Re: comments on uid

2012-03-18 Thread freejack
 Well, the UID is what other people sign. Suppose by a wonderful
 coincidence my name is Barack Obama. To prevent confusion, I create this
 UID Barack Obama (NOT the US president) bar...@is-my.name  

  People sign this. They have seen my birth certificate... erm... I mean
  passport :)
 
Hahaha!!! Damn Hawaiins!
 
 and the comment is quite helpful. Now I change the comment. I don't think
 by now I need to spell it out anymore, but here goes: 
 
  Barack Obama (US president) bar...@is-my.name
 
  People might not be so happy they signed this UID.
 
Alright that's a good answer but aren't people just confirming the email
address belongs to a known signer when they sign a key? Does it really
matter what the UID comment is? I think it may be going a bit too far to say
the UID is guaranteed.
 
 But you can simply create a new UID (command adduid from --edit-key) and
 delete the old UID (command deluid). That, as you say, doesn't help when
 it's on a keyserver as you can't delete data from a key on a
 keyserver. Likewise, people who already have a copy of your key and import
 your new key will still have the old UID as well(!). 
 
Do I have to do anything with the keys when adding a UID and deleting the
old one? I don't remember.
 
 When other people already have your key, revoking the UID (command revuid
 from --edit-key) is the standard way, if you think it's worth it for a
 changed comment. As people who sign your key sign an UID, you also lose
 all signatures when you revoke the signed UID. 
 
My question is on a situation I didn't add the comment by mistake when I
created the key and now I'd like to be able to add a comment. The key isn't
signed etc. Thanks.

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Re: comments on uid

2012-03-18 Thread Peter Lebbing
On 18/03/12 09:13, freej...@is-not-my.name wrote:
 Alright that's a good answer but aren't people just confirming the email
 address belongs to a known signer when they sign a key? Does it really
 matter what the UID comment is? I think it may be going a bit too far to say
 the UID is guaranteed.

Different people mean different things by signing an UID; they could
express this by policy. By the way, an UID doesn't even need to be of
the form Full Name (Comment) e@mail though it is certainly
recommended and standard.

So some people might not care about the comment part; others might. The
example I gave is clearly a case where it might matter. I certainly
would not sign the one with the comment (US president), but I haven't
personally formulated a policy on what I think about comments.

I think there are other mechanisms to add some comments to an UID, via
signatures with notations. Other people might know more about this. If
you want to add comments that you can freely change, this might be more
what you're looking for, rather than changing the UID.

I should note that many people actually *don't* check if the e-mail
address belongs to the person whose UID they sign. If this were as
simple to prove as it is to prove you have a certain name by showing a
passport or something, it might be checked more often. But that's
government regulated, unlike e-mail addresses. All you can easily prove
is that you have access to an e-mail account, which is something
completely different. Just to begin with: so does your e-mail provider.

 Do I have to do anything with the keys when adding a UID and deleting the
 old one? I don't remember.
  
 [snip] 
 My question is on a situation I didn't add the comment by mistake when I
 created the key and now I'd like to be able to add a comment. The key isn't
 signed etc. Thanks.

If you haven't given the key to anyone (the copy in your own keyring is
the only copy in existence), you can just add the new UID with adduid
and then delete the old one with deluid. A key needs at least one UID,
so you first need to add a new one before you delete the last and only UID.

The only catch is that if there is a copy in existence with the old UID,
and you import to that keyring the new version with the new UID, it will
have both UIDs.

Peter.

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Re: comments on uid

2012-03-18 Thread Faramir
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Hash: SHA256

El 18-03-2012 5:13, freej...@is-not-my.name escribió:
...
 Alright that's a good answer but aren't people just confirming the
 email address belongs to a known signer when they sign a key? Does
 it really matter what the UID comment is? I think it may be going a
 bit too far to say the UID is guaranteed.

  You define yout policy about what do you check when you sign a key
(or an UID, after all, you sign UIDs on a key, not the key itself). So
somebody might check email address and name of the key owner, and
ignore the comment, unless it is false (like the comment sayind USA
President). Others might don't care about the comments at all.

