Newsletter on Internet voting, privacy and security issues

2000-04-13 Thread Ed Gerck


List:

I would like to extend an invitation to the IETF list to read "The 
Bell" -- the first newsletter entirely dedicated to Internet voting and 
collaborative decision-making in Internet protocols (including the use 
of digital certificates and the resulting security/privacy concerns from
potentially non-anonymous voting). Electronic and hard copy subscriptions 
are available at www.thebell.net

Safevote [1] is sponsoring the newsletter as an open forum.  Regarding 
the name "The Bell", the idea was to use the image of a bell because 
mission bells were used in colonial California for telling time, 
announcing events, and for passing on news from one city to another. 
This newsletter intends to serve similar purposes and is also a public 
service open and free for all who may want it.

With monthly 16-page issues, the "The Bell" will focus on privacy, 
security and technology used in Internet voting. 

In Internet tradition, the newsletter is available free over the 
Internet (PDF format), or at an annual cost of $30 for first class 
mail delivery in hard copy.   The first issue contains an extensive 
marketing study of the year 2000 U.S. public elections market - a 
study that will be serialized in upcoming issues.  It also includes 
an article on today's public voting systems used in the United States 
by election expert Roy G. Saltman and an essay by myself outlining the
need for a strong separation between identification and authentication
in order to ensure fair Internet voting protocols.

Internet voting and its potential impact on society will increasingly
call upon us to understand and keep abreast of the latest developments 
in various fields of work. As a developer in this market, I see a 
widening gap between the 100-year-old voting technologies in use today 
and what Internet voting protocols need to take into account. The Bell is 
dedicated to help fill this gap -- perhaps with your help as well.

Cheers,

Ed Gerck

[1] Safevote (www.safevote.com) is a founding member of the Internet 
Voting Technology Alliance (www.ivta.org) and develops OEM (Original 
Equipment Manufacturer) systems for Internet voting, polling, public 
elections, bidding, consensus assessment and other Internet decision-
making applications. The Bell is edited at Safevote. The May 2000 issue 
is now available at the "The Bell" Web site, www.thebell.net




Re: interception proxies

2000-04-13 Thread Marc Horowitz

Vijay Gill [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:

 Any specific ISP's that one could care to name?  Coming from an ISP, what
 I've seen in general is that most routers have just enough cycles in the
 forwarding path to keep up with the offered traffic, much less sit around
 watching for SYN's in flight so as to mutate the MSS values.  In fact, I'd
 think this would be more of an end system issue rather than a "core" or a
 "backbone" issue, where the end system is the box prior to the ISP handoff
 and not quite under the ISP's control and not the end system as in the
 end2end tcp/ip sense of the word.

As the person who mentioned this to Ted in the first place, it's
BellAtlantic InfoSpeed DSL:

04:07:18.626618 ppp0  badsl.1886  home.finger: S 3981264130:3981264130(0) win 31944 
mss 1452,sackOK,timestamp 57597532 0,nop,wscale 0 (DF)
04:07:18.720702 ppp0  home.finger  badsl.1886: S 295466136:295466136(0) ack 
3981264131 win 16384 mss 1412,nop,wscale 0,nop,nop,timestamp 7390358 57597532
04:07:18.720725 ppp0  badsl.1886  home.finger: . 1:1(0) ack 1 win 31944 
nop,nop,timestamp 57597542 7390358 (DF)

04:08:17.797647 badsl.1886  home.79: S 3981264130:3981264130(0) win 31944 mss 
1412,sackOK,timestamp 57597532 0,nop,wscale 0 (DF)
04:08:17.798118 home.79  badsl.1886: S 295466136:295466136(0) ack 3981264131 win 
16384 mss 1460,nop,wscale 0,nop,nop,timestamp 7390358 57597532
04:08:17.839552 badsl.1886  home.79: . ack 1 win 31944 nop,nop,timestamp 57597542 
7390358 (DF)

Of course, it's hard to tell exactly where this is happening.  I
suspect either the DSL modem or the DSLAM.

I've considered bringing up IPsec using AH on the two endpoints, but
I'm sure that will involve far more pain dealing with incompetent
technical "support" droids than I have time to deal with.

On the other side, I can name over a dozen major web sites which
create a black hole by setting DF on outgoing TCP segments, but block
ICMP fragmentation required messages going the other way.

If anybody at Cisco is listening (a rhetorical question to be sure), a
great feature for a future version of IOS would be one which causes
TCP to be blocked completely if ICMP fragmentation required packets
are blocked.  At least then the black hole would be easy to spot :-)

Marc




Re: Source address (offtopic)

2000-04-13 Thread Keith Moore

 I don't want to change it (as if I could!), my purpose was to point out 
 that our current network is the sum of our mistakes, not the network 
 equivalent of the Mount Sinai tablets.

no disagreement there.  but the original mistakes in TCP/IP were more-or-less
designed to work together.  when people start deploying their own mistakes
in an ad hoc fashion, and when multiple mistakes get added concurrently,
not only do they break things that assumed that the only mistakes in the 
network were those originally designed-in, the combined effect of those 
new mistakes is far worse than the effect of any of them taken individually.

