A beautiful banker woman talks about the failed war on drugs in Latin America

2015-03-06 Thread Mr. Clif


She is on some global council to change drug policy:

http://www.ted.com/talks/ilona_szabo_de_carvalho_4_lessons_i_learned_from_taking_a_stand_against_drugs_and_gun_violence#t-380552

Clif

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Re: Looking for simple wrapper for symmetric key file encryption

2014-01-22 Thread Mr. Clif

Hi Ryan,

Yes that is exactly the kind of front end I was looking for, and it 
looks very nice. Thanks for writing it. :-) Though now I have finished 
the stab I took at solving the problem myself, which is a much simpler 
command line script. You can find the two versions of it here:


https://www.eugenemakerspace.com/wiki/Sites/Cryptsym

If folks have the time, I would appreciate any feed back on how they 
like it.


Ciao!
Clif

On 01/21/2014 09:28 AM, Ryan Sawhill wrote:

As already mentioned, you could decrypt the file to a ram disk -- the
/dev/shm directory should already be there, but if you're trying to
bypass creating an unnecessary file altogether, you need something
else.

I actually wrote a GUI frontend for this purpose (among others) a
while back. It's called pyrite and available at:
https://github.com/ryran/pyrite

It's extremely versatile and can do everything but manage keys --
basically you can do any kind of signing & verifying with or without
any kind of encryption/decryption (including symmetric).

Your workflow with it could look like this:

1.)  Run pyrite /path/to/encrypted/file
   [GUI opens up with text-input populated by encrypted text]

2.) Decrypt text
   [Cipher-text is replaced with decrypted version; never saved to disk]

3.) Make your edits/changes

4.) Re-encrypt

5.) Click save-to-disk button


On Sun, Jan 19, 2014 at 4:48 PM, Mr. Clif  wrote:

Hi Doug,

Thanks for the comments. Yes the threat model is mostly the worry of having
old temp files or even the original cleartext files left behind on the HD,
or even worse having them backed up. ;-) At the very least I want something
that tries to protect me from stupid mistakes. Yep the RAM disk idea was
part of the solution I'm heading towards.

So do you or does anyone know of a nice front end that helps with that? An
example of behavior that doesn't seem helpful is that when I use GPA to
decrypt a file it defaults to saving it on the HD. I'm not trying to knock
GPA here but wouldn't it be better to display the contents in a window? Well
I realize that might be just what I want, and others have use cases that it
works fine for. ;-)

 Clif


On 01/19/2014 01:23 PM, Doug Barton wrote:

On 01/19/2014 08:56 AM, Mr. Clif wrote:

So I'm trying to get a sense from the users here if they feel that the
process of using gpg for symmetric encryption is safe enough, and they
are not worried about leaving clear text behind.


I think you're misunderstanding a few things. First, the problem of the
plain text file is not exclusive to symmetric encryption. In fact there is
no difference between that, and the plain text file that's left behind after
public key encryption.

Second, you haven't defined your threat model. You have given us a vague
sense of wanting to have a "secure" system, but you haven't said what you're
trying to secure it against. Thus it's hard to respond intelligently to your
query.

That said, I would suggest that you consider using a RAM disk to do your
work on. It can be created to do the work, then deleted after you're done,
with no risk of leaving a file behind on disk. Of course you'd want to make
sure your RAM disk was not swap-backed.

hope this helps,

Doug



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Re: Looking for simple wrapper for symmetric key file encryption

2014-01-19 Thread Mr. Clif

Hi Doug,

Thanks for the comments. Yes the threat model is mostly the worry of 
having old temp files or even the original cleartext files left behind 
on the HD, or even worse having them backed up. ;-) At the very least I 
want something that tries to protect me from stupid mistakes. Yep the 
RAM disk idea was part of the solution I'm heading towards.


So do you or does anyone know of a nice front end that helps with that? 
An example of behavior that doesn't seem helpful is that when I use GPA 
to decrypt a file it defaults to saving it on the HD. I'm not trying to 
knock GPA here but wouldn't it be better to display the contents in a 
window? Well I realize that might be just what I want, and others have 
use cases that it works fine for. ;-)


Clif

On 01/19/2014 01:23 PM, Doug Barton wrote:

On 01/19/2014 08:56 AM, Mr. Clif wrote:

So I'm trying to get a sense from the users here if they feel that the
process of using gpg for symmetric encryption is safe enough, and they
are not worried about leaving clear text behind.


