Re: IASA Finances - an attempt at some uplevelling
All of which suggests to me that Harald's contentious last sentence should simply be removed. btw I agree with all his other suggested changes. Brian John C Klensin wrote: --On Monday, 10 January, 2005 14:07 -0500 Leslie Daigle [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: John, I believe Harald meant ISOC-appointed members of the IAOC, and not folks on the IAOC who happen to be ISOC members. (Hopefully, everyone on the IAOC will be an ISOC member...). That said, I'm not entirely comfortable with the proposal. I don't want to belabour it, because I don't want to give particular importance to something that is intended to be an edge case. I would suggest that the right way to handle it is, either: . to note that this will be rife with potential for conflict of interest, and that IAOC members appointed (or ex officio) by ISOC are expected to recuse themselves from discussion of separation issues (this should amount to what Harald has said, but phrases it in terms of more normal operating procedures); or . define a new committee, that is not the IAOC, but the IETF-specific subset (+ others, as necessary). I'm in complete agreement with the above. And I think I prefer your second formulation, if only because the right group of people to serve on a disentangling committee may not be the same people who have been selected to sit on the IAOC, regardless of how they are selected. In an odd way, that also makes the question of what to put in this document easier. If we go back to the principle that un-doing this agreement requires a new BCP, that hypothetical document can specify the relevant arrangements and transition structure as needed under the circumstances. That has another implication that may be important: Presumably any decision to undo the ISOC model should originate (at least formally) within the IETF -- the IAOC, or a subset of the IAOC should not have the authority to do it on its own. If the IAOC members, or a subset of them, are unhappy with ISOC, that should be brought to the attention of the IETF. And, if an un-doing process starts with ISOC deciding to fold its tent or kick the IETF out, it is again not clear that the members of the IAOC, with or without restrictions, are the right ones to handle that process -- the IETF community would almost certainly need to be brought into the discussion. john ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
IASA Finances - an attempt at some uplevelling
We have had a number of issues that circle around the financial model for the IASA. Some of these have been fairly nitpick-level, others have been more matters of principle, others are really hard to tell. In order to get the discussion to a place where we can reach some conclusions, it might be worthwhile to try to take the discussion to a bit higher level. The IASA model of finances, as presented in the BCP, is this one: Money comes from a number of places, which can be grouped roughly as: A - Money from meeting fees B - Money from designated donations C - Money from ISOC funds D - Money left in IASA account at end of previous year Similarly, the money goes to just a few places X - Money spent in support of the IETF Y - Money left by the end of the year (positive balance) By the end of the year, A + B + C + D = X + Y (by the theory of accounts) At the beginning of the year, we have a budget that estimates each of those - set by the IASA to cover the IETF's needs, approved and committed to by ISOC. At the moment, the assumption is X A + B, A+B+C = X, Y=0 (we are not budgeting for fund-building in IASA, and we need support from ISOC income not specifically earmarked for the IASA). This is accounted for using divisional accounting, which has nothing to do with which bank accounts the cash balance is kept in. It's all books. We all agree that money coming in as A and B and not spent on X is kept on an IASA account. So we have agreed that IASA can carry a positive balance - we do not require that Y is zero. Disagreements surfacing as tickets: - #737: How should donations be designated for IETF (that is, marked as B rather than C)? Currently, only Platinum sponsors' yearly dues may be marked in the B category; the BCP mentions the possibility of having other types of donation (smaller sums, non-yearly sums) designated as such. - #748: At what times of the year is the C money put on the books? Alternatives are: - At budgeting/beginning of year - On a regular schedule - As bills are paid - At the end of the year This really only affects two things: The numbers in the monthly report and the possibility of reducing C during the year. Money DOES NOT MOVE between real physical accounts because of this. - Also #748: How are budget changes during the year handled? Who approves them, and how do changes in X affect changes to C? If X goes up, C goes up. If X goes down, or A and B go up - is C changed (making more money available to ISOC's other activities), or does C stay unchanged (accumulating money that comes in from C in the IASA account)? - #722: What happens (in particular, what happens to C) if we split? - #740: When ISOC holds reserves in case of emergency (outside of the group D money above), how is that shown in the reports on the IASA? - #732: Raising money costs money. Are those costs skimmed off before money arrives from ISOC (reduction in C) and/or charged against designated donations (reducing B), or carried as an extra expense item? - #721: How do we describe the fact that IASA can request audits, and say what it wants to audit for? - #745, 749, 750: How much detail should the BCP give on the sync/discussion between IASA budgeting and ISOC budgeting? So far, it's mainly a