 Do I have to do anything with the keys when adding a UID and
 deleting the old one? I don't remember.

  I think you must make the new UID primary UID before being able to
delete the old one, but not sure about it. The worst thing that could
happen is to get a message saying you can't delete your primary UID
or something like that.

 My question is on a situation I didn't add the comment by mistake
 when I created the key and now I'd like to be able to add a
 comment. The key isn't signed etc. Thanks.

  If the key is not signed and it is not on keyservers, just make the
new UID, set it as primary, and delete the old one. If the key is
available at keyservers, then revoke the old one instead of deleting it.

   Best Regards
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Re: comments on uid

2012-03-18 Thread freejack
 I should note that many people actually *don't* check if the e-mail
 address belongs to the person whose UID they sign. If this were as
 simple to prove as it is to prove you have a certain name by showing a
 passport or something, it might be checked more often.

That doesn't sound right. If you can't verify the email shown on the key
belongs to the user what have you accomplished? All you did was tie a key id
to a person (maybe, not sure if you provably accomplished that) but not the
email address. If the purpose of key signing is ultimately to relate
something useful to a person then I think it's more useful to know a certain
person owns a certain email adddress and what his key id is. YMMV.

Passports and other documents are easily forged, just take 100 bucks and sit
on the corner for 10 minutes. Practially, it's probably harder to spoof an
email address. How do you know what his key id is? Couldn't he also forge a
little printout with somebody else's key id, fingerprint, etc and give it to
you along with his passport? I'm sure somebody has thought it all through
but it seems to me the purpose of trusting a key is to bind somebody to an
email address, not just a key ID...sort of like S/MIME that contains the
email address, but without relying on a trusted third party.

 But that's government regulated, unlike e-mail addresses. All you can
 easily prove is that you have access to an e-mail account, which is
 something completely different. Just to begin with: so does your e-mail
 provider.

Not necessarily but even if they did, how do they have access to the key?
I'm just saying 2 pieces of binding information sound better than one.

Wouldn't it be safer to ask the person who wants you to sign his key to mail
you his key id and then you respond with some piece of information he has to
bring when you sign his key, in additional to whatever else you do? 

 If you haven't given the key to anyone (the copy in your own keyring is
 the only copy in existence), you can just add the new UID with adduid and
 then delete the old one with deluid. A key needs at least one UID, 
 so you first need to add a new one before you delete the last and only UID.

Thanks

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Re: comments on uid

2012-03-18 Thread Daniel Kahn Gillmor

On 03/18/2012 04:13 AM, freej...@is-not-my.name wrote:

My question is on a situation I didn't add the comment by mistake when I
created the key and now I'd like to be able to add a comment. The key isn't
signed etc. Thanks.


I suggest that you probably actually don't want the comment at all.  The 
overwhelming majority of the comments that i've seen on User IDs are at 
best unnecessary, and at worst an explicit distraction and a reason for 
other people to not want to certify your User ID.


--dkg

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Re: comments on uid

2012-03-18 Thread Faramir
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256

El 18-03-2012 15:13, freej...@is-not-my.name escribió:
 I should note that many people actually *don't* check if the
 e-mail address belongs to the person whose UID they sign. If this
 were as
...
 That doesn't sound right. If you can't verify the email shown on
 the key belongs to the user what have you accomplished? All you did
 was tie a key id to a person (maybe, not sure if you provably
 accomplished that) but not the email address. If the purpose of key
 signing is ultimately to relate something useful to a person then I
 think it's more useful to know a certain person owns a certain
 email adddress and what his key id is. YMMV.

  Well, I can carry my photo-Id stuff with me to a keysigning party,
but I don't have any document to show I own my email address. Some
people solve that by sending the signed key, encrypted to the
recipient's key, to the email address. If the person doesn't control
the email address, the person won't get the signature. If the email
owner doesn't have the key, then he can't open the signature.

  Some people even adds what it is called a Freeform UID, which
carries Name, Comment, but no email address, that way, if they change
their email provider, signatures collected on that UID won't be lost
(you should revoke the UIDs that include an email address you no
longer can use).

