Re: Is there a chance smartcards have a backdoor? (was Re: Any future for the Crypto Stick?)
Peter Lebbing pe...@digitalbrains.com wrote: On 05/12/13 13:20, Paul R. Ramer wrote: On that note, why assume that the manufacturer would not do the opposite: feign helping the spy agency by giving them a compromised ROM and then substituting a secure one on the real product. In either case, we are assuming the company would try to supply different bodies with different ROMs. We're debating the risk that a card is backdoored. If there is such a risk, that risk still exists if we allow for the possibility that manufacturers try to do what you say. They're not mutually exclusive; how come you infer that I assume that the manufacturer would not do the opposite? It was not my intent to make it seem that I had made any insinuations on your part. It was more that I wanted to express an alternate possibility rather than the nefarious one that was being discussed. It seemed that the only scenario involving pressure or coercion on the part of the U.S. being discussed was one of compliance by the company rather than a range of possibilities. Events in life do not always happen neatly and predictably. If we are going to discuss outcomes, we need to talk about more than one. Cheers, --Paul -- PGP: 3DB6D884 ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Any future for the Crypto Stick?
On Sat, 7 Dec 2013 11:29, ein...@pvv.org said: AFAIK, the US has no import restrictions on cryptography, and the RSA patent ran out years ago, so e.g. shop.kernelconcepts.de should be able to ship it to you. IIRC, Petra of kernelconcepts told me that there is no problem for them to ship to the US. You may also order by simple or encrypted mail (Petra's fingerprint is on their website); the shop is merely an email frontend to them. Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Is there a chance smartcards have a backdoor? (was Re: Any future for the Crypto Stick?)
Il 08/12/2013 14:15, Mark Schneider ha scritto: A little security is not real security. There always can be backdoors in the firmware (BIOS, closed source drivers etc). Why is everyone thinking 'BIOS' as backdoorable piece of sw? Why not the hard disk? http://spritesmods.com/?art=hddhack Just another piece to think of when building a secure system... BYtE, Diego. ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Is there a chance smartcards have a backdoor? (was Re: Any future for the Crypto Stick?)
Am 08.12.2013 19:13, schrieb NdK: Why is everyone thinking 'BIOS' as backdoorable piece of sw? Why not the hard disk? http://spritesmods.com/?art=hddhack Just another piece to think of when building a secure system... Excellent article! Thank you. Writing firmware I meant every piece of code for / inside all involved hardware components and in particular with their own controllers (eg. keyboard, USB ...) and not only the BIOS of the motherboard. Some backdoors can be hardcoded in the hardware of controller chips (eg. network controller etc). Sending a special sequence of data to them can turn them in the debug or whatever mode. Hacking smartcards is more complicated but possible. BTW: there is no video at: http://achtbaan.nikhef.nl/events/OHM/video/d2-t1-13-20130801-2300-hard_disks_more_than_just_block_devices-sprite_tm.m4v Kind regards, Mark -- m...@it-infrastrukturen.org http://rsync.it-infrastrukturen.org ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Is there a chance smartcards have a backdoor? (was Re: Any future for the Crypto Stick?)
On 08/12/13 21:13, Mark Schneider wrote: BTW: there is no video at: http://achtbaan.nikhef.nl/events/OHM/video/d2-t1-13-20130801-2300-hard_disks_more_than_just_block_devices-sprite_tm.m4v You can find it at: http://bofh.nikhef.nl/events/OHM/video/d2-t1-13-20130801-2300-hard_disks_more_than_just_block_devices-sprite_tm.m4v And I've just told Sprite the link is dead :). I was just telling him he was just featured on this mailing list :). HTH, Peter. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at http://digitalbrains.com/2012/openpgp-key-peter ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Any future for the Crypto Stick?
