This patch adds support for measuring and appraising the IMA policy
itself.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zo...@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 1 +
security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 9 ++++++++-
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 14 ++++++++++++--
3 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index fc31ba2..e8f111b 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -185,6 +185,7 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v);
#define IMA_APPRAISE_LOG 0x04
#define IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES 0x08
#define IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE 0x10
+#define IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY 0x20
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE
int ima_appraise_measurement(int func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
index fe8b16b..57c6b2e 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
@@ -325,7 +325,14 @@ static ssize_t ima_write_policy(struct file *file, const
char __user *buf,
if (data[0] == '/')
result = ima_read_policy(data);
- else
+ else if (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY) {
+ pr_err("IMA: signed policy required\n");
+ integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL, NULL,
+ "policy_update", "signed policy required",
+ 1, 0);
+ if (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)
+ result = -EACCES;
+ } else
result = ima_parse_add_rule(data);
mutex_unlock(&ima_write_mutex);
out_free:
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index dbfd26b..7a63760 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -118,6 +118,7 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry default_measurement_rules[] = {
{.action = MEASURE, .hooks.func = MODULE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
{.action = MEASURE, .hooks.policy_id = FIRMWARE_CHECK,
.flags = IMA_FUNC},
+ {.action = MEASURE, .hooks.policy_id = POLICY_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
};
static struct ima_rule_entry default_appraise_rules[] = {
@@ -618,6 +619,8 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry
*entry)
entry->hooks.policy_id = FIRMWARE_CHECK;
else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "MODULE_CHECK") == 0)
entry->hooks.policy_id = MODULE_CHECK;
+ else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "POLICY_CHECK") == 0)
+ entry->hooks.policy_id = POLICY_CHECK;
else
result = -EINVAL;
if (!result)
@@ -776,6 +779,8 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry
*entry)
temp_ima_appraise |= IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES;
else if (entry->hooks.policy_id == FIRMWARE_CHECK)
temp_ima_appraise |= IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE;
+ else if (entry->hooks.policy_id == POLICY_CHECK)
+ temp_ima_appraise |= IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY;
audit_log_format(ab, "res=%d", !result);
audit_log_end(ab);
return result;
@@ -862,7 +867,8 @@ static char *mask_tokens[] = {
enum {
func_file = 0, func_mmap, func_bprm,
func_module, func_post,
- func_kexec, func_initramfs, func_firmware
+ func_kexec, func_initramfs, func_firmware,
+ func_policy
};
static char *func_tokens[] = {
@@ -873,7 +879,8 @@ static char *func_tokens[] = {
"POST_SETATTR",
"KEXEC_CHECK",
"INITRAMFS_CHECK",
- "FIRMWARE_CHECK"
+ "FIRMWARE_CHECK",
+ "POLICY_CHECK"
};
void *ima_policy_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos)
@@ -961,6 +968,9 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
case MODULE_CHECK:
seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_module));
break;
+ case POLICY_CHECK:
+ seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_policy));
+ break;
default:
snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d",
entry->hooks.func);
--
2.1.0
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