RE: Reforming the BOF Process (was Declining the ifare bof for Chicago)

2007-06-17 Thread Romascanu, Dan (Dan)
See in-line.

Dan


 
 

> -Original Message-
> From: John C Klensin [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
> Sent: Sunday, June 17, 2007 9:13 PM
> To: Bernard Aboba; ietf@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: Reforming the BOF Process (was Declining the 
> ifare bof for Chicago)
> 
> 
> 
> --On Tuesday, 12 June, 2007 09:52 -0700 Bernard Aboba 
> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> 
> >...
> > For example, by restricting the function of an initial BOF to  a 
> >determination of interest and a decision to form/not form a  study 
> >group,  the opportunities for unfairness and bias can be  reduced.  
> >Once the study group had produced a charter and  
> documentation of the 
> >formation criteria, the review of these  documents could 
> proceed with 
> >more information than is  typically available as the result of a 
> >(potentially delayed)  2nd BOF. Also, the review could 
> utilize existing 
> >procedures  for ensuring transparency and accountability, such as an 
> >open  review process and documentation of DISCUSS comments.
> 
> Bernard,
> 
> Some specific observations on shifting more toward an IEEE model...
> 
> (1) Unless things have changed since I was last paying 
> careful attention, the process you describe is used to adding 
> a new project to an existing technical committee.  The 
> process for creating a new technical committee is somewhat 
> more elaborate.
> The IETF has no layer between the steering group (IESG, TSC 
> (?)) and the WGs who actually do the technical work.  We also 
> usually try to charter WGs on a short-term, project basis 
> rather than assigning new projects to existing WGs.  Because 
> of those differences, we need to be careful about analogies 
> unless we are willing to rethink process models in much more 
> fundamental ways than tweaking the BOF process.

Actually I believe that the IEEE have study groups both at the level of
technical committees (Working Groups) which end if successful with new
projects within existing Working Groups as well as at the level of the
whole IEEE which may end with new Working Groups being formed. Now a
IEEE Working Group vary very much in size and scope, but there are a few
like IEEE 802.1 (bridging, security QoS) and IEEE 802.11 (wireless LAN)
which are comparable in size, scope and number of projects with an IETF
area rather than with an IETF WG. 

> 
> (2) I don't have statistics, but my impression is that most 
> technical standards work in the IEEE these days (not just in 
> 802, but more broadly) starts with a proposal to standardize a
> specific industry technology.   Those proposals are debated and
> refined, but the assumption is that little fundamental 
> engineering or design work is done in the standardization 
> process. 

This also differs from case to case. In some IEEE projects work may
start with a given technology on the table, in some other there may be
more than one, or just an idea or several ideas about how to solve the
problem, and much debate happens until an initial proposal is baselined.
I do not believe that overall the distribution of cases is significantly
different to what happens in the IETF. 
 

> We behave as if the IETF is still doing engineering 
> design work.  Maybe it is time to drop that as an inefficient 
> and ineffective fantasy, but, again, considering that 
> involves much broader issues than reforming the BOF process.
> 
> (3) Many of us are concerned about the length of time it 
> takes to move a well-thought-out idea that has significant 
> support forward from initial proposal to a functioning 
> standards development effort.  Perhaps we should be 
> concentrating as much on that question as on the one of how 
> we cut bad, or inadequately supported, ideas off as cleanly 
> as possible.

I believe that the lack of some agreed criteria of approval for new work
is a problem. Maybe this is what you mean by 'how we cut bad'. 

> Adding a study group creation process and a study group 
> process to the existing opportunities for delay would not 
> contribute to speeding things up.  Indeed, it would do much 
> the contrary.
> 
> (4) I, and others, have said this before, but my belief is 
> that the single most effective change that could be made to 
> the BOF process would be for the IESG to stop taking its 
> ability to project the future so seriously.  As you and 
> others have commented, the track record on that isn't good 
> anyway.  Suppose, instead, we were to permit WGs to be set up 
> on a provisional basis, with intense review after some 
> reasonable period of time and cancellation if they were not 
> performing adequately and producing results the community 
> seemed to care about.  This would combine some of the 
> advantages of IEEE-like study groups with a streamlined 
> process that focused on the one true measure of whether a WG 
> could produce useful work: starting it up and seeing if it 
> produced useful work.  

What would be the differences between 'study groups' and 'WGs set up on
provisional basi

Re: Should I* opinions be afforded a special status? (Re: [saag] Declining the ifare bof for Chicago)

2007-06-17 Thread Lakshminath Dondeti

Thanks for your response Thomas.

Apologies if I had inadvertently given the impression of mistrust in the 
current leadership, I* and WG chairs.  I have very good working 
relationships with most if not all of the I* folks I interact with. 
Sure, there have been differences of opinions, but with communication, 
the differences were either resolved or we agreed to disagree.  I try to 
communicate rather than hold things in and that may have given the 
impression you are getting.  Also, we seldom debate about all the things 
that went right. :)


In at least one of my emails I tried to balance things out by pointing 
out the positive.  I should have tried harder.