On Fri, Dec 06, 2013 at 06:41:31PM +, Bob (Robert) Cavanaugh wrote: If it is not violating any agreements or policies, can somebody on this thread please point to a source in the US for these products? AFAIK, the US has no import restrictions on cryptography, and the RSA patent ran out years ago, so e.g. shop.kernelconcepts.de should be able to ship it to you. -- Einar Ryeng ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Any future for the Crypto Stick?
On Thu, 5 Dec 2013 21:14, ein...@pvv.org said: Gemalto SIM USB adapter seems to be sort of the same thing as the Crypto Stick. However, it is a bit more hassle to get a USB adapter and a smart card, cut the card to fit etc. That is not a problem. You can buy pre-punched standard OpenPGP cards: it takes less then 10 seconds to break the ID000 sized part out and put it into one of the USB stick reader (I am using an SCT2512). Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Any future for the Crypto Stick?
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Le 06/12/2013 09:51, Werner Koch a écrit : On Thu, 5 Dec 2013 21:14, ein...@pvv.org said: Gemalto SIM USB adapter seems to be sort of the same thing as the Crypto Stick. However, it is a bit more hassle to get a USB adapter and a smart card, cut the card to fit etc. That is not a problem. You can buy pre-punched standard OpenPGP cards: it takes less then 10 seconds to break the ID000 sized part out and put it into one of the USB stick reader (I am using an SCT2512). Recently done with : * Gemalto usb reader : http://shop.kernelconcepts.de/product_info.php?products_id=119 * OpenPGP smartcard v2 with SIM breakout : http://shop.kernelconcepts.de/product_info.php?products_id=42language=en As saying Werner : a fast and easy move :) +1 Christophe Shalom-Salam, Werner -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (MingW32) iQGcBAEBAgAGBQJSoZbXAAoJENlOz/4GYcu6NVIL+wRj2jL2xqOXvtc8Z0d9bBeI R6+j3gVEGbDROerWLZR6IHT2hrI1TlJlSmE3jWcSbq9PgocScFeVbgM1Mulg/YJf 2xhj2JPlMyzSZ8hWSgeqRw6Cg/3iaIpelVetdqxEwMVU+iHOgQbNnjJq0IYYoUYO Cm8kZ68l1j2scpEtRt9R0BoqunUYh44Ndt/Q1mHC/fgNkD0Rt/4JnZq8CImo2epf o1UJRsLPAdwLq11myfVORkawB4h+QHKGQcIWEp9uYWATvUQU8REjiYNOATMAF84U lmNGRIUd/6lFNH0WAvTFtoF/oa5WjQkTEu6sEf/NokESTSGRigvd6aIRuxYsFVcL 7bU2Aa0LZ+m1QBMzVUZfWq9mRc2mEat+WIMdm9niZp2ewSf4H7OC0l6JD3f9Tcyc 5BSkQrhAYU3w3KynldBMvSKbG61nEEHmxuovZ0rOu06oG9MUmhr3QNfswOelJvKq iUZ0hfrxKZFQl6mt68ZUmPpT/4AjIWP2/Pt4WI4GaQ== =LHd/ -END PGP SIGNATURE- * Le contenu de ce courriel et ses eventuelles pièces jointes sont confidentiels. Ils s'adressent exclusivement à la personne destinataire. Si cet envoi ne vous est pas destiné, ou si vous l'avez reçu par erreur, et afin de ne pas violer le secret des correspondances, vous ne devez pas le transmettre à d'autres personnes ni le reproduire. Merci de le renvoyer à l'émetteur et de le détruire. Attention : L'Organisme de l'émetteur du message ne pourra être tenu responsable de l'altération du présent courriel. Il appartient au destinataire de vérifier que les messages et pièces jointes reçus ne contiennent pas de virus. Les opinions contenues dans ce courriel et ses éventuelles pièces jointes sont celles de l'émetteur. Elles ne reflètent pas la position de l'Organisme sauf s'il en est disposé autrement dans le présent courriel. ** ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
RE: Any future for the Crypto Stick?
