Constrained Delegation and PAC : Realm crossover

2015-10-15 Thread Rick van Rein
Hello,

Does anyone on this list have S4U2Proxy or "Constrained Delegation"
experience?

I know that the security is based on a PAC, but it is unclear where it
is enforced -- in the benevolent service, or in the KDC.

And, if it is the KDC, which one if client and service realms differ? 
The client provides a Forwarded TGT along with the session key on it, so
I presume it is the client's KDC who applies policy (to avoid that a
webmail service uses more than imap and smtp backend services).

Don't worry about pointing me to specs (or sections therein) if I missed
the hints.  Since I don't use Windows I'm already getting at this from
the "outside", reading specs, but it's not easy to see the whole picture.

Thanks!
 -Rick

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Working with Microsoft Premier Support RE MIT Kerberos for Windows 4.0.1

2015-10-15 Thread Binder, Dale

Please direct me to  the resources that can answer the following:


*   We have an open case with MS Premier Support and Kerberos for Windows 
4.0.1 states "Integration with the Windows LSA credentials cache"

*   We are using .NET webclient and can't seem to get the client to use the 
tickets in the cache.   Tickets are stored in the location specified by 
environment variable

*   See support case below


From: Frank Kim [mailto:frank@microsoft.com]
Sent: Thursday, October 15, 2015 1:59 AM
To: Binder, Dale
Cc: MSSolve Case Email; Shmain, Jeffrey
Subject: RE: Kerberos issues -> RE: [REG:115100513230017] Clarify the account 
infrastructure.

Hi Dale,

In regards to the code below, the .NET code will not know anything about the 
location of the MIT tickets at:

C:\Users\nbkvw7l\KerberosCacheFile\krb5cache

Kerberos tickets in Windows are stored in LSASS.exe.   Internally, .NET uses 
the SSPI APIs to implement Kerberos.  You pass the user's credentials to SSPI 
by calling AcquireCredentialsHandle().  AcquireCredentialsHandle() obtains this 
in LSASS.exe as well.  Internally, SSPI is implemented using the LSA APIs which 
are used to interface with LSASS.exe.

The reason I have suggested using the MIT GSS APIs is because they would be 
aware of the krb5cache.  I am going to assume that Java uses the MIT GSS APIs 
which is why things work for you.

I've read some of the docs on MIT Kerberos which indicate they store their 
credentials in LSA's cache for 4.0.0.  Here is the link I referenced.

http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/kfw-4.0/kfw-4.0.html
They mention the following, "Integration with the Windows LSA credentials 
cache."
They don't elaborate on what this means so you would need somebody familiar 
with this project to address the true meaning of this.  If the following call:

GetTGT()

If this associated the MIT ticket with the current user.

The only option I could see is the following:

credentialCache.Add(new Uri("http://lpnoe0vupotd1i.bankofamerica.com:20550/;), 
"Kerberos", CredentialCache.DefaultNetworkCredentials);

I'm not sure if you have tried this.

The other code below will not work just for the fact that .NET doesn't know 
anything about MIT Kerberos and it's tickets.  It only know about Kerberos 
Tickets created by Windows and stored in LSASS.  This is why you have to use 
the specific GSS APIs provided by MIT.

Finally about 20 years ago, Microsoft did create a GSS API whose interface was 
compatible with GSS APIs from MIT.   What this meant was that you could take an 
application written on Linux and rebuild it on Windows to run in the POSIX 
subsystem.  This is what they meant by GSS API compatibility.  The interface 
was compatible so a Linux developer did not have to rewrite their code to use 
SSPI.  (Internally, the GSS API offered by Microsoft was just a wrapper around 
SSPI).

Thanks

Frank Kim (frank@microsoft.com)
Sr. Escalation Engineer
Developer Tools - Windows SDK

+1 (425) 538 0692
Typical Hours - 8:30 - 17:30
(UTC-08:00) Pacific Standard Time (US & Canada)
Meeting and exceeding your expectations are my top priorities.  We are 
interested in any feedback you might have about the service you received on 
this incident.  Please let my manager, John Hornick, know what you think of the 
level of service provided; email 
john.horn...@microsoft.com, or even call 
425-538-0721




Dale Binder
Develop and Manage
Cyber Security Technology
Global Information Security

Bank of America
40 N Main Street
Dayton, OH 45423
937.938.1138 (work)
937.438.3507 (cell)
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Re: Constrained Delegation and PAC : Realm crossover

2015-10-15 Thread Simo Sorce
On 15/10/15 08:00, Rick van Rein wrote:
> Hello,
>
> Does anyone on this list have S4U2Proxy or "Constrained Delegation"
> experience?

Yes

> I know that the security is based on a PAC, but it is unclear where it
> is enforced -- in the benevolent service, or in the KDC.

Can be either, however according to MS specs the KDC is vouching for the 
contents, and can (should) apply SID filtering (for example), to remove 
unwanted Identifiers, from another domain.

> And, if it is the KDC, which one if client and service realms differ?

The client's KDC produces it, the service's KDC inspects it, perhaps 
changes it and then re-signs it therefore approving its use.

> The client provides a Forwarded TGT along with the session key on it, so
> I presume it is the client's KDC who applies policy (to avoid that a
> webmail service uses more than imap and smtp backend services).

Both KDCs are involved.

> Don't worry about pointing me to specs (or sections therein) if I missed
> the hints.  Since I don't use Windows I'm already getting at this from
> the "outside", reading specs, but it's not easy to see the whole picture.

Documetns you may want to read:
MS-KILE: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc233855.aspx
MS-PAC: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc237917.aspx


-- 
Simo Sorce * Red Hat, Inc * New York

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