With that clarification, I will try and respond to some of your notes below:

On 6/14/2007 5:08 PM, Thomas Narten wrote:
Your ideas that the "IETF is a meritocracy" and that "I* opinions are 
afforded special status" are to say the least worry me.


If you start from a postion that one cannot trust the I*, or WG
chairs, etc. (as a number of your recent postings seem to do), then
yes, one can't help to be troubled. however, if your basic starting
point is one of distrust, it's hard to imagine rules or process or
some other management or oganizational structure that will actually
work and also prevent abuse. If there is bad intent, very few rules
will prevent bad actions.


In most cases, I am simply seeking more transparency and determinism in 
our operation.  One of the things that has come about from the 
discussions is that perhaps a clear cut list of things to be done 
post-BoF-session from the AD and/or the IAB would be useful.  Now some 
ADs already do this and others are trying to get there.  That is a 
positive thing.


What this might remove is an appearance of arbitrary or biased decision 
making.  The I-D tracker is a great example of this.


If indeed there were abuse or improper bias, such processes might help 
independent evaluation.




IMO, you have to have a structure/process/rules that assumes people
are generally trying to do the Right Thing. For checks and balances,
you then also need appeals procedures and a willingness to speak up
and challenge parties when there is evidence of bad decision making.


Agreed.  I guess I challenge when there is an appearance of bad decision 
making.  I would rather not wait until things get out of hand and then 
attempt use of the hammer of appeals.  That is just my personal preference.




In my experience, the vast majority of our leadership do try to do the
right thing. And when confronted with having made a bad decision,
there is usually a genuine effort to fix things and do the right
thing.


Agreed, the vast majority are indeed trying to do the right thing and 
provide the right guidance based on their experiences in the leadership 
positions.  It is also important to point out that some of the positions 
are extremely time consuming.  I appreciate the I*'s and WG chairs' 
service to the IETF very much.  Many in fact go out of their way to 
reach out and communicate and that is also very much appreciated.





How do those, I wonder, fit with what's written in the IETF mission
web page http://www.ietf.org/u/ietfchair/ietf-mission.html?


Your slides on "Bringing new work to the IETF" presented at the Prague 
meeting that I have just looked at today also seem to be in 
contradiction to the IETF mission.  Your idea that some people's 
opinions are afforded more weight than others' is certainly not how the 
consensus process works.  Do smarter people hum louder or get to raise 
both of their hands?  What are you saying?


If a respected security expert (one who has reviewed many documents,
contributed significantly to WG efforts, etc.) comes to a WG and says
"there is a problem here", but 5 WG members stand up and say "I
disagree and don't see a problem", do you really expect the security
expert's opinion to be given strictly equal weight and to just be
overruled since 5 voices are greater than 1?


Sure, but the the notions of "respected" and "expert" are fuzzy.  I have 
used that argument myself in the past, but it gets us into trouble 
because the experts venture into topics where they are not experts at in 
any sense of that word.  Bernard and John allude to some of the related 
issues.


The notion of "expert opinion" is also trouble for another reason.  It 
is a longer story and somewhat indirect, so I won't go into that here.




The idea that somehow the ADs and the IAB are above the rest of the 
contributors is just wrong.


They are not above the rest in the sense of having absolute power and
having to answer to no one. Anyone is free to (and should) challenge
their arguments and decisions when they don't appear to be sound.  And
clearly they have to be able to defend their positions and give
concrete or "actionable" justifications.  


With that clarification, I don't see us being that far off from each 
other in our understanding of the operation of the IETF.


I was challenging

IANA considerations concerns -- specific cases?

2007-06-17 Thread Jari Arkko
All,

The ongoing thread has asked some pretty fundamental
questions about how we deal with allocations. Many
opinions have been expressed.

The general discussion is one thing, but I also wanted
to make an offer regarding specific cases where people
feel that the current IANA rules for a specific number space
are obviously wrong, need room for experimentation, etc.
We frequently run into such cases. If you have trouble
with a specific number space, I would be happy to be the
sponsoring AD for a document that fixes that issue. (Or
help you find another AD whose area it belongs, point
you to an existing WG that could handle it, or help you
find a willing author to write the document, whatever
is most suitable for the case at hand.)

Jari


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Re: Reforming the BOF Process (was Declining the ifare bof for Chicago)

2007-06-17 Thread John C Klensin


--On Tuesday, 12 June, 2007 09:52 -0700 Bernard Aboba
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

>...
> For example, by restricting the function of an initial BOF to
> a determination of interest and a decision to form/not form a
> study group,  the opportunities for unfairness and bias can be
> reduced.  Once the study group had produced a charter and
> documentation of the formation criteria, the review of these
> documents could proceed with more information than is
> typically available as the result of a (potentially delayed)
> 2nd BOF. Also, the review could utilize existing procedures
> for ensuring transparency and accountability, such as an open
> review process and documentation of DISCUSS comments.

