Ben Maddison wrote on 11/03/2022 07:23:
Essential, I would think: how could a far end relying party know that an
AS in the middle of a received AS_PATH is a non-transparent IXP RS in
order to apply any other treatment?
given that they're a shrinking rarity, would it not make sense to
completely exclude non-transparent RSs from the ASPA definition? In the
short term this would cause problems for ASNs which connect to
non-transparent RSs, but there are hardly any left, and only one
sizeable one.
I wonder whether it's a good idea to design a long term security
mechanism which includes a specific carve-out for a legacy corner case
like this.
Nick
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