Keith

p.s. I will also argue that the complexities of adding a separate 
application-level identifer and doing without the source address,
are such that had this been done in the original TCP/IP design, 
it would have had a much more difficult time getting deployed 
in the first place.




Re: recommendation against publication of draft-cerpa-necp-02.txt

2000-04-13 Thread John Martin

At 04:45 PM 11/04/00 -0700, Eliot Lear wrote:
I wonder if any of the authors has explored the risks of modifying data in
flight.  How could this be abused by interlopers and evil doers?  If I
could hack into a router implementing NECP, what damage could I do?  Could
I start a nasty little JavaScript/Java/Shockwave/... applet in an
advertisement?
And who would know it was me?

Do you mean the authors of NECP? If so, then I'm confused because NECP is 
not about "modifying data in flight" - it is about load balancing multiple 
services which sit behind e.g. a single IP address. (i.e. DNS server farms, 
firewalls, proxies). As I have said repeatedly, "interception proxies" is 
only one of these applications and by no means the most widely used.

Are you confusing this with WCCP (which *only* works with "interception 
proxies").

Quoth John Martin:
  [...]
  Let me be absolutely clear, NECP is about communication between server
  load-balancers (SLB) and the back-end servers they speak to.

Were this so clear in your document my mailbox wouldn't be full of this
stuff.

The very first sentance says:

"This document describes "NECP", a lightweight protocol for
signalling between servers and the network elements that forward
traffic to them.  It is intended for use in a wide variety of
server applications, including for origin servers, proxies, and
interception proxies."

Despite the fact that "interception proxies" are listed last, they are the 
only service people are talking about.

But, you are right in general: if this is how people read the document, 
we  need to fix the document.

If it looks like a duck and quacks like a duck, but it's not supposed to be
a duck, the IESG ought to point out that it's a turkey by so indicating at
the top of the document.  Also, I'd like to understand why you're not going
experimental, where it would be expected that you'll correct your mistakes.
Your choice of "informational" seems unfortunate at best and as
disingenuous marketing at worst.  I can't tell which.

We used "informational" because we saw that this is what was used for 
HTTP/0.9 with which there are parallels: NECP has existed for some time 
already in slightly differing implementations and this is a codification of 
existing practice. There was no magic of deceit intended. If the IESG 
thinks we should instead go for experimental, I'd be more than happy to 
pursue that instead and bring this into WREC. However, development is not 
within the current WREC charter so we are stuck, I think?

The fact that you mention interception proxies in the introduction has led
to this flame war.  Having used the words, you've mentioned none of the
risks associated with such services both from the server side and the
client side.

OK - we can fix that. It is not the goal of NECP to describe "interception 
proxies" or their deficiencies. There is, however, a working group which 
has a document aimed at exactly that (amongst other things) - WREC.

John

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Re: Source address (offtopic)

2000-04-13 Thread Jon Crowcroft


In message [EMAIL PROTECTED], Matt Crawford typed:

  The source address of a datagram was an architectural mistake, and should 
  never have been in the mandatory packet format.
 
 Nahh, the mistake was ignoring the source address when routing  forwarding.

thats an implementation detail not a design mistake.

there's plenty of fast classifier algorithms and data structures now
for the 5-tuple which reender  this debate academic - in fact, i think
the lack of a idee fixe about flow id, versus src or dst or src+dst
based routing, versus route hint +eid and so on is the _strength_ of
the tcp/.ip model-  the very lack lack of strong noel complains about
 foresight led to diversity and design freedom

 cheers

   jon




RE: eating our own dogfood

2000-04-13 Thread Scot Mc Pherson

Hehe

-Original Message-
From: Randy Bush [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
Sent: Wednesday, April 12, 2000 11:32 PM
To: ietf
Subject: eating our own dogfood


rip.psg.com:/usr/home/randy/mp3/neil_young nslookup ietf.org.
Server:  cache.psg.com
Address:  147.28.0.3

*** No address (A) records available for ietf.org.

rip.psg.com:/usr/home/randy/mp3/neil_young ns ietf.org.
Default Server:  cache.psg.com
Address:  147.28.0.3

Server:  cache.psg.com
Address:  147.28.0.3

Non-authoritative answer:
ietf.orgnameserver = ns.ietf.org
ietf.orgnameserver = ns.CNRI.Reston.VA.US

Authoritative answers can be found from:
ns.ietf.org internet address = 132.151.1.19
ns.CNRI.Reston.VA.USinternet address = 132.151.1.1



rfc2182 ignored, both servers on same backbone, probably in same site.

dns hosed, ietf.org was an A RR just a few hours ago.

randy




Re: interception proxies

2000-04-13 Thread Salvador Vidal

Hello Vernon,

At 21:48 12/04/00 -0600, you wrote:

I also think you need to give up the idea of
having computers make value judgements, but maybe that's just my lack of
imagination.