summary of what's in the BCP now. So let's see if it's possible to extract some more / clearer information at the principles level what follows is my personal thoughts about what these principles are, and how we need the BCP to reflect them. Reserves Stepping back a bit, I think there are two kinds of reserves we need to consider: - The money (let's call this the backstop) that allow us to operate for a while if there is an unexpected shortfall of income. The reason for having that reserve is prudent contingency planning, and the BCP says that this financial capacity is provided by ISOC, by whatever means that ISOC wishes to provide it. - The funds that consist of money earmarked for IETF work, but not yet spent (let's call this the balance). The reason for the existence of these is a question of fairness and proper accounting, not planning - when money is given to support the IETF, it needs to be clearly shown that it is retained for that purpose only. The balance may form part of the backstop, but not the other way around - if ISOC provides a reserve out of non-designated money, using the ISOC line of credit or by other means, that money still isn't designated for IETF use in the absence of a crisis. In the case of a split (should that ever be a reasonable thing to do), it's reasonably clear that the balance stays with the IETF-controlled entity, while what to do about the backstop reserve will depend on a number of factors, and certainly we can't describe all of them in this document. I think that's what the document currently says. But I may have read it too many times some changes to make it even clearer suggested later. Separable income
Re: IASA Finances - an attempt at some uplevelling
Harald Tveit Alvestrand wrote: The IASA model of finances, as presented in the BCP, is this one: Money comes from a number of places, which can be grouped roughly as: (snip) Similarly, the money goes to just a few places X - Money spent in support of the IETF Y - Money left by the end of the year (positive balance) (snip) By the end of the year, A + B + C + D = X + Y (by the theory of accounts) At the beginning of the year, we have a budget that estimates each of (snip) All this makes sense. Reserves Stepping back a bit, I think there are two kinds of reserves we need to consider: - The money (let's call this the backstop) that allow us to operate for a while if there is an unexpected shortfall of income. The reason for having that reserve is prudent contingency planning, and the BCP says that this financial capacity is provided by ISOC, by whatever means that ISOC wishes to provide it. - The funds that consist of money earmarked for IETF work, but not yet spent (let's call this the balance). The reason for the existence of these is a question of fairness and proper accounting, not planning - when money is given to support the IETF, it needs to be clearly shown that it is retained for that purpose only. The balance may form part of the backstop, but not the other way around - if ISOC provides a reserve out of non-designated money, using the ISOC line of credit or by other means, that money still isn't designated for IETF use in the absence of a crisis. Right. In the case of a split (should that ever be a reasonable thing to do), it's reasonably clear that the balance stays with the IETF-controlled entity, while what to do about the backstop reserve will depend on a number of factors, and certainly we can't describe all of them in this document. If the document already says that the backstop is provided by the ISOC, is there any case where it would NOT be left also at the ISOC in case of a split? This seems simple to me but maybe I missed something... Separable income It's a relatively consistent message from the IETF community throughout the IASA discussions that if people want to give money to support the IETF, then they should be able to do so - and see that this happens. There have been no requests for designating the funds more specifically than that. This is a transparency issue, not a way to increase or decrease overall numbers. We have had the request from the community, and we need to answer it. I agree. Where cost of fundraising is concerned - I think it's simplest in terms of showing people where the money goes if the cost of fundraising for the IETF is charged to the IASA, and a portion of the cost of fundraising for ISOC in general is charged to the IASA. But the important factor, the one that should get into the BCP, is that the cost of fundraising is reported. Yes. Budgeting process - I thnk we must allow ourselves to learn to walk here - the IASA and the rest of ISOC need to be allowed to work out these procedures together. The absolute requirement should be on the openness of the process - that the IETF community is able to see and understand who makes the decisions, at what time, and who's responsible for approving or changing them. In that spirit, I think the best way forward on the tickets that deal with this process may be to say less, not more - give the freedom to work this out in a way that works in practice. I agree. Specific suggestion for text changes Reserves Section 2.2 bullet 7, current: 8. The IASA shall establish a target for a reserve fund to cover normal operating expenses and meeting expenses in accordance with prudent planning, and ISOC shall work with the IASA to build up and maintain the reserve. Under the principle of state principles, not mechanisms, change to: 8. The IASA, in cooperation with ISOC, shall ensure that sufficient reserves exist to keep the IETF operational in the case of unexpected events such as income shortfalls. Ok. All other details should be in section 5.6. In section 5.6, change: Rather than having the IASA attempt to build that reserve in its separate accounts, the IASA looks to ISOC to build and provide that operational reserve, through whatever mechanisms ISOC deems appropriate: line of credit, financial reserves, meeting cancellation insurance, and so forth. Such reserves do not appear instantaneously; the goal is to reach this level of reserves within 3 years after the creation of the IASA. Such funds shall be held in reserve for use by IASA for use in the event of IETF meeting cancellation or other unexpected fiscal emergencies. These reserves shall only be spent on IETF support functions. to: The IASA expects ISOC to build and provide that operational reserve, through whatever mechanisms ISOC deems appropriate: line of credit, financial reserves,