I think you're misunderstanding a few things. First, the problem of 
the plain text file is not exclusive to symmetric encryption. In fact 
there is no difference between that, and the plain text file that's 
left behind after public key encryption.


Second, you haven't defined your threat model. You have given us a 
vague sense of wanting to have a "secure" system, but you haven't said 
what you're trying to secure it against. Thus it's hard to respond 
intelligently to your query.


That said, I would suggest that you consider using a RAM disk to do 
your work on. It can be created to do the work, then deleted after 
you're done, with no risk of leaving a file behind on disk. Of course 
you'd want to make sure your RAM disk was not swap-backed.


hope this helps,

Doug




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Re: Looking for simple wrapper for symmetric key file encryption

2014-01-19 Thread Mr. Clif


On 01/19/2014 03:53 AM, Johan Wevers wrote:

On 19-1-2014 7:50, Mr. Clif wrote:


Does anyone use symmetric file encryption?

Yes, but only for encrypting files for personal use. Not in
communication with others.



Same here. This is why I wrote that perl script, so I wouldn't have to 
remember to delete the plaintext file after I encrypted it. Are there 
other front ends or wrappers that help the work flow in this way?




What is the best practice here?

As always, that depends on your use case and threat model.


I heard of another solution which was to mount an encrypted
directory with fuser to drop files into.

Possible, I use TrueCryot containers for that but that's similar
(although more portable and usable on "that other  OS").


I think I would wounder how
safe the passphrase was for mounted filesystems,

Are you asking how long it would take to brute-force the pasword, how
difficult it is to snoop it or if there are known vulnarabilities in the
symmetric encryption used by gnupg, fuser or others?


though I know of some techniques for protecting them.

Remember the weakest link in all encryption: https://xkcd.com/538/
Yes I suppose that's true. Though I was just thinking about ways I heard 
of to hide the key material in RAM. As I mentioned below, I'd rather not 
have to resort to an encrypted filesystem just to handle the occasional 
private file unless the conventional wisdom says that it's the only good 
way to do it.


So I'm trying to get a sense from the users here if they feel that the 
process of using gpg for symmetric encryption is safe enough, and they 
are not worried about leaving clear text behind.


Thanks,
Clif


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Re: Looking for simple wrapper for symmetric key file encryption

2014-01-18 Thread Mr. Clif

So no one got back to me.

Does anyone use symmetric file encryption? What is the best practice 
here? I heard of another solution which was to mount an encrypted 
directory with fuser to drop files into. I think I would wounder how 
safe the passphrase was for mounted filesystems, though I know of some 
techniques for protecting them.


Any pointers regarding best practices for  symmetric file encryption 
would be much appreciated.


Thanks,
Clif

On 01/17/2014 01:15 PM, Mr. Clif wrote:

Greetings!

I've been happily using pgp and gpg off and on for decades. One thing 
I never quite figured out was what the best way to use it for 
encrypting sensitive files on disk. After doing that one has to 
remember to cleanup after themselves and delete all the leftover 
plaintext versions of the file, or it kind of defeats the whole 
purpose, and its pretty easy to make a mistake when doing it manually. 
I always felt that GPG should help you a bit more in that regard. Now 
I know that full disk encryption might be a way around this, but it 
seems like overkill if you just have a couple of files to protect.


I have searched high and low and checked out GnuPG Shell, GPA, 
Seahorse, XAP, and some other misc wrappers but nothing seemed to fit 
my use case. So I wrote a simple wrapper in perl. Basically it just 
lets you toggle a file between plaintext and encrypted forms without 
letting the plaintext version touch/remain on the disk, unless that is 
what you want.


#! /usr/bin/perl -U
#   This Perl script is a wrapper around GPG to decrypt or encrypt 
a file.

