Re: [liberationtech] Revised Liberationtech Mailing List Guidelines

[Omer Gibreel]

Greeting Greg,
you point is for sure true, the gap between virus releasing time and antivirus 
companies realizing it and updating there virus database could be used to 
initiate a virus attack, which lead me to another question, maybe the method in 
which pasting the text on the email is the best of them or i could say the most 
safest of them.
best regardsOmer Gibreel

Omer 
Gibreel010-8074-0882 // omeg...@hotmail.com // twitter:@OmerGibreelSeoul 
National UniversityMaster Candidate of Management Information System 




> Date: Fri, 3 Aug 2012 21:32:21 -0700
> From: g...@norcie.com
> To: liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu
> Subject: Re: [liberationtech] Revised Liberationtech Mailing List Guidelines
> 
> This is a good logic, but there is still a problem even if Google scans
> uploads.
> 
> Both state and nonstate actors often use zero day vulnerabilities. Since
> a zero day has never been seen before, there is no signature for it in
> any virus database.
> --
> Greg Norcie (g...@norcie.com)
> GPG key: 0x1B873635
> 
> 
> On 8/3/12 9:10 PM, Omer Gibreel wrote:
> > Greeting,
> > 
> > as i have suggested previously, a person could upload the doc file
> > to Google doc and select the option of sharing the link publicly, this
> > would allow people to access your document online. another method which
> > has already been stated before is to just copy and paste the content on
> > the email indicating the starting point of the document and the ending
> > point. also if you are worried about virus from google doc i have just
> > done a search and found out that google doc has an
> > internal mechanism for scanning virus from document that are being
> > shared. here is more information on that in this page under the subtitle
> > security  http://support.google.com/a/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=172541, 
> > 
> > well i hope this help and if anyone has any
> > information concerning the security of accessing document
> > using Google doc i hope they can share it with us. i also agree
> > with kyrah there is no point in using drop box as it would be as if we
> > are downloading a document into out system there is no difference
> > between a downloading a file from drop box and a downloading a file from
> > a email attachments. 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > Omer Gibreel
> > 010-8074-0882 // omeg...@hotmail.com // twitter:@OmerGibreel
> > Seoul National University
> > Master Candidate of Management Information System 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > /
> > /
> > 
> > 
> > 
> >> Date: Fri, 3 Aug 2012 23:42:54 +0200
> >> From: ky...@kyrah.net
> >> To: liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu
> >> Subject: Re: [liberationtech] Revised Liberationtech Mailing List
> > Guidelines
> >>
> >> Hi,
> >>
> >> Many thanks, Yosem, Brian and Nathan for this initiative!
> >>
> >> > Any sharing that needs to be done can use public Google Docs
> >> > or Dropbox links.
> >>
> >> This may be a silly question, but how exactly does downloading something
> >> from a a Dropbox link differ from downloading an email attachment? The
> >> basic issue of potentially malicious binaries from a potentially spoofed
> >> source is still there, isn't it?
> >>
> >> Unless I am overlooking something (which may very well be the case),
> >> isn't the main issue here about trusting binaries -- regardless whether
> >> they are sent as attachments, or as links to some download site? Just
> >> thinking aloud here... perhaps the policy could be extended to encourage
> >> sharing information in plain text/html whenever possible?
> >>
> >> Best, kyrah
> >>
> >> --
> >> For extra security, this message has been encrypted with double-ROT13.
> >>
> >> ___
> >> liberationtech mailing list
> >> liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu
> >>
> >> Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to:
> >>
> >> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
> >>
> >> If you would like to receive a daily digest, click "yes" (once you
> > click above) next to "would you like to receive list mail batched in a
> > daily digest?"
> >>
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> > moderator in monthly reminders. You may ask for a reminder here:
> > https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
> >>
> >> Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the list moderator.
> >>
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> > 
> > 
> > ___
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> > liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu
> > 
> > Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to:
> > 
> > https://mail

Re: [liberationtech] Revised Liberationtech Mailing List Guidelines

[Greg Norcie]

This is a good logic, but there is still a problem even if Google scans
uploads.

Both state and nonstate actors often use zero day vulnerabilities. Since
a zero day has never been seen before, there is no signature for it in
any virus database.
--
Greg Norcie (g...@norcie.com)
GPG key: 0x1B873635