 Passports and other documents are easily forged, just take 100
 bucks and sit

  Well, that depends on the technology used to make the passports.

...
 you along with his passport? I'm sure somebody has thought it all
 through but it seems to me the purpose of trusting a key is to bind
 somebody to an email address, not just a key ID...sort of like
 S/MIME that contains the email address, but without relying on a
 trusted third party.

  That depends on what do you want to achieve. Some people wants to
know which is the real key of a person (binding the key to a name),
some others want to make sure they are sending stuff to the right
person, but don't care about who is that person (they bind the key to
an email address, or to a nickname). That is the good (and for some
people, the bad) thing about OpenPGP, your signatures have the meaning
you want them to have...

   Best Regards
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Re: comments on uid

2012-03-18 Thread Eric H. Christensen
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Hash: SHA1

On Sun, Mar 18, 2012 at 06:13:32PM -, freej...@is-not-my.name wrote:
  I should note that many people actually *don't* check if the e-mail
  address belongs to the person whose UID they sign. If this were as
  simple to prove as it is to prove you have a certain name by showing a
  passport or something, it might be checked more often.
 
 That doesn't sound right. If you can't verify the email shown on the key
 belongs to the user what have you accomplished? All you did was tie a key id
 to a person (maybe, not sure if you provably accomplished that) but not the
 email address. If the purpose of key signing is ultimately to relate
 something useful to a person then I think it's more useful to know a certain
 person owns a certain email adddress and what his key id is. YMMV.

Just to play devil's advocate there could be a single email address being used 
for a group of people.  You'd know the message was for you because you have the 
correct key to open the message while everyone else would be left with a random 
mess of characters.  Not sure why one would setup such a system, since email 
addresses are cheap now days, but none the less you could setup something 
similar.  Although this does make one wonder about hijacking someone's account 
which means that you'd always want to make sure that you change the 
authentication to your email accounts regularly lest someone do this to you.  
It would, more than likely, be a very targetted attack.

  But that's government regulated, unlike e-mail addresses. All you can
  easily prove is that you have access to an e-mail account, which is
  something completely different. Just to begin with: so does your e-mail
  provider.
 
 Not necessarily but even if they did, how do they have access to the key?
 I'm just saying 2 pieces of binding information sound better than one.
 
 Wouldn't it be safer to ask the person who wants you to sign his key to mail
 you his key id and then you respond with some piece of information he has to
 bring when you sign his key, in additional to whatever else you do? 
 
  If you haven't given the key to anyone (the copy in your own keyring is
  the only copy in existence), you can just add the new UID with adduid and
  then delete the old one with deluid. A key needs at least one UID, 
  so you first need to add a new one before you delete the last and only UID.
 

So CAFF[0] does make key signing a bit more secure although it does not solve 
the problem completely.  When signing keys with CAFF, the program will create 
the signatures per UID and then email the specific UID signature to the address 
on that UID.  The message is encrypted which requires that the receiving party 
not only have access to the email address but also the key so they can import 
the signature.  Once they have imported the signature they can upload the 
updated key to a key server.  That means that if they are only attacking the 
email from a sending point of view then they wouldn't have access to the key 
signature.

[0] http://pgp-tools.alioth.debian.org/

- -- Eric

- --
Eric H Christensene...@christensenplace.us
Sparks  spa...@fedoraproject.org
 . .-.. .-.. ---  .-- --- .-. .-.. -..
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Re: comments on uid

2012-03-18 Thread Peter Lebbing
On 18/03/12 19:13, freej...@is-not-my.name wrote:
 Not necessarily but even if they did, how do they have access to the key?

The attacker is doing you a real service getting /your/ key signed then :)

Wasn't the purpose of the attacker to get his /own/ key falsely signed? The key
he does have access to?

BTW, your e-mail service provider does, necessarily, have access to mails sent
to your e-mail account. SSL/TLS might encrypt the connection to the SMTP server
serving your e-mail address, but the provider has the certificate for that
server, or more generally, has full access to their own server. So the
administrators of that SMTP server have full access to any mails sent to your
account, if they want to.