If it is not violating any agreements or policies, can somebody on this thread please point to a source in the US for these products? Thanks, Bob Cavanaugh -Original Message- From: Gnupg-users [mailto:gnupg-users-boun...@gnupg.org] On Behalf Of Werner Koch Sent: Friday, December 06, 2013 12:51 AM To: Einar Ryeng Cc: gnupg-users@gnupg.org Subject: Re: Any future for the Crypto Stick? On Thu, 5 Dec 2013 21:14, ein...@pvv.org said: Gemalto SIM USB adapter seems to be sort of the same thing as the Crypto Stick. However, it is a bit more hassle to get a USB adapter and a smart card, cut the card to fit etc. That is not a problem. You can buy pre-punched standard OpenPGP cards: it takes less then 10 seconds to break the ID000 sized part out and put it into one of the USB stick reader (I am using an SCT2512). Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Any future for the Crypto Stick?
Peter Lebbing pe...@digitalbrains.com wrote: On 02/12/13 20:37, Andreas Schwier (ML) wrote: Wait a second - you can not simply hide a backdoor in a Common Criteria evaluated operating system. There are too many entities that would need to be involved in the process Why couldn't the manufacturer simply put a different, backdoored firmware in the card ROM than the one they showed to the other entities? Are those other entities physically examining the ROM mask of the final product or somehow bypassing the code protection and reading out the flash ROM? On that note, why assume that the manufacturer would not do the opposite: feign helping the spy agency by giving them a compromised ROM and then substituting a secure one on the real product. In either case, we are assuming the company would try to supply different bodies with different ROMs. It is not that the mentioned scenario is impossible. It is that it just seems like too much effort to be made by a company that has no benefit in such duplicity. Cheers, --Paul -- PGP: 3DB6D884 ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Is there a chance smartcards have a backdoor? (was Re: Any future for the Crypto Stick?)
On 05/12/13 13:20, Paul R. Ramer wrote: On that note, why assume that the manufacturer would not do the opposite: feign helping the spy agency by giving them a compromised ROM and then substituting a secure one on the real product. In either case, we are assuming the company would try to supply different bodies with different ROMs. We're debating the risk that a card is backdoored. If there is such a risk, that risk still exists if we allow for the possibility that manufacturers try to do what you say. They're not mutually exclusive; how come you infer that I assume that the manufacturer would not do the opposite? But anyway: So the NSA simply buys a card from a shop, and notices that it doesn't respond to the backdoor command. Or they want to use the backdoor to get a suspect's private key, and again, the card does not respond. How is the manufacturer going to talk its way out of that? However, if you're up against specific investigation by the NSA (not the dragnet method), I think pretty much anybody will lose, backdoor or not. If they can't extract your private key, they'll simply hack your computer and batch up decryption requests to be bundled with your own next access of the card, or something similar, or something really smart I didn't think of. So it's really a question if it matters whether the NSA has a backdoor or not :). Peter. PS: the new subject line is very verbose because I wanted to avoid the risk that people interpret Chance smartcard backdoored as a statement rather than a question. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at http://digitalbrains.com/2012/openpgp-key-peter ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Is there a chance smartcards have a backdoor? (was Re: Any future for the Crypto Stick?)
On 05/12/13 13:20, Paul R. Ramer wrote: On that note, why assume that the manufacturer would not do the opposite: feign helping the spy agency By the way, there's a big difference. In the scenario that they install a backdoor but don't show it to the certification entities and such, they do that because they're forced to do so by the NSA (the NSA wouldn't want their backdoor certified :). If they feign helping the NSA, they aren't forced to do that, it would be their choice. In either case, we are assuming the company would try to supply different bodies with different ROMs. But they are completely different circumstances: force versus own choice. Peter. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at http://digitalbrains.com/2012/openpgp-key-peter ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Any future for the Crypto Stick?