On 8/3/12 9:10 PM, Omer Gibreel wrote:
> Greeting,
> 
> as i have suggested previously, a person could upload the doc file
> to Google doc and select the option of sharing the link publicly, this
> would allow people to access your document online. another method which
> has already been stated before is to just copy and paste the content on
> the email indicating the starting point of the document and the ending
> point. also if you are worried about virus from google doc i have just
> done a search and found out that google doc has an
> internal mechanism for scanning virus from document that are being
> shared. here is more information on that in this page under the subtitle
> security  http://support.google.com/a/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=172541, 
> 
> well i hope this help and if anyone has any
> information concerning the security of accessing document
> using Google doc i hope they can share it with us. i also agree
> with kyrah there is no point in using drop box as it would be as if we
> are downloading a document into out system there is no difference
> between a downloading a file from drop box and a downloading a file from
> a email attachments. 
> 
> 
> 
> Omer Gibreel
> 010-8074-0882 // omeg...@hotmail.com // twitter:@OmerGibreel
> Seoul National University
> Master Candidate of Management Information System 
> 
> 
> 
> /
> /
> 
> 
> 
>> Date: Fri, 3 Aug 2012 23:42:54 +0200
>> From: ky...@kyrah.net
>> To: liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu
>> Subject: Re: [liberationtech] Revised Liberationtech Mailing List
> Guidelines
>>
>> Hi,
>>
>> Many thanks, Yosem, Brian and Nathan for this initiative!
>>
>> > Any sharing that needs to be done can use public Google Docs
>> > or Dropbox links.
>>
>> This may be a silly question, but how exactly does downloading something
>> from a a Dropbox link differ from downloading an email attachment? The
>> basic issue of potentially malicious binaries from a potentially spoofed
>> source is still there, isn't it?
>>
>> Unless I am overlooking something (which may very well be the case),
>> isn't the main issue here about trusting binaries -- regardless whether
>> they are sent as attachments, or as links to some download site? Just
>> thinking aloud here... perhaps the policy could be extended to encourage
>> sharing information in plain text/html whenever possible?
>>
>> Best, kyrah
>>
>> --
>> For extra security, this message has been encrypted with double-ROT13.
>>
>> ___
>> liberationtech mailing list
>> liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu
>>
>> Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to:
>>
>> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
>>
>> If you would like to receive a daily digest, click "yes" (once you
> click above) next to "would you like to receive list mail batched in a
> daily digest?"
>>
>> You will need the user name and password you receive from the list
> moderator in monthly reminders. You may ask for a reminder here:
> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
>>
>> Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the list moderator.
>>
>> Please don't forget to follow us on http://twitter.com/#!/Liberationtech
> 
> 
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[liberationtech] pictures of protesters with placards: low tech messaging about security

[John Scott-Railton]

Hello All,  

Example of messaging on online security from the Syrian opposition responding 
to online attacks by Pro-Government Electronic Actors:  hold a sign with a 
message about information security, then take a picture.  

E.g.
 " Protect the revolution, protect your password. Don't be tricked by a fake 
login page."
-Attributed to the Union of Free Syrian Students.

Was pointed to photo set apparently from Homs, SY and KSA  here:  
https://www.facebook.com/media/set/?set=a.462678573763295.103406.262983947066093&type=1

-John



John Scott-Railton
www.johnscottrailton.com

PGP key ID: 0x3e0ccb80778fe8d7
Fingerprint: FDBE BE29 A157 9881 34C7  8FA6 3E0C CB80 778F E8D7

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Re: [liberationtech] Revised Liberationtech Mailing List Guidelines

[Omer Gibreel]

Greeting,
as i have suggested previously, a person could upload the doc file to Google 
doc and select the option of sharing the link publicly, this would allow people 
to access your document online. another method which has already been stated 
before is to just copy and paste the content on the email indicating the 
starting point of the document and the ending point. also if you are worried 
about virus from google doc i have just done a search and found out that google 
doc has an internal mechanism for scanning virus from document that are being 
shared. here is more information on that in this page under the subtitle 
security 
http://support.google.com/a/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=172541, 
well i hope this help and if anyone has any information concerning the security 
of accessing document using Google doc i hope they can share it with us. i also 
agree with kyrah there is no point in using drop box as it would be as if we 
are downloading a document into out system there is no difference between a 
downloading a file from drop box and a downloading a file from a email 
attachments. 

Omer 
Gibreel010-8074-0882 // omeg...@hotmail.com // twitter:@OmerGibreelSeoul 
National UniversityMaster Candidate of Management Information System 




> Date: Fri, 3 Aug 2012 23:42:54 +0200
> From: ky...@kyrah.net
> To: liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu
> Subject: Re: [liberationtech] Revised Liberationtech Mailing List Guidelines
> 
> Hi,
> 
> Many thanks, Yosem, Brian and Nathan for this initiative!
> 
> > Any sharing that needs to be done can use public Google Docs
> > or Dropbox links.
> 
> This may be a silly question, but how exactly does downloading something
> from a a Dropbox link differ from downloading an email attachment? The
> basic issue of potentially malicious binaries from a potentially spoofed 
> source is still there, isn't it?
> 
> Unless I am overlooking something (which may very well be the case),
> isn't the main issue here about trusting binaries -- regardless whether
> they are sent as attachments, or as links to some download site? Just
> thinking aloud here... perhaps the policy could be extended to encourage 
> sharing information in plain text/html whenever possible?
> 
> Best, kyrah
> 
> -- 
> For extra security, this message has been encrypted with double-ROT13.  
> 
> ___
> liberationtech mailing list
> liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu
> 
> Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to:
> 
> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
> 
> If you would like to receive a daily digest, click "yes" (once you click 
> above) next to "would you like to receive list mail batched in a daily 
> digest?"
> 
> You will need the user name and password you receive from the list moderator 
> in monthly reminders. You may ask for a reminder here: 
> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
> 
> Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the list moderator.
> 
> Please don't forget to follow us on http://twitter.com/#!/Liberationtech
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[liberationtech] The Tor Project has funding for a Firefox developer

[Mike Perry]

The Tor Project is looking for a Firefox developer as a contractor
position likely starting in October and going through Q1 2013, with the
possibility of later in 2013 and beyond. There may also be a possibility
for part-time work prior to October. This would be a telecommuting
position, with collaboration happening primarily over IRC and email.

