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The McMahon Line boundary dispute is at the heart of relations between
China and India. China has land and sea boundary issues with 14
neighbors, mostly for historical reasons. The Chinese have two major
claims on what India deems its own territory. One claim, in the
western sector, is on Aksai Chin in the northeastern section of Ladakh
District in Jammu and Kashmir. The other claim is in the eastern
sector over a region included in the British-designated North-East
Frontier Agency, the disputed part of which India renamed Arunachal
Pradesh and made a state. In the fight over these areas in 1962, the
well-trained and well-armed troops of the Chinese People's Liberation
Army overpowered the ill-equipped Indian troops, who had not been
properly acclimatized to fighting at high altitudes.

In the early 20th Century Britain sought to advance its line of
control and establish buffer zones around its colony in South Asia. In
1913-1914 representatives of China, Tibet and Britain negotiated a
treaty in India: the Simla Convention. Sir Henry McMahon, the foreign
secretary of British India at the time, drew up the 550 mile (890 km)
McMahon Line as the border between British India and Tibet during the
Simla Conference. The so-called McMahon Line, drawn primarily on the
highest watershed principle, demarcated what had previously been
unclaimed or undefined borders between Britain and Tibet. The McMahon
line moved British control substantially northwards. The Tibetan and
British representatives at the conference agreed to the line, which
ceded Tawang and other Tibetan areas to the imperial British Empire.
However the Chinese representative refused to accept the line. Peking
claimed territory in this far north down to the border of the plain of
Assam.

The land is mostly mountainous with Himalayan ranges along the
northern borders criss-crossed with mountain ranges running
north-south. These divide the state into five river valleys: the
Kameng, the Subansiri, the Siang, the Lohit and the Tirap. High
mountains and dense forests have prevented intercommunication between
tribes living in different river valleys. The geographical isolation
thus imposed has led different tribes to elove their own dialects and
grow with their distinct identities. Nature has endowed the Arunachal
people with a deep sense of beauty which finds delightful expression
in their songs, dances and crafts.

A slow forward move towards the McMahon Line was begun on the ground,
to establish a new de facto boundary. The McMahon Line was then
forgotten until about 1935 when the British government decided to
publish the documents in the 1937 edition of Aitchison's Collection of
Treaties. The NEFA (North East Frontier Agency) was created in 1954.
On 7 November 1959, Chou En-lai proposed that both sides should
withdraw their troops twenty kilometres from the McMahon line. The
issue was quiet during the decade of cordial Sino-Indian relations,
but erupted again during the Sino-Indian War of 1962. During the 1962
war, the PRC captured most of the NEFA. However, China soon declared
victory and voluntarily withdrew back to the McMahon Line.

China is in occupation of approximately 38,000 sq. kms of Indian
territory in Jammu and Kashmir. In addition, under the so-called
China-Pakistan "Boundary Agreement" of 1963, Pakistan ceded 5,180 sq.
kms. of Indian territory in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir to China. China
claims approximately 90,000 sq. kms. of Indian territory in Arunachal
Pradesh and about 2000 sq. kms. in the Middle Sector of the
India-China boundary. Beijing has stated that it does not recognise
Arunachal Pradesh.

The border between China and India has never been officially
delimited. China's position on the eastern part of the border between
the two countries is consistent. Not a single Chinese government
recognizes the "illegal" McMahon Line. For China, the McMahon Line,
stands as a symbol of imperialist aggression on the country. The
so-called "Arunachal Pradesh" dispute is China's most intractable
border issue. Because the gap between the positions of China and India
is wide, it is difficult for both nations to reach consensus. The area
of this disputed region is three times that of Taiwan, six times that
of Beijing and ten times that of the Malvenas islands, disputed by
Britain and Argentina. It is flat and rich in water and forest
resources.

Arunachal Pradesh is the only issue which has a potential for conflict
between India and China. If ever, India and China go to war one day,
it will be on this issue. India considers recurring Sino-Indian border
clashes a potential threat to its security. Since the war, each side
continued to improve its military and logistics capabilities in the
disputed regions. China has continued its occupation of the Aksai Chin
area, through which it built a strategic highway linking Xizang and
Xinjiang autonomous regions. China had a vital military interest in
maintaining control over this region, whereas India's primary interest
lay in Arunachal Pradesh, its state in the northeast bordering Xizang
Autonomous Region.

Barring an armed clash at Nathu La in eastern Sikkim in 1967, the
border between India and China (Tibet) - and specifically the
ill-defined Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Ladakh/Aksai Chin and
Arunachal Pradesh - had remained free of any major incidents through
the 1970s and the early 1980s. While relations between the two
countries remained cool,, official statements from Beijing and New
Delhi professed a desire to solve the border tangle peacefully through
mutual consultations. Beginning in December 1981, officials from both
countries held yearly talks on the border issue.

With the improvement of logistics on the Indian side, the Indian Army
sought to reinforce and strengthen forward areas in Arunachal Pradesh
in the early 1980s. Patrols resumed in 1981 and by the summer of 1984
India had established an observation post on the bank of the Sumdorong
Chu [referred to as Sangduoluo He in the Chinese media].

In July 1986 there were reports in the Indian media of Chinese
incursions into the Sumdorong Chu [S-C] rivervalley in Arunachal
Pradesh. By September-October, an brigade of the Indian Army 5
Mountain Division was airlifted to Zimithang, a helipad very close to
the S-C valley. Referred to as Operation Falcon, this involved the
occupation of ridges overlooking the S-C valley, including Langrola
and the Hathung La ridge across the Namka Chu rivulet.