On Thu, Dec 05, 2013 at 04:20:42AM -0800, Paul R. Ramer wrote: Peter Lebbing pe...@digitalbrains.com wrote: On 02/12/13 20:37, Andreas Schwier (ML) wrote: Wait a second - you can not simply hide a backdoor in a Common Criteria evaluated operating system. There are too many entities that would need to be involved in the process Why couldn't the manufacturer simply put a different, backdoored firmware in the card ROM than the one they showed to the other entities? Are those other entities physically examining the ROM mask of the final product or somehow bypassing the code protection and reading out the flash ROM? On that note, why assume that the manufacturer would not do the opposite: feign helping the spy agency by giving them a compromised ROM and then substituting a secure one on the real product. In either case, we are assuming the company would try to supply different bodies with different ROMs. Probably because the company might be open to criminal charges. I understand that the NSA has used this threat in the past. -- Bob Holtzman Your mail is being read by tight lipped NSA agents who fail to see humor in Doctor Strangelove Key ID 8D549279 signature.asc Description: Digital signature ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Any future for the Crypto Stick?
On Sun, Dec 01, 2013 at 01:21:56PM +0100, arne renkema-padmos wrote: On 12/01/2013 12:45 PM, Einar Ryeng wrote: Any news on the crypto stick (or similar initiatives) would be appreciated. An OpenPGP card with something like a Gemalto SIM usb adapter would seem to fit the bill. Thanks for the replies. I've got some Crypto Sticks, so for my own use I'm covered for the time being, but I was wondering what to recommend to friends who have been trying to buy crypto sticks without luck for some time now. Gemalto SIM USB adapter seems to be sort of the same thing as the Crypto Stick. However, it is a bit more hassle to get a USB adapter and a smart card, cut the card to fit etc. The yubikey solution mentioned in the thread seems simpler in that regard, and depening on your use, you may or may not be worried that NSA or some other service has wrangled some kind of backdoor into it (which I doubt, except if they've done it by compromising security standards). None the less I'd probably opt for open solutions for my personal use just due to ethical/political reasons, but would have no worries about using Yubico stuff at work. Cheers, -- Einar Ryeng ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Is there a chance smartcards have a backdoor? (was Re: Any future for the Crypto Stick?)
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 On 12/05/2013 08:08 PM, Peter Lebbing wrote: On 05/12/13 13:20, Paul R. Ramer wrote: On that note, why assume that the manufacturer would not do the opposite: feign helping the spy agency by giving them a compromised ROM and then substituting a secure one on the real product. In either case, we are assuming the company would try to supply different bodies with different ROMs. We're debating the risk that a card is backdoored. If there is such a risk, that risk still exists if we allow for the possibility that manufacturers try to do what you say. They're not mutually exclusive; how come you infer that I assume that the manufacturer would not do the opposite? The smartcard having a bad RNG as seen in [0] springs to mind. References: [0] http://sites.miis.edu/cysec/2013/10/10/taiwans-citizen-smart-card-plan-compromised-by-bad-rngs/ - -- - Kristian Fiskerstrand Blog: http://blog.sumptuouscapital.com Twitter: @krifisk - Public PGP key 0xE3EDFAE3 at hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net fpr:94CB AFDD 3034 5109 5618 35AA 0B7F 8B60 E3ED FAE3 - Great things are not accomplished by those who yield to trends and fads and popular opinion. (Jack Kerouac) -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJSoNKKAAoJEAt/i2Dj7frjgacQAKftpqC3shsP1p4oF1Ksdd25 