Re: IASA Finances - an attempt at some uplevelling
--On Monday, 10 January, 2005 16:31 +0100 Harald Tveit Alvestrand [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: ... Any IASA account balance, any IETF-specific intellectual property rights, and any IETF-specific data and tools shall also transition to the new entity. Other terms of removal shall be negotiated between the non-ISOC members of the IAOC and ISOC. (the last point is an afterthought. It seems strange to have ISOC members negotiating with ISOC in the case of a separation. While I don't expect to have to use that paragraph, many have argued that it's better to get it written properly while we're starting than to wait until we need it.) Harald, I may have other thoughts on your other suggestions as I think more about them, but this strikes me as just wrong. There are many people who are members of ISOC who are members because it seems like the Right Think to Do, with or without the former $35 fee. Many people became members by virtue of attending one conference or another, and are still on the rolls since the membership fee was eliminated and everyone was carried forward. Unless you want to make non-ISOC-membership a criterion for anyone on the IAOC who is not appointed by ISOC --which I think would be a very serious case of shooting ourselves in the foot-- you run the risk of every IAOC member being also an ISOC member, leaving no one to negotiate or, worse, leaving only one or two people to represent all IETF interests. In addition, because this might discourage IETF participants from becoming ISOC members, there is a case to be made that the ISOC Board could not approve this without violating their duties to ISOC. It would be reasonable to exclude any person who has a position of authority or responsibility within ISOC's structure from participating on both sides of a negotiation (or negotiating for the IETF if you want to force them to the other side), excluding any ISOC member feels to me like it is both excessive and dumb. I'd look to Lynn or Fred for an acceptable way to state position or authority or responsibility in the ISOC context. I don't know what would work and be stable as they evolve their management and volunteer structures. john ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IASA Finances - an attempt at some uplevelling
Specific suggestion for text changes from harald Reserves Section 2.2 bullet 7, current: 8. The IASA shall establish a target for a reserve fund to cover normal operating expenses and meeting expenses in accordance with prudent planning, and ISOC shall work with the IASA to build up and maintain the reserve. Under the principle of state principles, not mechanisms, change to: 8. The IASA, in cooperation with ISOC, shall ensure that sufficient reserves exist to keep the IETF operational in the case of unexpected events such as income shortfalls. looks good to me All other details should be in section 5.6. In section 5.6, change: Rather than having the IASA attempt to build that reserve in its separate accounts, the IASA looks to ISOC to build and provide that operational reserve, through whatever mechanisms ISOC deems appropriate: line of credit, financial reserves, meeting cancellation insurance, and so forth. Such reserves do not appear instantaneously; the goal is to reach this level of reserves within 3 years after the creation of the IASA. Such funds shall be held in reserve for use by IASA for use in the event of IETF meeting cancellation or other unexpected fiscal emergencies. These reserves shall only be spent on IETF support functions. to: The IASA expects ISOC to build and provide that operational reserve, through whatever mechanisms ISOC deems appropriate: line of credit, financial reserves, meeting cancellation insurance, and so forth. Long term, financial reserves are preferred; it should be a goal for ISOC to reach this level of reserves within 3 years after the creation of the IASA. If the IASA account accumulates a surplus, ISOC may count that as part of the reserve. also OK by me modulo changing account to accounts in the last sentence IASA accounts - In section 7 (Removability), change: Any accrued funds, any IETF-specific intellectual property rights, and any IETF-specific data and tools shall also transition to the new entity. to Any IASA account balance, any IETF-specific intellectual property rights, and any IETF-specific data and tools shall also transition to the new entity. Other terms of removal shall be negotiated between the non-ISOC members of the IAOC and ISOC. I agree with John's concern maybe fix by saying non ISOC-appointed members Scott ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IASA Finances - an attempt at some uplevelling