This was followed by reports of large-scale troop movements on both
sides of the border in early 1987, and grave concerns about a possible
military clash over the border. In February 1987, India established
the so-called Arunachal Pradesh in its ["illegally occupied"]
Chinese-claimed territories south of the McMahon Line. The Chinese
side made solemn statements on many occasions that China never
recognizes the "illegal" McMahon Line and the "so-called" Arunachal
Pradesh. After these events, and India's conversion of Arunachal
Pradesh from union territory to state, tensions between China and
India escalated. Both sides moved to reinforce their capabilities in
the area, but neither ruled out further negotiations of their dispute.

China, which had always maintained a large military presence in Tibet,
was said to have moved in 20,000 troops from the"53rd Army Corps in
Chengdu and the 13th Army in Lanzhou by early 1987, along with heavy
artillery and helicopters. By early April, it had moved 8 divisions to
eastern Tibet as a prelude to possible belligerent action.
Reinforcements on the Indian side began with Operation Falcon in late
1986, and continued through early 1987 under Exercise Chequerboard.
This massive air-land exercise involved 10 Divisions of the Indian
Army and several squadrons of the IAF. The Indian Army moved 3
divisions to positions around Wangdung, where they were supplied
solely by air. These reinforcements were over and above the 50,000
troops already present across Arunachal Pradesh.

Although India enjoyed air superiority in 1987, rough parity on the
ground existed between the two military forces, which had a combined
total of nearly 400,000 troops near the border. The Indian Army
deployed eleven divisions in the region, backed up by paramilitary
forces, whereas the PLA had fifteen divisions available for operations
on the border. Most observers believe that the mountainous terrain,
high-altitude climate, and concomitant logistic difficulties made it
unlikely that a protracted or larges-cale conflict would erupt on the
Sino-Indian border.

That the Sino-Indian border has not suffered any major disruptions
since 1986, as compared to the incessant firing incidents and
infiltration on the Indo-Pak borders, made the Sino-Indian border an
example of good neighbourly relations.

In December 1988, Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi visited China.
The Prime Ministers of the two countries agreed to settle the boundary
questions through the guiding principle of "Mutual Understanding and
Accommodation and Mutual Adjustment". Agreement also reached that
while seeking for the mutually acceptable solution to the boundary
questions, the two countries should develop their relations in other
fields and make efforts to create the atmosphere and conditions
conducive to the settlement of the boundary questions. The two sides
agreed to establish a Joint Working Group (JWG) on the boundary
questions at the Vice-Foreign Ministerial level.

An Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the
Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas was signed on 7
September 1993. After more than thirty years of border tension and
stalemate, high-level bilateral talks were held in New Delhi starting
in February 1994 to foster "confidence-building measures" between the
defense forces of India and China, and a new period of better
relations began. In November 1995, the two sides dismantled the guard
posts in close proximity to each other along the borderline in
Wangdong area, making the situation in the border areas more stable.
During President Jiang Zemin's visit to India at the end of November
1996, the Governments of China and India signed the Agreement on
Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field along the Line of
Actual Control in the China-India Border Areas, which is an important
step for the building of mutual trust between the two countries. These
Agreements provide an institutional framework for the maintenance of
peace and tranquility in the border areas.

Though lot had been done during the Sino-Indian official border talks,
with number of border related CSBMs put in place, the border issue
remains mired in various bilateral and domestic compulsions and
contradictions on both sides. Border 'encounters' between India and
China are not rare and arise from the very real disagreements that
exist between the two sides in demarcating the LCA on the ground. Such
incidents have usually been handled, not in full media glare, but by
the two sides discreetly withdrawing to their earlier positions.

The two sides withdrew sentries along the eastern section that were
considered to be too close to each other. During early 1990s, India
unilaterally withdrew about 35,000 troops from its eastern sector. On
the other hand, the PLA maintains a force between 180,000 and 300,000
soldiers and has directly ruled Tibet from 1950 to 1976, and
indirectly thereafter. Tibet today is connected to other military
regions through four-lane highways and strategic roads. And Beijing's
capability to airlift troops from its other neighbouring military
regions has advanced very far from its comparative inability to use
air force in 1962.

During the Indian Prime Minister's visit to China in June 2003 India
and China signed a Memorandum on Expanding Border Trade, which adds
Nathula as another pass on the India-China border for conducting
border trade. The Indian side has agreed to designate Changgu of
Sikkim state as the venue for border trade market, while the Chinese
side has agreed to designate Renqinggang of the Tibet Autonomous
Region as the venue for border trade market.

During Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's visit to India in April 2005, the
two sides signed an agreement on political settlement of the boundary
issue, setting guidelines and principles. In the agreement, China and
India affirmed their readiness to seek a fair, reasonable and mutually
acceptable solution to the boundary issue through equal and friendly
negotiations.

India after 1962 adopted a policy to not develop the border areas. The
idea was that if India developed the border areas, the Chinese can
easily use these facilities in the event of a war. This policy had
changed by 2008. To redress the situation arising out of poor road
connectivity which has hampered the operational capability of the
Border Guarding Forces deployed along the India-China border, the
Government has decided to undertake phase-wise construction of 27 road
links totaling 608 Km in the border areas along the India-China border
in the States of Jammu & Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand,
Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh at an estimated cost of Rs.912.00 crores.
The work of construction of 2 roads in Arunachal Pradesh has started.
The construction of these roads was expected to start during 2008-09.

The two sides have differences in perception of the Line of Actual
Control (LAC) in the India-China border areas. Both sides carry out
patrolling activity in the India-China border areas. Transgressions of
the LAC are taken up through diplomatic channels and at Border
Personnel Meetings/Flag Meetings. India and China seek a fair,
reasonable and mutually acceptable settlement of the boundary question
through peaceful consultations.

Article Source :
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/india-china_conflicts.htm

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