bjS1lX/SsGUKe5ynKr6elY7NxAea6L7QH5yP9uinBYDGpZnUV9JcNAyYtwUwYlDS MwPoYXcOdoYVe/cSIJflARDBzDDdaLw/51O/4ZReeYUjOQlz5Lr+JqO0O/02FcwJ E3jKHkQo44CbpYEqF3LAIl7qua2eMwNV99hxvuUQxrj3k3FJAZaPrAP9duJkA9BA Ssvq4iBWVgikPw8jrefBrzhIpSTjSYSslXEJzgBnYsQ6zbPtWnX/15cVz8n4GWiI o06A7Obx1siIzOL/S+nJK1jv8as3JU/Q5Xh5OfvmiXhjljhjQr0lKo4DMEaQ4z6B IPJODsL8Pe6u44kC+qyZ0JABFxUlDPh4RD8xpFeJBizZPajoYfJWBEyNuW0swB5J L2WZqRITYiz/epQROp6SLPY06O2ym78twwjM/ldtH1dgVqygze15aNB0onHeSZd7 8LDvm4Dnn4F259nuPyJ0ejjtvupOu/DkHE8UShynEELuFIrxenEEULplISRJ8To9 d+bwEaX0nfPMSbj6j8cBsMa1YyxI2NHqmgPweqc9UB+FUi6Mc6/W9HfRH5XgAW+J sSZDWJvOBLWMAf6qOnCIK6WmhhlPY0YYiFQByiBF3idmVIj4iAokbr7kHvPepIMj 6tzH0YpBaNF9wSLh7tMh =fTni -END PGP SIGNATURE- ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Any future for the Crypto Stick?
On Mon, Dec 02, 2013 at 07:33:22PM +0100, Peter Lebbing wrote: [snip] Since smartcards are primarily used for security purposes, I wouldn't be surprised if it responded specially to a message signed by the NSA (or encrypted with a symmetric cipher with a specific key known to the NSA). I wonder how feasible that really is. The system surrounding the card is not under control of the card's manufacturer or anyone who might have corrupted him. All it takes is one knowledgable person watching the data stream for interesting anomalies, and you have given the game away. The cost, as we've recently seen, could be considerable. -- Mark H. Wood, Lead System Programmer mw...@iupui.edu Machines should not be friendly. Machines should be obedient. signature.asc Description: Digital signature ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Any future for the Crypto Stick?
Il 03/12/2013 15:30, Mark H. Wood ha scritto: I wonder how feasible that really is. The system surrounding the card is not under control of the card's manufacturer or anyone who might have corrupted him. All it takes is one knowledgable person watching the data stream for interesting anomalies, and you have given the game away. The cost, as we've recently seen, could be considerable. Unless the exploit could be categorised as bug. Like the power glitch that allows clearing fuses in some PICs (advertised as secure chips, at the time... now they're saying it's secure unless operated outside nominal values) w/o wiping the rest of the memory. This way you'd have to use a non-standard reader to introduce a specific error. Or, maybe, a protection layer that fails if frozen before exposing it to oxygen, allowing the attacker to succesfully decap the chip before it self-erases. There are simply too many attack vectors to say the evaluation considers 'em all. It needs to stop somewhere saying this chip is secure against these attacks since it can't say it's secure against any attack you could think of. And/or it places a budget limit on the attack: if it costs more than that, the attack is worthless. I've seen this tradeoff while studying openalarm, a (wannabe, still in its early stages) burglar alarm system scalable from garage to bank: as long as you can trust a producer and an installer, it's quite easy and anything will do (if you need to protect your personal mail from your nosy boss, FST-01 is more than enough). If you can't, you need exponentially more resources to be able to pinpoint the black hat, be it the producer of a node, of one of the management systems or the installer trying to slip a backdoor in. If you don't/can't trust a single smartcard manufacturer, you'd need to use at least four (if you need to be able to say who is the misbehaving one -- byzantine generals problem in case of 3 with one misbehaving agent). So, for the vast majority of uses, the solution might be non-technical: use a certified Common Criteria card and make sure to have evidence that if the key is leaked then that certification is bogus. Quite unlikely the NSA will reveal having a backdoor just to arrest *you* :) BYtE, Diego. ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Any future for the Crypto Stick?