The purpose of our browser is to build a private-by-design reference
implementation of "Do Not Track", but through the alteration of
browser behavior and without the need for regulation or begging:
https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser/design/#privacy
https://blog.torproject.org/blog/improving-private-browsing-modes-do-not-track-vs-real-privacy-design

Your job would be to work on that Firefox-based browser as a developer.
This includes triaging, diagnosing, and fixing bugs; looking for and
resolving web privacy issues; responding on short notice to security
issues; and working collaboratively with coworkers and volunteers on
implementing new features and web behavior changes. You'd also be
reviewing other people's code, designs, and academic research papers,
and looking for ways to improve upon them.

For information on how to apply and what to send in with your
application, please see the job posting:
https://www.torproject.org/about/jobs-browserhacker.html.en



-- 
Mike Perry
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[liberationtech] Humanitarian Hack Box & Chance to win $20k

[George Chamales]

Good afternoon folks,

We've just released v1 of the Humanitarian Hack Box, a VirtualBox VM that
comes pre-loaded with Ushahidi, Sahana Eden, and OpenStreetMap.  The image
is designed to enable testing by security professionals interested in
finding and fixing vulnerabilities in these programs.

The VM image and documentation are available here:
https://docs.google.com/a/roguegenius.com/folder/d/0B-QB7rXOd9AudzYtWm1pRG1GaHc/edit

Updates on the HHB will be posted here:  http://roguegenius.com/hhb

Any bugs that you do find can be submitted for a chance to win $20,000 from
the Access Innovation Prize:  https://accessnow.org/prize

If you have any specific questions please feel free to email me directly.

george

George Chamales
Rogue Genius LLC
http://roguegenius.com
Phone:  718.288.7718
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Re: [liberationtech] Revised Liberationtech Mailing List Guidelines

[Karin Kosina]

Hi,

Many thanks, Yosem, Brian and Nathan for this initiative!

> Any sharing that needs to be done can use public Google Docs
> or Dropbox links.

This may be a silly question, but how exactly does downloading something
from a a Dropbox link differ from downloading an email attachment? The
basic issue of potentially malicious binaries from a potentially spoofed 
source is still there, isn't it?

Unless I am overlooking something (which may very well be the case),
isn't the main issue here about trusting binaries -- regardless whether
they are sent as attachments, or as links to some download site? Just
thinking aloud here... perhaps the policy could be extended to encourage 
sharing information in plain text/html whenever possible?

Best, kyrah

-- 
For extra security, this message has been encrypted with double-ROT13.  

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Re: [liberationtech] Who governs digital trust? (Cory Doctorow talk)

[Jon Lebkowsky]

No reference to Freedom Box ir Free Network Foundation?

Jon Lebkowsky
(Sent from my iPhone)

On Aug 3, 2012, at 1:49 PM, Yosem Companys  wrote:

> From: Stewart Brand 
> 
> Doctorow framed the question this way:  “Computers are everywhere.  They are 
> now something we put our whole bodies into---airplanes, cars---and something 
> we put into our bodies---pacemakers, cochlear implants.  They HAVE to be 
> trustworthy.“
> 
> Sometimes humans are not so trustworthy, and programs may override you: “I 
> can’t let you do that, Dave.” (Reference to the self-protective insane 
> computer Hal in Kubrick’s film “2001.”  That time the human was more 
> trustworthy than the computer.)  Who decides who can override whom?
> 
> The core issues for Doctorow come down to Human Rights versus Property 
> Rights, Lockdown versus Certainty, and Owners versus mere Users.
> 
> Apple computers such as the iPhone are locked down---it lets you run only 
> what Apple trusts.  Android phones let you run only what you trust.  Doctorow 
> has changed his mind in favor of a foundational computer device call the 
> “Trusted Platform Module” (TPM) which provides secure crypto, remote 
> attestation, and sealed storage.  He sees it as a crucial “nub of secure 
> certainty” in your machine.
> 
> If it’s your machine, you rule it.  It‘s a Human Right: your computer should 
> not be overridable.  And a Property Right: “you own what you buy, even if it 
> what you do with it pisses off the vendor.”  That’s clear when the Owner and 
> the User are the same person.  What about when they’re not?
> 
> There are systems where we really want the authorities to rule---airplanes, 
> nuclear reactors, probably self-driving cars (“as a species we are terrible 
> drivers.”)  The firmware in those machines should be inviolable by users and 
> outside attackers.  But the power of Owners over Users can be deeply 
> troubling, such as in matters of surveillance. There are powers that want 
> full data on what Users are up to---governments, companies, schools, parents. 
>  Behind your company computer is the IT department and the people they report 
> to.  They want to know all about your email and your web activities, and 
> there is reason for that.  But we need to contemplate the “total and 
> terrifying power of Owners over Users.”
> 
> Recognizing that we are necessarily transitory Users of many systems, such as 
> everything involving Cloud computing or storage, Doctorow favors keeping your 
> own box with its own processors and storage.  He strongly favors the 
> democratization and wide distribution of expertise.  As a Fellow of the 
> Electronic Frontier Foundation (who co-sponsored the talk) he supports public 
> defense of freedom in every sort of digital rights issue.
> 
> “The potential for abuse in the computer world is large,” Doctorow concluded. 
>  “It will keep getting larger.”
> 
>   
> --Stewart Brand
> 
> 
> __
> 
> Stewart Brand -- s...@gbn.org 
> The Long Now Foundation - http://www.longnow.org
> Seminars & downloads: http://www.longnow.org/seminars/
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Re: [liberationtech] Revised Liberationtech Mailing List Guidelines

