Re: Last Call: draft-ietf-opsec-ip-options-filtering-05.txt (Recommendations on filtering of IPv4 packets containing IPv4 options.) to Best Current Practice

2013-09-26 Thread SM

At 12:05 16-09-2013, The IESG wrote:

The IESG has received a request from the Operational Security
Capabilities for IP Network Infrastructure WG (opsec) to consider the
following document:
- 'Recommendations on filtering of IPv4 packets containing IPv4 options.'
  draft-ietf-opsec-ip-options-filtering-05.txt as Best Current Practice

The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits
final comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
ietf@ietf.org mailing lists by 2013-09-30. Exceptionally, comments may be


I took a quick look at the draft.

In Section 4.3.5:

  Routers, security gateways, and firewalls SHOULD implement an option-
   specific configuration knob ...

The heading of that section is Advice.  It's better to have an 
explanation as advice instead of using a RFC 2119 should.


  'The default setting for this knob SHOULD be drop, and the
   default setting MUST be documented.'

I guess that the SHOULD be drop is obvious.  Using a RFC 2119 
must to state that the default setting must be document is excessive.


The above comment also applies to Section 4.5.5

In Section 4.8.5:

  This option SHOULD be allowed only in controlled environments, where
   the option can be used safely.  [RFC6398] identifies some such
   environments.  In unsafe environments, packets containing this option
   SHOULD be dropped.

There could be one RFC 2119 should instead of two in the above.

  A given router, security gateway, or firewall system has no way of
   knowing a priori whether this option is valid in its operational
   environment.  Therefore, routers, security gateways, and firewalls
   SHOULD, by default, ignore the Router Alert option.  Additionally,
   Routers, security gateways, and firewalls SHOULD have a configuration
   setting that governs their reaction in the presence of packets
   containing the Router Alert option.  This configuration setting
   SHOULD allow to honor and process the option, ignore the option, or
   drop packets containing this option.  The default configuration is to
   ignore the Router Alert option.

The last sentence mentions the default configuration.  It looks clear 
to me.  The first (quoted text) RFC 2119 should says that same thing.


Regards,
-sm




Re: Last Call: draft-ietf-opsec-ip-options-filtering-05.txt (Recommendations on filtering of IPv4 packets containing IPv4 options) to Best Current Practice

2013-09-21 Thread C. M. Heard
On Mon, 16 Sep 2013, The IESG wrote:
 The IESG has received a request from the Operational Security
 Capabilities for IP Network Infrastructure WG (opsec) to consider the
 following document:
 - 'Recommendations on filtering of IPv4 packets containing IPv4 options.'
   draft-ietf-opsec-ip-options-filtering-05.txt as Best Current Practice
 
 The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits
 final comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
 ietf@ietf.org mailing lists by 2013-09-30.



I would like to see the following issues addressed before this 
document is approved for publication.  I have suggested specific 
replacement text in most cases, but I recognize that there are other 
ways to address the concerns that I raise.



Sections 4.3 (LSRR) and 4.4 (SSRR):

OLD:
4.3.5.  Advice

   Routers, security gateways, and firewalls SHOULD implement an option-
   specific configuration knob whether packets with this option are
   dropped, packets with this IP option are forwarded as if they did not
   contain this IP option, or packets with this option are processed and
   forwarded as per [RFC0791].  The default setting for this knob SHOULD
   be drop, and the default setting MUST be documented.

NEW:
4.3.5.  Advice

   Routers, security gateways, and firewalls SHOULD implement an option-
   specific configuration knob whether packets with this option are
   dropped or whether packets with this option are processed and
   forwarded as per [RFC0791].  The default setting for this knob SHOULD
   be drop, and the default setting MUST be documented.

The same change should be applied to 4.4.5.

Rationale: pretending that the option is not present will result in
violation of the semantics of the option.  More specifically, if a node
is specified in the dettination address of the IPv4 header ignores an
unexpired source route option, then it will consume a packet that is
actually addressed to another node.