Bernard,

Some specific observations on shifting more toward an IEEE
model...

(1) Unless things have changed since I was last paying careful
attention, the process you describe is used to adding a new
project to an existing technical committee.  The process for
creating a new technical committee is somewhat more elaborate.
The IETF has no layer between the steering group (IESG, TSC (?))
and the WGs who actually do the technical work.  We also usually
try to charter WGs on a short-term, project basis rather than
assigning new projects to existing WGs.  Because of those
differences, we need to be careful about analogies unless we are
willing to rethink process models in much more fundamental ways
than tweaking the BOF process.

(2) I don't have statistics, but my impression is that most
technical standards work in the IEEE these days (not just in
802, but more broadly) starts with a proposal to standardize a
specific industry technology.   Those proposals are debated and
refined, but the assumption is that little fundamental
engineering or design work is done in the standardization
process.  We behave as if the IETF is still doing engineering
design work.  Maybe it is time to drop that as an inefficient
and ineffective fantasy, but, again, considering that involves
much broader issues than reforming the BOF process.

(3) Many of us are concerned about the length of time it takes
to move a well-thought-out idea that has significant support
forward from initial proposal to a functioning standards
development effort.  Perhaps we should be concentrating as much
on that question as on the one of how we cut bad, or
inadequately supported, ideas off as cleanly as possible.
Adding a study group creation process and a study group process
to the existing opportunities for delay would not contribute to
speeding things up.  Indeed, it would do much the contrary.

(4) I, and others, have said this before, but my belief is that
the single most effective change that could be made to the BOF
process would be for the IESG to stop taking its ability to
project the future so seriously.  As you and others have
commented, the track record on that isn't good anyway.  Suppose,
instead, we were to permit WGs to be set up on a provisional
basis, with intense review after some reasonable period of time
and cancellation if they were not performing adequately and
producing results the community seemed to care about.  This
would combine some of the advantages of IEEE-like study groups
with a streamlined process that focused on the one true measure
of whether a WG could produce useful work: starting it up and
seeing if it produced useful work.  

Since decisions as to whether to charter a WG are somewhat
subjective and the IESG has broad discretion, this is a change
the IESG could institute --experimentally or permanently-- on
its own initiative without our spending energy on changing the
processes.   Its success would, however, depend on a change of
attitude in the community: today, so much effort goes into the
charter process because it has become almost impossible, in
practice, to kill off a non-performing WG or to put a tight
leach on one that is wandering in the weeds.   ADs who try to do
so do not win popularity contests, to put it mildly.   If the
IESG saw clear and broad community support for chartering WGs
that were questionable but plausible and then tuning charters or
killing non-performing WGs if things didn't work out as
originally conceived, I believe we could get a great deal of the
nonsense, arbitrariness, and delays out of the early parts of
the process.  

But I don't think that support is there, at least yet.  Without
it, changes in forms or procedures probably do not produce
better results and, if delay is considered an important cost,
might produce worse ones.

regards,
john





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Re: [XCON] Re: tsv-dir review of draft-ietf-xcon-bfcp-connection-04

2007-06-17 Thread Eric Rescorla
At Sun, 17 Jun 2007 11:07:10 -0400,
Brian Rosen wrote:
> 
> Minor nit on the last part:
> When the keys are randomly generated and of sufficient length,
> these attacks do not obtain
> 
> "obtain" doesn't work.  Either "do not succeed" or "generally do not
> succeed" or even "usually fail".

Actually, I think obtain is fine (though a bit obscure) here.

http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/obtain


3. (intransitive): To prevail; to succeed.
4. (intransitive): To exist

Even though the Pervaise confession had never come to light, no reasonable 
doubt could obtain; for the act in question [...] was on a par with countless 
other acts committed by the oligarchs, and, before them, by the capitalists. -- 
Jack London, The Iron Heel.


The more common replacement would be "apply".

-Ekr

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RE: [XCON] Re: tsv-dir review of draft-ietf-xcon-bfcp-connection-04

2007-06-17 Thread Brian Rosen
Minor nit on the last part:
When the keys are randomly generated and of sufficient length,
these attacks do not obtain

"obtain" doesn't work.  Either "do not succeed" or "generally do not
succeed" or even "usually fail".