John, I believe Harald meant ISOC-appointed members of the IAOC, and not folks on the IAOC who happen to be ISOC members. (Hopefully, everyone on the IAOC will be an ISOC member...). That said, I'm not entirely comfortable with the proposal. I don't want to belabour it, because I don't want to give particular importance to something that is intended to be an edge case. I would suggest that the right way to handle it is, either: . to note that this will be rife with potential for conflict of interest, and that IAOC members appointed (or ex officio) by ISOC are expected to recuse themselves from discussion of separation issues (this should amount to what Harald has said, but phrases it in terms of more normal operating procedures); or . define a new committee, that is not the IAOC, but the IETF-specific subset (+ others, as necessary). Leslie. John C Klensin wrote: --On Monday, 10 January, 2005 16:31 +0100 Harald Tveit Alvestrand [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: ... Any IASA account balance, any IETF-specific intellectual property rights, and any IETF-specific data and tools shall also transition to the new entity. Other terms of removal shall be negotiated between the non-ISOC members of the IAOC and ISOC. (the last point is an afterthought. It seems strange to have ISOC members negotiating with ISOC in the case of a separation. While I don't expect to have to use that paragraph, many have argued that it's better to get it written properly while we're starting than to wait until we need it.) Harald, I may have other thoughts on your other suggestions as I think more about them, but this strikes me as just wrong. There are many people who are members of ISOC who are members because it seems like the Right Think to Do, with or without the former $35 fee. Many people became members by virtue of attending one conference or another, and are still on the rolls since the membership fee was eliminated and everyone was carried forward. Unless you want to make non-ISOC-membership a criterion for anyone on the IAOC who is not appointed by ISOC --which I think would be a very serious case of shooting ourselves in the foot-- you run the risk of every IAOC member being also an ISOC member, leaving no one to negotiate or, worse, leaving only one or two people to represent all IETF interests. In addition, because this might discourage IETF participants from becoming ISOC members, there is a case to be made that the ISOC Board could not approve this without violating their duties to ISOC. It would be reasonable to exclude any person who has a position of authority or responsibility within ISOC's structure from participating on both sides of a negotiation (or negotiating for the IETF if you want to force them to the other side), excluding any ISOC member feels to me like it is both excessive and dumb. I'd look to Lynn or Fred for an acceptable way to state position or authority or responsibility in the ISOC context. I don't know what would work and be stable as they evolve their management and volunteer structures. john ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IASA Finances - an attempt at some uplevelling
Apologies for the bad parse. When I said non-ISOC member, I intended to say the members of IAOC who are not representing ISOC, not not a member of ISOC. Having the ISOC President have a formal role in representing the IETF when discussing how to dissolve the relationship between ISOC and the IETF doesn't sound right. The ISOC-appointed representative is less obvious to me - the BCP says that he/she does not represent ISOC. Harald ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: IASA Finances - an attempt at some uplevelling
--On Monday, 10 January, 2005 14:07 -0500 Leslie Daigle [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: John, I believe Harald meant ISOC-appointed members of the IAOC, and not folks on the IAOC who happen to be ISOC members. (Hopefully, everyone on the IAOC will be an ISOC member...). That said, I'm not entirely comfortable with the proposal. I don't want to belabour it, because I don't want to give particular importance to something that is intended to be an edge case. I would suggest that the right way to handle it is, either: . to note that this will be rife with potential for conflict of interest, and that IAOC members appointed (or ex officio) by ISOC are expected to recuse themselves from discussion of separation issues (this should amount to what Harald has said, but phrases it in terms of more normal operating procedures); or . define a new committee, that is not the IAOC, but the IETF-specific subset (+ others, as necessary). I'm in complete agreement with the above. And I think I prefer your second formulation, if only because the right group of people to serve on a disentangling committee may not be the same people who have been selected to sit on the IAOC, regardless of how they are selected. In an odd way, that also makes the question of what to put in this document easier. If we go back to the principle that un-doing this agreement requires a new BCP, that hypothetical document can specify the relevant arrangements and transition structure as needed under the circumstances. That has another implication that may be important: Presumably any decision to undo the ISOC model should originate (at least formally) within the IETF -- the IAOC, or a subset of the IAOC should not have the authority to do it on its own. If the IAOC members, or a subset of them, are unhappy with ISOC, that should be brought to the attention of the IETF. And, if an un-doing process starts with ISOC deciding to fold its tent or kick the IETF out, it is again not clear that the members of the IAOC, with or without restrictions, are the right ones to handle that process -- the IETF community would almost certainly need to be brought into the discussion. john ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