[Douglas Lucas]

Perhaps the mentions of Dropbox and Google Docs could be accompanied by caveats 
regarding using those sites or links to caveats.

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Re: [liberationtech] Revised Liberationtech Mailing List Guidelines

[Brian Conley]

#6 being my adapted appropriation of Tibet Action Insititute's:
https://tibetaction.net/detach-from-attachments/

On Fri, Aug 3, 2012 at 1:08 PM, Katrin Verclas wrote:

> Looks like the mobileactive.org discussion list guidelines. Verbatim, in
> fact, until #6. Which I will, in turn, appropriate... :)
>
> Katrin
>
> On Aug 3, 2012, at 3:07 PM, Yosem Companys wrote:
>
> > Hi All,
> >
> > We have revised the Liberationtech mailing list guidelines to restrict
> the sending of attachments to avoid viruses and spyware (#6 below).
> >
> > A big thanks to Brian Conley and Nathan of Guardian Project for helping
> compose the text.
> >
> > Best,
> >
> > Yosem
> >
> >
> >
> > *
> >
> > Moderation Guidelines:
> >
> > We've had an influx of super-interesting people join the Liberationtech
> mailing list.  That would be... YOU!!!  We are up to 1,500 members and
> counting.  You're an amazing bunch of researchers, practitioners, and
> journalists.  You all have a passion for and an interest in how research
> and design of information and communication technologies (ICTs) can be used
> to promote democracy, human rights, development, governance, and other
> social goods (for more, please see:
> http://liberationtechnology.stanford.edu/docs/about_libtech/).
>  Liberationtech is focused on fostering discussion and exchanging
> information about how we can best achieve these ends. Sticking to this
> focus will make the list useful to all.
> >
> > A few reminders on how to use this list:
> >
> > 1. Liberationtech is YOUR list.  Use it to ask advice on strategic or
> technical questions, offer advice on questions raised, share interesting
> resources or articles, or post jobs, internships, grant announcements,
> CFPs, or RFPs.  Any member of the group can post to the list.  So if you
> have anything interesting to share, a question you are puzzling over, or
> something you learned in your work, please feel free to draw on the
> community!
> >
> > 2. Liberationtech is NOT a list for selling, marketing, or advertising
> products (or services), so please refrain from doing so.  Product questions
> and reviews are fine.  Hard sells are not.
> >
> > 3. Please keep discussions constructive and civil.  All topics, in so
> far as they relate to Liberationtech as defined above, are fine.  Be aware,
> however, that there are people from many different countries and cultures
> on this list, so please be considerate of these cultural and national
> differences when you contribute.  We have a zero-tolerance policy for
> anyone who posts inflammatory, extraneous, or off-topic messages to our
> community.
> >
> > 4. And a few obvious things: Remember to use a good subject line when
> you post; keep "me too" messages to a minimum; if you read this list via a
> digest, delete extraneous messages when responding and explain (or avoid)
> technical terms or industry-specific jargon so that everyone can understand
> what you mean.
> >
> > 5.  The Liberationtech mailing list archives are private to the extent
> that only list members can access these archives.  But please keep in mind
> that anyone who requests to sign up as a list member is accepted.  As with
> any other mailing list, please note that we cannot guarantee that members
> won't forward information without our knowledge.  As an institution,
> however, we don't forward any information you post without your consent
> except for publicly-available links to resources, articles, events, jobs,
> internships, grants, CFPs, and RFPs, which we may from time to time send
> without attribution via Twitter or Facebook.
> >
> > 6. Please don't send attachments to the Liberationtech mailing list.
> Online activists, and certainly Liberationtech list members are likely
> targets of internet attacks, such as viruses and spyware. One of the most
> common way of these attacks are through email sent pretending to be from
> someone it’s not really from, or that looks identical to a real email
> you’ve seen but has a virus in the attachment. Remember that all these
> emails will look and sound genuine. Opening these attachments received
> through your inbox is similar to inviting a spy into your computer.  At
> downloading and opening these attachment files on your computer, you let
> the spy:
> >
> > a) Steal documents and information from your system
> > b) Start the camera to watch around you
> > c) Start the microphone to listen to you
> > d) ...and many more
> >
> > Liberationtech recommends, if you don’t recognize the sender or the
> email address, don’t confirm by replying to that email with attachment.
>  See https://tibetaction.net/detach-from-attachments/ for more
> information about why you should refrain from sending or opening
> attachments from senders you don't know.  If you are expecting an email
> with attachment from someone, make sure to confirm or reconfirm before
> downloading. It’s always better to confirm through text message or phone
> call for people you know.  The best thing

