. Is it correct? Regards, On Fri, Apr 29, 2011 at 10:12 AM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > On 4/28/11 11:05 AM, Michel Messerschmidt wrote: >> Sounds very much like Off-the-Record messaging for every kind of >> communication. Or is there a difference I have missed? > > The barrier to usage is still high with OTR: users still have to > authenticate, and you can get horrible sync issues. Plus, let's not > forget the wacky hijinks that occur if you're logged into IM from two > places at once -- although this is explicitly supported by some IM > protocols (Jabber), with OTR it causes no end of troubles. > > The thought experiment here -- it's not a real proposal -- is, "what > would happen if we discarded authentication entirely, and went purely > for a require-brute-force approach to discover the random session key?" > > ___ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users@gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users > Marcio Barbado, Jr. ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Still OT: NLP (was: Re: An Invitation to Neuroscientists and Physicists)
Hacking the mind for fun and profit: http://phrack.org/issues.html?issue=67&id=15#article On Tue, May 17, 2011 at 8:58 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > On 5/17/2011 5:07 PM, Andre Amorim wrote: >> It's Called INCEPTION ! > > There are two major possibilities here: either the poster is correct, or > the poster is incorrect. If correct, he deserves our compassion for the > troubles others are inflicting upon him. If incorrect, he deserves our > compassion for the troubles his own mind is inflicting upon him. > > Either way, let's show a little polite discretion. Thanks. :) > > > ___ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users@gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users > Marcio Barbado, Jr. ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Fyi: keysigning parties in Brazil
Hi, this wiki, maintained by "Associação Software Livre", is dedicated to coordinate (and subsequently, list) all of the keysigning parties in Brazil: http://wiki.softwarelivre.org/KSP/WebHomeEn regards, and a harmonious 2011 to you all, Marcio Barbado, Jr. ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: GPF Crypto Stick vs OpenPGP Card
Thank you, Grant, and perhaps, it's a good idea to own more than one of those devices. One would be in constant use and the other(s) would mirror the former for backup purposes. Because a small size device is easier to be carried, and maybe this fact increases the chances of losing it or getting it stolen. I know its contents cannot be used by other than its legitimate owner. Still, a coherent backup policy would include at least a second device. However, considering what Łukasz Stelmach answered to Andre Amorim: > I know: secret keys may be uploaded to a card but not downloaded from > it. I think (read speculate): the above question is asked when you > generate a key pair on the PC and upload it to a card. backup seems to be a hard task. Well, supposing you have 2 Crypto Sticks or 2 OpenPGP cards. Is it possible to create a mirroring/"synchronization" scheme between them? And if possible, is it prudent? What do you think of that? Regards, On Mon, Dec 6, 2010 at 5:38 PM, Grant Olson wrote: > On 12/6/10 2:21 PM, Marcio B. Jr. wrote: >> Hello, >> sorry for this insistence. I just want to get it clearly. >> >> So, you mean those devices certainly protect information better than a >> regular computer (even if making proper use of disk encryption >> software)? >> > > Yes. Ultimately a malicious user with 'root' access can compromise any > software solution. Maybe that means downloading your keys and mounting > an offline attack. Maybe that means downloading your keys and > installing a keylogger to get your passphrase. Or finding your > unencrypted key that's been cached by gpg-agent in system memory. Full > Disk Encryption doesn't provide protection there when your system is up > and running, it only helps when someone steals your laptop, or tries to > access the system while it's powered down. > > By moving the keys to a dedicated hardware device, it creates a > partition between your (possibly compromised) computer's OS and and the > device. The key information never gets loaded into the OS and is opaque > to the system. So now a malicious user would need to 'root' your card, > or card reader, which would probably involve something like trying to > access or change the physical chips on the device, and is much much > harder than installing a root-kit, or creating a virus, or developing > some other malicious software. > > That's also why people are talking about readers with pin-pads. That > prevents someone from installing a general-purpose keyboard sniffer to > get your pin, stealing your physical token, and having the two pieces of > info they need to use your keys. > > > -- > Grant > > "I am gravely disappointed. Again you have made me unleash my dogs of war." > > > ___ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users@gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users > > Marcio Barbado, Jr. ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: GPF Crypto Stick vs OpenPGP Card
Hello,
sorry for this insistence. I just want to get it clearly.
So, you mean those devices certainly protect information better than a
regular computer (even if making proper use of disk encryption
software)?
On Mon, Dec 6, 2010 at 9:06 AM, Hauke Laging
wrote:
> Am Freitag 03 Dezember 2010 14:55:34 schrieb Marcio B. Jr.:
>
>> I've never used those external devices, and my private keys have
>> always been one place only located, a computer.