Section 4.6 (Stream ID):

Editorial:

OLD:
   However, as stated by Section 3.2.1.8 of RFC 1122 [RFC1122] and
   Section 4.2.2.1 of RFC 1812 [RFC1812], this option is obsolete.
   Therefore, it must be ignored by the processing systems.  See also
   Section 5.

NEW:
   However, as stated by Section 3.2.1.8 of RFC 1122 [RFC1122] and
   Section 4.2.2.1 of RFC 1812 [RFC1812], this option is obsolete.
   Therefore, it must be ignored by the processing systems.

Rationale: Section 5 is the IANA Considerations section.  RFC 6814 
requested IANA to mark this option as obsolete, and that has been 
done.  No change is needed to Section 5 as it does not request any 
actions from IANA.

Misuse of RFC 2119 language:

Section 4.6.3, Threats, says:

   No specific security issues are known for this IPv4 option.

while Section 4.6.5, Advice, says:

   Routers, security gateways, and firewalls SHOULD drop IP packets
   containing a Stream Identifier option.

Note that RFC 2119, Section 6 says:

   Imperatives of the type defined in this memo must be used with care
   and sparingly.  In particular, they MUST only be used where it is
   actually required for interoperation or to limit behavior which has
   potential for causing harm (e.g., limiting retransmisssions).  For
   example, they must not be used to try to impose a particular method
   on implementors where the method is not required for interoperability.

The document does not identify any interoperability problems or 
potential harm that would be mitigated by dropping packets with this 
option.  The SHOULD in Section 4.6.5 is therefore unjustified.

Possible fixes: either provide a valid justification for the SHOULD, 
change it to a MAY, or specify that the Stream ID option SHOULD be 
treated in the same manner as an unknown option, i.e., as specified 
in Section 4.23.4.  My vote would be for the latter; possible 
replacement text along those lines is as follows:

NEW:
4.6.5.  Advice

   Routers, security gateways, and firewalls SHOULD process IP packets
   containing this option in the same manner as those containing unknown
   options (see Section 4.23.4).



Section 4.7: The Internet Timestamp option has similar uses as the 
Record Route option, and should be treated similarly.  Specifically:

OLD:
4.7.1.  Uses

   This option provides a means for recording the time at which each
   system processed this datagram.

NEW:
4.7.1.  Uses

   This option provides a means for recording the time at which each
   system (or a specified set of systems) processed this datagram,
   and may optionally record the addresses of the systems providing
   the timestamps.

OLD:
4.7.4.  Operational and Interoperability Impact if Blocked

   None.

4.7.5.  Advice

   Routers, security gateways, and firewalls SHOULD drop IP packets
   containing an Internet Timestamp option.

NEW:
4.7.4.  Operational and Interoperability Impact if Blocked

   Network troubleshooting techniques that may employ the Internet
   Timestamp option (such as ping with the 

Last Call: draft-ietf-opsec-ip-options-filtering-05.txt (Recommendations on filtering of IPv4 packets containing IPv4 options.) to Best Current Practice

2013-09-16 Thread The IESG

The IESG has received a request from the Operational Security
Capabilities for IP Network Infrastructure WG (opsec) to consider the
following document:
- 'Recommendations on filtering of IPv4 packets containing IPv4 options.'
  draft-ietf-opsec-ip-options-filtering-05.txt as Best Current Practice

The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits
final comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
i...@ietf.org mailing lists by 2013-09-30. Exceptionally, comments may be
sent to i...@ietf.org instead. In either case, please retain the
beginning of the Subject line to allow automated sorting.

Abstract


   This document provides advice on the filtering of IPv4 packets based
   on the IPv4 options they contain.  Additionally, it discusses the
   operational and interoperability implications of dropping packets
   based on the IP options they contain.




The file can be obtained via
http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-opsec-ip-options-filtering/

IESG discussion can be tracked via
http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-opsec-ip-options-filtering/ballot/


No IPR declarations have been submitted directly on this I-D.