Brian

> -Original Message-
> From: Gonzalo Camarillo [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Sent: Sunday, June 17, 2007 5:52 AM
> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Cc: Cullen Jennings; [EMAIL PROTECTED]; ietf@ietf.org; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Subject: [XCON] Re: tsv-dir review of draft-ietf-xcon-bfcp-connection-04
> 
> Hi David,
> 
> thanks for your comments. Answers inline:
> 
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> > I've reviewed this document as part of the transport area
> > directorate's ongoing effort to review key IETF documents.
> > These comments were written primarily for the transport
> > area directors, but are copied to the document's authors
> > for their information and to allow them to address any
> > issues raised.
> >
> > This is a relatively straightforward draft about how a
> > client opens a TCP connection to a BFCP server when it
> > has the server's transport address information.
> >
> > Section 3 ventures into the area of IP address selection -
> > it references RFC 3484 (which is good) and then goes on to
> > make additional comments and recommendations on usage and
> > state of deployment of the techniques specified in RFC 3484.
> > While there's nothing technically wrong with this text, the
> > additional comments and recommendations are not specific
> > to BFCP, and may belong in a more generic document.
> 
> Given that such a generic document does not exist, we need to give these
> recommendations here.
> 
> 
> > Section 4 starts with "All BFCP entities implement TLS ..."
> > That is correct, as RFC 4582 requires this, but it would be
> > better to cite RFC 4582 as part of this statement, e.g.,
> > "[RFC 4582] requires that all BFCP entities implement TLS ..."
> 
> What about performing the following change?
> 
> OLD:
> 
> All BFCP entities implement TLS [7] and SHOULD use it in all their
> connections.
> 
> NEW:
> 
> [RFC 4582] requires that all BFCP entities implement TLS and recommends
> that they use it in all their connections.
> 
> 
> > In the second paragraph of Section 4, I would change
> > "can request the use of TLS" to "SHOULD request the use
> > of TLS".
> 
> OK, I will fix it.
> 
> > Section 5.1 specifies that SubjectAltName identities in
> > certificates are to be preferred to Subject identities.
> > Is this specific to BFCP or more general?
> 
> We got that recommendation from our security adviser. I do not know
> whether this will be documented in a generic document at some point.
> 
> > The following text appears to be an oversight:
> >
> >If the client knows the server's IP address, the iPAddress
> >subjectAltName must be present in the certificate and must
> >exactly match the IP address known to the client.
> >
> > The client *always* knows the server's IP address (e.g.,
> > DNS returns it).  I think the intended case here is that
> > the client contacts the server using the server's IP address
> > and as a result does not know the server's hostname.  Rephrasing
> > in that sort of fashion would also express a preference for
> > hostname as certificate identity, which I believe is desirable.
> 
> What about performing the following change?:
> 
> OLD:
> If the client knows the server's IP address, the iPAddress
> subjectAltName must be present in the certificate and must exactly
> match the IP address known to the client.
> 
> NEW:
> If the client does not know the server's hostname and contacts the
> server directly using the server's IP address, the iPAddress
> subjectAltName must be present in the certificate and must exactly
> match the IP address known to the client.
> 
> 
> > Section 6 disturbingly shifts between "password" and
> > "pre-shared key" and appears to get a few things wrong in
> > the process.  To begin with, the statement that "TLS PSK mode
> > is subject to offline dictionary attacks." is false when
> > the PSK is high-entropy.  OTOH, it is correct when the PSK
> > is low-entropy (e.g., a password, or derived from a password
> > without introduction of additional entropy).  The discussion
> > in Section 7.2 of RFC 4279 applies, especially the last
> > paragraph about PSK generation.  The section needs to be
> > carefully revised to distinguish between "password" and
> > "pre-shared key", especially given the mention of use of
> > PBKDF2 to generate the latter from the former.
> 
> what about performing the following change?:
> 
> OLD:
> 
> TLS PSK mode is subject to offline dictionary attacks.  In DHE and
> RSA modes, an attacker who can mount a single man-in-the-middle
> attack on a client/server pair can then mount a dictionary attack on
> the password.  In modes without DHE or RSA, an attacker who can
> record communications between a client/server pair can mount a
> d

Re: Role of IANA in approving assignments

2007-06-17 Thread Harald Alvestrand

Robert Elz wrote:

And in this case, this is exactly the point.   IANA is the
INTERNET Assigned Numbers Authority, not the IETF Assigned Numbers
Authority - and the code points it assigns and the registries it
maintains are used by the Internet as a whole, not just that part of
it that participates in the IETF.

In my opinion: No. There's no magic in names.

The IANA is a function carried out by a department of ICANN. It has 
inherited the name from the work done by Jon Postel since the time when 
the Internet was small enough that all the users knew each other by 
name. But there is no magic in the name that makes this department have 
any more credibility than any other group that performs functions.


We, as the IETF, whose mission it is to "make the Internet work better", 
need to look at what the function we want to have performed is, and 
whether the current entity is the best one to perform the function we 
want performed. Others have to perform the same evaluation when 
entrusting their registration functions to this entity.


The name is just a name.

 Harald


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