Sure that computers will improve doing judgements, but don´t lost the main
force on Interenet, there are hundres of millons of human brains here able
to do judgements, and for me, the most important Internet goal is how to
get this incredible power running in an usefull way?

For the information that you see the first time before anybodi else you
only have computers for the jugement, but also the computers jugements can
use the people past jugements i.e. about the information font... 

Some questions about people feedback are:

How to feedback? It is required a way to feedback not only to the owner of
the information but to the comunity, about the information that you see,
it´s  requiered to invistigate what atributes want the people to use to
select the information in each categorie, then to ask the people that see
this information before about any of this atributes when they are getting
this information.

Why to feedback? Most people will never feedback unless they don´t get a
reward for it, feedback must be paid, but I don´t agree to: please reply
this question about this information and you get 1$, because people will
reply anything, feedback must be competitive in a feedback game, in the way
that people that are more usefull to other people with their information
will get the greats rewards.

How to organize the feedback to be usefull? with feedback happens that is
as important the jugement as who did this jugement, that´s why I think
trusters can be a usefull way to organize this knowlege, because the people
that join the same trusters seems to have similar values and so similar
jugements.
...

Not only values also e-comerce need people feedback, with the current
Internet stuff mainly comercial brouchures, people will not able to do good
decisions because everyting is gorgeous, wonderfull,..., to been able to
take decisions people need real information not comercial garbage!, it
doesn´t matter how much inteligence you put on people desktop, If you
remove the garbage it will remain garbage, information that comes from
independent people is not so wonderfull about everything because is real
information usefull to do decions, so to impulse the e-comerce.

So yes, we must improve computers jugement but much more people one!

Salva


Vernon Schryver[EMAIL PROTECTED]







Re: recommendation against publication of draft-cerpa-necp-02.txt

2000-04-13 Thread Eliot Lear

Part of the problem here is that a knife may be used as a food utensil or a
weapon.  Safe handling, however, is always required, and should be
documented.

I would add two other comments.  I tried to locate the RFC for HTTP/0.9,
but the best I could find was a reference to a CERN ftp site for the
protocol.  In any case, by the time HTTP got to the IETF it was deployed
over a vast number of end stations, and comparisons to it are probably not
apt.

Finally, rechartering is precisely what you ought to have done, and should
do, IMHO.






Request for Information

2000-04-13 Thread du pot

Hello,

I am doing my Masters in US.  I have a few ideas for my masters' project.

I request you to comment about these ideas, and help me choosing the best
out of these.

1. Real time video transmission using Java.
2. Internet telephony using Java.
3. Remote network management using Java.
4. Video conferencing.
5. e-business service development.

Thanks for your time,
du.

__
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RE: Request for Information

2000-04-13 Thread Mehul Shah

(2) option is the best of all from my view point but you could use some real
time OS like VxWorks
or Nuclues


 -Original Message-
 From: du pot [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
 Sent: Thursday, April 13, 2000 2:05 PM
 To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 Subject: Request for Information


 Hello,

 I am doing my Masters in US.  I have a few ideas for my
 masters' project.

 I request you to comment about these ideas, and help me
 choosing the best
 out of these.

 1. Real time video transmission using Java.
 2. Internet telephony using Java.
 3. Remote network management using Java.
 4. Video conferencing.
 5. e-business service development.

 Thanks for your time,
 du.

 __
 FREE Personalized Email at Mail.com
 Sign up at http://www.mail.com/?sr=signup






Re: recommendation against publication of draft-cerpa-necp-02.txt

2000-04-13 Thread John Martin

At 10:49 AM 13/04/00 -0700, Eliot Lear wrote:
Part of the problem here is that a knife may be used as a food utensil or a
weapon.  Safe handling, however, is always required, and should be
documented.

Granted.

I would add two other comments.  I tried to locate the RFC for HTTP/0.9,
but the best I could find was a reference to a CERN ftp site for the
protocol.

Ooops. s/0.9/1.0 - rfc1945.

   In any case, by the time HTTP got to the IETF it was deployed
over a vast number of end stations, and comparisons to it are probably not
apt.

NECP is a super-set of various load-balancing technologies already deployed 
at thousands of sites.

Finally, rechartering is precisely what you ought to have done, and should
do, IMHO.

For the record: this is exactly what we are doing. (We were waiting for the 
two starter documents to be published or at least start their path via the 
IESG).

Rgds,
John

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---




Re: interception proxies

2000-04-13 Thread Vijay Gill

On 13 Apr 2000, Marc Horowitz wrote:

 Vijay Gill [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
 
  think this would be more of an end system issue rather than a "core" or a
  "backbone" issue, where the end system is the box prior to the ISP handoff
  and not quite under the ISP's control and not the end system as in the
  end2end tcp/ip sense of the word.
 
 As the person who mentioned this to Ted in the first place, it's
 BellAtlantic InfoSpeed DSL:



 Of course, it's hard to tell exactly where this is happening.  I
 suspect either the DSL modem or the DSLAM.

Ah yes.  Perhaps it would be interesting if the vendor(s) name(s) were
published, so that when they come touting the hardware to other providers,
some hard questions may be asked.

/vijay