Re: [liberationtech] Revised Liberationtech Mailing List Guidelines

[Katrin Verclas]

Looks like the mobileactive.org discussion list guidelines. Verbatim, in fact, 
until #6. Which I will, in turn, appropriate... :) 

Katrin 

On Aug 3, 2012, at 3:07 PM, Yosem Companys wrote:

> Hi All,
> 
> We have revised the Liberationtech mailing list guidelines to restrict the 
> sending of attachments to avoid viruses and spyware (#6 below).  
> 
> A big thanks to Brian Conley and Nathan of Guardian Project for helping 
> compose the text.  
> 
> Best,
> 
> Yosem
> 
> 
> 
> *
> 
> Moderation Guidelines:
> 
> We've had an influx of super-interesting people join the Liberationtech 
> mailing list.  That would be... YOU!!!  We are up to 1,500 members and 
> counting.  You're an amazing bunch of researchers, practitioners, and 
> journalists.  You all have a passion for and an interest in how research and 
> design of information and communication technologies (ICTs) can be used to 
> promote democracy, human rights, development, governance, and other social 
> goods (for more, please see: 
> http://liberationtechnology.stanford.edu/docs/about_libtech/).  
> Liberationtech is focused on fostering discussion and exchanging information 
> about how we can best achieve these ends. Sticking to this focus will make 
> the list useful to all.
> 
> A few reminders on how to use this list:
> 
> 1. Liberationtech is YOUR list.  Use it to ask advice on strategic or 
> technical questions, offer advice on questions raised, share interesting 
> resources or articles, or post jobs, internships, grant announcements, CFPs, 
> or RFPs.  Any member of the group can post to the list.  So if you have 
> anything interesting to share, a question you are puzzling over, or something 
> you learned in your work, please feel free to draw on the community!
> 
> 2. Liberationtech is NOT a list for selling, marketing, or advertising 
> products (or services), so please refrain from doing so.  Product questions 
> and reviews are fine.  Hard sells are not.
> 
> 3. Please keep discussions constructive and civil.  All topics, in so far as 
> they relate to Liberationtech as defined above, are fine.  Be aware, however, 
> that there are people from many different countries and cultures on this 
> list, so please be considerate of these cultural and national differences 
> when you contribute.  We have a zero-tolerance policy for anyone who posts 
> inflammatory, extraneous, or off-topic messages to our community.
> 
> 4. And a few obvious things: Remember to use a good subject line when you 
> post; keep "me too" messages to a minimum; if you read this list via a 
> digest, delete extraneous messages when responding and explain (or avoid) 
> technical terms or industry-specific jargon so that everyone can understand 
> what you mean.
> 
> 5.  The Liberationtech mailing list archives are private to the extent that 
> only list members can access these archives.  But please keep in mind that 
> anyone who requests to sign up as a list member is accepted.  As with any 
> other mailing list, please note that we cannot guarantee that members won't 
> forward information without our knowledge.  As an institution, however, we 
> don't forward any information you post without your consent except for 
> publicly-available links to resources, articles, events, jobs, internships, 
> grants, CFPs, and RFPs, which we may from time to time send without 
> attribution via Twitter or Facebook. 
> 
> 6. Please don't send attachments to the Liberationtech mailing list. Online 
> activists, and certainly Liberationtech list members are likely targets of 
> internet attacks, such as viruses and spyware. One of the most common way of 
> these attacks are through email sent pretending to be from someone it’s not 
> really from, or that looks identical to a real email you’ve seen but has a 
> virus in the attachment. Remember that all these emails will look and sound 
> genuine. Opening these attachments received through your inbox is similar to 
> inviting a spy into your computer.  At downloading and opening these 
> attachment files on your computer, you let the spy:
> 
> a) Steal documents and information from your system
> b) Start the camera to watch around you
> c) Start the microphone to listen to you
> d) ...and many more
> 
> Liberationtech recommends, if you don’t recognize the sender or the email 
> address, don’t confirm by replying to that email with attachment.  See 
> https://tibetaction.net/detach-from-attachments/ for more information about 
> why you should refrain from sending or opening attachments from senders you 
> don't know.  If you are expecting an email with attachment from someone, make 
> sure to confirm or reconfirm before downloading. It’s always better to 
> confirm through text message or phone call for people you know.  The best 
> thing to do when receiving an attachment with your email is to IGNORE IT. 
> Start getting used to not only NOT OPENING ATTACHMENTS, but also NOT SENDING 
> ONE. Any sharing that needs to be