#It's goal is to try to prevent plaintext from touching, or remaining
#on the disk, something GPG fails to do. If there is a new file 
created
#It will be in the same directory as the original unless you 
specify a new

#path in a second arg.
#
#By Clif 12/05/13
#

# External utilities
$GPG   = "/usr/bin/gpg";  # GnuPG 1.4.15
$SHRED = "/usr/bin/shred";  # secure file deleter 
(GNU coreutils) 8.13


# Arguments
($arg, $dest) = @ARGV;

# Break down the pathname
$path = $1 if $arg  =~ /^(.*?)(\/[^\/]*)$/;
$file = $1 if $arg  =~ /([^\/]+)\/?$/;
$base = $1 if $file =~ /^(.+?)(\.[^.]*)?$/;
$ext  = $1 if $file =~ /\.([^. ]*)\s*$/;

# Get destination
if ($dest) {
 $destp = 1;
 $dest .= "/$base" if (-d $dest);
 $dest =~ s/\.asc\s*$//;
} else { $dest = $path ? "$path/$base" : $base }

# Is this a planetext or an encrypted file?

if (-r $arg) {
if ($ext eq "asc") {# Encrypted
if ($destp) { system("$GPG -o $dest $arg") }
else{ system("$GPG -o - $arg") }
} else {# Plaintext
unlink "${dest}.asc";
$err = system("$GPG -o ${dest}.asc -ca --cipher-algo AES256 
$arg");

if ($err) { print "ERROR = $err\n" }
else  { system("$SHRED -un9 $arg") }
}
} else { warn "No such file: $arg\n" }
# All done


Obviously it could be much more thorough but I just wanted to get the 
idea across. I was also thinking about adding a RAM based editing 
feature but I didn't want to reinvent the wheel if someone knows of a 
similar project.


Thanks for any comments you might have,
Clif





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Looking for simple wrapper for symmetric key file encryption

2014-01-17 Thread Mr. Clif

Greetings!

I've been happily using pgp and gpg off and on for decades. One thing I 
never quite figured out was what the best way to use it for encrypting 
sensitive files on disk. After doing that one has to remember to cleanup 
after themselves and delete all the leftover plaintext versions of the 
file, or it kind of defeats the whole purpose, and its pretty easy to 
make a mistake when doing it manually. I always felt that GPG should 
help you a bit more in that regard. Now I know that full disk encryption 
might be a way around this, but it seems like overkill if you just have 
a couple of files to protect.


I have searched high and low and checked out GnuPG Shell, GPA, Seahorse, 
XAP, and some other misc wrappers but nothing seemed to fit my use case. 
So I wrote a simple wrapper in perl. Basically it just lets you toggle a 
file between plaintext and encrypted forms without letting the plaintext 
version touch/remain on the disk, unless that is what you want.


#! /usr/bin/perl -U
#   This Perl script is a wrapper around GPG to decrypt or encrypt a file.
#   It's goal is to try to prevent plaintext from touching, or remaining
#   on the disk, something GPG fails to do. If there is a new file created
#   It will be in the same directory as the original unless you specify a 
new
#   path in a second arg.
#
#   By Clif 12/05/13
#

# External utilities
$GPG   = "/usr/bin/gpg";  # GnuPG 1.4.15
$SHRED = "/usr/bin/shred";  # secure file deleter (GNU 
coreutils) 8.13

# Arguments
($arg, $dest) = @ARGV;

# Break down the pathname
$path = $1 if $arg  =~ /^(.*?)(\/[^\/]*)$/;
$file = $1 if $arg  =~ /([^\/]+)\/?$/;
$base = $1 if $file =~ /^(.+?)(\.[^.]*)?$/;
$ext  = $1 if $file =~ /\.([^. ]*)\s*$/;

# Get destination
if ($dest) {
 $destp = 1;
 $dest .= "/$base" if (-d $dest);
 $dest =~ s/\.asc\s*$//;
} else { $dest = $path ? "$path/$base" : $base }

# Is this a planetext or an encrypted file?

if (-r $arg) {
if ($ext eq "asc") {  # Encrypted
if ($destp) { system("$GPG -o $dest $arg") }
else{ system("$GPG -o - $arg") }
} else {# Plaintext
unlink "${dest}.asc";
$err = system("$GPG -o ${dest}.asc -ca --cipher-algo AES256 
$arg");
if ($err) { print "ERROR = $err\n" }
else  { system("$SHRED -un9 $arg") }
}
} else { warn "No such file: $arg\n" }
# All done


Obviously it could be much more thorough but I just wanted to get the 
idea across. I was also thinking about adding a RAM based editing 
feature but I didn't want to reinvent the wheel if someone knows of a 
similar project.


Thanks for any comments you might have,
Clif



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