Obviously using GnuPG solves that problem, but not before identity is
established, and here we are talking about establishing that.

Peter.

-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at http://wwwhome.cs.utwente.nl/~lebbing/pubkey.txt

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Re: comments on uid

2012-03-18 Thread Peter Lebbing
On 18/03/12 19:13, freej...@is-not-my.name wrote:
 I should note that many people actually *don't* check if the e-mail
 address belongs to the person whose UID they sign.
 
 That doesn't sound right. 

We could have a simple misunderstanding here: I do think many people check if
the person whose UID they sign have /access/ to the e-mail address in the UID.
But I'm making a distinction between access and belonging.

Peter.

-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at http://wwwhome.cs.utwente.nl/~lebbing/pubkey.txt

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Re: comments on uid

2012-03-17 Thread brian m. carlson
On Sat, Mar 17, 2012 at 12:11:39AM -, freej...@is-not-my.name wrote:
  The comment can only be added when creating the UID. If you wish to
  add, remove or edit you can create a new UID and set it as primary. If
  the key has not been shared, you can delete the old UIDs, but if it is
  already on the keyservers the copies there cannot have bits removed.
 
 Thanks for the info. Is there some reason why we can't edit the UID? I
 realize it doesn't help if the key is on a server but this key is not.

When you compute a signature over a UID, part of the data you hash is
the UID.  If the UID is different, then any signatures aren't valid
anymore because the hash result will be different.  The facility isn't
implemented since it breaks all existing signatures and is essentially
equivalent to deleting an old UID (which really can't be done if the UID
has been published) and adding a new UID.  If you want to do those two
steps, you have to do them manually.

-- 
brian m. carlson / brian with sandals: Houston, Texas, US
+1 832 623 2791 | http://www.crustytoothpaste.net/~bmc | My opinion only
OpenPGP: RSA v4 4096b: 88AC E9B2 9196 305B A994 7552 F1BA 225C 0223 B187


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Re: comments on uid

2012-03-16 Thread freejack
 The OP was maybe referring to the comment in UIDs of the form
 
 Name (Comment) email address.

Right that's what I meant.


 The comment can only be added when creating the UID. If you wish to
 add, remove or edit you can create a new UID and set it as primary. If
 the key has not been shared, you can delete the old UIDs, but if it is
 already on the keyservers the copies there cannot have bits removed.

Thanks for the info. Is there some reason why we can't edit the UID? I
realize it doesn't help if the key is on a server but this key is not.

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comments on uid

2012-03-15 Thread freejack
Is it possible to add or edit comments on a uid? I didn't see any obvious
option in the help for edit.

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Re: comments on uid

2012-03-15 Thread Hauke Laging
Am Donnerstag, 15. März 2012, 18:54:28 schrieb freej...@is-not-my.name:
 Is it possible to add or edit comments on a uid? I didn't see any obvious
 option in the help for edit.

--cert-notation / --cert-policy-url may be what you're looking for.

But you need --list-options show-notations / show-policy-urls to see them. 
And, being more precise, that is not a comment on a UID but on one of the 
signatures of the UID.


Hauke
-- 
PGP: D44C 6A5B 71B0 427C CED3 025C BD7D 6D27 ECCB 5814


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Re: comments on uid

2012-03-15 Thread MFPA
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512

Hi


On Thursday 15 March 2012 at 7:26:36 PM, in
mid:201203152026.56818.mailinglis...@hauke-laging.de, Hauke Laging
wrote:


 But you need --list-options show-notations /
 show-policy-urls to see them. And, being more precise,
 that is not a comment on a UID but on one of the
 signatures of the UID.


The OP was maybe referring to the comment in UIDs of the form

Name (Comment) email address.

The comment can only be added when creating the UID. If you wish to
add, remove or edit you can create a new UID and set it as primary. If
the key has not been shared, you can delete the old UIDs, but if it is
already on the keyservers the copies there cannot have bits removed.


- --
Best regards

MFPAmailto:expires2...@rocketmail.com

Don't cry because it is over - smile because it happened
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