Re: [liberationtech] Revised Liberationtech Mailing List Guidelines

[Steven Clift]

FYI - If folks are interested in alternative open source online group
software, we use http://GroupServer.org via http://OnlineGroups.Net.
See

It places attachments on the server (where if malicious could be
removed) which makes it really handy for lower bandwidth environments.

Example online community of practice:
http://forums.e-democracy.org/groups/locals

For those interested in how to craft spaces for sustained online
democratic participation, the advantage of such a tool is that you can
craft the technology to foster your civic goals.
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Re: [liberationtech] Revised Liberationtech Mailing List Guidelines

[Omer Gibreel]

Greeting Liberationtech
i have just read the guideline and the additional number 6 guideline, it would 
for sure help in keeping the list safe from computer virus or spyware. i would 
like to suggest a solution for those who are posting document with there email 
when sending it out to liberationtech mailing list. i suggest to you if you 
wish to attach a document file instead of attaching it with the email, you 
could upload it to google doc and select the option of sharing the link 
publicly, this would allow people to access your document online. another 
method which has already been stated before is to just past the content on the 
email indicating the starting point of the document and the ending point. 
well i hope this help and if anyone has any information concerning the security 
of accessing document using Google doc i hope they can share it with us.
liberationtech thank you for allowing members of the mailing list to comment on 
this issue. guideline number one rocks :) 
best regardsOmer Gibreel

Omer 
Gibreel010-8074-0882 // omeg...@hotmail.com // twitter:@OmerGibreelSeoul 
National UniversityMaster Candidate of Management Information System 




> Date: Fri, 3 Aug 2012 21:15:17 +0200
> From: li...@infosecurity.ch
> To: liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu
> Subject: Re: [liberationtech] Revised Liberationtech Mailing List Guidelines
> 
> On 8/3/12 9:07 PM, Yosem Companys wrote:
> > Hi All,
> > 
> [...]
> > 
> > 5.  The Liberationtech mailing list archives are private to the extent
> > that only list members can access these archives.  
> 
> But do we have a leak breaking the policy?
> 
> http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/
> 
> -naif
> ___
> liberationtech mailing list
> liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu
> 
> Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to:
> 
> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
> 
> If you would like to receive a daily digest, click "yes" (once you click 
> above) next to "would you like to receive list mail batched in a daily 
> digest?"
> 
> You will need the user name and password you receive from the list moderator 
> in monthly reminders. You may ask for a reminder here: 
> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
> 
> Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the list moderator.
> 
> Please don't forget to follow us on http://twitter.com/#!/Liberationtech
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Re: [liberationtech] Revised Liberationtech Mailing List Guidelines

[Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)]

On 8/3/12 9:07 PM, Yosem Companys wrote:
> Hi All,
> 
[...]
> 
> 5.  The Liberationtech mailing list archives are private to the extent
> that only list members can access these archives.  

But do we have a leak breaking the policy?

http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu/

-naif
___
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Re: [liberationtech] Attachments

[Brian Conley]

Hi all,

I've suggested the following text, which I believe Yosem has made the
default response to anyone who sends an attachment to the list from hereon.
It's based on Tibet Action's great overview. Those familiar will notice
I've cut some of their text, for brevity.

I used their text because I like it, and it is the one I was familiar with.
Please feel free to comment if anything is missing/misleading/etc.

--->

Please don't send attachments to the Liberationtech list!

Online activists, and certainly Liberationtech list members are likely
targets of internet attacks, such as viruses and spyware. One of the most
common way of these attacks are through email sent pretending to be from
someone it’s not really from, or that looks identical to a real email
you’ve seen but has a virus in the attachment. Remember that all these
emails will look and sound genuine.

Opening these attachments received through your inbox is similar to
inviting a spy into your computer.

At downloading and opening these attachment files on your computer, you let
the spy:

   -

   steal documents and information from your system
   -

   start the camera to watch around you
   -

   start the microphone to listen to you

… and many more.


Liberationtech recommends, if you don’t recognize the sender or the email
address, don’t confirm by replying to that email with attachment.


See https://tibetaction.net/detach-from-attachments/ for more information
about why you should refrain from sending or opening attachments from
senders you don't know.

If you are expecting an email with attachment from someone, make sure to
confirm or reconfirm before downloading. It’s always better to confirm
through text message or phone call for people you know.


The best thing to do when receiving an attachment with your email is to
IGNORE IT. Start getting used to not only NOT OPENING ATTACHMENTS, but also
NOT SENDING ONE.

