[RFC PATCH 1/5] vfs: define a generic function to read a file from the kernel

2016-01-08 Thread Mimi Zohar
In order to measure and appraise files being read by the kernel,
new module and kexec syscalls were defined which include a file
descriptor.  Other places in the kernel (eg. firmware, IMA,
sound) also read files.

This patch introduces a common function for reading files from
the kernel with the corresponding security post-read hook and
function.

Changelog:
- Add missing 

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar 
---
 fs/exec.c | 56 +++
 include/linux/fs.h|  1 +
 include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 11 ++
 include/linux/security.h  |  9 
 security/security.c   | 16 ++
 5 files changed, 93 insertions(+)

diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index b06623a..3c48a19 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@
 #include 
 #include 
 #include 
+#include 
 
 #include 
 #include 
@@ -831,6 +832,61 @@ int kernel_read(struct file *file, loff_t offset,
 
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(kernel_read);
 
+int kernel_read_file(struct file *file, void **buf, loff_t *size,
+loff_t max_size, int policy_id)
+{
+   loff_t i_size, pos;
+   ssize_t bytes = 0;
+   int ret;
+
+   if (!S_ISREG(file_inode(file)->i_mode))
+   return -EINVAL;
+
+   i_size = i_size_read(file_inode(file));
+   if (max_size > 0 && i_size > max_size)
+   return -EFBIG;
+   if (i_size == 0)
+   return -EINVAL;
+
+   *buf = vmalloc(i_size);
+   if (!*buf) {
+   ret = -ENOMEM;
+   goto out;
+   }
+
+   pos = 0;
+   while (pos < i_size) {
+   bytes = kernel_read(file, pos, (char *)(*buf) + pos,
+   i_size - pos);
+   if (bytes < 0) {
+   ret = bytes;
+   goto out_free;
+   }
+
+   if (bytes == 0)
+   break;
+   pos += bytes;
+   }
+
+   if (pos != i_size) {
+   ret = -EBADF;  /* firmware uses -EIO */
+   goto out_free;
+   }
+
+   ret = security_kernel_post_read_file(file, *buf, i_size, policy_id);
+   if (!ret)
+   *size = pos;
+
+out_free:
+   if (ret < 0) {
+   vfree(*buf);
+   *buf = NULL;
+   }
+out:
+   return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_read_file);
+
 ssize_t read_code(struct file *file, unsigned long addr, loff_t pos, size_t 
len)
 {
ssize_t res = vfs_read(file, (void __user *)addr, len, &pos);
diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
index 3aa5142..9b1468c 100644
--- a/include/linux/fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/fs.h
@@ -2527,6 +2527,7 @@ static inline void i_readcount_inc(struct inode *inode)
 extern int do_pipe_flags(int *, int);
 
 extern int kernel_read(struct file *, loff_t, char *, unsigned long);
+extern int kernel_read_file(struct file *, void **, loff_t *, loff_t, int);
 extern ssize_t kernel_write(struct file *, const char *, size_t, loff_t);
 extern ssize_t __kernel_write(struct file *, const char *, size_t, loff_t *);
 extern struct file * open_exec(const char *);
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 71969de..10baa8f 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -561,6 +561,14 @@
  * the kernel module to load. If the module is being loaded from a blob,
  * this argument will be NULL.
  * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @kernel_post_read_file:
+ * Read a file specified by userspace.
+ * @file contains the file structure pointing to the file being read
+ * by the kernel.
+ * @buf pointer to buffer containing the file contents.
+ * @size length of the file contents.
+ * @policy_id contains the calling function identifier.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
  * @task_fix_setuid:
  * Update the module's state after setting one or more of the user
  * identity attributes of the current process.  The @flags parameter
@@ -1457,6 +1465,8 @@ union security_list_options {
int (*kernel_fw_from_file)(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size);
int (*kernel_module_request)(char *kmod_name);
int (*kernel_module_from_file)(struct file *file);
+   int (*kernel_post_read_file)(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
+int policy_id);
int (*task_fix_setuid)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
int flags);
int (*task_setpgid)(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid);
@@ -1716,6 +1726,7 @@ struct security_hook_heads {
struct list_head kernel_act_as;
struct list_head kernel_create_files_as;
struct list_head kernel_fw_from_file;
+   struct list_head kernel_post_read_file;
struct list_head kernel_module_request;
struct list_head kernel_module_from_file;
struct list_head task_fix_setuid;
diff --git a/include/linux/security.