>>
>> That situation is a sort of "trade-off" for it keeps the referred keys
>> more protected/restricted whereas it gives me little chance of using
>> them in other hosts, easily.
>>
>> So, I guess one of the ideas behind making use of those devices would
>> be the facility of taking all of my keyrings ("secring.gpg" for
>> example) with me everywhere, is it correct? If so, by doing that,
>> weren't we losing the whole point?
>
> As you said: ONE of the ideas. The other one is to ptotect the keys (though
> not completely their usage) on your more protected system. As "more protected"
> is still a serious risk in typical environments. Using secret keys on other
> systems is the more serious argument but even for keys on a single host we are
> not missing the point.
>
>
> Hauke
> --
> PGP: D44C 6A5B 71B0 427C CED3 025C BD7D 6D27 ECCB 5814
>
Marcio Barbado, Jr.
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Re: GPF Crypto Stick vs OpenPGP Card
Ok,
let me utilize this thread to clarify something.
I've never used those external devices, and my private keys have
always been one place only located, a computer.
That situation is a sort of "trade-off" for it keeps the referred keys
more protected/restricted whereas it gives me little chance of using
them in other hosts, easily.
So, I guess one of the ideas behind making use of those devices would
be the facility of taking all of my keyrings ("secring.gpg" for
example) with me everywhere, is it correct? If so, by doing that,
weren't we losing the whole point?
Regards,
On Fri, Dec 3, 2010 at 10:21 AM, Hauke Laging
wrote:
> Am Freitag 03 Dezember 2010 09:47:27 schrieb Nils Faerber:
>
>> The non-obvious content of the transaction, what you say as "you do not
>> see what you sign even on the PIN-pad" is an issue that has been
>> discussed a lot of times already - yes, it is definitely an issue but
>> very hard to solve. IMHO this would require a card terminal that
>> understands the data to be signed and present the user with a meaningful
>> summary.
>> But it strictly assumes again that this terminal cannot be compromised
>> too. And being more intelligent (in order to display complex data) means
>> to be a more complex device containing more complex device software
>> which again opens new possible security holes.
>
> A first improvement would be to show the hash to be signed. Of course, you
> cannot trust the hash calculation on a potentially compromised PC but this
> would be a start for further protection (e.g. by sending the file to someone
> else and comparing the hashes).
>
> If I understand the process correctly then not the file hash is signed but the
> hash for a combination of the file hash and some metadata (timestamp, signer
> ID). For a security progress the card reader would have to see both hash
> components which would require a protocol change. IMHO it makes sense to plan
> this for the future. Ask the card reader whether it has a display and can do
> the hash calculation itself. If so then send the data in a new format.
>
>
> Hauke
> --
> PGP: D44C 6A5B 71B0 427C CED3 025C BD7D 6D27 ECCB 5814
>
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>
>
Marcio Barbado, Jr.
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EFF: Eight Epic Failures of Regulating Cryptography
Hello, I think this Electronic Frontier Foundation's text may be of your interest[1]. It was written by American attorney Cindy Cohn. [1] Eight Epic Failures of Regulating Cryptography: http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/10/eight-epic-failures-regulating-cryptography regards, Marcio Barbado, Jr. ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Gnupg good for big groups?
I guess all you need is proper "read" and "write" privileges management. Regards, On Tue, Aug 3, 2010 at 9:51 PM, Snaky Love wrote: > Hi, > I would like to better understand: is gnupg good for big groups? > > I would like to encrypt communication in groups - not instant communication > like e.g. messengers like pidgin, but like on a forum or web-group - the > data persists in an archive, where the communication can be read. Members > are coming and leaving a group constantly - that means if somebody leaves > the group, she should not be able to read the content decrypted anymore, and > if anybody attaches the group all the old content optionally must be > encrypted with her key so she can read all data belonging to this group. > well, maybe you get the idea. It´s basically like a forum or mailing list > with an archive. > With my understanding of gnupg I see no other way than to store the data NOT > encrypted - in a database or wherever, perhaps on an encrypted disc to > compensate for the data not being encrypted - and then to encrypt the data > on the fly with the pubkey of the user after the user logged into the > website and is checked to belong to the right group. > But doing this would be stupid, as it would basically use gnupg only for > transport - but there is already SSL and TLS existing for this purpose. > So is there any trick to encrypt data at creation time for unknown future > users? > And how can I remove users from the group of allowed users without > re-encrypting the content? Is this possible to realize at all without having > to keep the original unencrypted content? > Is this scenario - group communication - not a use-case for gnupg at all? > Thank you very much for your attention! > Have a nice day, > Snaky > ___ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users@gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users > > Marcio Barbado, Jr. ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