Il 01/12/2013 20:09, Tristan Santore ha scritto: You might want to check out the Yubikey guys. They make a yubikey with an openpgp applet. https://www.yubico.com/2012/12/yubikey-neo-openpgp/ Yubikeys would be interesting, if only it would be possible to develop personal applets to load on 'em. Too bad some needed libraries (like the one to access the button for OOB consent) are only available under NDA from NXP (quite uncollaborative with hobbyists). Moreover, their applet doesn't allow key import, only on-card generation! Some people should peer review this stuff though. At least the code is FOSS. Quite useless to review something you won't be able to compile and load yourself, don't you think? I would still prefer a openpgp card though mainly because I trust a German company more, than a business that also might be harassed by the US Government. Another alternative is getting a SIM-cut Java card and a reader for it, then load one of the OpenPGP Java applets you can find around. You'll then be able to load code you compiled (and audited) yourself and can import your 'old' keys if you like. All depends on the legal situation and the willingness of companies to abuse their position, because they are being lobbied by governments. Who can you really trust? If you don't trust NXP, then you can't use any of their JCOP chips... What would stop 'em from adding an undocumented command to the card manager that dumps the whole memory? PS: too bad all the Java cards I could get are limited to 2048 bit keys... Only BasicCard supports longer keys, but I'm not using Basic since Commodore-64 era :) BYtE, Diego. ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Any future for the Crypto Stick?
On Mon, Dec 2, 2013 at 9:24 AM, NdK ndk.cla...@gmail.com wrote: Il 01/12/2013 20:09, Tristan Santore ha scritto: You might want to check out the Yubikey guys. They make a yubikey with an openpgp applet. https://www.yubico.com/2012/12/yubikey-neo-openpgp/ Yubikeys would be interesting, if only it would be possible to develop personal applets to load on 'em. Too bad some needed libraries (like the one to access the button for OOB consent) are only available under NDA from NXP (quite uncollaborative with hobbyists). Moreover, their applet doesn't allow key import, only on-card generation! Not lately - there has been an update to support key import. Tested it and it works great for keeping keys off my machine. Hopefully we do see more features being made accessible for Open-Source usage, though. [commit reference where it was added] https://github.com/Yubico/ykneo-openpgp/commit/b30612237e610cbc35d37fc5ebe59629de93001d -- Thomas Harning Jr. (http://about.me/harningt) ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Any future for the Crypto Stick?
On 02/12/13 15:24, NdK wrote: Who can you really trust? If you don't trust NXP, then you can't use any of their JCOP chips... What would stop 'em from adding an undocumented command to the card manager that dumps the whole memory? Exactly the point I was going to make when I read your mail up to this point. And don't forget that the draconian US laws aren't just for multinationals whose main offices are in the US... it's also for multinationals with any office in the US. I wouldn't count on it that NXP thought we'd rather lose the US market than backdoor our smartcards. Since smartcards are primarily used for security purposes, I wouldn't be surprised if it responded specially to a message signed by the NSA (or encrypted with a symmetric cipher with a specific key known to the NSA). Only BasicCard supports longer keys, but I'm not using Basic since Commodore-64 era :) I agree with you, but programs on BasicCards are generally rather simple since they just define the contents for the ISO 7816 APDU's and files, and everything else, including the file system on the card, is part of the interpreter and OS on the card. And BASIC has two advantages: it's easy to learn, and it's easy to compile to bytecode (that is, writing a compiler is easy). Obviously, the design of the language from an academic standpoint is really bad by todays standards; we learned a lot since BASIC was designed. But that's not so important for the small applet-like programs that only work with the contents of ISO 7816 APDU's and files. Peter. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at http://digitalbrains.com/2012/openpgp-key-peter ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Any future for the Crypto Stick?