Re: [RFC PATCH 1/5] vfs: define a generic function to read a file from the kernel

2016-01-08 Thread Kees Cook
On Fri, Jan 8, 2016 at 11:22 AM, Mimi Zohar  wrote:
> In order to measure and appraise files being read by the kernel,
> new module and kexec syscalls were defined which include a file
> descriptor.  Other places in the kernel (eg. firmware, IMA,
> sound) also read files.
>
> This patch introduces a common function for reading files from
> the kernel with the corresponding security post-read hook and
> function.
>
> Changelog:
> - Add missing 
>
> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar 
> ---
>  fs/exec.c | 56 
> +++
>  include/linux/fs.h|  1 +
>  include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 11 ++
>  include/linux/security.h  |  9 
>  security/security.c   | 16 ++
>  5 files changed, 93 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
> index b06623a..3c48a19 100644
> --- a/fs/exec.c
> +++ b/fs/exec.c
> @@ -56,6 +56,7 @@
>  #include 
>  #include 
>  #include 
> +#include 
>
>  #include 
>  #include 
> @@ -831,6 +832,61 @@ int kernel_read(struct file *file, loff_t offset,
>
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL(kernel_read);
>
> +int kernel_read_file(struct file *file, void **buf, loff_t *size,
> +loff_t max_size, int policy_id)
> +{
> +   loff_t i_size, pos;
> +   ssize_t bytes = 0;
> +   int ret;
> +
> +   if (!S_ISREG(file_inode(file)->i_mode))
> +   return -EINVAL;
> +
> +   i_size = i_size_read(file_inode(file));
> +   if (max_size > 0 && i_size > max_size)
> +   return -EFBIG;
> +   if (i_size == 0)
> +   return -EINVAL;
> +
> +   *buf = vmalloc(i_size);

This could get very large -- what risks do we have to system stability
here? Having userspace able to trigger such a massive allocation could
be a problem. The firmware loader was limited to MAX_INT...