On Tue, Jul 31, 2012 at 11:38 PM, Marcin de Kaminski
wrote:

> Could we please agree on not sending attachments with emails on the
> libtech list? Important information can be enclosed as plain text.
>
> Marcin
>
>
> ___
> liberationtech mailing list
> liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu
>
> Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to:
>
> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
>
> If you would like to receive a daily digest, click "yes" (once you click
> above) next to "would you like to receive list mail batched in a daily
> digest?"
>
> You will need the user name and password you receive from the list
> moderator in monthly reminders. You may ask for a reminder here:
> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
>
> Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the list moderator.
>
> Please don't forget to follow us on http://twitter.com/#!/Liberationtech
>



-- 



Brian Conley

Director, Small World News

http://smallworldnews.tv

m: 646.285.2046

Skype: brianjoelconley

public key:
http://pgp.mit.edu:11371/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0xCEEF938A1DBDD587
___
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[liberationtech] Revised Liberationtech Mailing List Guidelines

[Yosem Companys]

Hi All,

We have revised the Liberationtech mailing list guidelines to restrict the
sending of attachments to avoid viruses and spyware (#6 below).

A big thanks to Brian Conley and Nathan of Guardian Project for helping
compose the text.

Best,

Yosem



*

Moderation Guidelines:

We've had an influx of super-interesting people join the Liberationtech
mailing list.  That would be... YOU!!!  We are up to 1,500 members and
counting.  You're an amazing bunch of researchers, practitioners, and
journalists.  You all have a passion for and an interest in how research
and design of information and communication technologies (ICTs) can be used
to promote democracy, human rights, development, governance, and other
social goods (for more, please see:
http://liberationtechnology.stanford.edu/docs/about_libtech/).
 Liberationtech is focused on fostering discussion and exchanging
information about how we can best achieve these ends. Sticking to this
focus will make the list useful to all.

A few reminders on how to use this list:

1. Liberationtech is YOUR list.  Use it to ask advice on strategic or
technical questions, offer advice on questions raised, share interesting
resources or articles, or post jobs, internships, grant announcements,
CFPs, or RFPs.  Any member of the group can post to the list.  So if you
have anything interesting to share, a question you are puzzling over, or
something you learned in your work, please feel free to draw on the
community!

2. Liberationtech is NOT a list for selling, marketing, or advertising
products (or services), so please refrain from doing so.  Product questions
and reviews are fine.  Hard sells are not.

3. Please keep discussions constructive and civil.  All topics, in so far
as they relate to Liberationtech as defined above, are fine.  Be aware,
however, that there are people from many different countries and cultures
on this list, so please be considerate of these cultural and national
differences when you contribute.  We have a zero-tolerance policy for
anyone who posts inflammatory, extraneous, or off-topic messages to our
community.

4. And a few obvious things: Remember to use a good subject line when you
post; keep "me too" messages to a minimum; if you read this list via a
digest, delete extraneous messages when responding and explain (or avoid)
technical terms or industry-specific jargon so that everyone can understand
what you mean.

5.  The Liberationtech mailing list archives are private to the extent that
only list members can access these archives.  But please keep in mind that
anyone who requests to sign up as a list member is accepted.  As with any
other mailing list, please note that we cannot guarantee that members won't
forward information without our knowledge.  As an institution, however, we
don't forward any information you post without your consent except for
publicly-available links to resources, articles, events, jobs, internships,
grants, CFPs, and RFPs, which we may from time to time send without
attribution via Twitter or Facebook.

6. Please don't send attachments to the Liberationtech mailing list. Online
activists, and certainly Liberationtech list members are likely targets of
internet attacks, such as viruses and spyware. One of the most common way
of these attacks are through email sent pretending to be from someone it’s
not really from, or that looks identical to a real email you’ve seen but
has a virus in the attachment. Remember that all these emails will look and
sound genuine. Opening these attachments received through your inbox is
similar to inviting a spy into your computer.  At downloading and opening
these attachment files on your computer, you let the spy:

a) Steal documents and information from your system
b) Start the camera to watch around you
c) Start the microphone to listen to you
d) ...and many more

Liberationtech recommends, if you don’t recognize the sender or the email
address, don’t confirm by replying to that email with attachment.  See
https://tibetaction.net/detach-from-attachments/ for more information about
why you should refrain from sending or opening attachments from senders you
don't know.  If you are expecting an email with attachment from someone,
make sure to confirm or reconfirm before downloading. It’s always better to
confirm through text message or phone call for people you know.  The best
thing to do when receiving an attachment with your email is to IGNORE IT.
Start getting used to not only NOT OPENING ATTACHMENTS, but also NOT
SENDING ONE. Any sharing that needs to be done can use public Google Docs
or Dropbox links.