Wait a second - you can not simply hide a backdoor in a Common Criteria evaluated operating system. There are too many entities that would need to be involved in the process: The manufacturer, the evaluator, the certification body and possibly a national regulator (Here for example NXP, TÜV-IT, BSI and Bundesnetzagentur). And if there were a backdoor, then the manufacturer could be held liable if the backdoor was exploited. They wouldn't risk their business just to comply with a fairly small US smart card market requirement. Btw. we are working on a solution to add OpenPGP support for our SmartCard-HSM, which is running on a JCOP platform. It's available as card, USB-Stick or MicroSD card. Andreas Am 02.12.2013 19:33, schrieb Peter Lebbing: On 02/12/13 15:24, NdK wrote: Who can you really trust? If you don't trust NXP, then you can't use any of their JCOP chips... What would stop 'em from adding an undocumented command to the card manager that dumps the whole memory? Exactly the point I was going to make when I read your mail up to this point. And don't forget that the draconian US laws aren't just for multinationals whose main offices are in the US... it's also for multinationals with any office in the US. I wouldn't count on it that NXP thought we'd rather lose the US market than backdoor our smartcards. Since smartcards are primarily used for security purposes, I wouldn't be surprised if it responded specially to a message signed by the NSA (or encrypted with a symmetric cipher with a specific key known to the NSA). Only BasicCard supports longer keys, but I'm not using Basic since Commodore-64 era :) I agree with you, but programs on BasicCards are generally rather simple since they just define the contents for the ISO 7816 APDU's and files, and everything else, including the file system on the card, is part of the interpreter and OS on the card. And BASIC has two advantages: it's easy to learn, and it's easy to compile to bytecode (that is, writing a compiler is easy). Obviously, the design of the language from an academic standpoint is really bad by todays standards; we learned a lot since BASIC was designed. But that's not so important for the small applet-like programs that only work with the contents of ISO 7816 APDU's and files. Peter. -- -CardContact Software System Consulting |.## ##.| Andreas Schwier |# #| Schülerweg 38 |# #| 32429 Minden, Germany |'## ##'| Phone +49 571 56149 -http://www.cardcontact.de http://www.tscons.de http://www.openscdp.org ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Any future for the Crypto Stick?
On 02/12/13 20:37, Andreas Schwier (ML) wrote: Wait a second - you can not simply hide a backdoor in a Common Criteria evaluated operating system. There are too many entities that would need to be involved in the process Why couldn't the manufacturer simply put a different, backdoored firmware in the card ROM than the one they showed to the other entities? Are those other entities physically examining the ROM mask of the final product or somehow bypassing the code protection and reading out the flash ROM? And if there were a backdoor, then the manufacturer could be held liable if the backdoor was exploited. They wouldn't risk their business just to comply with a fairly small US smart card market requirement. I'm not so sure. This is equally true for the backdoors than are known to have been placed by the NSA; yet still there they are. By the way, when NXP is kicked out of the US, they lose their whole US market, not just the smartcard market. Instead of kicked out, also think of harassed, not getting government contracts, etcetera. Btw. we are working on a solution to add OpenPGP support for our SmartCard-HSM, which is running on a JCOP platform. It's available as card, USB-Stick or MicroSD card. Cool, the more, the merrier. NdK just pointed me to the FST-01 USB stick, not a JCOP platform, but cool in a different way. Fully free software on a generic ARM platform. Peter. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at http://digitalbrains.com/2012/openpgp-key-peter ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Any future for the Crypto Stick?
Hi. The GPF Crypto Stick has been unavailable for months now, and I wondered if anyone here has information on its future. After the German Privacy Foundation apparently closed down this summer, I've started getting worried that we've seen the end of what I consider the most practical hardware token for GPG. Any news on the crypto stick (or similar initiatives) would be appreciated. Cheers, -- Einar Ryeng ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Any future for the Crypto Stick?