-Kees

> +   if (!*buf) {
> +   ret = -ENOMEM;
> +   goto out;
> +   }
> +
> +   pos = 0;
> +   while (pos < i_size) {
> +   bytes = kernel_read(file, pos, (char *)(*buf) + pos,
> +   i_size - pos);
> +   if (bytes < 0) {
> +   ret = bytes;
> +   goto out_free;
> +   }
> +
> +   if (bytes == 0)
> +   break;
> +   pos += bytes;
> +   }
> +
> +   if (pos != i_size) {
> +   ret = -EBADF;  /* firmware uses -EIO */
> +   goto out_free;
> +   }
> +
> +   ret = security_kernel_post_read_file(file, *buf, i_size, policy_id);
> +   if (!ret)
> +   *size = pos;
> +
> +out_free:
> +   if (ret < 0) {
> +   vfree(*buf);
> +   *buf = NULL;
> +   }
> +out:
> +   return ret;
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_read_file);
> +
>  ssize_t read_code(struct file *file, unsigned long addr, loff_t pos, size_t 
> len)
>  {
> ssize_t res = vfs_read(file, (void __user *)addr, len, &pos);
> diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
> index 3aa5142..9b1468c 100644
> --- a/include/linux/fs.h
> +++ b/include/linux/fs.h
> @@ -2527,6 +2527,7 @@ static inline void i_readcount_inc(struct inode *inode)
>  extern int do_pipe_flags(int *, int);
>
>  extern int kernel_read(struct file *, loff_t, char *, unsigned long);
> +extern int kernel_read_file(struct file *, void **, loff_t *, loff_t, int);
>  extern ssize_t kernel_write(struct file *, const char *, size_t, loff_t);
>  extern ssize_t __kernel_write(struct file *, const char *, size_t, loff_t *);
>  extern struct file * open_exec(const char *);
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> index 71969de..10baa8f 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> @@ -561,6 +561,14 @@
>   * the kernel module to load. If the module is being loaded from a blob,
>   * this argument will be NULL.
>   * Return 0 if permission is granted.
> + * @kernel_post_read_file:
> + * Read a file specified by userspace.
> + * @file contains the file structure pointing to the file being read
> + * by the kernel.
> + * @buf pointer to buffer containing the file contents.
> + * @size length of the file contents.
> + * @policy_id contains the calling function identifier.
> + * Return 0 if permission is granted.
>   * @task_fix_setuid:
>   * Update the module's state after setting one or more of the user
>   * identity attributes of the current process.  The @flags parameter
> @@ -1457,6 +1465,8 @@ union security_list_options {
> int (*kernel_fw_from_file)(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size);
> int (*kernel_module_request)(char *kmod_name);
> int (*kernel_module_from_file)(struct file *file);
> +   int (*kernel_post_read_file)(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t 
> size,
> +int policy_id);
> int (*task_fix_setuid)(struct cred *new, const struct cred

Re: [RFC PATCH 1/5] vfs: define a generic function to read a file from the kernel

2016-01-08 Thread Mimi Zohar
On Fri, 2016-01-08 at 12:24 -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Fri, Jan 8, 2016 at 11:22 AM, Mimi Zohar  wrote:
> > In order to measure and appraise files being read by the kernel,
> > new module and kexec syscalls were defined which include a file
> > descriptor.  Other places in the kernel (eg. firmware, IMA,
> > sound) also read files.
> >
> > This patch introduces a common function for reading files from
> > the kernel with the corresponding security post-read hook and
> > function.
> >
> > Changelog:
> > - Add missing 
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar 
> > ---
> >  fs/exec.c | 56 
> > +++
> >  include/linux/fs.h|  1 +
> >  include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 11 ++
> >  include/linux/security.h  |  9 
> >  security/security.c   | 16 ++
> >  5 files changed, 93 insertions(+)
> >
> > diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
> > index b06623a..3c48a19 100644
> > --- a/fs/exec.c
> > +++ b/fs/exec.c
> > @@ -56,6 +56,7 @@
> >  #include 
> >  #include 
> >  #include 
> > +#include 
> >
> >  #include 
> >  #include 
> > @@ -831,6 +832,61 @@ int kernel_read(struct file *file, loff_t offset,
> >
> >  EXPORT_SYMBOL(kernel_read);
> >
> > +int kernel_read_file(struct file *file, void **buf, loff_t *size,
> > +loff_t max_size, int policy_id)
> > +{
> > +   loff_t i_size, pos;
> > +   ssize_t bytes = 0;
> > +   int ret;
> > +
> > +   if (!S_ISREG(file_inode(file)->i_mode))
> > +   return -EINVAL;
> > +
> > +   i_size = i_size_read(file_inode(file));
> > +   if (max_size > 0 && i_size > max_size)
> > +   return -EFBIG;
> > +   if (i_size == 0)
> > +   return -EINVAL;
> > +
> > +   *buf = vmalloc(i_size);
> 
> This could get very large -- what risks do we have to system stability
> here? Having userspace able to trigger such a massive allocation could
> be a problem. The firmware loader was limited to MAX_INT...

The different callers allowed different sizes.  Instead of hard coding
the max size for all callers, the third parameter of kernel_file_read is
the caller max_size.
  
Mimi


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