More generally, please take the necessary security and privacy precautions
such as using pseudonyms, fake email addresses, https, and anonymizer
software especially if you intend to discuss items of a sensitive nature.
 Two particularly robust applications are
https://www.eff.org/https-everywhere & https://www.torproject.org/.
___
libe

[liberationtech] Who governs digital trust? (Cory Doctorow talk)

[Yosem Companys]

From: Stewart Brand 

Doctorow framed the question this way:  “Computers are everywhere.  They
are now something we put our whole bodies into---airplanes, cars---and
something we put into our bodies---pacemakers, cochlear implants.  They
HAVE to be trustworthy.“

Sometimes humans are not so trustworthy, and programs may override you: “I
can’t let you do that, Dave.” (Reference to the self-protective insane
computer Hal in Kubrick’s film “2001.”  That time the human was more
trustworthy than the computer.)  Who decides who can override whom?

The core issues for Doctorow come down to Human Rights versus Property
Rights, Lockdown versus Certainty, and Owners versus mere Users.

Apple computers such as the iPhone are locked down---it lets you run only
what Apple trusts.  Android phones let you run only what *you* trust.
 Doctorow has changed his mind in favor of a foundational computer device
call the “Trusted Platform Module” (TPM) which provides secure crypto,
remote attestation, and sealed storage.  He sees it as a crucial “nub of
secure certainty” in your machine.

If it’s your machine, you rule it.  It‘s a Human Right: your computer
should not be overridable.  And a Property Right: “you *own* what you buy,
even if it what you do with it pisses off the vendor.”  That’s clear when
the Owner and the User are the same person.  What about when they’re not?

There are systems where we really want the authorities to rule---airplanes,
nuclear reactors, probably self-driving cars (“as a species we are terrible
drivers.”)  The firmware in those machines should be inviolable by users
and outside attackers.  But the power of Owners over Users can be deeply
troubling, such as in matters of surveillance. There are powers that want
full data on what Users are up to---governments, companies, schools,
parents.  Behind your company computer is the IT department and the people
they report to.  They want to know all about your email and your web
activities, and there is reason for that.  But we need to contemplate the
“total and terrifying power of Owners over Users.”

Recognizing that we are necessarily transitory Users of many systems, such
as everything involving Cloud computing or storage, Doctorow favors keeping
your own box with its own processors and storage.  He strongly favors the
democratization and wide distribution of expertise.  As a Fellow of the
Electronic Frontier Foundation (who co-sponsored the talk) he supports
public defense of freedom in every sort of digital rights issue.

“The potential for abuse in the computer world is large,” Doctorow
concluded.  “It will keep getting larger.”

--Stewart Brand


 __

Stewart Brand -- s...@gbn.org
The Long Now Foundation - http://www.longnow.org
Seminars & downloads: http://www.longnow.org/seminars/
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Re: [liberationtech] New Mobile report / Safety on the Line: Exposing the myth of mobile communication security

[Katrin Verclas]

Our review:
http://www.mobileactive.org/safety-line-new-report-bbg-and-freedom-house-mobile-security.
Underwhelming.
On Aug 2, 2012 10:59 PM, "Robert Guerra"  wrote:

> Thought this newly released report might be of interest to the Liberation
> Tech community...
>
>
> Safety on the Line: Exposing the myth of mobile communication security
> http://goo.gl/VnpYK
>
> Executive Summary
>
> This report evaluates the risks and vulnerabilities of mobile phone
> services and apps in 12 specified countries: the Republic of Azerbaijan,
> the Republic of Belarus, the People’s Republic of China, the Arab Republic
> of Egypt, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Libya, the Sultanate of Oman, the
> Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Syrian Arab Republic, the Tunisian Republic,
> the Republic of Uzbekistan, and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Rather
> than focus on a single innovation, this study analyzes multiple mobile
> technologies – including operating systems, applications and mobile
> protocols – to determine their capacity to protect security and privacy and
> to combat censorship and surveillance. Throughout this study the protection
> of mobile phone users was of paramount importance.
>
> This project was managed by Freedom House and supported by the
> Broadcasting Board of Governors.
>
> This study is divided into several sections. The Introduction outlines
> this research initiative and its methodology. It also justifies the need to
> focus attention on specific mobile phone environments. The Background
> section provides a comprehensive description of mobile phone technologies
> with particular emphasis on smartphones. Technical Testing outlines an
> analysis of the five primary platforms for smartphone usage: Apple iOS,
> Google Android, Nokia Symbian, Microsoft Windows Phone, and RIM BlackBerry
> OS. A Threat Assessment analyzes security and privacy challenges facing
> citizens who own and use a mobile phone, as well as obstacles confronting
> mobile internet users. The assessment confirms that various platforms can
> be used to overcome some threats particularly when blocking and
> circumvention technology is used. The Country Profiles evaluate 12
> countries predetermined by the BBG for investigation. Data points in the
> analysis include the most recent key performance indicators for each
> national mobile market, various mobile operators, the range of handsets in
> use and the scale of mobile penetration for each country. The report is
> completed with a short section of Findings and a list of Recommendations
> for the future.
> ___
> liberationtech mailing list
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>
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