Einar Ryeng schrieb: Hi. The GPF Crypto Stick has been unavailable for months now, and I wondered if anyone here has information on its future. Any news on the crypto stick (or similar initiatives) would be appreciated. I just use a OpenPGP Card in a small gemalto stick reader. AFAIK in the Crypto stick they just soldered a OpenPGP card in, so it is basically the same! smime.p7s Description: S/MIME Cryptographic Signature ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Any future for the Crypto Stick?
On 01/12/13 17:01, Josef Schneider wrote: Einar Ryeng schrieb: Hi. The GPF Crypto Stick has been unavailable for months now, and I wondered if anyone here has information on its future. Any news on the crypto stick (or similar initiatives) would be appreciated. I just use a OpenPGP Card in a small gemalto stick reader. AFAIK in the Crypto stick they just soldered a OpenPGP card in, so it is basically the same! ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users You might want to check out the Yubikey guys. They make a yubikey with an openpgp applet. https://www.yubico.com/2012/12/yubikey-neo-openpgp/ And the applet code is here: https://github.com/Yubico/ykneo-openpgp Some people should peer review this stuff though. At least the code is FOSS. I would still prefer a openpgp card though mainly because I trust a German company more, than a business that also might be harassed by the US Government. However, if there is no other way to connect a device like a card reader, then maybe this would offer an alternative. As Bruce Schneier said, FOSS is harder to manipulate, so that is a good thing, and also he warns of US (non US)influence on proprietary companies. To be honest, I think one now has to take any US business with a pinch of salt. This of course also applies to other businesses, which are not located in the US. All depends on the legal situation and the willingness of companies to abuse their position, because they are being lobbied by governments. The usual, do this or we won't offer your products for tendering in the public sector (government departments), or worse threats where laws allow that. Or just plain stupidity, thinking they are doing the right thing, believing all the rubbish they have been fed. Regards, Tristan -- Tristan Santore BSc MBCS TS4523-RIPE Network and Infrastructure Operations InterNexusConnect Mobile +44-78-55069812 tristan.sant...@internexusconnect.net Former Thawte Notary (Please note: Thawte has closed its WoT programme down, and I am therefore no longer able to accredit trust) For Fedora related issues, please email me at: tsant...@fedoraproject.org ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Any future for the Crypto Stick?
Am 01.12.2013 18:01, schrieb Josef Schneider: Einar Ryeng schrieb: Hi. The GPF Crypto Stick has been unavailable for months now, and I wondered if anyone here has information on its future. Any news on the crypto stick (or similar initiatives) would be appreciated. I just use a OpenPGP Card in a small gemalto stick reader. AFAIK in the Crypto stick they just soldered a OpenPGP card in, so it is basically the same! Well, at least similar, let's say. The CryptoStick uses an AVR microcontroller as cardreader chip and the sotware to that AVR is also AFAIK free software. Cheers nils -- kernel concepts GmbH Tel: +49-271-771091-12 Sieghuetter Hauptweg 48 D-57072 Siegen Mob: +49-176-21024535 http://www.kernelconcepts.de signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Any future for the Crypto Stick?
On 12/01/2013 12:45 PM, Einar Ryeng wrote: Hi. The GPF Crypto Stick has been unavailable for months now, and I wondered if anyone here has information on its future. After the German Privacy Foundation apparently closed down this summer, I've started getting worried that we've seen the end of what I consider the most practical hardware token for GPG. Any news on the crypto stick (or similar initiatives) would be appreciated. Cheers, An OpenPGP card with something like a Gemalto SIM usb adapter would seem to fit the bill. Cheers, arne -- Arne Renkema-Padmos Doctoral researcher SecUSo – Security, Usability and Society Center for Advanced Security Research Darmstadt TU Darmstadt, Department of Computer Science Building S2|02, Room B214 Phone: +49 163 734 6164 Web: https://www.secuso.informatik.tu-darmstadt.de/de/staff/arne-renkema-padmos/ ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
